Wahuni, the undesirables: African urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam, 1919-1961. by Burton, Andrew
Wahimi
(The Undesirables)
African urbanisation, crime and colonial order in Dar es Salaam, 1919-1961
Andrew Burton
This thesis is submitted in part fulfilment o f  the requirements for the degree o f  Ph.D. at the School o f  
Oriental and African Studies, University o f London, January 2000
ProQuest Number: 10672992
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672992
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
‘[I]n Africa nothing is quite as it should be to the European mind. The European mind requires logic and 
order and civilisation, and so it tries to bring these to Africa. Historically this is desirable, but for the 
individual European often exhausting, like trying to prod a dinosaur along a narrow path with a small 
stick.’
J.C. Cairns (former DO, Dsm), Bush andBoma, London: 1959, p .l 17.
‘Straightness is one o f  the things the Europeans have brought here. We Africans must learn it, like 
arithmetic.’
Abdullah (Cairns’ servant), Ibid., p.20.
Abstract
The thesis examines African urbanisation in Dar es Salaam in the British colonial period 
and the official response to this phenomenon. It is divided into three parts.
In Part One colonial urban policy is discussed. British officials initially showed a marked 
antipathy towards African urbanisation. The true home of the African was considered to 
be in the rural areas where his tribal society not only catered for his social and economic 
needs but also provided a medium through which he could conveniently be administered. 
Beginning in the 1940s there was a revision of colonial policy. The inevitable growth of 
permanent African urban communities was acknowledged. An attempt was made to 
nurture a ‘respectable’ class of urban African. At the same time, however, antipathy 
towards urbanisation persisted. Officials continued to display concern about the 
deleterious effects of the urban environment on the ‘upcountry native’, and in particular 
the growing problem of unemployment.
Part Two is concerned with crime in Dar es Salaam. The most immediate aspect which 
informed official antipathy to African urbanisation was its role in the spread of 
criminality. Anxiety over the presence of growing numbers of Africans in the capital, 
many of whom had no regular formal employment, was closely associated with the 
problem of urban lawlessness, which grew ever more serious as the years passed. This 
lawlessness was in part a product of strict colonial legislation which criminalised both 
customary and informal economic activities.
In the final part of the thesis, attempts to control urban growth are examined. Throughout 
the colonial period Tanganyikan officials argued for the introduction of a pass system to 
stem the rural-urban flow. Political considerations ruled it out, however. Faced with a 
burgeoning urban population and limited resources with which to administer it, colonial 
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Introduction
The process of urbanisation has perhaps been the single most noteworthy trend of 
twentieth century world history.1 In 1900 only one country, Britain, could be described as 
‘urbanised’. By the end of the century those countries which had larger rural than urban 
populations had become the exception instead of the rule, and a majority of the human 
race was residing in towns.2 Nowhere has this urban revolution been more profound than 
in the third world. Here societies which were overwhelmingly rural in character at the 
beginning of the century (or later -  just 18 per cent of Africans lived in towns in I9603) 
had by its’ end become predominantly urban (in residential terms at least). Towns and 
cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America have grown at rates which far exceeded those 
experienced by the industrialised world. In the 1940s and 1950s the urban population in 
these three regions was growing at rates approaching 5 per cent. By contrast, in European 
countries at the point of their fastest urban population growth (mostly in the late 19th 
century) the average gain per year was around 2 per cent.4 The rapid growth of third 
world cities has meant that their economic development has frequently failed to keep 
pace with their demographic expansion, resulting in widespread unemployment and 
inadequate infrastructure and services. Large populations of urban poor have emerged 
living and working on the margins of the modern city and the urban economy.
Whilst urban geographers and town planners may have viewed the emergence of these 
communities as a problem to be solved, municipal authorities and national governments 
in the developing world have all too often viewed them simply as a problem to be 
eradicated. Anxious to promote controlled urban development, third world politicians
1 A technical definition o f  urbanisation is the proportion o f people living in urban settlements (usually of 
100,000 or more). Thus an urbanised society is one in which more than half the population lives in a town. 
It has other, less precise meanings, however, which include the cultural processes associated with the shift 
from a rural to an urban society.
2 UN, Global Report on Human Settlements, (Oxford, 1987), p.23.
3 Ibid., p.52.
4 Kingsley Davis, in “The Urbanization o f the Human Population”, Scientific American^ 1965, (reprinted in 
LeGates, R.T. and Stout, F. (eds.), The City Reader (London, 1996)), p.8, quotes urban growth rates in the 
1940s and 1950s o f  4.7 per cent for a sample o f seven African countries, 4.7 per cent for 15 Asian
have been dismissive of the initiatives of the urban poor to provide themselves with an 
income and a home. Difficult to supervise, the shanty communities are perceived by 
ruling classes as contaminating the urban environment, or as threats to the urban order. 
Frequently the politicians response to their presence has been to remove them from the 
cities and/or to prevent rural-urban migration in the first place. Such policies rarely (if 
ever) achieved the desired effect, but this has not prevented politicians throughout the 
developing world repeatedly adopting the same tactics. Examples are numerous. 
Armstrong, for example, mentions (amongst others) campaigns in the Philippines in 
1963; in Indonesia in 1976; in Kampuchea in the late 1970s; and in Nigeria in 1984.5 
Hardoy and Satterthwaite cite instances in Dakar in 1977 and in Indonesia and the 
Philippines once again in 1970 and 1982 respectively.6 Despite their manifest historical 
inadequacies contemporary politicians continue to favour such policies as a response to 
rapid urban growth. In 1998 a law was passed by the Cuban government giving Havana 
officials the power to forcibly repatriate migrants to their homes in the provinces.7 
Meanwhile, in the world’s most populous country influx control is currently occurring on 
a monumental scale. A recent Economist reports that authorities in Beijing expelled 
300,000 migrants from the city ‘to ensure a spick-and-span capital’ for the Communist 
Party’s 50th-amiiversary celebrations in October 1999.8 Nor was this a one off. A New 
York human rights organisation estimates that several million Chinese are locked up each 
year as a result of the government’s ‘custody and repatriation’ policies.9 If urbanisation 
has been one of the twentieth century’s most noteworthy historical trends, then perhaps 
the most frequent response to rapid urban growth has been for governments to attempt to 
limit it through the employment of highly coercive measures.
Like the populations’ of other third world cities Dar es Salaam’s inhabitants have, over 
the past fifty years, experienced government campaigns aimed at controlling urban 
growth and residence. As recently as 1997, in an attempt to clear the city of mendicants,
countries, and 4.3 per cent for 12 Latin American countries. Peak growth rates in nine European countries 
was just 2.1 per cent.
5 Allen Armstrong, “Urban control campaigns in the Third World: The case o f Tanzania”, Geography 
Dept., University o f Glasgow, Occ. Papers no.19 (1987), p.5.
6 Jorge Hardoy & David Satterthwaite, Squatter Citizen: Life in the Urban Third World (London, 1989), 
p.51.
The Economist, 23rd October 1999, p.94.
8 The Economist, 16th October 1999, pp.99-102.
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one of Dar es Salaam’s District Commissioners was lobbying for a law to prohibit alms­
giving. In the Commissioners’ own words this would serve ‘to make the city attractive 
and free from filth.’10 Perhaps the most notorious drive aimed at ‘cleansing’ the 
Tanzanian capital, though, occurred in 1983. The Human Resources Deployment Act 
(popularly known as Nguvu Kazi), passed by the Tanzanian government that year, 
criminalised the urban presence of those without formal employment. In turn Coast 
Regional Commissioner Mhaville declared that petty business and street vending in 
general would not be regarded as gainful employment. Vegetable and ground nut 
vending, shoe shining, selling of fried fish, unauthorised kiosks and car washing were 
specifically targeted.11 As a result of ‘indiscriminate swoops’ on people ‘loitering’ on the 
streets between 10am and 2pm, 15,000 were arrested in the last three months of 1983.12 
Those without employment were repatriated to their home regions or sent to work on 
sisal estates.13 Many of the small traders who used to add life to the streets of Dar have 
gone’, mourned the Africa Contemporary Record the following year: ‘The nut, fruit and 
kebab sellers, watch repairers, cobblers, knife sharpeners, the barbers with their mirrors 
hung on trees, shoe-shiners, the women who cooked food for workers and, of course, the 
prostitutes were mostly scared off, or rounded up.’14
Nguvu Kazi was only the most notorious of the Tanzanian campaigns aimed at 
arresting urban growth. In the previous two decades measures to control urban un- and 
‘under-’ employment had been adopted repeatedly by over-zealous politicians. Seven 
years before Nguvu Kazi, in 1976, there had been Operation Kilci Mtu Afanya Kazi 
(‘Everyone must work’).15 In 1972 Operation Kupe16, according to the Daily News, 
‘aimed at sending to the rural areas all jobless youths who roamed about in the city of Dar
9 ‘[M igrants picked up by the authorities for ‘custody and repatriation” , observes the E co n o m ist, 
‘represent a bigger affront to the concept o f human rights than do the persecuted dissidents so publicised in 
the West.’
10 Quoted in personal correspondence from The Express (an edition from August or July, 1997).
u DN, 5th October 1983.
12 Colin Legum (Ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-84, (New York, 1985), p.B276.
13 See for eg., DN, 11th November 1983.
14 Legum, R ecord, p.B276. The popular anger and indignation provoked by Nguvu Kazi at least had the 
happy consequence o f  the liberalisation o f controls over informal economic activities in 1987, many o f  
which became lawful for the first time. See J.M.L. Kironde, “Approaches to dealing with urban poverty in 
Tanzania: The role o f Urban Authorities”, paper given at a Regional Workshop on Urban Poverty in 
Southern and Eastern Africa, March 1995, Nairobi.
15 Known in Dar es Salaam as Operation Rwegasira after the then Regional Commissioner. Kironde, 
“Approaches”.
16 Kupe is Swahili for a tick or parasite.
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es Salaam and other towns in the region.’17 Five years earlier, Regional Commissioner 
Songambele had implemented a campaign against those without formal employment 
setting a deadline in early 1967 ‘to have the city rid of unemployed’ by March 31st that 
year. A similar effort two years before had been successful, but only for a limited period. 
‘Now’, complained a journalist for the Weekly News,
the idlers are back with a vengeance. Palsied beggars are again to be seen, hands 
outstretched on the street corners and the queues at the Labour Exchange are as long as 
they ever were.18
It was ever thus. A decade on, President Nyerere commented on the intermittent attempts 
made to cleanse the town in the intervening period:
there is a great ‘drive’ to round up the unemployed in towns and repatriate them. For a 
week or so the criminals and idle parasites hide in their houses while responsible workers 
and peasants on legitimate business are harassed... Then the whole campaign dies away 
until it is realised that the problem of criminals in towns and o f people not doing a hard 
day’s work is still with us and the process repeated.19
In the course of these urban control campaigns the unemployed (a category which 
usually included those engaged in informal sector activities) were demonised by official 
propaganda. They were kupe (parasites); wazurulaji (loiterers); wavivu (idlers); walevi 
(drunkards); wanyonyaji (exploiters); as well as being maadui wa siasa ya ujamaa na 
kujitegemea (‘enemies of the policy of socialism and self-reliance’).20 The politics of 
post-independence Tanzania resulted in the adoption of a distinctive slant to justify the 
state’s attempts at urban ‘cleansing’. It was those accused of being ‘unproductive’ who 
were perennially the targets of such campaigns. However, the origins of these campaigns 
are to be found in an earlier period. It was in the colonial era that both the phenomenon of 
rapid urbanisation emerged, and coercive measures aimed at controlling the urban 
population were first employed. The marginalisation of that section of the urban 
population existing outside the formal economy also occurred at this time. It is the period 
of British colonial rule which provided the formative influence on post-colonial attitudes 
towards the urban poor. It is this period which is the focus of my thesis.
17 DN, 10th January 1973, p .l.
18 WN, 31st March 1967, p.14.
19 Julius Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After (Dsm, 1977), pp.46/7. The fault with the 
‘drives’, according to Nyerere, lay in their temporary nature, not in the decision to target the unemployed.
20 Joe Lugalla, Crisis, urbanization, and urban poverty in Tanzania (Lanham, 1995), p. 164.
Undesirables in colonial Dar es Salaam
Whilst post-independence politicians employed a wide range of Swahili terms in their 
propaganda against the ‘unproductive5 urban poor, the principal source of colonial 
officials’ anxieties could be reduced to just one category in Swahili: the wahuni. The 
category of vrahuni had by the 1950s, if not before, come to refer to all the un-, under-, 
and nefariously-employed Africans who, from the colonial point of view, cluttered the 
streets of Dar es Salaam. More specifically they were the target of repatriation campaigns 
conducted under the Removal of Undesirable Natives (later ‘Undesirable Persons’) 
ordinance. Wahuni derives from the Swahili verb huni, which, according to Johnson’s 
Standard Swahili-English Dictionary (an excellent source for colonial Swahili usage), 
means to wander about for no good purpose, disobey or to be a vagabond. This made the 
wahuni ‘profligates’, ‘wastrels’, ‘gadabouts’, ‘lawless persons’ or ‘outcasts’. Its’ closest 
modern English equivalent, though, is ‘hooligans’. It is unclear when the term first came 
to be applied to sections of the urban population in Dar es Salaam, although the adoption 
by a dance group of the title Ngoma ya Kihuni (‘the hooligan’s dance society’)21 in 
Sadaani in 1911 indicates its early usage along the Mrima (the Tanganyikan coast). This 
society was formed, Prof. Iliffe tells us, by Tow class, up-country immigrants to coastal 
towns.’22 The adoption of the kihuni title by the dance group may well have been a 
defiant response to prevalent negative stereotypes.23 Certainly by the 1930s iwahunV 
seems to have passed into common usage as a pejorative term in Dar es Salaam. 
According to a 1939 editorial in Kwetu ‘the well-known Wahuni’ were to be encountered 
‘loafing in the bazaars and hotels, walking out late at night, and sleeping in obscure 
nooks.’24 Sometime thereafter the term was adopted with increasing frequency by 
colonial officials to describe the growing number of young male Africans in the town 
without formal employment. It was a conveniently inclusive term25 which encapsulated
21 The ki- prefix in Swahili is a diminutive.
22 John Iliffe, A Modern H istoiy o f  Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), p.23 8.
23 By 1935 a Dar es Salaam successor to the Ngoma y a  Kihuni had come to the attention o f the Tanganyika 
Standard in the form o f  ‘The Loafer Band’. TS, 16th March 1935.
24 K w etu , 21st February 1939. Quoted in David Henry Anthony, “Culture and society in a town in 
transition: a people’s histoiy o f Dar es Salaam, 1865-1939”, unpub. Ph.D. thesis (University o f Wisconsin, 
1983), p. 159/60. See also the letter on wahuni from M.F.Kassam in Kwetu, 13th January 1942.
25 C.C. Harris, who more than any other official was responsible for intensified action against this section 
of the population, translated wahuni, in his autobiographical account o f his colonial service, Donkey's 
G ratitude (Edinburgh, 1992), variously as ‘bachelors’ (p.297), ‘young town stiffs’ (p.304), ‘wandering 
vagabonds’ (p,341) and ‘layabouts’ (p.351).
(and at the same time marginalised) a troublesome section of the urban population, about 
whose movements and actions colonial officials had little knowledge.
In fact, official knowledge of the whole African community in Dar es Salaam 
remained limited at best throughout the colonial period. As the principle economic and 
administrative centre in Tanganyika Territory, the town always attracted a great diversity 
of people, of both indigenous and alien origin. So the District Commissioner, Orde- 
Browne, could complain as early as 1924 that the ‘cosmopolitanism’ of the town 
population
presents a real problem from an administrative point o f view; an astonishing number of 
nationalities may be involved in any question which arises. Township Regulations have to 
be framed so as to suit the needs and idiosyncrasies o f British, Belgian, Portuguese and 
Greek communities, living among the numerous Asiatic population which is divided rather 
by religion than nationality, while the whole is imposed upon the original inhabitants who 
vary from aristocratic and cultured Arabs, to primitive ex-slaves from the Congo.26
Interestingly, although Orde-Browne is complaining of the problems of administering 
such a mixed population, he has neglected to mention that section of the urban populace 
which caused District Commissioners the greatest concern; the large numbers of 
‘upcountry’ African immigrants present in the town (other than the ‘original’ freed 
slaves). Dar es Salaam’s population contained autochthonous Africans. These included 
local Zaramo and Swahili whose communities were subsumed by the growth of the town. 
In addition, there were Manyema freed slaves and Sudanese ex-askaris who had settled in 
the town in the late 19th century. However, by the 1920s these established urbanites were 
outnumbered by Africans who had come to Dar es Salaam from their rural homes.27 Not 
only was this section of the population larger than any other, it was also in itself 
particularly variegated, incorporating people from diverse ethnic and educational 
backgrounds, of varying ages and either sex, whose motives for being present in the 
Tanganyikan capital were, significantly, more poorly apprehended by colonial officials 
than those of other communities entering or residing in the town. It included those from 
neighbouring territories as well as from neighbouring districts, runaway youths alongside 
unattached women, itinerant traders alongside petty criminals. Educated Africans came to
26 DAR for 1924, p.4, TNA/53.4. It is revealing that Orde-Browne describes municipal legislation designed 
for the British, Belgian, Portuguese and Greek communities as being ‘im posed upon the original 
inhabitants’.
secure employment as junior government officials or as clerical staff in the various 
trading companies. Migrant labourers from all over the Territory worked on the docks -or 
on the sisal plantations 011 the outskirts of town- on fixed-term contracts; at the end of 
which they may decide to return to their rural home or to take a chance by remaining in 
the town. There was a constant flow of other migrant workers stopping off on their way 
to -or returning from- employment on the plantations in Eastern or Tanga Provinces or 
picking cloves in Zanzibar. Large numbers of men from outlying districts in Eastern 
Province came to the town as casual labourers working intermittently on the docks or for 
businesses in the commercial area, whilst in the meantime sometimes cultivating a small 
suburban plot or engaging in petty trade. ‘Target’ workers came to the capital from near 
and far -and for varying periods- to earn fixed amounts of money in order to meet tax 
requirements perhaps, or to pay bridewealth, before returning home. There was a constant 
flow into the town of jobless migrants seeking employment, not all of whom were 
successful. Many engaged in waged work only intermittently and lack of formal 
employment became a recurring problem from the early-193Os on. For many Africans 
who, for whatever reason, found themselves indigent, the capital was a place to seek 
alms; as it was too for the physically disabled who in many cases travelled to the town 
from the distant interior in order to gain access to the unprecedented surplus present in 
the town. In addition to those coming to earn money for taxes, Africans came to Dar es 
Salaam in order to avoid payment of them to their Native Authorities. The town was 
described in the district annual report for 1936 as ‘a veritable haven for the tax defaulter.’ 
Finally, the dense population of Dar es Salaam also attracted Africans who had adopted 
theft or deception as a means of getting by, although indications are that these kind of 
habits were more commonly learnt after arrival in the town. In either case petty thieves 
and con-men were a constant presence amongst the capital’s African population. 
Alongside this immigrant community, Dar es Salaam’s permanent African population 
was also a heterogeneous one, amongst whom diverse means of earning a living were 
adopted about which colonial officials often had but limited knowledge. As well as 
formal waged employment, on the docks or the railway for example, any number of more 
informal activities were engaged in: from the cultivation and sale of foodstuffs (raw as
27 The earliest breakdown o f  Dar es Salaam’s population by area o f origin I have -from  the mid-19503- 
gives the proportion o f  town residents originating in the town as just 11.5%, although what this tells us o f  
the situation in the 1920s is o f  course unclear.
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well as cooked) to the tapping and sale of tembo,28 from the itinerant vending of tea and 
coffee to the harvesting of beche de mer -sea cucumbers- for export to the Orient.
Dar es Salaam’s African community then, was a particularly heterogeneous one. It was 
also constantly shifting. Mobility was high. Contract labourers may lapse into 
unemployment, the indigent turn to crime, immigrants may acquire property in the town 
and become permanent residents. The community was also characterised by spatial 
mobility. Movement between the upcountry rural areas -near and far- and the capital was 
constant. There were great seasonal fluctuations of population. June to August -the start 
of the growing season in Eastern Province- in particular being a time when the rural- 
urban flow abated and to a certain extent was reversed. Meanwhile, times of economic 
slump not only forced jobless workers to return to their rural homes but also often 
resulted in a drift of the unemployed to the rural areas surrounding the town to engage in 
shamba cultivation. In addition, within the town itself the African urban population was 
characterised by its mobility, with frequent shifts of address being common.30
Theoretically, colonial Dar es Salaam should have been an orderly, regimented town 
in which people’s residential and occupational space was well defined and had been 
internalised by members of its diverse communities. Whilst technically there were no 
racial restrictions on place of residence, building regulations in the town’s three zones 
were expected to result in effective segregation. Bye-laws restricting Africans’ freedom 
of movement within the town existed to reinforce residential segregation, and other 
regulations were in place designed to defend against unrestricted migration into the town. 
At no time, however, did the well-ordered capital envisaged in colonial legislation, in 
which inhabitants of the town knew their proper place, correspond to reality (although it 
remained an ideal informing decisions made by colonial and post-colonial administrators
28 Palm wine.
29 J. A.K. Leslie, A Survey o f  Dar es Salaam (Oxford, 1963), p.93.
30 For example Leslie estimated in 1957 ‘that a quarter o f younger people move house every three to four 
months’. Leslie, Survey, p.250.
31 The three zones, which were defined by these differing building regulations, were arranged as follows: 
Zone I, which stretched from present day Maktaba Street to the sea front (and was later extended 
northwards to include Oyster Bay and Kinondoni), was occupied predominantly by Europeans. Zone II, 
which included the main commercial centre and the docks, was occupied almost entirely by Indians. Zone 
III, which extended from the western side o f Mnazi Mmoja and included all areas within the township 
boundary to the west and south o f there, was principally an area o f African residence.
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alike). Building regulations failed to stop wealthy Indians32 residing in the ‘European’ 
quarter; to prevent the existence of African owned shanties on the fringes of the so-called 
‘Indian bazaar’; or to restrict the presence of substantial numbers of Indian residents in 
the African township of Kariakoo. Of greater significance though, was the equal 
ineffectiveness of those regulations aimed at restricting rural-urban migration, alongside 
those aimed at controlling migrants once they’d arrived in the town. Throughout the 
British period, in the midst of Dar es Salaam’s heterogeneous and ill-comprehended 
African community, the disturbing presence of a ‘floating population’ loomed large in the 
official imagination, representing a persistent threat to colonial urban order. Whilst 
legislation proscribed the urban residence of those with ‘no visible means of subsistence’, 
however, officials were hard pressed to enforce it against a population which was not 
only an impermanent and constantly shifting one but which was also, from the late-1930s, 
expanding at an alarmingly swift pace.
British officials had difficulty, in spite of the relatively small size of the town, in 
fathoming such a fluid population. In part this was a consequence of the distance 
between European officials responsible for administering Dar es Salaam and those 
African inhabitants whom they ‘ruled’. This distance had both a physical and a cultural 
aspect. European representatives of the native administration were physically distant not 
only as result of their area of residence -in Zone I, located at a strategic remove from the 
congested streets of the African township- but also in the location of the district office, 
which, despite numerous moves between 1919 and 1958, was only situated in the African 
areas of Dar es Salaam just three years before independence. It is likely that this distance 
not only inhibited European awareness of everyday life in the African areas, but also that 
the minimal European presence allowed the inhabitants of those areas a leeway one may 
not expect to find amongst the ‘native’ community of a colonial town. Meanwhile, whilst 
individual officers displayed varying degrees of empathy with the needs and desires of 
the African population, the cultural distance between the district official and his subjects 
was, despite the presence of more familiar urban institutions and the nucleus of a 
western-educated class of Africans in the town, in most cases just as great as that between 
European officials and Africans in the rural areas. The African community of Dar es 
Salaam tended to be perceived as an aggregate mass by most officials about whom one
32 Throughout the thesis ‘Indians’ is used to refer to individuals originating from the Indian sub-continent,
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complained in 1930, ‘[w]e know less... than we do of remote tribes’.33 Twenty years 
later, the situation was much the same: sociologists working for the government in 1951 
were told that ‘[p]eople make wild guesses about the native population but we don’t 
know their habits.’34 This lack of knowledge magnified anxieties about the African urban 
presence. Where to the European mind 110 apparent order was discernible, a portentous 
disorder was assumed. Confronted with a faceless and yet heterogeneous population, 
colonial officials tended to anticipate the worst and to demand ever increasing powers to 
assuage their exaggerated concerns. The demonisation of the wahuni formed a prime 
expression of these concerns.
The administration and policing of the town
Throughout the British colonial period considerable difficulties were encountered in 
establishing viable administrative structures to supervise and control the African 
township. Establishing the authority of African intermediaries amongst the mixed 
communities of the township was problematic. Meanwhile, mobility amongst the African 
population, to, from, and within the town, undermined administrative attempts at 
supervision. The other principal difficulty was a lack of resources. The District Office 
was consistently short-staffed up to the closing years of colonial rule, and whilst officials 
may often have had ambitions to establish more effective urban governance, the limited 
resources available to them led to these ambitions being constantly thwarted. Despite 
these problems, a durable native administration was in place by the late-193Os which 
included a Liwali acting as its head and presiding over the principal African court in the 
town, and three Wakili (increased to four in 1953), who were responsible for the wards 
into which the town was divided, all of whom eventually were also presiding over their 
own (grade B) courts. Perhaps the most important function played by these African 
officials was that in administering the law in minor criminal matters -which formed the 
bulk of the cases in the town- they added some legitimacy to legislation which may not 
have existed had it been administered solely by a European judiciary. Their
Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
33 Quoted in the Report by R. and C. Sofer on a possible sociological survey o f  Dsm, p .14, TNA/18950 
Vol. III.
34 Notes leading up to recommendations that a sociological survey o f  Dsm should take place (by the 
Sofers?) in Dsm Ex-Prov. Dist. Book Vol.V.I.
10
administrative capacity to influence or control the African population of the various 
wards, on the other hand, was limited. It was the Jumbes or Town Headmen, who in 
terms of the everyday administration of the urban African population were the most 
important African agents of government within the town. The Jumbes, in the words of 
one Provincial Commissioner, combined ‘the roles of local special constable and petit 
fonctionaire.’35 They had responsibility for a number of sub-divisions within the 
township, which might incorporate just one street in the more densely populated heart of 
Zone III or larger areas in the less urbanised outskirts such as Kinondoni or Msasani. At 
the end of the war, Dar es Salaam had 24 of these Town Headmen, rising to 28 in the 
early-1950s. By 1956 though, this number had, in spite of a substantial increase in the 
urban population, been reduced to just 14, at which point there were approximately 2,450 
taxpayers to each Headman, although numbers varied greatly from ward to ward.36 The 
Headmen acted as the “‘eyes and ears” of the District Commissioner’,37 passing on 
instructions and explanations of policy in one direction, and people’s complaints and 
information about events and individuals in the African areas of the town in the other. 
They were, in addition, expected to ensure that the communities over which they presided 
remained orderly and well-behaved; liaising with the police over the prevention of crime 
and control of undesirables, and with the tax department over the collection of taxes. 
Jumbes, like the Liwali and Wakili, were directly appointed by the provincial 
administration. Whilst some attention may have been paid to local feeling -the Headmen 
would, for example, usually have been long-term residents of the area for which they 
were made responsible38- there was no established consultative process and the needs of 
Government in the selection process remained paramount. The reliability of different 
Headmen in the eyes of district officials, as well as their legitimacy as leaders amongst 
African communities within the town, no doubt varied greatly. For example, one of the 
Jumbes’ prime responsibilities was to help organise tax raids in order to apprehend 
defaulters. It was just as likely though, that some at least were warning residents about 
the raids that they had helped organise.39 In the main, according to Leslie, the Jumbes’ 
‘loyalties lay with their people and not the Government.’40 As such it is unlikely they
35 PC, EP to Sec. for African Affairs, 7th September 1949, TNA/540/27/28.
36 DC, Dsm to DC, Mwanza (Urban), 24,h February 1956, TNA/540/3/75/A.
37 M.J.B. Molohan, Detribalisation, (Dsm, 1959), para. 65.
38 Interview no.l.
39 Interview no. 11.
40 Ibid.
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provided the degree of control over their respective areas that provincial administration 
officials aspired to.
Along with the native administration and judiciary, the Tanganyika police force 
formed the third branch of the state at the heart of the imposition and maintenance of a 
colonial urban order in Dar es Salaam. Indeed, of all three, it was perhaps the most 
essential. Whilst the colonial regime, in its administrative and judicial initiatives in Dar es 
Salaam, was attempting to establish structures of governance which retained the broad 
acceptance of the African urban population, its’ success in this endeavour was in the end 
greatly facilitated by the background presence of an organised police force. The 
legitimacy of such institutions was always to some degree reliant upon the coercive 
potential of the colonial state, which in Dai’ es Salaam the police represented. In the inter­
war period the police presence throughout Dar es Salaam was negligible. An African 
constabulary which by 1938 numbered 247 was commanded by 10-15 European officers. 
A network of police patrols was established by the late-1920s. Whilst the European, and 
to a significantly lesser extent, the Indian, areas were covered, Zone III received very 
little attention. With an increase in the police establishment and the introduction of more 
sophisticated policing techniques this changed after WWII. However, the African areas 
continued to receive less attention in the form of crime prevention measures than the 
remainder of the town. In the 1950s the total strength of the Dar es Salaam force had 
risen to over 400 officers and men. They were engaged in a diverse range of activities 
which included motorised, bicycle, dog and beat patrols, undercover work, traffic duty, 
and ‘wahuni raids’ aimed at the apprehension and removal of urban ‘undesirables’. 
Alongside the numerical expansion of the force, new police posts emerged throughout the 
town in the course of the 1950s. Whilst the extension in policing after WWII resulted in 
the apprehension of more and more criminals, growing powers of surveillance and 
detection only served to bring to light growing evidence of criminality. Meanwhile, the 
increasingly intrusive nature of urban policing resulted in the unpopularity of the force. 
From the mid-1950s police constables were commonly subject to assaults by criminals 
which often appeared to have widespread support amongst urban Africans.41 By this time, 
if not before, the Dar es Salaam constabulary, ethnically distinct and residentially and 
socially separated from the wider African population, appear to have been perceived of as
41 See eg. TS, 26th September 1957.
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something of an occupying force. For this reason, as well as for more straightforward 
ones related to the difficulties in policing a rapidly expanding population, the degree of 
influence exercised by the police 011 the African population was substantially less than 
that aspired to by both European officials and police officers. Resources for the policing 
of the town were in just as short a supply as those for its general administration and 
development. Whilst police activity in the town resulted in the arrest of many offenders 
responsible for a variety of criminal acts, major and minor, it is likely that many more 
offences against the penal code and the municipal bye-laws -the effectiveness of which 
often depended upon the active presence of agents of enforcement- went undetected as 
large parts of the African town remained more or less un-policed.
As the limited effectiveness of the orthodox institutions of colonial control was 
exposed thanks to the strain placed upon urban resources by the growing African 
population, it was found necessary to consider the more unorthodox -not to say coercive- 
measures of controlling internal migration and of the removal of those individuals whom 
the colonial state deemed had no place in the urban areas.
Methodology
The shortcomings of Dar es Salaam’s police force and native administration in part 
have their origin in official ignorance about the urban African population. The lacunae in 
colonial knowledge are only too apparent in the primary material that has survived, which 
invariably is much stronger on the perceived sources for official anxiety than it is on 
everyday life of the African community in Dar es Salaam. Even the best-informed, and 
most sympathetic observers had only a partial view of African life in the capital. They 
were especially ignorant of the movements and actions of that section of the population 
drifting between urban and rural life, and/or intermittently engaging in waged 
employment, otherwise resorting to petty trade, to scavenging or to crime to get by, who 
by the late colonial period formed a large proportion (probably a majority) of the urban 
African population. This lack of knowledge also expanded at a rate comparable to the 
growth of the town. So the social surveys produced by Baker and Leslie, in 1931 and 
1957 respectively, can be viewed as yardsticks of colonial knowledge. Whilst Leslie may 
have spent twice as much time (or more) in researching and writing his report; whilst the
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resulting survey is substantially longer, richer and more detailed; and whilst Leslie had 
access to information gathered by organisations which didn’t exist in Baker’s day, the 
two surveys provide pictures of Dar es Salaam in 1931 and 1957 of similar 
comprehensiveness and reliability at different stages of the town’s development. By 1957 
the African population of the town had increased fourfold, its’ geographical extent by two 
or three times, and urban economic, social and cultural activities had proliferated at a 
comparable rate. All of these factors substantially complicated any attempt by even the 
most enthusiastic and sympathetic colonial officer42 to get a grasp of the African town. 
Meanwhile, the administration of Dar es Salaam was mainly in the hands of officials, 
who either hadn’t the time or the inclination (or both), to familiarise themselves fully 
with the lives of urban Africans (who would probably not have encouraged such 
intrusions anyway). The African township as viewed from the Boma (District Office) 
differed as much from that constructed from the innumerable interviews and other data 
collected by Leslie in the course of his survey as Leslie’s picture differed from the 
African experience of Dar es Salaam.
The shortcomings of the official record provide obvious problems for the historian of 
the town. Any attempt to construct a portrait of the lives of the many thousands of 
Africans who came to the Tanganyikan capital and survived through intermittent formal 
employment or through the adoption of informal economic activities is rendered futile. 
Whilst a window can be opened up on the lives of the so-called wahuni using data 
gleaned from the various colonial reports and correspondence, that window is invariably 
located in the district Boma. Where informal economic activities, for example, do come 
to light, they are generally viewed simply as a problem to be controlled. We get little or 
(mostly) no idea of their location, their extent, who exactly is engaging in them, their 
profitability or any number of other aspects which may be of interest.43 Meanwhile other 
surviving records of colonial Dar es Salaam also fail to illuminate those areas neglected 
in official sources. In European reminiscences, and in the settler, the Indian, and even the 
African press (which was of course the voice of a literate elite), the wahuni occupy a 
similar space to that which they occupy in government correspondence or reports. Here 
too they generally emerge as a faceless mass and a source for concern; indeed, as
42 Which, judging by his survey, Leslie undoubtedly was.
43 The reports by Baker and Leslie are the exception, although even these present only a limited snapshot of 
such activities.
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undesirables. In Dar es Salaam, as elsewhere, the poor leave behind only ‘sporadic
, 4 4traces .
Despite these difficulties, however, broad patterns do begin to emerge from the 
historian’s privileged overview of data surviving from the four decades of British 
colonial rule in Tanganyika. Whilst we may catch what are just glimpses of the activities 
of those Africans labelled wahuni, it is at least possible to gain some impression of what 
was going on in Dar es Salaam beyond the colonial ken. Also, whilst the official record 
may have significant weaknesses as far as the understanding of the African town is 
concerned, it is on the other hand extremely strong on how the colonial mind responded 
to the phenomenon of rapid urban growth. Parts one and three of the thesis take 
advantage of this rich material. In part one there is an analysis of official attitudes 
towards African urbanisation and of the evolution of a colonial urban policy. In part three 
it has proved possible to reconstruct in some detail the application of one part of that 
policy; the attempts to stem rural-urban migration and to control the urban African 
population. Sandwiched between these, in part two, is an account —salvaged mostly from 
colonial sources- of those urban phenomena, rendered criminal by colonial legislation, 
which were the occasion for such official disquiet, and which led to the emergence of 
wahuni as colonial bogeymen par excellence.
Sources
The thesis is heavily dependent on three archives in particular. First (and foremost) the 
Tanzanian National Archive provided a wealth of previously neglected data on colonial 
Dar es Salaam. This included district and departmental reports, government 
correspondence, and conference minutes. They offer an invaluable perspective 011 the 
town as seen through the eyes of colonial administrators. At the British Public Records 
Office there is also valuable material originating from Tanganyika, including official 
reports and correspondence. In addition, Colonial Office records provide some idea of the 
view from Whitehall. The final substantial archive collection, is that held at Rhodes 
House, Oxford. Here, the memoirs and correspondence of former colonial officials
44 John Iliffe, The African Poor (Cambridge, 1987), p.2.
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collected in the Colonial Records Project in particular provided data which was highly 
complementary to that to be found in Tanzania and at ICew. Archive material relating to 
colonial Dar es Salaam is also to be found in the East Africana section of Dar es Salaam 
University library, notably reports from the Provincial Commissioners’ conferences and 
Municipal Council minutes and committee reports. The library also contains useful 
secondary literature unavailable elsewhere. After these archives, the colonial press 
proved the next most valuable source. For the historian of crime everyday information 
recorded by newspapers is invaluable. In the case of Dar es Salaam these include the Dar 
es Salaam/Tanganyika Times, Tanganyika Opinion, Tanganyika Herald', Tanganyika 
Standard, Kwetu, Mambo Leo, and the Sunday News. These newspapers were particularly 
useful in shedding light on the perspective of European and Indian settlers and traders, 
and that of the African educated elite. Interviews of, and correspondence with, former 
officials and inhabitants of the town served to confirm (and embellish) much of the 
information gleaned from surviving documentary sources. As did a number of published 
colonial memoirs, notably those of C.C. Harris and J. C. Cairns. Finally, mention must be 
made of the two important surveys of the town conducted by E.C. Baker and J.A.K. 
Leslie.45 Leslie’s survey in particular is an extraordinarily rich document.
As far as the secondary literature is concerned, for a town of its’ size and importance, 
Dar es Salaam has been curiously neglected by historians. Other than David Henry 
Anthony’s thesis on early Dar es Salaam,46 there has been no extended piece of historical 
research with the town as its subject. Useful surveys of Dar es Salaam’s history can be 
found in the special edition of Tanzania Notes and Records by John Sutton, and in John 
Iliffe’s magisterial history of Tanganyika.47 Other work by Iliffe is also useful, notably 
the chapters on the dockworkers and on labour and urbanisation.48 Nicholas Westcotf s 
thesis on the impact of WWII on Tanganyika provides excellent analysis of the situation 
in Dar es Salaam in the 1940s.49 The chapter by Deborah Bryceson an overview of the
45 A copy o f  Baker’s report can be found in the SOAS archive; Leslie’s was published as A Survey o f  Dal­
es Salaam, (Oxford, 1963).
46 Anthony, “Culture”.
47 J.E.G. Sutton, “Dar es Salaam: a sketch o f  a hundred years”, in TNR No.71; Iliffe, Modern H istory, 
especially pp. 381-404.
48 Iliffe, J. “A history o f  the Dockworkers o f Dar es Salaam’, in TNR No.71; and “Wage labour and 
urbanisation in Tanzania under colonial ride, Kaniki,. M. (Ed.) (London, 1979).
49 Nicholas Westcott, “The Impact o f the Second World War on Tanganyika: 1939-49”, unpub. Ph.D. thesis 
(Cambridge University, 1982).
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politics and economics of food in the town.50 Richard Stren reviews urban housing policy 
in the colonial and the post-colonial period.51 Two recent works on Tanganyikan 
nationalism provide useful incidental material on conditions in Dar es Salaam. Susan 
Geiger’s book sheds light on the position of urban women in the late colonial period.52 
Mohamed Said’s book on Abdulwahid Sykes, in addition to unearthing a wealth of detail 
011 a section of the African elite in the town, also offers numerous insights into other 
aspects of urban life.53 Daisy Sykes Buruku’s chapter 011 Abdulwahid’s father, Kleist 
Sykes, and Westcott’s article on Erica Fiah both complement Said’s work.54 From an 
anthropological perspective, Swantz, in his book on Zaramo waganga, offers valuable 
insights on urban life.55 Two unpublished geographical works are also especially useful to 
the historian. Adolfo Mascarenhas gives a good overview of the development of Dar es 
Salaam. Meanwhile, Dr. Kironde’s thesis on land use, much of which is written from an 
explicitly historical perspective, provides a very useful account of urban planning in the 
town.56
Of all the secondary literature, the only work to concentrate specifically 011 themes 
relating to this thesis are works by Allen Armstrong and Marjorie Mbilinyi. Armstrong’s 
paper documents influx control measures and repatriation campaigns in 
Tanganyika/Tanzania. However, he focuses predominantly 011 the post-colonial period.57 
Mbilinyi’s work, on the other hand, is of greater relevance to this research. In her article 
in the Economic and Political Weekly -and the revision of it in Parpart and Staudt- 
Mbilinyi observes the racial organisation of space in colonial Tanganyika and official 
concern over the process of African urbanisation.58 She notes particular antipathy towards
50 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, “A century o f  food supply in Dar es Salaam”, in Feeding African Cities: Studies 
in Regional Social History, ed. J.I. Guyer (Manchester, 1987).
51 R. Stren, Urban inequality and housing policy in Tanzania: The problem  o f  squatting in Tanzania. 
University o f California, Berkeley, Institute o f International Studies, Research Series No.24, 1975.
52 Susan Geiger, TANU Women: Gender and culture in the making o f  Tanganyikan nationalism, 1955-1965 
(Portsmouth, NH, 1997).
53 Mohamed Said, The life and times o f  Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The untold story o f  the Muslim 
struggle against British colonialism in Tanganyika (London, 1998).
54 Daisy Sykes Buruku, “The townsman: Kleist Sykes”, in Modern Tanzanians, Iliffe, J. (Ed.) (Dar es 
Salaam, 1973); Nicholas Westcott, “Erica Fiah: An East African Radical”, Journal o f  African H istory, 
1981.
55 Lloyd Swantz, The Medicine Man among the Zaramo o f  Dar es Salaam (Uppsala, 1990).
56 J.M.L. ICironde, “The evolution o f land use structure in Dar es salaam 1890-1990: A study in the effects 
of land policy”, unpub. Ph.D. thesis (University o f Nairobi, Dept, o f Land Devt., 1994).
57 Armstrong, “Urban control campaigns”.
58 Marjorie Mbilinyi, “‘City’ and ‘Countryside’ in colonial Tanganyika”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol.XX (1985); and “This is an unforgettable business: Colonial state intervention in Tanzania”, in J.L. 
Parpart & K.A. Staudt (eds.), Women and the state in Africa (Boulder, 1989), pp.l 11-129.
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the presence of African women in the town, and documents colonial attempts to 
undermine the independence of female pombe (traditional beer) brewers in Dar es Salaam 
in the 1930s. Mbilinyi is right to observe this antipathy. However, urban women do not 
appear to have suffered the same attention from the district administration that men in the 
town experienced. It is not true to say that ‘women were specifically targeted5 for 
repatriation.59 Indeed the almost complete absence of records of female repatriations is 
noteworthy, as is, more generally, the absence of any significant consideration -before the 
1950s- of this not insubstantial section of the urban population in the official record. For 
colonial officials it was primarily African men who posed the threat of urban disorder. 
Mbilinyi goes on to analyse the supposed perpetrators of disorder as portrayed in the 
work of Leslie and Iliffe (1979). These authors are criticised for the way in which they 
marginalise rebellious youth. Mbilinyi sees in the anti-authoritarian behaviour of African 
youth evidence of the resentment felt towards colonial rule by the majority of the urban 
African population. There is something in this; the rapidly worsening police-public 
relations in the 1950s can be cited as evidence. However, delinquency cannot be 
attributed solely, or even principally, to anti-colonial feeling; poor urban adolescents in 
Tanganyika acted in much the same way as they do in other parts of the world. It is 
consequently spurious to see in their behaviour ‘a new kind of order in the process of 
creation’ or an emerging proletarian class-consciousness.60
Chapter Outline
The three parts of the thesis are broken down into nine chapters. The purpose of the 
first chapter is to place what follows in a wider context. Whilst the secondary literature 
on Dar es Salaam is sparse, work on urbanisation elsewhere in Africa, and in western 
countries in particular, is more comprehensive. The chapter begins with a discussion of 
the similarities between colonial responses to urban growth in Dar es Salaam and 
responses to the early stages of mass urbanisation in the west. The second section 
describes urban policy in colonial Africa, with special reference to East and Central 
Africa.
59 Mbilinyi (1989), p.126. Mbilinyi also mistakenly dates the introduction o f Cap.104 to the early-1930s.
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In the second chapter the response to African urbanisation in Tanganyika is 
considered. Up to WWII official policy towards the urban African population had, like 
that in other colonies, been characterised by a high degree of ambivalence towards the 
growing numbers of Africans who were choosing to come to the towns to live and to 
work. Whilst the rural areas, where cohesive ‘tribal’ societies were presided over by 
Native Authorities, were perceived as a protective environment in which Africans could 
safely experience the transforming currents of colonial rule, the urban areas represented 
an anomic environment in which the culturally disoriented native was exposed and prone 
to corruption. However, colonial officials had presided over a society in which the lure of 
the towns -which according to a later report were ‘essentially the result of non-African 
initiative’61- was proving more and more attractive to increasing numbers of Africans. 
This was a phenomenon that both inconvenienced and deeply concerned the colonial 
administration. In an attempt to assert some control over the process of African 
urbanisation colonial urban policy was transformed in the post-war period. From being 
places where the African presence was at best unwelcome, towns suddenly became an 
arena in which the ‘new’ African was to be moulded. By the late-1950s government was 
encouraging the stabilisation of an African petit-bourgeoisie in the towns, who had a 
vested interest in urban good governance. The broader process of urbanisation, however, 
continued to elicit official concern. Whilst a respectable, salaried and property-owning, 
class was emerging, it was dwarfed by the many unskilled Africans who -despite 
persistent official antipathy towards their presence- were making their way to the urban 
centres in ever greater numbers.
Chapter fcWisaprovides a discussion of crime in the colonial context. The problem of 
defining crime is addressed first. It is observed that in a society governed by laws framed 
by an alien -though dominant- minority notions of illegality and illegitimacy often fail to 
coincide. The distinction is made -drawn from European criminal historiography- 
between ‘real’ and ‘social’ crime. In Dar es Salaam activities which were technically 
criminal were not necessarily viewed as such by many amongst the urban population. The 
different definitions of crime depended in part but not only on the racial background of 
the observer. Class was the other determinant. After a discussion of the reliability of
60 Ibid. pp.123/124.
61 Draft copy o f  ‘Urban problems in East and Central Africa -  Report o f  a conference held at Ndola, N. 
Rhodesia, February 1958’ [hereafter: ‘NdolaReport’], p.4, TNA/UW 80.131/Vol.l.
19
criminal statistics as a historical source, an impressionistic account is then given of the 
extent and pattern of crime in Dar es Salaam during the British colonial period. Judging 
by surviving records crime in the town between the wars was not serious. With the rapid 
increase in population from the late-1930s on, however, it appears to have become much 
more prevalent. This does not necessarily mean that the urban population was any more 
criminal. According to official statistics whilst there was a substantial rise in criminal 
cases, crimes per capita actually declined. To colonial officials, though, the rise in crime 
was a disquieting trend. The chapter ends with a review of the causes of crime as 
perceived (predominantly) by officials. Familiar factors tended to be singled out; the 
process of urbanisation, unemployment and want, but not, as in 19th century Britain, a 
psychological predilection for criminality on the part of the offender.
Chapter f p r o v i d e s  a survey of ‘real’ crime in Dar es Salaam. Urbanisation in 
Tanganyika as elsewhere led to the emergence of a distinctive urban criminality. Property 
theft, in the form of burglary and theft from the person, became increasingly common. 
Distributors of stolen goods (wittingly or not) appear to have encouraged its’ incidence. 
Links are observed connecting receivers with the theft of scrap metal, of bicycles, and 
theft from the workplace. Stolen items were often transported from Dar es Salaam and 
disposed of further afield. Zanzibar was an obvious market. Smuggling from Zanzibar to 
Dar es Salaam (and elsewhere along the northern Mrima) was also common. In addition, 
there appears to have been a small number of professional criminals with links to 
Zanzibar and further north, who moved freely along the coast between Mombasa and Dal­
es Salaam. The emergence of an indigenous ‘class’ of professional criminals, including 
the activities of criminal gangs in the late-colonial period, is also observed. However, the 
conclusion is reached that the vast majority of crime in Dar es Salaam was opportunistic 
and petty in form.
The legitimacy of much colonial legislation was often considered highly questionable 
by Dar es Salaam’s African population, and laws and by e-laws were as a result routinely 
breached. It is these ‘social’ crimes which form the subject of chapter -fWG. The 
legislation controlling the manufacture and consumption of alcohol was particularly 
unpopular, proscribing as it did the customary usage of alcohol such as tembo. It also 
interfered with a profitable line of business for urban entrepreneurs. From early on then, 
liquor legislation was honoured in its’ breach. Petty trading was another form of social
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crime which was common. Whilst a limited amount of licensed trade was allowed by 
municipal authorities, many Africans took the opportunities represented by the large 
urban population to engage in unlicensed activities. As rural-urban migration swelled and 
urban unemployment became a problem, increasing numbers turned to petty trade as a 
means of subsistence. By the mid-1950s it appears to have become widespread. Although 
it provided a living for a vulnerable section of the population, however, unlicensed 
trading was not tolerated by the municipal administration and periodic round-ups 
occurred. Discussion of the most common social crime, default of taxes, is left till last. 
Tax evasion was widespread. The town was used as a refuge from the attentions of 
Native Authorities by defaulters from Dar es Salaam’s hinterland. In addition, urban 
residents were quite happy to avoid payment as much as possible. From the early-1940s 
tax raids became a recurring feature of town life. The more systematic the tax regime 
became, however, the more evasion was brought to light. By the end of the colonial 
period default of taxes was endemic. This is taken as evidence of the declining legitimacy 
of the British colonial regime.
In Tanganyika various legislation existed on the statute books aimed at restricting 
African mobility both within and to Dar es Salaam. It had limited success. In chapter s'lx 
the emergence in the town of an undifferentiated mass of un- and under-employed 
Africans who to the colonial mind represented a constant threat to urban order is 
described. It included jobless ‘loiterers’, shiftless rickshaw-pullers, beggars, and perhaps 
most seriously unruly adolescents. Attempts were made to control all these groups, but 
with the meagre resources available to the urban administration they had limited effect. 
Anxieties provoked by the presence of these urban undesirables were confirmed by 
periodic outbreaks of disorder which occurred in the town. The second half of the chapter 
provides a detailed overview of those instances of disorder which are recorded in 
surviving sources.
The final part of the thesis deals with colonial attempts to control the ‘surplus’ 
population of Dar es Salaam. Chapterse/fiw reviews the varied legislation aimed at 
restricting urban immigration by Africans between the wars. This included laws limiting 
an African’s right to remain in the town without permission from the district office. 
Legislation also criminalised the presence of jobless Africans, and empowered the 
District Commissioner to have them repatriated to their areas of origin. Whilst the
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unemployed were singled out by colonial legislation, however, they were actually rarely 
targeted in the inter-war period, during which the urban African population grew 
relatively slowly. The one time repatriations occurred 011 any great scale was during the 
early-1930s, when the depression had resulted in serious urban unemployment. When the 
same problem emerged once again towards the end of the decade, renewed attention was 
directed at controlling rural-urban migration which by now was gathering pace. In the 
early-1940s repatriation of jobless Africans under Township Rule 136(2) was becoming 
an increasingly frequent ploy used by the district administration. However, its’ routine 
application was rudely interrupted by a hostile legal judgment by a maverick magistrate, 
Justice McRoberts, Discussion of the controversial McRoberts’ ruling occupies the latter 
part of the chapter.
Chapter offers a description of increased rural-urban migration which occurred 
from the late-1930s, and a tentative explanation of this phenomenon is advanced 
(although existing data is extremely weak in this area). The official response is then 
examined. Faced with a rapidly increasing urban African population colonial 
administrators hankered after some form of pass system to control movement from the 
rural areas. A number of proposals were put forward along these lines. Whilst such 
measures were administratively desirable, however, politically they were unacceptable, 
and Whitehall made sure that no such system was introduced in Tanganyika. This 
restricted official action to prevent the growth of a ‘surplus’ population in Dar es Salaam 
to just one piece of legislation, the Removal of Undesirable Natives (later Persons) 
Ordinance (Cap. 104), which had replaced Township Rule 136(2) after this had been 
declared ultra vires by Justice McRoberts.
Deprived of any other measures to take against the rapidly expanding urban 
population, Cap. 104 was applied with increasing frequency by the district administration, 
particularly in the closing years of the British administration. By the late-1950s, in the 
course of daily raids in the township, up to 2,000 Africans were being forcibly removed 
from the town annually. Chapter nin«2 gives a detailed account of the increased 
application of repatriation legislation in the final decades of colonial rule. It ends with 
short biographical sketches of some of the victims of these campaigns. Through these a 
chink of light is shed upon the lives of individual Africans deported as wahuni.
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Part One 
‘The problem of the urban African’1: The ‘town native’ and colonial 
order in Dar es Salaam 1919-1961
‘The population is hourly increasing in breadth and strength. It is an aggregate of masses, 
our conception of which clothe themselves in terms which express something portentous 
and fearful.’
William Cooke Taylor, quoted in Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.61.




Urbanisation in comparative perspective
The greater difficulty in the management o f the poor occurs in great cities. It is there that 
vice has spread great temptation, and pleasure her seductions, and folly her allurements: 
that guilt is encouraged by the hope o f her impunity, and idleness fostered by the frequency 
o f example. It is to these great marts of human corruption, that the base and the profligate 
resort from the simplicity of country life: it is there that they find victims whereon to 
practise their iniquity, and gains to reward the dangers that attend them. Virtue is there 
depressed from the obscurity in which it is involved: guilt is matured from the difficulty o f 
its detection: licentiousness is rewarded by the immediate enjoyments which it promises.1
The concern provoked amongst colonial officials by the phenomenon of African 
urbanisation was by no means unique to Tanganyika. Such anxiety had been 
characteristic of social relations in urban centres in Western societies at least since the 
industrial revolution began to change the character of their towns and cities from the 
early 19th century. In part these anxieties arose from the loosening of traditional structures 
of control. The urban arena was one in which old social, economic and political 
formations were broken down and -eventually- were replaced by new ones. Urbanisation 
led to the atomisation of individuals, and the emergence of distinct -and conflicting- 
interest groups. In Victorian Britain -the first modem society one can characterise as 
urbanised- the concentrations of landless workers that began to congregate in the large 
industrial cities were viewed with mounting concern by contemporary politicians and 
observers.2 The first half of the nineteenth century had witnessed the shift from a 
predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society in Britain and there was great 
uncertainty amongst ‘respectable’ classes over the consequences of this process. In part, 
these concerns were articulated in terms of the loss of an idyllic agrarian society 
characterised by the reciprocal links between rulers and the ruled. They found expression 
in 19th century nostalgia for Merrie England and in the poetry of the Romantics. As the 
crucible of the emerging industrial society, urban centres were characterised as the
1 Friedrich Engels, The condition o f  the working class in England, trans. & ed. by W.O. Henderson & W.H. 
Clialoner, (Stanford, CA, 1958), pp.135-6.
2 See pp.59-87 of Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, (Harmondsworth, 1968) for examples.
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location of human degeneration and demoralisation. Stedman-Jones, writing of London’s 
‘respectable’ classes in the late-19th century, notes that whilst ‘the countryside had 
symbolised the forces of simplicity, strength, phlegm, loyalty and deference’ to these 
people, ‘the growing preponderance of the urban population portended the sway of 
dangerous and volatile populations.’3 To 19th century observers the towns were 
particularly associated with the acquisition of vices. For many, such as Charles 
Masterman, who viewed with concern the emergence of ‘a new race ...this New Town 
type’ in the East End of London, what was occurring with the shift to the city was a kind 
of ‘demographic degeneration’, in which second generation urban citizens were not only 
‘stunted, narrow-chested, easily wearied’ but also ‘voluble, excitable, with little ballast, 
stamina, or endurance -  seeking stimulus in drink, in betting, in any unaccustomed 
conflicts at home or abroad.’4
In fact, there was widespread ignorance about the new urban working class 
communities and about the social forms that were emerging in their midst. Middle class 
concern over urban growth stemmed from this lack of knowledge. It was largely a fear of 
the unknown. According to Emsley:
H.A. Fregier coined the term ‘les classes dangereuses’ in 1840; and while the Parisian poor 
may, in the event, have been far more dangerous to the bourgeoisie than any o f their British 
counterparts, Fregier*s term was rapidly anglicised and taken over by British men o f  
property as much to define their fears as any social group lurking in the city slums.5
Briggs observes that to the Victorian middle classes ‘(t)he ‘dark city’ and the ‘dark 
continent’ were alike mysterious, and it is remarkable how often the exploration of the 
unknown city was compared with the exploration of Africa and Asia.’6 William Booth, 
the founder of the Salvation Army, for example, asked in 1890:
As there is a darkest Africa, is there not also a darkest England? Civilisation, which can 
breed its own barbarians, does it not also breed its own pygmies? May we not find a 
parallel at our own doors, and discover within a stone’s throw of our cathedrals and palaces 
similar horrors to those which Stanley has found existing in the great Equatorial forest?7
3 Gareth Stedman-Jones, Outcast London, (Harmondsworth, 1984), p. 150.
C.F.G. Masterman, The Heart o f  Empire: Discussions o f  Modern City Life in England (1901), quoted in 
A. Lees, Cities Perceived: Urban society in European and American thought, J820-J940, (Manchester, 
1985), p .155.
5 Clive Emsley, Crime and society in England, 1750-1900, (London, 1996 (2nd ed.)), p.36.
6 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.62.
7 General William Booth, In Darkest England and the Way Out (1890), quoted in Lees, Cities, p.l 10.
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He equated the English slum to the African jungle in its ‘monotonous darkness, its 
malaria and its gloom, its dwarfish de-humanised inhabitants, the slavery to which they 
are subjected, their privations and their misery.’
Towards the end of the 19th century these uncharted territories began to be penetrated 
by Victorian philanthropists. Men such as Charles Booth and Charles Masterman, both of 
whom were particularly concerned by the breakdown of community and associated 
problems in the overcrowded East End of London. In contrasting the organic type of 
communities to be found in rural areas with the more individualistic, alienated society of 
the cities, later social scientists refined concerns of pioneers such as Booth and 
Masterman and began to theoretise the social and cultural processes that were occurring 
in modern society. Durkheim’s concept of anomie -a  state where ‘common values and 
common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, and new values and meanings 
have not developed’8- is perhaps the best known of these theories of social change and 
one which was seen to have particular relevance to conditions in the towns and cities of 
the industrialised world. Durkheim, like many earlier commentators on the process of 
urbanisation, was ‘concerned that the city, together with the spread of ‘modern 
civilisation’, was destabilising the ‘equilibrium’ of certain individuals and prompting 
degeneracy and deviance.’9 In America, Robert Park, one of the pioneers of the Chicago 
school of urban sociology, reached similar conclusions. ‘Everyone is more or less on his 
own in the city’, he wrote in 1915. ‘The consequence is that man, translated to the city, 
has become a problem to himself and to society in a way and to an extent that he never 
was before.’10
Concerns aroused by the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation in 19th century 
Britain, and later other Western societies, are echoed by attitudes towards the similar 
processes occurring a century later in sub-Saharan Africa, as we shall see in the case of 
Dar es Salaam. In the colonial rhetoric regarding the effects of urban growth in 
Tanganyika are traces of the Victorian anxiety towards the transformation of British 
society. There is the same idealisation of country life and corresponding concern over the 
detachment of the urban migrant from his rural community. In the colonial context,
8 This definition is from the Encyclopaedia Britannica CD ROM 1997 version.
9 Emsley, Crime, p.94.
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though, the African jungle -or ‘bush’, at least- becomes a virtuous environment instead of 
a metaphor for vice and demoralisation. Similarly, Merrie England could be equated with 
a conception of Merrie Afi'ica in which existed integrated rural African societies 
governed by unchanging customary regulations. Colonial officials expressed the same 
concern over the breakdown of traditional structures of control, and the licentiousness of 
the urban environment. They were, like their counterparts in the West, anxious about an 
emerging urban ‘mass’; over the corruption that results from the dense concentration of 
population, amongst which a penchant for criminality is acquired, or the thriftlessness of 
the stereotyped urbanite. In the ‘detribalised native’ we have the colonial counterpart to 
Masterman’s ‘New Town type’. Meanwhile, surveys of the African populations of Dar es 
Salaam and other colonial towns, which found widespread malnutrition and concluded 
that large numbers of urban Africans were as a result more or less ‘unemployable’, 
uncovered a ‘demographic degeneration’ similar to that which had been described by 
Masterman in the East End. The colonial state, like 19th century industrial capitalism, had 
created a monster of its own making. Amongst the immigrants to the urban areas it was 
the African youth who were a prime focus for concern. The emergence of wahimi in Dar 
es Salaam, or the ‘wharf rats’ of Accra or Lagos, were equally unwelcome as the ‘street 
urchins’ in the rookeries of London. Colonial perceptions of the negative consequences of 
African urbanisation are coloured by a sense of the ‘other’ -resulting from an ignorance 
about African life in the towns- that corresponds with the fear of the unknown inhabitants 
of the Victorian slums. In the Tanganyikan case the ignorance is deeper still because the 
cultural and racial barrier between the colonial masters and their subjects is much greater 
than that which separated the Victorian urban poor from their bourgeois contemporaries. 
This gap in colonial knowledge only began to be bridged when, as had also occurred in 
the West, attention was belatedly directed towards the urban areas as the process of 
urbanisation became acknowledged as irreversible late in the colonial era. Some 
observers even made explicit the connection between what was occurring in Africa to 
what had earlier occurred in the West. ‘When we cease looking upon Africa as a 
completely exotic land,’ wrote P.M. Henry in the New Commonwealth in 1954,
10 Robert Park, “The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behaviour in the urban environment” 
(1915), quoted in Lees, Cities Perceived, p.301.
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we shall recognise the many familiar features o f  the Industrial Revolution o f the 19lh 
century. Obviously the situation is complicated by racial differences, but fundamentally it 
is the same.11
As parallels can be drawn between colonial Tanganyika and 19th century Britain so 
too, less surprisingly perhaps, are similarities to be found with the colonial experience in 
other parts of Africa. In the most extreme cases Africans were legally denied the right to 
reside in urban centres. This was the case in colonial Nairobi and in Salisbury where 
African labourers had only temporary rights of residence (although the prevalence of 
migrant labour meant that short-term residents were the commonest type of inhabitant in 
most African towns in the colonial period). In Southern Rhodesia, observed Gray, 
‘[ajccording to the theory of segregation they [urban Africans] were not there’:
The towns were part o f the white man’s world. There his interests alone should be 
considered and his outlook should prevail. The black man’s needs and security were to be 
provided for in the Reserves; there was the centre and focus for his life, and his periods o f 
labour for European employers were merely brief interruptions.12
In 1935 the District Officer for Mufulira, on the North Rhodesian Copperbelt, lamented 
the process of African urbanisation there:
A wholly industrialised Wemba is, I should think, a very unpleasant person indeed, and it 
will come when this generation grows up here. He will require very strong discipline, he 
will lose the very powerful discipline o f the White Fathers’ Mission in the Wemba country, 
and he will find himself down here an individual instead o f as in his own country a section 
o f his family group. I think he will be a very difficult man indeed to manage, and his son 
will be worse.13
Whilst this ‘anti-urbanism’ was most evident in the settler colonies like Kenya and the 
Rhodesias -and of course South Africa- it was nevertheless present in some shape or form 
in colonies throughout Africa. In his 1933 book, The African Labourer, Orde Browne, 
then acting as Colonial Office advisor on African labour, provides a classic example of 
this colonial prejudice (in this case under the guise of support for rural African tradition):
The structure o f primitive tribal society had in itself much to be said for it, and as an 
experiment in government must be considered a success in its elementary degree. It can be 
claimed that the system produced a community where crime was rare, pauperism and 
prostitution unknown, and drunkenness not a serious evil; where, under normal conditions, 
all were adequately fed, clothed, and housed according to the primitive standard expected;
11 P.M. Henry, “The African Townee”, New Commonwealth, 4th March 1954, pp.221/2.
12 Richard Gray, The Two Nations, (London, 1960), pp.l 10 and 229.
13 Ibid., p . l l l .
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and where life could be carried on in wholesome and natural circumstances.14
Crime, pauperism, prostitution and drunkenness were, of course, all associated with 
towns. In the case of East Africa, it was observed in 1955 that in the past:
The theory o f indirect rule as well as the personal inclinations of many administrators led 
to a concentration on the development o f rural tribal societies rather than the training of an 
educated urban elite, and also to the view that the town was not a suitable habitat for a 
permanent African urban society; there has indeed been a tendency to look upon the 
‘westernised’ African with suspicion. The towns have, therefore, been regarded as bases 
for administrative and commercial activities rather than as centres o f civilising influence, 
still less o f permanent African population.15
European ambivalence towards African urbanisation is best exemplified by the 
legislation designed to impose order and to control movement within and to the urban 
centres. Measures aimed at jobless Africans in the towns, for example, were rife 
throughout colonial Africa. They were an early part of the legislation enacted in ‘the tidy- 
minded Belgian Congo’,16 where the urban ‘loafer problem’ had by the mid-1920s 
become ‘so serious that the Labour Commission of 1925 expressed very strong views and 
recommended drastic remedies.’17 In the French colonies ‘officials, with an ingrained fear 
of urban riot, made a ‘banal and daily’ but ineffective practice of deporting the 
population flottante, which meant almost any unemployed immigrant.’18 In East Africa 
the Vagrancy Ordinances of Uganda and Kenya empowered officials to imprison and/or 
repatriate persons ‘found wandering without any visible means of subsistence’19 just as 
similar legislation did in Tanganyika. In 1944, no less than eleven municipal bye-laws 
existed in Nairobi that were aimed at unemployed Natives20, and the Voluntarily 
Unemployed Persons Ordinance of 1950 gave police the power to repatriate undesirables.
Alongside this legislation aimed at enforcing order within the towns were a variety of 
measures designed to control movement to them. In the Haut Katanga province of the 
Belgian Congo ‘every attempt (was) made to strictly control the entry of Africans into 
Elisabethville... to try and ensure... that only the requisite number of workers in relation
14 Major G. St.J. Orde-Browne, The African Labourer, (Oxford, 1933), p. 12.
15 East Africa Royal Commission 1953-55 Report, (HMSO, 1961 Ed.) [hereafter: EARC Report\, p. 201.
16 Iliffe, African Poor, p. 190.
17 Report by Gen. St.J. Orde-Browne on ‘Labour conditions in Tanganyika Territory’ (Dsm, 1926) 
[hereafter: Orde-Browne, ‘Labour’], para. 115, copy in C0691/83.
18 Iliffe, African Poor, p. 190.
19 ‘Ndola Report’, p.67.
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to the work available (was) permitted to enter the city.’21 In Southern Rhodesia, on arrival 
in a town Africans had to obtain a pass to seek work from the Town Pass Officer. After 
work and accommodation had been obtained the municipality issued a Certificate of 
Service which was usually valid for a period of three months. A similar registration 
system was in operation in Kenya before it was replaced by an identification system 
based 011 fingerprinting. Visitors to Nairobi were required to obtain a temporary residence 
permit from the City African Affairs Officer 22
Whilst legislation such as that discussed above often existed throughout the colonial 
period without being significantly altered, official attitudes towards the more general 
process of African urbanisation began to shift from the late-193Os. A growing awareness 
of the permanence of African communities emerged. As early as 1935 a British Secretary 
of State observed, in response to developments in Northern Rhodesia, that ‘it will be 
necessary to accept a degree of detribalisation’ in towns on the Copperbelt.23 Three years 
later Lord Hailey wrote of African urban populations that whilst ‘(t)he growth of this 
class is viewed with some apprehension’, colonial administrations foresaw ‘the expansion 
of a class which will eventually become in the fiill sense detached from tribal life.’ Hailey 
recommended that a new policy should be adopted ‘directed to building up an organic 
social life of a type of which Africa itself offers little experience.’24 Indeed, after WWII 
colonial administrations did become increasingly concerned about the social welfare of 
African urban populations. In part this was a response to the perceived loss of moral and 
material support which was suffered by the town-dwelling African, detached as he was 
from his kith and kin in his tribal home. It was also a result of strains 011 the urban 
environment which were becoming apparent to colonial officials at this time.
The 1940s saw an acceleration in rates of rural-urban migration which led to rapidly 
growing urban populations. Colonial administrations had great difficulties developing an 
infrastructure to keep pace. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the shortage of
20 Bye-Laws Numbers 187, 188, 190, 200, 202, 207, and 208 to 212. Deputy PC Pike to CS 22,,d July 1944, 
TNA/61/443/1.
21 Report on a visit to the Belgian Congo to examine African housing, September 1954, in 
TNA/225/DC01/3/3.
22 ‘Ndola report’, pp.63-66, contains information on controls on urban migration and residence in East and 
Central Africa.
23 Quoted in Frederick Cooper, On the African Waterfront, (New Haven 1987), p.255.
24 Lord Hailey, An African Survey, (London, 1938), p.544.
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housing. In Dar es Salaam, massive overcrowding in the African and Asian areas became 
apparent in the course of WWII, during which the available housing stock actually fell. 
Overcrowding was only partially -and temporarily- solved by the government housing 
schemes of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In Nairobi, where stricter building rules 
resulted in an even more restricted supply of rented accommodation, the number of 
inhabitants grew by seventeen per cent a year in the 1940s. By 1947 the Kenyan 
administration estimated that 82,000 Africans were living in housing designed to
7  ^accommodate only 54,000. It is no coincidence that it was in the 1940s that both 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam saw the emergence of the first significant squatter settlements. 
Further south administrators faced the same problem. In 1944 the Howman Committee, 
in investigating the living conditions of Africans in Southern Rhodesian towns, found 
overcrowding everywhere, with the result that ‘Africans squeeze into what rooms they 
can find, seek out all kinds of shelters about the towns and ‘married’ couples share 
rooms with bachelors’.26
Malnutrition amongst town populations was another urban problem which began to 
receive increasing attention from the late 1930s. In 1939 the Committee on Nutrition in 
the Colonial Empire found evidence of widespread malnourishment throughout the 
empire 27 In Dar es Salaam in the same year a report estimated that in a town ‘plagued 
with low rates of wages and a high cost of living’ sixty per cent of workers were 
employed for wages insufficient to provide a subsistence. Meanwhile, in Kenya, where 
in 1939 the minimum wage to meet the cost of living in Nairobi was calculated to be 21 
Kenyan shillings, the Davies Report found that out of a workforce of 36,000 nearly 
16,000 were earning under this amount. Widespread malnutrition was also uncovered in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s by a number of reports on urban labour in the Rhodesias. 
Evidence given to the Howman Committee in 1944 was ‘almost unanimous in stating that 
malnutrition is seriously prevalent eveiywhere in the urban areas.’29 On the Copperbelt in
25 See Andrew Burton, “Emergence o f an African underclass: Nairobi 1954-1971”, unpub. MA diss. 
(SOAS, 1993).
26 Quoted in Gray, Two Nations, p.252.
27 Report o f  the Cttee. on Nuti'ition in the Colonial Empire, (HMSO, 1939), p.151.
28 ‘Report on Native Affairs in Dar es Salaam Township’ by DO Pike [hereafter: Pike, ‘Native Affairs’], 5lh 
June 1939, in TNA/18950/Vol.II.
29Ibid., p.223.
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the early-1940s, whilst the average wage was found to be enough to meet basic needs, 
large numbers of men were earning considerably less.30
The low rates of pay prevalent in colonial economies were a product of the 
predominance of migrant labour. Most Africans working in the towns were on short-term 
contracts and travelled there alone; this absolved employers of the responsibility of 
providing a family wage. Migrant workers’ continued links with the rural areas 
subsidised the cost of their labour. Indeed, the notion that wages were merely pocket 
money for African workers was a widely held belief. Their [Africans] pocket is a 
different one from ours,’ a Provincial Commissioner told an enquiry into disturbances on 
the Copperbeltin 1935,
and the money they put into it still remains for almost the whole population o f this territory 
an unnecessary luxury, that is as far as living is concerned. They can live comfortably 
without any money at all -not at Nkana [mine] for instance, but when they return to their 
homes- apart from their payment o f revenue. If I am deprived of my salary I starve, but the 
native in similar circumstances can go home and live as happily as ever,3’
As Gray has pointed out, this point of view was riddled with error. An African’s links 
with the rural areas were ‘in many cases... financially a mixed blessing’ with the 
expectations of rural kin often outweighing the benefits these might bring. Nevertheless, 
attitudes such as these allowed the payment of often spectacularly inadequate wages to 
urban African workers to go unremarked until WWII. Increasingly, though, from the 
early-1940s reports on conditions in urban African communities in East and Central 
Africa began to conclude that this so-called cheap labour was not in actual fact cheap at 
all as it was linked to inefficiency. Low rates of pay led to widespread malnutrition 
amongst migrant labourers. If only for reasons of labour efficiency African standards of 
living needed to be raised. In Tanganyika, M.J.B. Molohan, a Labour Officer in Dar es 
Salaam, was just one official who at this time counselled for the introduction of a 
minimum urban wage.32 Similarly, in Southern Rhodesia both Ibbotson, in his Report on 
a survey o f urban African conditions in Southern Rhodesia, and the Howman Committee 
both advocated a minimum wage. It was considered that this would
30 See A. Lynn Saffery, A report on some aspects o f  African living conditions on the Copperbeft o f  N. 
Rhodesia, Lusaka (1943); and R.J.B. Moore, “Native wages and standard o f  living in Northern Rhodesia”, 
African Studies, V ol.l (1942).
31 Quoted in Gray, Two Nations, pp. 116/7.
32 Report on Unemployment and Wage Rates in Dsm by Labour Officer Molohan [hereafter: Molohan 
‘Unemployment’], 27th September 1941, p.7, in TNA/61/443/1.
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give protection against the casual, inefficient rural visitor; lead to more efficient use of 
labour by certain employers; prevent exploitation; link up with a ‘compulsory education’ 
recommendation by preventing the employment o f juveniles; and finally would ‘provide a 
floor above which wages would be encouraged to rise’ by various measures designed to 
increase efficiency.33
A later Kenyan report, written by Labour Commissioner Carpenter, concluded that 
under conditions in which migrant labour predominated it was ‘clearly illogical to expect 
that the African worker... (would) be capable of that concentrated and sustained physical 
effort which we like to associate with the western conception of manual work.’34 Migrant 
work, Carpenter noted, entailed the ‘shuttling back and forth between two modes of 
life’,35 and participants in the system were not making a satisfactory adjustment to either. 
In order to inculcate western attitudes to work it was considered necessary ‘to first 
remove the African from the enervating and retarding influences of his economic and 
cultural background.’36 In addition, the migrant labour system was found to be inefficient 
on account of its high labour turnover and the associated need to continuously recruit and 
train new workers. A better trained, more reliable workforce was increasingly what was 
required by post-war employers in the colonies. Migrancy was also causing 
administrative concerns. A growing mass of poorly housed, poorly fed Africans 
congregating in the urban areas came to constitute a real threat to their smooth 
administration, a threat made manifest in the strikes and disturbances of the 1940s and 
early 1950s.37 Also, as increasing numbers of Africans spent longer periods of time in the 
urban centres, the traditional, rural sources of authority upon which colonial officials 
relied came to carry less weight.
Confronted with rapidly expanding town populations, which were often 
undernourished and ill-housed, over which the colonial state in many cases exercised 
diminishing control, colonial officials were forced to re-appraise policy with regard to 
urban areas. ‘The urbanisation of the native population in Africa’, wrote one 
commentator in 1954, ‘is now recognised as the paramount social development.’38 In East
33 Gray, Two Nations, pp.213/4
34 Kenya Colony, Report o f  the Committee on African Wages, (Nairobi Govt. Printer, 1954), p. 32.
35 UN report quoted in Cooper, Waterfront, p. 261.
36 Kenya Colony, op. cit., para. 94, p. 11.
37 Cooper, Waterfront, pp. 20-22; see also F. Cooper (Ed.), Struggle fo r  the city, (Beverley Hills, 1983), 
Introduction, pp. 7-48.
38 Henry, “African Townee”, p.220.
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Africa the same year, it was the East African Royal Commission which set the tone by 
announcing:
It is essential to break down the barriers which prevent Africans from full participation in 
the life o f towns. The African must come to regard the towns as places which fully provide 
him with an outlet for his courage, ability and initiative.39
By this time a consensus was emerging, in both London and the East and Central African 
colonies, over the adoption of a policy of labour stabilisation in the towns. According to 
one report stabilisation was ‘an essential condition of the advance of the African... [one] 
which should be carefully encouraged and we believe it is a movement which in any case 
will gradually take place.’40 As well as addressing the problem of workers productivity, 
the new labour policy was also hoped to have beneficial consequences for the embattled 
urban administrations. The creation of a permanent urban workforce receiving 
substantially higher wages than the old migrant labourers would not only improve the 
skill levels of African workers, it would also produce a restricted, manageable class of 
African workers residing in the towns —with their families- who had a vested interest in 
the smooth functioning of the urban economy.
39 EARC Report, p. 250.
40 ‘Ndola report’, pp.6-7.
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Chapter Two 
The colonial mind and African urbanisation in Tanganyika, 1919-1961
The emergence of the ‘town native’: Dar es Salaam 1919-39
In the covering despatch for a 1926 report the Governor of Tanganyika, Donald
Cameron, was expressing a commonplace of colonial wisdom when he observed that ‘the
native in a town, even when employed, is exposed to many temptations and is liable to
take to evil ways. *1 Freedom from the customary constraints of his or her rural home all
too often, in the view of colonial officials, combined with the density of the urban
population and the dynamism and unfamiliarity of urban life to have a disastrous impact
on the native character. So, in 1927, the Labour Commissioner warned that were the drift
into towns of unemployed workers to occur on any appreciable scale ‘it is difficult to
imagine a speedier means of debauching a whole population.’2 The towns were the
location of many evils. It was, according to the 1924 Dar es Salaam district report,
‘fatally easy for a native who finds it difficult to earn what he considers a satisfactory
wage, to turn to the profits that he can readily secure from such sources as gambling,
*>
liquor and prostitution.’ Even at leisure the African in Dar es Salaam was felt to be 
exposed to unsalutary influences. ‘The amusements and relaxation provided for the 
African in the town,’ the 1924 district report tells us, ‘must all be classed as unedifying in 
the extreme; the possible exception being the cinema theatres which are censored, and 
probably do not much harm, if very little good.’4 ‘Education, mission efforts, and closer 
supervision and control’, the 1924 report goes on, ‘may, it is hoped, work an 
improvement; but the present effect of town life on the average African is indubitably 
most demoralising.’5
1 Governor Cameron’s despatch accompanying Orde-Browne, ‘Labour’, in PRO/C0691/83.
2 Labour Dept. AR for 1927, p.51.
3 DAR for 1924, p,4, TNA/53.4.
4 DAR for 1924, p.6.
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Africans who existed on the fringes of the urban economy and administration were a 
particular source of official anxiety. The casual labourer only intermittently engaged in 
employment; the newly arrived immigrant exploiting the hospitality of a town dwelling 
relative; the local Zaramo from a neighbouring ‘native’ location; the contract worker at 
the end of his contract; all were not only prey to the temptations of town life but were 
also beyond the supervision of the colonial administration. Most disturbingly they were 
exposed to the corrupting influence of that class of ‘native’ described as ‘detribalised’; 
the African who had succumbed to temptation and been contaminated by contact with the 
cosmopolitan milieu of the town.6 It was the ‘detribalised native’ to whom the perceived 
ills of African urban society were invariably ascribed, and whom colonial officials 
considered to be their principal foe in their struggle to assert control over the urban arena; 
who, according to the 1926 Police report, was ‘the real culprit against peace and good 
order.’7 Detribalisation was ‘an evil which looms largely in the vision of many 
administrative officers; it is also the basic idea which makes many native headmen 
reluctant to allow their people to go to work.’8 Referring to the ‘detribalised town native’ 
the following year, Orde-Browne observed that ‘(t)his drifting mass of doubtfully 
employable natives’ who lacked ‘the moral fibre which might form a safeguard against 
evil influences’ was ‘in much need of closer control.’9 The problem, however, was ‘a 
difficult and elusive one’, for whilst it was
desirable to discourage the formation o f the detribalised, demoralised element which 
unfortunately is common in the towns, it is nevertheless far from easy to devise any system 
o f registration or control that will not in practice prove oppressive to the innocent and 
unsophisticated native, while easily eluded by the type that needs it most.10
As increasing numbers of Africans had experience of town life the growth of this 
detribalised class was a prime concern of inter-war officials. Once in the town the 
guileless native was considered to be all too easily led down the path to corruption. Orde- 
Browne, bemoaning the frequent descent of the ‘uncontaminated native’ into the
5 DAR for 1924, p. 10.
6 M.J.B. Molohan, in his 1957 report on Detribalisation , (Dsm, 1959), p.l 1, gives the following definition 
o f the term: ‘ ...the effect on Africans that is occasioned by their separation from family, clan and tribal 
authority as well as from the social codes o f behaviour, discipline, custom and perhaps religion which 
originally guided their thoughts and actions, with the object o f making them useful members o f  the tribe or 
community to which they belonged.5
7 Police AR for 1926, p.57.
8 Orde-Browne, ‘Labour5, para. 165.
9 Labour Dept. AR for 1927, p.8.
10 Labour Dept. AR for 1928, p .10.
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‘unemployable loafer’ through contact with the urban environment, warned of ‘the large 
and growing class of detribalised natives who have fallen away from African social 
organisation without having qualified themselves to take a place in a Europeanised 
community.’11 Part of the problem was the diminishing influence of elders over the 
growing number of African youths making their way to Dar es Salaam. According to 
Baker:
the old men usually dislike the town atmosphere... No effort has been made to incorporate 
them in modern town civilisation and they appear to be somewhat bewildered at the rate 
and nature o f modern progress whilst the younger generation considers that it is more 
competent to deal with present day affairs than they are and openly scoff them [sic] as 
inefficient and out o f date.12
Meanwhile, the colonial administration itself was considered to be ‘a thing apart from 
native life’.13 Lacking any form of constructive influence on their behaviour, large 
numbers of young Africans were to be found in the town who, according to Baker, were 
‘devoid of any sense of responsibility’. ‘Such men’, he complained,
are released from all tribal sanctions and often, finding a life o f uncontrolled freedom to 
their liking, remain in the township until they have become so used to an urban existence 
that they are unfit for any other life.14
Attitudes towards African urbanisation in the 1940s
Beginning in the late 1930s a shift in attitude took place amongst Tanganyikan 
officials towards the African urban population, a shift that corresponded with the similar 
process that occurred in British colonies throughout East and Central Africa. Whilst 
concern over the demoralising effects of town life on Africans continued to be expressed, 
many officials recognised that a permanent African community in Dar es Salaam -one 
which in the future was likely to grow substantially- was an established fact, and that new 
initiatives were required in order to achieve the proper development of this community. A 
number of factors led to this reappraisal. There was growing awareness of the poor living 
and working conditions suffered by the majority of Africans in the town. Second, from
11 Orde-Browne, ‘Labour1, para. 114.
12 Memo on the Social Conditions o f Dsm, E.C. Baker, 4 th June 1931 [hereafter: Baker, ‘Social 
Conditions’], p.72. Copy in author’s possession -  also in SOAS archive.
13 Baker, ‘Social Conditions’, p.72.
14 Ibid., p.70.
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the late 1930s there was a surge in the growth rate of Dar es Salaam’s African population. 
Finally, the prospect of a fully urbanised African community, whose links with their rural 
homes had been severed, was no longer perceived to be such a cause for alarm (as long as 
it was guided down proper channels). The shift in approach was also a reflection of the 
new African policy emerging from Whitehall in the course of the 1940s, in which indirect 
rule by chiefs was to give way to representative local government involving educated 
Africans.15 The focus had shifted from the preservation of traditional loyalties to the 
creation of a new, purportedly more democratic, set of values, which if anything stood 
more chance of being inculcated by urban than by rural Africans.
The impecunious existence suffered by the majority of Dar es Salaam’s African 
population was first observed in a 1939 report by DO Pike in which he calculated that a 
majority of employees were being paid ‘sub-marginal’ wages.16 Conditions actually 
deteriorated over the next few years. Whilst the cost of living rose steeply in the early 
1940s, wages remained at the same low level, becoming, in the words of one Labour 
Officer, ‘more sub-marginal than ever.’17 Meanwhile, a shortage of housing was leading 
to the accentuation of slum conditions in the African township. What resulted from the 
high demand for and the limited supply of housing were ever higher rents which, along 
with the poor wages paid to workers, were leading to homelessness amongst the town’s 
African population. It was, according to Molohan, ‘a common sight for natives to be seen 
sleeping out at night in public places and buildings or on verandahs of private houses 
simply because they are unable to pay for a night’s lodging.’18
By the early 1940s officials were acknowledging that the conditions of existence 
experienced by the majority of Africans in Dar es Salaam were simply unacceptable. 
Something had to be done, not only to alleviate the position of the urban African but also 
to effect a more orderly organisation of labour. Social, political and  economic 
imperatives made it essential that the ‘vicious circle of low wages and sub-human living 
conditions on the one hand and laziness and unwillingness to work on the other’ was 
broken.19 In particular, it was important that the growing problem of urban joblessness
15 See R.D. Pearce, Turning Point in Africa, (London, 1982), for a discussion o f this policy.
16 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’, p,9.
17 Molohan, ‘Unemployment’, p.4.
18 Ibid.
19 Suggestion for PC’s conference agenda, AO Mafia to PC, 27lh May 1943, T N A /61/702/3. Although this
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was addressed. In his report on unemployment Molohan had recorded that ‘he felt... in 
Dar es Salaam we may be regarded as sitting on top of a volcano which may erupt at any 
moment. With the return of demobilised natives after the war the eruption may be all the 
more imminent.’20 Anticipating solutions which were to be adopted throughout much of 
East and Central Africa in the following decade, Molohan advocated a hike in wages - 
through the imposition of a minimum urban wage- accompanied by stricter controls over 
urban residence and over movement to the towns. The wisdom of the latter objective, the 
regulation of rural-urban migration was widely echoed in official correspondence at the 
time and in 1944 legislation was passed that was aimed at controlling the town 
population, although the pass system advocated by many officials was never introduced. 
Efforts to increase the levels of pay received by African workers were more half-hearted. 
Legislation for a minimum wage, although first enacted in 193 921 (and amended in 1947) 
was not actually put into effect until some seventeen years later.
Conditions in Dar es Salaam had not been helped by the town’s rapid growth in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s. In spite of there being ‘insufficient work available for the 
normal town residents as it is’,22 large numbers of persons were entering Dar es Salaam 
in search of employment, particularly from neighbouring districts such as Uzaramu, 
Rufiji, Morogoro and Bagamoyo. ‘This drift was unacceptable’, wrote the Provincial 
Commissioner in 1943, because ‘besides increasing the difficulties of the Administration 
[it] means the withdrawal of agriculturalists from food production to non-productive, 
non-essential jobs and the tendency must be stopped.’23 The situation was further 
exacerbated by the introduction of a rationing system in 1943 which ‘acted like a magnet 
in attracting natives to the town who wished to be ensured a regular means of procuring 
foodstuffs.’24 In the six years up to 1944 the town’s African population had increased by 
more than 50 per cent, from 26,000 to approximately 40,000,25 and District Officer Pike 
anticipated (correctly) that there was ‘every prospect that this increase will continue in an
comment was made by an officer presiding over a rural district he pointed out that ‘(t)his state o f affairs is 
particularly bad in and around townships’ -  it is likely he had Dsm uppermost in mind.
Molohan, ‘Unemployment’, p.7.
21 Ordinance no.19 o f 1939.
22 Political Dsm to Political Utete, 17th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
23 Province!', Dsm to Political, Rufiji, Morogoro and Bagamoyo, 21st December 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
24 Quarterly Labour report by DO Dsm (for quarter ending 30lh September 1943), TNA/61/14/30.
25 Memo on the Development o f  African areas o f  Dar es Salaam Township by DO Pike, 12th July 1944, 
[Hereafter: Pike, ‘Development’] TNA/61/643/3.
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ever growing stream after the war.’26
Conscious of this development, officials became increasingly anxious about the return 
of demobilised soldiers, amongst whom, it was anticipated, many would be impatient of 
life in their rural districts of origin, opting instead to remain in Dar es Salaam. There was 
going to be, according to a secretariat minute, ‘a much larger proportion than hitherto of 
sophisticated and travelled natives who have seen the world and are likely to be restless 
and discontented with their conditions, and contemptuous of tribal discipline’ 27 
‘Demobilised Africans’, predicted Pike, ‘will flock to the towns as the only places where 
can be found the money, the food, the pleasures and not least the comradeship to which 
army life has accustomed them.’28 Indeed, in a letter to the Provincial Commissioner a 
month earlier, he had pointed out:
It is common knowledge that a high proportion of our conscripts were ‘town roughs’. 
These men will have learnt discipline and how to work; they will also have gained 
experience o f life. If we can place them in work, they may settle down; if  they fail to find 
work, they will revert to being ‘town roughs’ -  with such additional experience in 
‘roughness’ as will make them a serious problem.29
As early as 1942 Baker was reporting concern on the part of the Governor that measures 
be put in place to deal with ex-soldiers settling in Dar es Salaam as they otherwise would 
‘be liable to lead a profitless existence in the town if left to their own devices.’30 The 
Governor’s foresight, however, did not appear to be acted upon. The following year Pike 
observed that nothing had been done about this ‘urgent problem’ and that government 
departments, if they could be said to be doing anything, were actually contributing to the 
problem by giving preference in employment to ‘non-service persons’.31 It appears that 
after the war had ended demobilised soldiers continued to suffer from neglect as in 1946 
the District Officer for Uzaramo complained that ‘(n)othing is being done for these men; 
they are going to seed and becoming a serious problem in Dar es Salaam and possibly
o n
other Townships.’ By this time the influx of ex-servicemen, along with continuing 
rural-urban migration, had helped increase Dar es Salaam’s African population to around
26 Ibid.
27 Minute by W.E.J. to CS, 7th May 1943, TNA/61/702/3.
28 DO Pike to the Secretary o f  the Township Development Sub-committee, 11th September 1944, 
TN A /61/643/3.
29 DO Pike to PC, EP, 24th August 1944, TNA/61/686/16.
30 PC Baker to CS, 16th July 1942, TNA/61/443/1.
31 Suggestions for PC’s conference agenda by DC Pike, 12th May 1943, TNA/61/702/3.
32 Political, Uzaramu to PC, EP, 1st August 1946, TNA/61/502/pt.l.
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45,000.33
Corresponding with this expansion of Dar es Salaam’s population was a growing 
awareness of the permanence of African communities located in the urban areas and a 
new sense of urgency amongst colonial officials to devise a policy to cope with this 
phenomenon. Prompted by Lord Hailey, Tanganyikan administrators were coming to 
realise that ‘the urban centres have an importance which has not been fully appreciated 
by African Administrations.’34 According to the 1944 report of the Township 
Development Sub-committee c(t)he whole question of African development in urban 
communities merits the closest investigation on the part of Government. ’ What is more, 
members of the committee could ‘find no record that any considered Government policy 
in regard of urban Africans has either been propounded or implemented and we 
recommend that this defect be remedied at a very early date.’35 At the same time officials 
were becoming more sanguine about the dangers of urbanisation in general, and of 
‘detribalisation’ in particular. By the end of the decade attitudes had moved on so far on 
this score that in 1948 it was being pointed out that ‘(i)n the long run it will probably be 
accepted that tribalism has a retarding effect on the progress of the African community of 
the Territory (or East Africa) as a whole, and hence the long-term effect of detribalisation 
cannot be regarded as detrimental.’36
At a time when indirect rule was being abandoned, tribal sanction was 110 longer 
perceived to be so important in governing African behaviour. It was essential, however, 
that a new set of values emerged to take the place of customary rights and 
responsibilities. At the end of the war the problems of the towns and their inhabitants 
were seen as being at least in part attributable to administrative neglect between the wars. 
In Dar es Salaam this neglect was evident not only in the lack of physical ‘development’ 
in Zone III but also in the failure to foster amongst town-dwelling Africans a respectable 
urban identity to replace their former ‘tribal’ ones. According to District Officer Pike, 
‘(t)he one feature that is predominant in all past schemes in dealing with the urban 
African is that they have failed and instead of people with some degree of civic 
consciousness, everywhere one finds the African urban populations steeped in poverty,
33 Uzaramo DAR for 1946, TNA/3/XV/A.
34 Lord Hailey, Survey, p.543.
35 Report o f  the Township Development Sub-committee, 29th August 1944, TN A /61/643/3.
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crime and filth with all the selfishness of town ‘stiffs’.’37 The provincial report for the 
following year, meanwhile, phrased the position thus:
The present system in the township serves within certain limits but it provides insufficient 
outlet for the intelligentsia in the management o f affairs and also insufficient discipline for 
the less sophisticated elements in the population.38
What post-war officials should be aiming for was ‘to make the urban African a better 
citizen with a civic conscience.’39 This would be achieved by devoting more resources to 
the African community and its area of residence, and, perhaps most importantly, in 
encouraging greater African participation in township affairs. Indeed, beginning in 1941, 
when the Township Authority was expanded to include one unofficial African member 
for the first time, the 1940s saw Dar es Salaam’s administration undergo reorganisation 
on a number of occasions, each adjustment resulting in increased African participation in 
government.
Remaking urban society: official policy in the 1950s
The rapid expansion of the African population of Dar es Salaam in the preceding ten 
years40 had by the early 1950s led to urban development in Tanganyika ascending the 
political agenda. As the township burgeoned it became increasingly clear that new 
policies were required to address this situation. It was recognised, however, that a prime 
obstacle to the formation of any realistic new policy was official ignorance of what was 
actually going on in the African areas of the town. In response to this a preliminary 
survey of Dar es Salaam was commissioned. It was conducted by two South African 
sociologists who had just completed research on the town of Jinja, in neighbouring 
Uganda.41 In their estimation a comprehensive survey of Dar es Salaam was essential as a 
foundation for any new approach to dealing with the African urban population. When 
details of the proposed full-scale survey of Dar es Salaam reached the Standing Finance 
Committee, however, the members of the committee blanched at the envisaged costs and
36 Memo on the Effects o f  Detribalisation dated 2nd April 1948, TNA/37520.
37 Pike, ‘Development’, TNA/61/643/3.
38 PAR for 1945, p,31.
39 Pike, ‘Development’.
40 See Appendix 1.
41 Mr. and Mrs. R. and C. Sofer. Their report on Jinja was published as Jinja Transformed, East African
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the Sofers returned to Jinja. Officials responsible for the administration of the African 
urban population reacted to this setback with dismay. A senior government official 
berated the short-sightedness of this decision:
The rapid ‘urbanisation5 of our African population is one o f the most solid, urgent and vital 
facts o f the time, and it is giving rise to a great number of important problems... It is not 
possible to walk or drive from here to Ilala Football Ground or to the Hide Sheds on the 
Pugu Road without seeing evidence o f the fact...42
As the decade progressed, however, the situation in Dar es Salaam apparently became 
serious enough for the SFC to revise their decision and in 1956 a detailed social survey of 
the town was carried out. Indeed, such was the interest in Tanganyika’s urban areas in 
general that two further surveys were conducted of towns within the territory around the 
same time; one of Africans living in the northern town of Arusha, and another which 
looked at the situation of detribalised workers in both the plantation areas of Tanga 
region, as well as in Tanga town itself.43 In addition, research was being carried out by a 
government appointed committee -whose report was eventually published in 195944- on 
the phenomenon of detribalisation in the territory as a whole, with special reference to the 
urban areas,45 and to Dai- es Salaam in particular. In conjunction with the material on East 
African towns produced by the (slightly earlier) East Africa Royal Commission (EARC) 
report, this burst of activity in the mid-1950s was unprecedented. By this time though, it 
was acknowledged that ‘the urban proletariat have in history played an important part in 
changes in society’ and that ‘(a)lthough the (African) urban community is estimated as 
being as little as two per cent they are nonetheless an important percentage.’46 ‘They are, 
however,’ the minutes revealingly continue, ‘handicapped unless we can arrange urban, 
social and political life to help them.’47 Without more information on African urban 
society this was unlikely to occur.
In the early-1950s the same fundamental problems continued to vex colonial
Studies no.5 (EAISR, Kampala: 1955).
42 Minute by MSS (Minister for Social Services?), 25th September 1951, TNA/18950/Vol.III.
43 Social Survey o f  Arusha Township Africans *by C.J.K. Latham (Social Development Officer), 1957, in 
TNA/225/PA8.06B; & Dr. P.H. Gulliver, Alien Africans in Tanga Region, (Dsm, 1956).
44 Molohan, Detribalization.
45 Detribalisation was not confined to urban areas as may be assumed; it was also believed to occur at 
plantations, mines and other rural locations where large numbers o f migrant workers congregated.




administrators in Dar es Salaam as had done in the previous decade. Of greatest concern 
was the uninterrupted tide of rural-urban migrants which persisted seemingly unaffected 
by the increasing application of legislation against urban ‘undesirables’. ‘One of the 
biggest problems which faces us’, complained the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern 
Province in 1953, ‘is the question of uncontrolled migration into the big towns, with the 
presence of a floating, constantly changing, moneyless, propertyless, and often jobless 
class amounting at present often to thousands.’48 It was not only the numbers of the urban 
immigrants that was causing concern but their character also. According to the Labour 
Department report of the same year whilst ‘(o)stensibly such individuals may be said to 
be seeking employment.. .judging from the relatively small number who register for work 
at employment exchanges it is probable that the greater proportion are attracted to the 
towns by the possibility of making a living by dubious means.’49 A year earlier Governor 
Twining had seen fit to complain to the Colonial Office that
the movement o f Africans to the towns has gained momentum since the war and shows no 
signs o f abating. The lure o f the town has, on the contrary, increased and the number o f 
unemployed Africans in townships, including numerous juveniles, who eke out an 
existence by breaking the law or preying on their fellows grows daily.50
In spite of the increasing tolerance towards the process of African urbanisation, in the 
official imagination the urban environment continued to be one in which moral 
degeneracy abounded; and increasing rural-urban migration meant that growing numbers 
of Africans were at risk of contamination. According to a 1952 memorandum by the 
Acting Member for Local Government: ‘The evils and dangers which can result if this 
drift is allowed to continue unchecked are well known.’51
These ‘evils and dangers’ included not only the lure of petty crime but also urban 
alienation. According to the administration’s Senior Sociologist ‘[mjodern conditions 
were forcing Africans into a position where they had no cultural anchor and were 
therefore liable to become discontented.’52 The authors of the EARC report concurred:
In the towns Africans are confronted with a new way of life in which they join as isolated 
individuals, who must provide for their own material, mental and emotional needs. In many
48 PAR for 1953, p.40.
49 Labour Dept. AR for 1953, p.33.
50 Twining to Rogers, 21st November 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
51 Memo. No.68 for Executive Council, 6th May 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III,
52 Extract from minutes o f  Provincial Advisory Council, Tanga, 27 th/2 8 th September 1955, 
TNA/225/PA.8/06A.
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towns, the facilities for doing so are lacking, which leads to the resort to drunkenness and 
crime by those who, fresh from a life in a community which exercises considerable control 
over the thoughts and actions o f its members, are almost entirely lacking in those resources 
o f mind and character which would give them the capacity to develop interests at their 
leisure.53
In 1954, the District Commissioner of Dar es Salaam echoed these comments, observing 
that ‘in the urban areas where the cohesive and disciplinary sanctions of tribal life and 
authority are lacking... Africans are living in circumstances to which they have not 
adapted themselves fully.’54 There was precious little evidence of the ‘civic 
consciousness’ which some officials in the 1940s had hoped could be nurtured in the 
urban African population. In their preliminary survey the Sofers had reported ‘an 
ignorance among citizens which may be widespread concerning their rights, obligations 
and responsibilities.’55 E.G. Rowe, Commissioner for Eastern Province in 1954, recalled 
‘it was very difficult to get any civic sense, even in the crudest interpretation of that term, 
going among this shifting population.’56 Attempts had been made to correct this partly 
through the establishment of a network of Ward Councils to which Africans were elected. 
Their role in the administration of Dar es Salaam though, was negligible, and in the view 
of DC Harris they would ‘not be an important factor in the development of citizenship 
until they [we]re given some powers.’57
Although the post-war period had been one of relative affluence, poor living and 
working conditions experienced by the majority of the town’s African population also 
remained a prime concern of colonial officials in the early 1950s. Whilst there had been 
an upswing in the urban economy after the war, there had been a corresponding increase 
in the town’s population. ‘At the moment,’ reported the Tanganyika Standard in 1952, 
‘the territory is passing through a stage of great prosperity, but in Dar es Salaam there is 
definite hardship.’58 ‘[T]o obtain money for the bare necessities of life’, the report 
continued, ‘the score of ‘duka ya rahani’ [pawn shops] scattered strategically in the 
African areas of town have a constant stream of clients.’ These insignificant little shops, 
the Standard warned, with their ‘piles of clothes and stoves’, were ‘a red danger signal
53 EARC report, page unknown (Quoted in: Social Development to MLG 28 th Novem ber 1955, 
TN A/17396).
54 DC, Dsm to PC, EP, 12th May 1954, TNA/540/1/23.
55 Sofers’ Report, p .l.
56 Interview, p.38, RH/Mss.Afr.s.1698.
57 Minutes o f meeting o f Committee on African Detribalisation, (December?) 1956, TNA/225/PA.8/06A.
58 TS, 8th March 1952, p. 19.
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which the leaders of all communities might do well to bear in mind.’ Growing numbers 
of intermittently employed and jobless Africans were to be found in Dar es Salaam; a 
situation which no doubt contributed to the low rates of pay which continued to be 
prevalent there. In 1953 the Dar es Salaam British Legion discovered that the average 
wage of unskilled labourers (who constituted the majority of the town’s workforce) was 
insufficient to meet their needs by at least 25 per cent. According to its report the average 
worker
enjoyed good meals for the first few days o f the month and thereafter is faced with the 
alternatives of:
a) Semi-starvation for the remainder o f the month, or
b) Frequent visits to the pawnbroker, or
c) Petty theft and pilfering, or
d) Various forms o f spivvery, or (b), (c) and (d).59
Confirming these findings, the budget survey of 1956/7 reported that indebtedness 
was endemic amongst the town’s African residents.50 Commenting on the survey Leslie 
observes: ‘...groups were taken from the lowest range of wages up to the comparatively 
high wage of Shs.150/- and over, and in almost every case a steady income from net 
borrowing was shown to form a significant proportion of the total income.’61 Although 
decasualisation of dockworkers had, from 1950, slowly been taking place, no 
fundamental change had occurred in the overall organisation of labour. The Dar es 
Salaam workforce continued to be characterised by its poverty, its impermanence, its 
unreliability and its lack of productivity. The result, according to Leslie, was a vicious 
circle of inefficiency: ‘So long as there is an abundance of low-quality labour at low rates 
of pay, the labourer has no incentive to improve output, nor the employer to improve the 
quality of his staff.’62 What is more these poorly paid workers also remained poorly 
housed. Although efforts had been made since the late 1940s, by both central and 
municipal government, to address the shortage of housing, African residents, particularly 
in the inner areas of Kariakoo and Ilala, continued to suffer from overcrowding. There 
was, according to the District Commissioner in 1953, ‘an acute shortage of houses’.63 
Meanwhile, as the Provincial Commissioner observed four years earlier, on the outskirts 
of Dar es Salaam ‘shanty towns... continue to exist and are a menace to health and a
59 Report by British Legion on Cost o f Living in Dar es Salaam, 4th February 1953, TNA/540/16/15.
50 Budget survey o f African consumers in Dar es Salaam 1956/7, TNA/225/PA.8/06A.
61 Leslie, Siwvey, p. 139. This survey was originally submitted to the colonial administration in 1957.
62 Ibid., p.6.
63 DC, Dsm to MLG, 27th February 1953, TN A/540/27/19.
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breeding ground of discontent.’64
Dar es Salaam’s housing, like much of its infrastructure, was getting overwhelmed by 
the influx of Africans entering the town. According to the Director of Town Planning this 
was simply unsustainable, placing an ever-escalating financial burden on Dar es 
Salaam’s wealthier residents:
There is a growing flow o f people from the country to the town, and these people, when 
they arrive, contribute little to the economic or industrial structure o f the towns. Enormous 
new neighbourhoods have to be provided, which tend to spread the towns over ever- 
increasing areas, all o f which must be supplied with some form o f public services. The 
continual expansion o f public services has to be paid for, and the tax revenue from the 
African is insufficient for this. Thus towns are becoming increasingly expensive to run and 
maintain, with no concomitant increase in revenue from those causing the increased 
expense. A relatively small body o f heavy taxpayers is carrying around its neck an ever 
increasing number o f people who do not (and can not) pay their way, and the whole 
economic structure o f our larger towns is in my opinion becoming unsound.65
In response to this situation, colonial officials adopted a number of initiatives. The 
intensification of action against urban ‘undesirables’ was the most significant, although it 
did nothing to reverse the urban-ward tide. Most unusual was the propaganda film 
Mohogomchungu (translated by the Tanganyika Standard as ‘The country bumpkin’), 
which sought to persuade rural folk of the evils and dangers of town life. The Standard 
summarised the plot as follows:
The film is about a country-boy who, as the translation hints, feels the age-old urge to visit 
the big city -in this case Dar es Salaam- and sets out via a sisal estate, where he earns 
enough money to finance his wanderlust.
Rashidi Kawawa, cleverly portraying the bumpkin in his first film part, has a most trying 
time in the big city, where his rusticity is ill-suited to the streamlined urban mode o f life.
After being sent sprawling by a car, fleeced o f his money by cardsharps, robbed o f his 
clothes, mixed up in a dripping wet fire-fighting incident, struck on the head by the irate 
husband o f an African girl he admires, and generally subjected to a very tough passage - 
the bumpkin is well content to return to working the shamba with his parents.66
c[T]he incidents are given unbroken continuity by the country bumpkin theme,’ reported 
the Standard, ‘which is never lost sight of throughout the film.’ Ironically, the most this 
film can be said to have done was to promote the career of the future unionist and
64 PAR for 1949, p.38.
65 Minute by D.T.P., 7th March 1953, TNA/225/DC3602.
66 TS, 21st June 1952, p.8.
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nationalist, Kawawa, who, as an employee of the Social Development Department, had 
landed the leading role. There is, on the other hand, no evidence of Mohogomchungu 
having any influence whatsoever on the growing number of migrants making their way to 
the capitol. Even if it had, this would only have had a mitigating influence on the 
problems facing Dar es Salaam. These required a much more dramatic solution than a 
simple restriction of internal migration. By the mid-1950s, though, a more substantial 
answer had begun to emerge.
The East African Royal Commission and urban development
Whilst many officials in Dar es Salaam had, since before the end of the war, been 
counselling that a raise in African wages coupled with the control of immigration into the 
towns was the best approach to dealing with the problems of the urban areas, it was not 
until the early-195Os that such views got a public airing. In 1951, a committee on 
manpower in Tanganyika recommended a territorial policy of labour stabilisation.68 In 
the towns this would have the benefit of not only promoting greater productivity, through 
the reduction in casual labour, but it would also, according to the 1951 Labour 
Department report, promote the civic consciousness which up till that point had been 
noticeable by its absence. ‘Problems inherent in urban areas today’, declared the report, 
‘are the regular employment of African unskilled labour and the evolution of a social 
order by which some form of moral discipline will be imposed on detribalised urban 
Africans.’69 A policy of stabilisation would address both these difficulties in one fell 
swoop. However, in the early-1950s all that was done to promote labour stabilisation was 
the extension of the maximum permissible contract for workers accompanied by their 
wives and families from two to three years. The initiative passed to neighbouring Kenya, 
where, in 1954, the publication of the influential Carpenter Report introduced a 
systematic new approach to the question of urban labour. It recommended the 
replacement of Kenya’s irregular and poorly paid migrant workforce with a smaller,
67 According to J. Vinter, who served in the Tanganyika service in the post-war period, Kawawa became 
the first Tanganyikan film star: ‘his films were immensely popular long before he became PM, whenever 
one o f  Rashidi’s films appeared in Tabora marketplace, roars of applause. So he had... the same sort o f  pull 
which a radio personality, or TV personality, in England now, who goes into politics, he immediately has 
an enormous advantage.’ Interview, RH/Mss.Afr.s.1999.
G8 Tgj 23rd June 1951, p.8.
69 Labour Dept. AR for 1951.
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permanent urban African population, receiving higher wages which would enable them to 
establish and maintain their families in the towns.
The following year a similar approach to urban and labour questions in the region was 
proposed by the East African Royal Commission. ‘The part played by Africans in the 
towns’, the authors of the report observed:
is now more important and they themselves have become increasingly dependent on wage- 
earning employment. They are still, however, regarded socially and financially as liabilities 
for whose housing and welfare the urban authorities are responsible. The problem is to 
make it possible for them to become an element in town life which shares responsibility 
with other communities for the development o f the towns and which also contributes to 
urban revenues.70
Both the poor conditions of town life and the high turnover of temporary labour, 
however, were creating an environment in which it was difficult to forge such a 
community of responsible urban Africans. Indeed, according to the Commission, the 
African communities which w>ere emerging in East African towns were shifting and 
impermanent ones amongst whom ‘crime, immorality and drunkenness’ were rife. These 
communities contained individuals who were freed ‘not only from the influences that 
customarily control (their) behaviour but also from the responsibilities of family life’71. 
Individuals that is, with no stake in the urban order. ‘The maintenance of order’, 
complained the authors
depends in the last resort on the active support o f public opinion, which hardly exists where 
the majority o f the population consists o f rootless and irresponsible individuals, who have 
neither family responsibilities nor property to give them an interest in supporting the 
authorities.72
‘The first step in the formation of a healthy urban society’, the authors advised, ‘is the 
growth of a settled urban population whose loyalties are directed towards the town rather 
than to their areas of origin.’73
One way to achieve this was through greater African participation in municipal 
government -  including giving some executive and financial responsibility to Africans. 
This would encourage ‘a sense of responsibility among [African urban residents] and




f  BIBL \  
LONDON'
would result in a full contribution from them towards the services which they enjoy.’74 In 
addition, various recommendations were put forward to improve housing conditions in 
the townships, improvements which, it was hoped, would also encourage long-term urban 
residence. Building regulations should be relaxed, land should be made available and 
Africans should be helped to build their own houses; home ownership was to be 
encouraged ‘wherever possible’. Priority of access to educational facilities for the 
children of town dwelling Africans was mooted, as was the extension of provident fund 
schemes and the introduction of old age pensions for long-term urban workers to replace 
the social security implicit in the organisation of rural communities.
The principal plank of the policy of stabilisation though, was an increase in the rate of 
wages paid to African urban workers. Better pay would enable the African worker to 
move his family to the town, would lead to an improvement in his conditions of existence 
there and would diminish the importance of maintaining links with his rural home. The 
permanent urban employee would be a more efficient worker, he would be easier to 
administer, and in addition would be better equipped to contribute towards municipal 
revenue. It was recognised that economic expansion was essential in order for wages to 
rise towards a level which would support family life in the towns, and that consequently 
the process of stabilisation would be a slow one. Nevertheless, the authors observed the 
‘paramount need to create a settled African labour force’75 and recommended that 
‘ [ejvery effort must, on the other hand be made to create conditions which are favourable 
to it.’76
It was anticipated that one of the likely side-effects of this policy of stabilisation was 
an increase in the number of urban immigrants. Although the authors of the report had 
noted that considerable concern over urban drift already existed amongst officials in East 
Africa, however, they concluded that control over movement to the towns was 
undesirable. In the first place, it was disagreeable on economic grounds ‘because it 
restricts mobility and therefore inhibits the development of the exchange economy’.77 
Second, it was simply impracticable; ‘systems of control,’ the authors observed,
74 ibid., p.249.
75 Ibid., p .158.
76 Ibid., p.214.
77 Ibid., p.240. The development o f the exchange economy would encourage increasing specialisation o f  
labour, which in the view o f  the Commission was necessary in order to raise standards o f living in both
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‘although rigorously enforced have broken down even in territories where the population 
is sparser and the towns more isolated than in East Africa.’78 They advised that whilst 
steps should be taken to improve conditions in the rural areas, and so limit the attraction 
of an urban life, ‘ (t)he continued growth of the population of the towns at a rate which is 
unpredictable must be accepted.’79
The Tanganyikan response
The EARC report had an impact on urban policy in all three East African territories. In 
Tanganyika the immediate response of officials was ambivalent. Whilst the benefits of a 
policy of stabilisation were broadly accepted in principle, the practicalities of achieving it 
in the Territory were questioned. Officials were particularly concerned about the 
consequences of stabilisation for those Africans who had severed their links with their 
home areas only to find themselves without an income at the end of their working life or 
as a result of unemployment. ‘A rapid turnover of labour is inefficient’, the Tanganyikan 
Government noted in their preliminary observations to the report, ‘but at present ties with 
the tribal areas constitute a certain security for old age and sickness and will continue to 
do so until equally acceptable monetary forms of social security are provided in 
exchange.’80 As MacMillan observes, ‘Tanganyika remained too poor to be in much of a 
position to put the [EARC] recommendations into effect’.81 Although officials could see 
the benefits of stabilisation, the administration could not afford to establish some form of 
adequate social security to replace that which resulted from Africans’ continued links 
with their country kin; neither were they in a position to persuade employers to do so.
Of equal concern to Tanganyikan officials was the apparently laissez faire attitude 
adopted in the Royal Commission report towards rural-urban migration. For those 
responsible for the administration of Dar es Salaam and the territory's other rapidly 
growing urban centres, there was no way that the unfettered movement which the 
Commission recommended could be countenanced. Indeed, the years which followed the
rural and urban areas in East Africa.
78 Ibid., p.240.
79 Ibid., p.240.
80<Preliminary observations by the Tanganyika Government on EARC report, P R 0/C 0822/1113.
81 Hugh MacMillan, “The East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955”, in Low and Smith (eds.) History o f
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publication of the report saw more concerted - if  not entirely successful- attempts being 
made to control the flow to the towns, and by the mid-1950s more Africans were being 
repatriated from Dar es Salaam than at any previous time. At their bi-annual conference 
of June 1955, Tanganyika’s Provincial Commissioners discussed a whole raft of 
measures aimed at controlling African immigration into towns. In their discussion of the 
establishment of a Minimum Wage Board for Dar es Salaam they went so far as to 
question the wisdom of introducing a family wage in order to encourage stabilisation (in 
place of the then-current bachelor rates), noting that one of the consequences would be to 
‘militate against the control of immigration by attracting rural workers.’82
The Tanganyikan government was sympathetic to the broader recommendations of the 
EARC. The spectre of detribalisation had been superseded in the official mind by the 
recognition of the need to foster a new urban identity amongst town dwelling Africans, 
and Tanganyikan officials were very much in step with EARC proposals that greater civic 
responsibility should be fostered amongst Africans living in the urban areas through 
extending the scope for their participation in town life. Although there may still have 
been differences over the optimum duration of African urban residence, it was, as DC 
Harris put it at a meeting on detribalisation in 1956, ‘immaterial whether a man is 
permanently or temporarily detribalised: in Dar es Salaam we have got to stimulate the 
growth of the feeling of citizenship.’83
Just one year after the publication of the EARC report, the Tanganyikan government 
was instigating its own investigation into ‘the development and growth of new 
communities in urban and peri-urban areas’. The emergence of such communities was 
now seen as both inevitable and, from the point of view of enhanced economic efficiency 
and the productivity of labour, as advisable. By this time it was an accepted fact that:
there are in varying degrees both in the urban and som e rural areas o f  Tanganyika Africans
w ho have b ecom e, are b ecom in g, and w ill be lik ely  to b ecom e, partially or w h o lly
detribalized, stabilized and urbanized.84
The report on ‘Detribalisation’, authored by a Tanganyikan Provincial Commissioner,
East Africa Vol. ///(O xford, 1976), p.555.
82 PC’s Conference (June 1955) Minutes, p.25, in the East Africana collection o f  the University o f Dar es 
Salaam.
83 Minutes o f meeting o f  Committee on African Detribalisation, (December?) 1956, TNA/225/PA.8/06A.
84 Molohan, Detribalisation , para. 7.
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M.J.B. Molohan, which resulted from these investigations, took its place alongside the 
Kenyan Carpenter Report and the EARC chapter on urban development as another 
influential contribution towards the revision of colonial urban policy which occurred in 
the final decade of colonial rule in East and Central Africa. Molohan addressed himself 
‘entirely to the problem of finding the most effective means whereby these [urbanised 
and/or detribalised] persons can be assisted to settling down peacefully and contentedly 
in their new environments and becoming good citizens’. He reduced the problem to two 
main parts: ‘the establishment of an efficient system of administration in which the 
people concerned share and secondly the provision of greatly increased social and
* QCcultural amenities for these new communities.’ Addressing the problems of urban 
administration first, he observed that Dar es Salaam had always been under-administered 
and recommended that the African population ‘required a higher degree of closer 
administration.’86 In addition, he counselled for a reinvigoration of urban local 
government. There was, according to the report, ‘a very great need to make the 
inhabitants of the [African] areas take a greater interest in the administration of their own 
units and the management of their own affairs and so become civic conscious.’87 The 
introduction of local elections for Ward Councils88, along with the Councils’ acquisition 
of executive and financial responsibilities, would, it was suggested, encourage the 
formation of this civic consciousness. This would be augmented by making each of Dal­
es Salaam’s five wards ‘a self-contained unit with its own council, court and hakimu89, 
dispensary or clinic, schools, shops, market, pombe market, assembly hall, cinema, 
recreation and playing fields, post office, public telephone, bus service, etc.’ ‘By 
providing such facilities’, Molohan concluded, ‘the inhabitants will begin to feel that they 
are part of a single community with a common interest.’90 The wards would also become 
‘the natural base[s] for the maintenance of law and order’; each having its own police 
station, and the formation of ‘special constabulary’ units ‘should be encouraged in order 
to impress upon the inhabitants their duty and responsibility for aiding the enforcement of 
the law.’91 With regard to housing, Molohan felt that greater emphasis should be placed
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p.2.
87 Ibid., para. 70.
88 Up to June 1957 unofficial representatives on the Ward Councils were selected at open meetings by 
residents o f each sub-ward.
89 Magistrate.
90 Ibid., para. 70.
91 Ibid., para. 80.
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011 African construction and ownership of houses on serviced plots, rather than the 
previous policy of governmental construction of housing built for leasing on unserviced 
estates to meet what had been up till recently a shortage of African accommodation. ‘If 
we are to encourage the formation of a stable and contented urban middle class African 
populace,’ he observed, ‘house ownership must be encouraged in every way, together 
with security of tenure.’92 With this in mind greater use of the ‘African Urban Housing 
Loan Fund’ was encouraged as was the establishment of a tenant-purchase scheme.
Molohan also addressed what many officials felt to be the most pressing problem; that 
of the drift of population from the country areas to the towns. Whilst he acknowledged 
the impracticality of establishing some form of pass system to control rural-urban 
migration, he nevertheless counselled -contrary to the recommendations contained in the 
EARC report- measures aimed at reducing this drift. Above all, he deemed it ‘essential to 
strengthen the administrative powers for getting rid of drones and spivs, which are 
contained in the Townships (Removal of Undesirable Persons) Ordinance,’93 By the mid- 
1950s use of this ordinance had come to be the principal means of attempting to limit the 
urban population.
On the question of labour, Molohan made a number of proposals which modestly 
advanced what he acknowledged as the ‘accepted policy of encouraging the stabilisation 
of the working population.’94 The regulation of casual employment was recommended 
which, in the absence of ‘any effective scheme to control entry into and residence in the 
town’, was felt might be of value as ‘employers would be forced progressively to rely on 
a more permanent labour force.’95 It was advised that a casual labour registration scheme 
recently established in Mombasa should be examined with a view to implementing a 
similar system in Tanganyika. Second, measures to encourage greater employment of 
women in domestic service should be encouraged. Not only would this free ‘able-bodied 
men in this unproductive sphere of employment for which women are far better suited 
and equipped’96, but it would also increase the earning power of urban families, better 
equipping them for the expense of town life. Third, action needed to be taken against the
92 Ibid., para. 112.
93 Ibid., para. 95.
94 Ibid., para. 156.
95 Ibid., para. 102.
% Ibid., para. 103.
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employment of children in the town, which was common, chiefly taking place in 
domestic service. Whilst child labour had been acknowledged as having a depressive 
effect on wages since the late 1930s, administrators had yet to come up with adequate 
controls over the phenomenon. Molohan counselled the strengthening of the Employment 
Ordinance along with an increase in the inspectorate staff of the labour department. He 
also hoped ‘that Ward Councils when revivified and properly established will take an 
interest in this matter and enlist public opinion in their support.’97 Finally, employers 
were encouraged to play a greater role in meeting the social needs of their employees 
including providing housing and other amenities and by establishing provident fund 
schemes for as many of their employers as possible, although they were not to be made 
legally responsible to do so.98 Meanwhile, the introduction of a statutory minimum wage 
in 1957 -before Molohan had submitted his report- along with the ongoing process of 
industrial mechanisation and ‘the gradual accretion of settled workers’, was having the 
effect of encouraging the transition from a casual, migrant labour force to one which was 
better paid and more permanent.99
The Ndola Conference
In late 1956, whilst Molohan’s report was still under preparation, the Tanganyikan 
Government were informed of a Colonial Office proposal for a conference to be held on 
urban problems in East and Central Africa, to which representatives from each of the 
British territories’ administrative and social services staff should attend.100 Whilst it 
appeared that the policy of encouraging more permanent African urban settlement had 
been endorsed by the Colonial Office,101 officials in London clearly felt there was still 
much left to discuss regarding the implementation of such a policy. The conclusions 
eventually arrived at by conference participants were in the event modest and cautious; a 
reflection perhaps, of the widely differing circumstances to be found in each of the 
participating territories. It was observed that the ‘division of labour’, a process which was
97 Ibid., para. 104.
98 Ibid., paras. 106 & 156.
99 Iliffe, Modern History, p.541.
100 Gorrell-Barnes to Gov. Twining, 2IldNovember 1956, TNA/225/UW80.131/VoI. 1.
101 According to an undated (c.1956) Proposal for a Professional Conference on Urban Problems in East 
and Central Africa in PRO/CO/955/40 it was ‘assumed that policy in all territories is now directed towards 
the growth o f a permanent African population in the towns.’
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held to be accelerating in the region, should be encouraged. This was important both for 
reasons of industrial efficiency, and from the point of view of establishing a more affluent 
-and ‘progressive5- (rural) agricultural sector in which increasingly cash crops were 
being produced on land held under individual tenure. An ‘essential part of this process 
[was] the stabilisation of some Africans as town-dwellers.5'02 On the other hand, it was 
considered wise that not all African workers5 links with their rural homes should be 
severed. The colonial state could not afford to provide for old people or those made 
redundant in the event of recession. Better to maintain a proportion of migrant labour 
and for some of the Africans who spent their working lives in towns to be encouraged to 
retire to the countryside. Nevertheless, the conference concluded that
the gradual m ove towards a greater d iv ision  o f  labour, and as part o f  that process the 
stabilisation  o f  increasing numbers o f  A fricans in tow ns, is an essentia l condition  o f  the 
advance o f  A fr ica n s... C onsequently w e  consider that it is a process w hich  should  be 
carefully encouraged and w e believe that it is a m ovem ent w hich in any case w ill gradually 
take p lace .103
At the same time it was acknowledged that conditions in the various territories ‘differ 
considerably and the pace at which this aim of policy can be achieved may equally differ 
from territory to territory.’104
A number of stratagems to produce an environment conducive to stabilisation were 
advanced by the conference. First, for the stated purpose of building integrated urban 
communities it was considered ‘highly desirable that Africans living in towns should 
have their wives and families with them.5105 To this end the conference advised that ‘the 
needs of a married man rather than the individual should be progressively taken into 
account in determining wages.5106 Second, home ownership was identified, as it had been 
by Molohan, as making a valuable contribution to the stabilisation of urban populations. 
A number of suggestions were made to encourage African ownership of ‘sufficient 
accommodation to enable a family to live in conditions of decency5107 including 
construction of permanent housing for tenant purchase either by Central Government or 
Local Authorities, the provision of demarcated and serviced plots, and the provision of
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loans by public authorities or by private lenders such as Building Societies. Third, the 
question of the social security of urbanised Africans was addressed. Whilst the past 
importance of the reciprocal links between rural and urban dwellers was acknowledged, 
the observation was made that:
Th[e] partial operation o f  tribal socia l security is apt h ow ever to becom e increasingly  
disadvantageous to both parties. The obligations o f  the extended fam ily , in so far as they  
are fu lfilled  by the tow n dweller and w age earner, becom e a drag upon h im ... At the sam e 
tim e the fulfilm ent o f  custom ary obligations becom es m ore and m ore o f  a burden upon the 
rural com m unity to w hich a town dweller returns...108
Governments were advised to conduct investigations into social security problems with a 
view to establishing schemes operated by either local or central government. The 
extension of provident funds and pension schemes organised by public authorities and 
private employers was also recommended.
In the final section of the conference report the ‘control over movements of Africans 
to, within, and out of urban areas’ is discussed. At the outset the consequences of a policy 
of urban stabilisation for such movement is identified:
P ossib ility  o f  gainful em ploym ent and the am enities o f  tow ns are liable to act as a m agnet 
to rural populations, and in particular to the you ng m en from  the v illa g es . There is, 
therefore, a tendency for m ore p eop le to drift to the tow ns than the tow ns can readily  
absorb; and the surplus is apt to becom e a danger to law and order and/or a social security  
problem .109
It was recognised that the long-term solution to this problem was the improvement of 
economic conditions in the rural areas. In the meantime, administrators would have to 
make do with the piecemeal -and largely ineffective- measures already in place in the 
various territories. Any concerted attempt to control movement by central or local 
government would involve the introduction of an effective system of identification which 
would require ‘fingerprinting and the maintenance of a central registry’ and would be 
politically unacceptable.110 With regard to removing those unwanted immigrants who had 
reached the towns it was concluded that:
W here there is a lack o f  balance betw een urban and rural econom ies or w here there is no 
system  o f  social security operative in the towns, w e consider that there should be provision  





persons w ho are not perm anently urbanised and w ho cannot reasonably be exp ected  to
secure em ploym ent in the im m ediate future.111
Those individuals who failed to find a niche in the formal urban economy had no place in 
colonial towns. As was also the case with both the EARC report and Molohan’s 
Deti'ibalisation, there was no acknowledgment of the role that informal economic 
activities could play in providing a livelihood to the growing number of town-dwellers. 
Although urban social surveys, such as Leslie’s in Dai’ es Salaam, had brought to light the 
existence of a flourishing informal sector, to urban administrators this represented a loss 
of control over the urban arena, and not the reassertion of government influence over the 
course of urban development which they were attempting to achieve.
The recommendations made by conference participants were broadly in line with the 
existing policy of the Tanganyikan Government.112 The one area with which issue was 
taken was the wisdom of establishing any state-administered social security scheme. 
Tanganyikan officials displayed a distinct reluctance to assume the burden of social 
insurance. As Gower, the Governor’s Deputy, pointed out: ‘The underlying philosophy, 
that social security is not the responsibility of the individual or of his family, is alien to
1 1 TAfrica.’ Notwithstanding this minor difference, the remainder of the conference 
recommendations were endorsed in the despatch. Indeed Gower indicated the 
Tanganyikan government’s prior implementation of many of the proposals made by 
officials at Ndola. He could thus boast of the high proportion of African-owned houses in 
Dar es Salaam and of the ‘comprehensive wage’ received by the majority of urban 
workers.114 The unanimity displayed between the authors of the conference report and 
Tanganyikan officials was hardly surprising. By 1958 most of the arguments raised at 
Ndola had been well rehearsed and a consensus had emerged amongst those responsible 
for the administration of urban areas throughout British East and Central Africa. The 
Ndola conference simply served to strengthen this consensus whilst at the same time 
giving an opportunity to discuss the ways and means of achieving the fundamental 
objectives of late colonial urban policy.
111 Ibid., p.69.




Throughout the British colonial period officials in Tanganyika retained, with regard to 
the ‘native’ population, a distinctly anti-urban outlook. This anti-urbanism was most 
marked in the first twenty years of British rule. At this time such attitudes were the 
logical corollary of a policy of indirect administration. With the post-war shift to a local 
government strategy, and the emergence of a more developmental agenda, this anti­
urbanism was tempered and the stabilisation of an urban African workforce was actually 
encouraged. The urban arena was now acknowledged to be the ideal location to mould a 
new non-tribal (not ‘detribalised’) African, who had internalised Western attitudes to 
work, and whose tribal values had been replaced by civic ones. However, the state of the 
colonial economy restricted the number of Africans who would form the new urban 
communities. Urbanisation amongst the remainder of the African population continued to 
be a cause for concern. Existing outside the planned residential estates and employment 
in the formal sector, this African ‘residuum’ was as much as ever a cause for concern. 
The colonial response was to attempt to restrict its expansion. At the same time as the 
African urban presence was gradually accepted, a stricter definition of what constituted a 
‘legitimate’ town-dweller was inserted in successive versions of the Townships (Removal 
of Undesirable Natives/Persons) Ordinance. In 1944, in order to have a right to urban 
residence you had to have paid poll tax in a town the previous year. A decade later this 
was amended to having lived in a town for eighteen months out of the past three years. In 
1958 qualification was extended to four out of the past five years, making it even more 
difficult to be legally classed a townsman or woman. Throughout the period the colonial 
urban vision was always an exclusive one. What a policy of stabilisation required was
people w ith  regular em ploym ent w ho can settle dow n to a stable life  and by b ein g good  
citizen s can m ake their contribution to the high reputation that the capital o f  Tanganyika  
should enjoy.115
Tellingly, the colonial period produced (or imported) a rich vocabulary to describe 
those Africans who, failing to conform to this description, were held to have no place in 
the urban areas. In addition to wahuni, loafers, idlers, town roughs, waifs, strays, spivs, 
drones, rogues, vagabonds, destitutes, paupers, hooligans, guttersnipes and seini-occupied 
natives were all deemed ‘undesirable persons’ in Dar es Salaam and other Tanganyikan
1,4 Ibid.
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towns. And they remained so throughout the period under consideration. Whilst the 
1950s was a time when the respectable Africans’ place in the colonial urban vision was at 
last confirmed, it was also a time when more concerted action was simultaneously taking 
place against the growing numbers of Africans who did not fit this vision. In their forty 
years in Tanganyika the British colonial rulers had helped create a society in which the 
lure of the towns grew ever stronger. They had also been engaged in a constant struggle 
against the consequences of this attraction.
115 Gov. Twining’s speech at the opening o f Ilala Boma, 20th May 1958, TNA/540/27/11/A.
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Part Two
Crime and colonial order
Tanganyika is rapidly developing all the Social Problems of civilised countries. 
Rev. R.M. Gibbons, Report on the Question o f Imprisonment in Tanganyika (1932) App.C.
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Chapter Three
Crime in colonial Dar es Salaam
Legitimate or illegitimate lawlessness? - Defining crime in Dar es Salaam
There is no perm anent crim inal class at war with the peace o f  the com m unity but rather a 
series o f  separate acts by individuals, w h ose need or con sc ien ce  is for the m om ent in 
conflict w ith the provisions o f  the law .1
The British administration presided over a substantial increase in recorded criminality 
in Tanganyika. To what extent does this indicate a breakdown of morality as defined by 
the coloniser as opposed to a more general degeneration of behaviour in the terms of the 
majority African population? Historians of crime in the western world have often 
distinguished between illegal actions that were universally condemned by the society in 
which they were committed, and those which were considered legitimate acts by 
significant sections of that society. Emsley, for example, in his survey of crime in 
England between 1750-1900, draws attention to the difference between ‘real’ (or ‘anti­
social’) crime and ‘social’ crime.2 In eighteenth and nineteenth century England some 
laws which appeared to have protected the interests of a particular class, were not 
necessarily accepted by those they discriminated against, who in breaking them felt no 
sense of wrongdoing. Such offences -the classic example of which is that of poaching- 
have been characterised as social crime.3 ‘Real’ crime, on the other hand, which might 
include violent crimes or crimes against property motivated by acquisitiveness rather than 
need, was more roundly condemned by all sections of society.4 The distinction between 
real and social crime has perhaps even greater pertinence in a colonial context. In Dar es
1 ‘Some observations on the treatment o f  the offender against the law’ [in Tanganyika] by Alexander 
Paterson (1939), p .l, TNA/27062.
2 Emsley, C rim e , p.2. See also John G. Rule, ‘Social crime in the rural south in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries’, Southern H istory , 1 (1979), pp. 135-53; and George Rude, Criminal and Victim: 
Crime and society in early 19th c. England, (Oxford, 1985), p.78. Rude specifies a third category o f crime, 
‘survival’ crime, which was committed out o f dire necessity.
3 Another form o f social crime according to Rule and Rude was protest crime, which involved protest made 
in breach o f the law.
4 Emsley cautions that the distinction between social and real crime be made with care, as these categories 
are often blurred.
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Salaam, and elsewhere in the European empires, laws -often, but not always, the product 
of distinctive western legal and cultural traditions- were framed by outsiders and imposed 
upon colonised subjects, their legitimacy in some cases resting solely on the threat of 
force. In urban centres in particular, colonial subjects were subject to local laws imported 
from European towns and cities; ones originally designed to impose municipal order 
amongst European urban communities, communities which were a part of the 
industrialised and more affluent societies of the west. In the attempt to assert a colonial 
order customary pursuits of local African populations were frequently criminalised; as 
were many subsistence activities adopted by Africans in the often harsh urban 
environment. In Dar es Salaam, for example, strict liquor laws prohibited the customary 
usage of alcohol, and municipal regulations severely restricted the number of people 
engaging in petty trade. Amongst the African population such legal restrictions 
commanded little or no acceptance. Indeed, even those which one may characterise as 
illegitimate, such as the theft of property, may not have been universally considered so 
amongst sections of the population who were perplexed -and perhaps aggravated- by the 
unequal distribution of resources in colonial society.5
Some officials acknowledged the problem. In 1932 one senior administrator stressed 
that ‘it must be remembered that there is no real moral turpitude or real criminality 
involved in breach of the hundred and one rules, regulations, bye-laws etc.’6 Alexander 
Patterson, who as Commissioner for Prisons in England and Wales visited East Africa in 
1939, concurred with this point of view. He considered it was
in ev itab le that crim e and con sc ien ce  should  not co in cid e, w hen a Penal C ode that is 
founded on a European ethic is im posed upon an African people, w h ose ideas o f  right and 
w rong are so  com p letely  different. M any acts deem ed by the law to be the m ost heinous  
crim es are com m itted from  a high sense o f  duty. M any m ore little evasions are construed  
by the law to be petty offences, though the African can see no harm in them .7
Towards the end of the colonial period, Leslie observed the frustrations arising from 
certain municipal regulations:
A ll the restrictions w hich  seem  to be aim ed at preventing a man from m aking a few  pence  
- n o  haw king w ithout a licence, no begging, no three card-trick stands- are m ade by these
5 Leslie, Survey, p. 106.
6 Sec. min., 22nd September 1932, TNA/21041.
7 ‘Report on a visit to the Prisons of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Aden and Somaliland’, 1939, 
[hereafter: Paterson, ‘Report’], p .l, in TNA/27062
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people [Europeans] w ho com bine the three attributes o f  being rich, alien  and in authority, 
all three sitting ducks for the frustrated, the discontented, the sim ple and bew ildered.8
In his 1957 survey of the town, Leslie detected widespread indifference towards crime in 
general amongst Dar es Salaam’s African inhabitants. In part he ascribed this to a general 
neglect of community interest. * [T]he instinct to help the victim [of a crime] and the 
forces of law and order’, he observed, ‘is simply not there.’9 The mutual communal 
responsibilities which characterised village life, according to Leslie, were lost on the 
move to town. In addition to the relative absence of notions of the public good, though, 
he also found that moral sanctions against criminal behaviour were also not particularly 
strong. ‘The pilferer, the thief, the embezzler,’ wrote Leslie, ‘are in the eyes of many 
-including themselves- hardly criminals but are ‘winning’ something which nobody will 
miss, and to which they are in any case in some way entitled.’10 There is evidence which 
supports Leslie’s conclusions. Throughout the colonial period officials bemoaned the lack 
of co-operation given to the police by the African public. Whether this can best be 
explained by the loss of communal responsibility, however, is another matter. Another 
theory, advanced at a meeting to discuss the theft of crops in 1941, is perhaps more 
convincing:
The A fr ican ... has in his ow n custom s the principle o f  restitution and reparation for theft or 
dam age as fundam ental, but it is n eg lected  in British practise and as a result the A frican  
population w ill not g ive  that co-operation to the police that is essential i f  law and order are 
to be secured.11
Also, the apparent indifference of the African population to the maintenance of order 
could more plausibly be attributed to a lack of commitment to colonial order, not order 
per se. Indeed, the harsh and instant justice which could be meted out by Africans to 
criminals caught in the act was evidence of a dramatic lack of indifference.
In observing the relative tolerance of much criminal behaviour Leslie was on firmer 
ground. The ill-distributed wealth of colonial society could serve to endorse some 
unilateral redistribution; particularly at times of need. Thus Rajabu bin Alfani, 
complaining of low rates of pay in a letter to Kwetu, observed that ‘[m]any Africans are 
enduring without food for four or more days [per month], but for others who are not able
8 Leslie, Survey, p. 106.
9 Leslie, Survey, p.242.
10 Leslie, Survey, p. 109.
U TS, 4th July 1941, p.15.
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to endure it is necessary to turn to crime.’12 Kondo bin Waziri, after being caught stealing 
a bicycle in 1942, endeavoured to justify a criminal career which up to then had stretched 
to six convictions for property offences over a twelve year period. He sought, remarked 
the presiding judge in his summary,
to excu se his life  o f  crim e by putting the blam e for it on other people. H e is com pelled  to 
steal for a livelihood, he says, because the p olice do not find him w ork when he is released  
from prison. This particular theft, he alleges, was forced upon him by the N ative authorities 
w ho w ere pressing him  to pay his tax. Even when he has sought to m ake a liv ing by honest 
toil in the fields the bush pigs have rendered his efforts nugatory by stealing his crops by 
night, thus proving the truth o f  the old saying that there is no honour am ong th ieves.13
According to Leslie the prevalence of thefts by servants occurred partly as a result of a 
kind of redistributive impulse:
the servants in the houses, working for a pittance, have to handle m eat and fish  and butter 
and drink and do w ithout them selves; their em ployers have so  many sheets and tow els and 
shirts that they have to be counted, yet i f  one is m issin g  there is the devil to pay: w hy  
cannot there be m ore o f  a share out? W hy does one have to take o n e’s cut out o f  food  by 
stealth instead o f  by right?14
Corresponding with this general indifference towards crime, Leslie also observed that no 
real stigma seemed to attach itself to those who had been convicted of crimes and/or 
imprisoned.15
Leslie’s observations no doubt cany some weight. However, African attitudes towards 
crime in the capital were not undifferentiated. Most Africans in Dar es Salaam, sharing 
similar backgrounds and the same impecunious conditions of existence as offenders (the 
bulk of whom were opportunists and not recidivists), would probably not condemn the 
petty offences -such as shoplifting or theft from the workplace- which were the 
commonest form of property crime in the town, nor would they condemn ‘social’ crimes 
such as gambling, hawking or mendicancy. However, also present in Dar es Salaam were 
a minority of Africans who, through education, employment or position, enjoyed a 
somewhat better standard of living than the majority of their compatriots. It seems that 
this petty bourgeoisie actually shared some of the anxieties about African criminality felt 
by Europeans and Asians. Although a minority, it was this group who were best placed to
12 Awe/wNo. 5, 26th March 1942, p.4. (Original in Swahili).
13 TS, 28,h August 1942, p.9.
14 Leslie, Survey, p. 106.
15 Leslie, Survey, p.239; see also Paterson, Report.
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articulate their concerns and to lobby the colonial administration for protection. So Erica 
Fiali, proprietor of the African newspaper, Kwetu, in complaining of an increase in urban 
crime in 1940, advocated similar measures to his European counterparts:
For G overnm ent to be a llow ing the job less to stay in the town is very bad indeed; perhaps 
the G overnm ent has a fondness for these destitutes. People have been vulnerable to having  
all their things stolen , to having their p ossession s plucked from them , over a period o f  
m any years. N o w  I bring to the attention o f  Governm ent and the D istrict and M unicipal 
administrations the policy  o f  rem oving thieves from the town; unem ployed persons should  
be forced out and be m ade to cultivate; hom eowners should com pile lists o f  the names o f  
their tenants in work and send them to the adm inistration.. , .16
M.F. Kassam, in a letter to Kwetu two years later, complained of wahuni collecting 
together and harassing women, tin-owing stones at askaris and buildings, gambling and 
stealing. For him too the solution was forced removal. £Why5, he asked,
are those elders appointed by the DC not look ing out for these things w hich contribute to 
disorderliness in town. ...W e  ask that the DC should rem ove this trouble from the tow n so  
that it should be cleansed .17
A few years later, in a letter to the Chief Secretary, Magulele Mkonimwe ascribed a 
-supposed- increase in criminality to the laxity of the British penal regime, which, he 
held, should treat offenders more harshly, thus echoing the complaints of European and 
Asian settlers:
Theft is now  about 75%. In 1889 it was 0.5%  because theft w as a thing o f  disgrace; thieves 
w ere killed  or m ade slaves or burnt. In 1909 it w as 1%. W hen a person was found stealing  
he w as g iven  15 strokes and one m onth’s im prisonm ent and after the expiry o f  the one  
m onth he w as given  som e 15 strokes m ore then was discharged. In 1913 theft w as 0.75%  
because people w ere afraid. In 1921 it w as 10% because if  a person w as found stealing he 
w as left unpunished. In 1928 it w as 35% because a person w ithout clothes w as supplied  
with som e and when in prison he got sufficient food than when he w as free.
In 1935 a th ie f som etim es w on  the case i f  he were cleverer than the owner. In 1944 it w as 
44%; Sham ba  people do not sleep because they are afraid o f  thieves; in the tow n w indow s  
are b eing forced broken. The th ieves are very proud and they praise the British Em pire. 
T hey have a m otto as, ‘Provided you  are clever enough to w in  in a case you  w ill never  
w ork .’ W e ask that governm ent should m ake a punishm ent for th ieves m ore severer than 
the other cases b ecause about 25%  o f  peop le in the tow n have no w ork but they eat 
sufficiently m ore than those who are working.
W e ask that governm ent rem ove theft just like the C ongo B elg ian  governm ent so that w e  
live com fortably.18
16 Kwetu, No.4, 12th March 1940, p .l (original in Swahili).
17 jKwetu, N o .l, 13th February 1942 (original in Swahili).
18 M. Mkonimwe to CS, undated (1944/45?), TNA/10849.
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This was not an isolated point of view. In a letter to the Tanganyika Standard eight years 
later, Erica Fiah reiterated Mgonimwe’s concerns:
W e, the A fricans cannot be good peop le unless w e are taught by punishm ent o f  beating. 
E ven at our hom es, our to to s , i f  not nursed in that w ay, becom e u seless peop le, lazy and 
vagabond, the w ay to becom e thieves because they don’t want to work.
...W h e n  the territory w as under the Germ ans, nobody could attem pt to steal for being  
afraid o f  the punishm ents. They w ere g iven  k ibokos  every Saturday and all o f  then chained  
together day or night. N o  clothes w ere issued to them  and they could  not shave until the  
day o f  their release.
T o save this A frica from  such unrest o f  stealing, the system  o f  the Germ ans should  be 
brought into being. Such action w ill m ake us to g ive up with the laziness o f  not to w illin g  
to work, their work is to steal to enable them to get what they want for their liv in g .19
In another letter to the Standard five years later, Lawi Kardi, a resident of Ilala, also 
advocated the use of corporal punishment as a deterrent. ‘Noone will steal for being 
afraid of the kiboko\ he claimed, comparing Tanganyika unfavourably with the Congo 
and Portuguese East Africa, where, thanks to the use of the whip, ‘one can leave a bike 
on the road unlocked’ 20
It is clear from these surviving letters that the denunciation of unoccupied Africans on 
the streets of Dar es Salaam was by no means confined to Europeans and Indians. The 
presence of impropertied wahuni not only caused a propertied (African) elite anxiety over 
the vulnerability of their possessions —4 [i]f an African who obtains his living by hard 
working, and his properties are stolen, he prefers to die rather than to live’, wrote Fiah21- 
but their unruly behaviour was also an affront to the elite sensibility -  so Kassam asked 
for the town to be ‘cleansed’. The social distance between these two groups was great. 
According to Norman Pearson, who visited Tanganyika as a Trade Unions advisor in the 
late 1940s, ‘educated Africans tend to hold themselves aloof from the common people in 
the towns who, it must be admitted, include many undesirable elements.’ ‘It has been 
said,’ he continued, ‘with a certain amount of justice, that there is a greater gulf between 
the well-educated and the uneducated African, than there is between the latter and some 
Europeans.’22 Those Africans who formed the educated elite most commonly originated 
from districts far from the capital, and were, in contrast to the majority Muslim
19 75, 28th June 1952.
20 75, 18th June 1957, p.4.
21 75, 28th June 1952.
22 Norman Pearson, ‘Trade Unionist on Safari’, [hereafter: Pearson, ‘Safari’], p.225, RH/Mss.Aff.s.394.
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population, often practising Christians.23 Muslim members of the elite also often came 
from dissimilar backgrounds to most other Africans.24 By contrast the majority of the 
urban African population -including those jobless individuals labelled wahuni- were 
from the -overwhelmingly Muslim- coastal areas (and their hinterland) close to Dar es 
Salaam.25 In addition to these cultural and religious factors dividing the ‘masses’ from the 
elite, economic, occupational and even generational differences also served to separate 
them. Western education, relative affluence, and the seniority of age gave members of the 
elite the confidence to condemn the behaviour of their less respectable brethren; however, 
they also served to promote elite anxiety about those townsmen who shared none of these 
privileges and were disdainful of their supposed betters.
Criminality was a contested notion amongst Dar es Salaam’s various strata. Colonial 
definitions of crime were broad, their object being an orderly and strictly regulated urban 
environment. Attempts to criminalise particular activities, however, were resisted by 
Africans. Petty economic activities might have been proscribed by colonial law, but they 
also provided incomes and services to the African population. In an urban context in 
which widespread poverty existed beside prosperity even certain property crimes appear 
to have been condoned by many Africans. Though not by all. Alongside the breach 
between the colonised and the coloniser, African attitudes towards crime were also 
differentiated along class lines.
The extent of crime in Dar es Salaam
In addition to those problems relating to definitions of criminality, a second set of 
problems emerging from any discussion of crime relate to the nature of the historical 
data. The incidence of crime in Dar es Salaam appears to have risen precipitously in the
23 To take some examples from Iliffe: Sanrwil Chiponde, who came to Dar es Salaam after WWI and 
became a High Court interpreter, was a product o f  the UMCA school at Kiungani, Zanzibar; Benedict 
Madalito, a Makua from Southern Tanganyika, who was also educated in Zanzibar, was a senior African 
clerk in the Dar es Salaam district office; other African civil servants, such as Edwin Brenn and Rawson 
Watts were products o f the CMS school at Mombasa. Iliffe, Modern History, 1979, p.266. Meanwhile Erica 
Fiah, erstwhile medical clerk, shopkeeper, activist and newspaper proprietor had come to Tanganyika from 
Uganda during WWI.
24 Men like Kleist Sykes, who was born to a Shangaan father and Nyaturu mother in Tanga Province. 
Buruku, For further background on the Muslim ‘elite’ see Said, Abdnhvahid Sykes.
25 In 1956 Zararno, Ruflji, Luguru, Ndengereko and Ngindo- constituted 62% o f  the total urban population.
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period of the British mandate. Both the statistical record and impressionistic evidence 
support this view. It is necessary to stress caution about these sources, however.26 Any 
rise in crime rates to be detected in surviving police, court or prison records may be as 
much a reflection of increased efficiency in policing, the decision to enforce previously 
neglected laws, or a change in sentencing policy, as it is of rising criminality amongst the 
general populace.27 In the case of Dar es Salaam, low crime figures in the early colonial 
period are likely to have had at least something to do with the negligible police presence 
in the town in the inter-war period. Similarly, the rapid escalation of crime rates after 
WWII was almost certainly partly related to the enhanced capacity of the police to detect 
misdemeanours and to enforce the law. They may have also reflected the greater 
likelihood for crimes to be reported as a result of increasing public confidence in the 
ability of the police to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Both before and after WWII, 
however, it is likely that a large number of offences remained unreported. In a study of 
crime amongst low income residents of Kampala shortly after independence it was found 
that 41 per cent of those who had been the victim of a theft had not reported the offence
* OR • ■ •to the police. Africans in colonial Dar es Salaam were probably even less inclined to
report crimes to a policing body whom many regarded as more of an occupying force
00than a neutral keeper of the peace. The ‘dark figure’ -as historians of crime in the 
western world have coined ‘the number of offences committed of which there is no 
record because noone bothered to, wished to, or was able to report a particular offence’30- 
casts a considerable -though unquantifiable- shadow over the recorded crime statistics in 
colonial Tanganyika, as elsewhere.
In assessing rates of criminality it is also important to relate surviving crime statistics 
alongside those recording the growth of the urban population. The escalation in recorded 
offences which occurred in Dar es Salaam give the impression of an urban environment 
in which crime became increasingly prevalent. It is by no means clear that this was the 
case. For example, if we take the number of cases dealt with in Dar es Salaam’s local
26 For a useful discussion o f interpreting crime-related data see Emsley, Crime, pp. 1-55.
27 For discussion o f such factors in operation in colonial Kenya see chapters by Anderson and Willis in 
David Anderson, and David Killingray, Policing the Empire: Government, authority and control, 1830- 
1940, (Manchester, 1991).
28 M.B. Clinard, & D.J. Abbott, Crime in developing countries, (New York, 1973), p.24.
29 Clinard and Abbott make the observation that if victims of crime ‘have been harassed about licence or 
tax regulations, or treated in an overbearing manner, many cases o f  crime will not be reported at all.’ Ibid., 
p.24.
30 Emsley, Crime, p.24.
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courts in 1950 and 1957, we find that the incidence of criminality actually appears to 
have decreased, with one case for every 25 urban inhabitants in 1950 compared to one for 
every 38 in 1957. With the capital increasing at the rate it did from c.1939 urban crime 
rates inevitably rose. Commonly expressed anxieties about crime probably reflected this 
increased incidence rather than a growing tendency to criminality.
A further problem with official crime records is that in Dar es Salaam the law was 
imposed differentially. Offences which the police decided to prosecute could vary over 
time. The production and consumption of tembo (palm wine), for example, was legally 
proscribed throughout the inter-war period. The official response to such activity, 
however, was uneven, varying between tolerance and sporadic attempts at eradication. 
Such unevenness in the application of the law was most marked in the case of the sex 
trade. Whilst prostitution was declared illegal by the colonial administration, the laws that 
prohibited it were not implemented -systematically, at least- against Dar es Salaam’s 
growing community of prostitutes. At one point, in fact, in the late 1920s, an attempt was 
made by the Township Authority to license brothels and to provide for the medical 
inspection of prostitutes. It was opposed by central government, however.31 Nevertheless 
prostitution was, in spite of the clauses which outlawed such activity in both the town 
rules and the penal code, broadly tolerated throughout the period of the British mandate. 
That prostitutes in Dar es Salaam did not receive the treatment meted out to comparable 
offenders against the law, such as beggars or street traders, is perhaps surprising. 
Officials disapproved of it on a number of grounds: the areas in which it was practised 
were often a haven for the town’s more unruly elements;32 the steady flow33 of customers 
to the red light districts hindered the control of these areas; it offered the opportunity to 
amass wealth beyond the supervision of the state; and finally there was the 
straightforward moral objection to the sale of sex to earn a living. In spite of all of these 
objections, however, prostitution was tolerated by colonial officials. This policy was 
partly based on expediency; in a town full of single men the contribution of these women 
to urban stability did not go unrecognised. ‘[A]ny attempt at repression of prostitution in 
Dar es Salaam by means of legal sanctions or administrative action’, wrote the Municipal 
Secretary in 1944,
31 Mbilinyi, “Unforgettable business”, p.l 16.
32 See for example TH, 23rd February 1935, p.6.
33 In Kisutu, according to TH (23rd February 1935, p.6), ‘prostitutes are allowed to carry on their profession
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is to be stron g ly  con d em ned  unless  the authorities are prepared to p rovide so c ia l  
alternatives that w ill attract the you ng m ale. Personally, I do not think that the Authorities 
can provide these alternatives -  after all the b iological urge is not lightly repressed without 
grave danger.34
Equally significant though, was the fact that the urban administration was never in 
position to eliminate prostitution in the town, even if it had desired to do so. When, after 
the outbreak of an epidemic of venereal diseases during the Second World War, an 
attempt was made to curtail the trade ‘all attempts to stop it proved futile.’35 At no time 
did Dar es Salaam’s prostitutes become the victims of colonial campaigns against urban 
undesirables. As a result, the sale of sex is one criminal activity the extent of which is 
poorly reflected in police and judicial records. For other illegal activities too, the uneven 
application of the law complicates the interpretation of such records.
Other, more impressionistic sources, including newspapers and official 
correspondence, are also unreliable. Heightened public perceptions of particular crimes, 
or of crime waves, can in the end almost prove self-fulfilling.36 Human anxiety, 
meanwhile, often leads to exaggerated fears about the prevalence of criminality, 
especially violence-related crimes. This in part helps to explain the impression of rampant 
lawlessness in Uhindini given by Dar es Salaam’s Indian-owned newspapers. Claims that 
a ‘native raj’ operated in Zone II37 should be treated with some scepticism. Whilst police 
complacency about conditions in the Indian (and African) quarters in the 1930s was not 
justified, neither was the situation quite as extreme as portrayed in numerous 
overwrought editorials in the Indian press. Similarly, the settler press reflected distorted 
perceptions of the prevalence of crime on the part of the European community, whose 
anxieties were perhaps magnified by a consciousness of being heavily outnumbered in 
the Tanganyikan capital by ‘native’ subjects. Official observations on the incidence of 
crime in Dar es Salaam are also perhaps more unreliable than opinions offered on other 
aspects of town life. The degree of lawlessness will always, to some extent at least, 
depend upon the eye of the beholder. Meanwhile, the same may be said of oral sources on 
the colonial period. Informants interviewed about colonial Dai' es Salaam, from all races
day and night.5
34 MS to CS, 16th December 1944, TNA/20887/Vol.II.
35 Westcott, “Impact55, p.291.
36 See Emsley, Crime, p.26.
37 TH, 6th April 1935, p.4.
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and backgrounds (but particularly African informants), tend to recollect a town in which 
crime was almost absent. Such a view does not chime with the picture which emerges 
from surviving records -  even allowing for the most exaggerated fears on the part of 
contemporary observers. This tendency to idealise the situation can perhaps best be 
accounted for by the post-colonial experience -for those who have remained in the town- 
of substantially increased lawlessness in Dar es Salaam, mixed with a degree of wistful 
nostalgia. Various factors then, complicate the treatment of crime as a historical subject. 
Having necessarily made such qualifications, however, it is nevertheless possible to 
venture to give some impression of the extent of crime in Dar es Salaam in the colonial 
period.38
The installation of the British administration had an inauspicious beginning. The final 
years of WWI and the immediate post-war years saw a wave of lawlessness sweeping the 
country in which the capital was also caught up. ‘[D]ue to the demobilised native 
follower and soldier’, the District Officer reported in 1920, ‘crime was a very serious 
matter in the town and district during the last nine months of 1919.’39 The repatriation of 
undesirables and prosecution of offenders helped stabilise the situation in the capital. 
However, it was not until 1921 that the Commissioner of Police could report that ‘crime 
within the territory for the first time since the war was brought within normal limits.’40 
Nevertheless, crime rates soon began to escalate once again, in Dar es Salaam especially. 
As the largest urban concentration, property crime was far more prevalent there than in 
other parts of Tanganyika. In 1921, 48 out of the 160 reported incidents of housebreaking 
occurred in the territorial capital.41 By 1923 this total had risen to 123, and the following 
year Dar es Salaam accounted for 191 out of 416 in Tanganyika as a whole.42 By the end 
of the 1920s approximately one third of all criminal cases in Tanganyika were reported in 
Dar es Salaam - 1,723 cases out of a total of 5,142. Over the next two years this
38 The foregoing discussion gives an account o f  criminal activity which is based on surviving colonial 
records. It shares the weaknesses o f those records, which, without knowledge o f how they were produced, 
are furthermore difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, as the main source o f information about crime -however 
unreliable- statistics have been quoted in an attempt to convey an impression o f  the situation in Dar es 
Salaam. They should be treated as indicators o f trends instead of a reliable guide to the extent o f crime at 
any one time or in any one place.
39 DAR for 1919-20, TNA/1733:1. The increased incidence o f  crime in the aftermath o f  war, when large 
numbers o f  young men return ‘home’, appears to have been a relatively common historical phenomenon. 
See Emsley, C rim e , p.33, for the example o f  Britain in the aftermath o f  the American War o f  
Independence.
40 Police AR for 1921, p.28.
41 Ibid.
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Table 3.1 Convictions for various crimes and offences in Subordinate Courts in 
Tanganyika, 1928-1941 ______________ _____________________ _______ _______
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
Malicious injuries to property 33 33 37 18 53 47 47
O ther o f fe n c e s  aga in st  
property
1,766 1,940 2,076 2,241 2,401 2,552 2,534
O ffences against revenue 
laws, M unicipal, Road and 
other laws relating to the 
so c ia l econ om y o f  the 
Territory
5,039 4,566 5,484 5,868 5,684 6,251 7,745
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Malicious injuries to property 74 79 92 93 54 69 110
O ther o f fe n c e s  aga in st  
property
2,529 2,436 2,561 2,705 3,022 3,323 3,396
O ffences against revenue 
laws, M unicipal, Road and 
other laws relating to the 
so c ia l econ om y o f  the  
Territory
8,005 9,013 8,946 10,357 10,874 9,835 6,774
Source: Judicial Dept. ARs
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Table 3,2 Prosecutions in Dar es Salaam Township 1931-1938
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Total no. o f  cases against local 
and special laws
1031 911 1272 1472 1174 1417 1615 2145
O ffen ce  aga in st T ow n ship  
Regulations
614 399 449 591 368 505 456 433
Cases o f  drunkenness - Europeans 4
Cases o f drunkenness -  Asiatics 4 3 9 3 5 3
Cases o f drunkenness -  Arabs 2 3 2 2
Cases o f drunkenness -  Natives 107 57 71 42 36 103 78 112
Cases o f  theft reported (value 
over Shs.100/-)
101 72 46
Cases o f  theft reported (value 
under Shs.100/-)
342 311 198
Cases o f theft reported 281 908 1126 924 1317
Total cases in which juveniles 
were concerned
26 21 131 122 45 46 9
Source: TNA 18950 Vol.II.
Table 3.3 Convictions in Dar es Salaam Township 1925-38
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Europeans 55 34 50 132 105 86 102
Asiatics 86 93 184 226 176 205 234
Arabs 15 27 8 10 17 20
Somalis 1 1
Aboriginal natives 1035 830 1175 992 926 1041 1180
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Europeans 97 132 135 38 42 116 131
Asiatics 250 389 548 356 335 573 665
Arabs 34 35 46 64 43 57 82
Somalis 2 2 8 1
Aboriginal natives 1107 1228 1419 1374 1328 1470 1596
Juvenile Aboriginal natives 26 19 105 108 21 40 9
Source: Memorandum on the social conditions of Dsm, 4.6.31, p.96; & information in TNA 18950 Vol. II.
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proportion rose to almost 38%, with 2,217 cases being reported in Dar es Salaam in 
1931.43 These included 443 cases of theft (see Table 5,1). ‘Few nights pass without some 
form of minor appropriation of property taking place in the native quarter’, observed 
Baker in his report that year.44 Also in 1931, a group of settlers, alarmed at what they 
perceived to be the escalation in crime, published a satirical despatch in the Tanganyika 
Times purporting to be penned by Governor Cameron:
Every care is taken to prevent them [the police] from effective ly  dealing with the criminal 
classes w ho now  openly flout authority and it must now  be obvious to everybody that the 
type o f  crim e now  pursued by the native inhabitants approxim ates m ore and m ore to 
eastern standards, thus vindicating my astonishing im m igration p o licy . B ag snatching is 
now  com peting w ith  the burglary ep idem ic and this Territory has now  becom e one o f  the 
safest places in the world for a criminal fraud to be perpetrated.45
In the course of the following decade reported cases of theft jumped dramatically, 
reaching 1,317 in 1939. In the same period the number of Africans convicted in Dar es 
Salaam rose from 1,041 to 1,596. c[T]heft and all sorts of petty crimes are rampant’, 
complained Pike in his 1939 report on African affairs in the township, ‘but the wrong 
doers are seldom if ever caught.’46 A UMCA missionary, writing in Central Africa the 
following year, bemoaned ‘the prevalence of petty larceny in every quarter of the town.’ 
‘In one month recently’, he complained, ‘there were 200 such convictions, and much of it 
goes on undetected and unpunished’.47 The picture painted by the headmaster of the 
Government Primary School on reporting a burglary the same year was equally bleak:
It is probable that not a s in g le  day or night passes w ithout at least one burglary in the 
A frican  quarter o f  the town; usually  there are several. M ost o f  th ese  are never even  
reported to the P o lice, because the v ictim s know  quite w ell that in present circum stances 
nothing can be done in the vast majority o f  cases.48
In the early years of WWII there was an actual reduction in crime in the capital, 
attributed to the absence from town of a large number of men away on service, less 
unemployment and the repatriation of ‘undesirable sojourners’.49 By the end of the war 
though, crime rates appeared to be escalating once again. Whilst few statistics for Dar es
42 Police AR for 1924.
43 CP to CS, 11.7.32, TNA/18950/vol./l; & Police ARs for 1929-31.
44 Baker, ‘Social conditions’, p.93.
45 ‘What the Gov might have said’ -  Published by the ‘Vigilantes,’ PO Box 554, Salisbury, in the 
Tanganyika Times in 1930 (cutting in RH/Mss.Afr.s.1072).
46 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’.
47 Central Africa (1940), p. 161.
48 R.J. Harvey to Director o f  Education, 6th March 1940, TNA/61/207/Voi.II.
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Table 3.4 Comparable table o f convictions for various crimes in Tanganyika 1946-1962
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Offences against the person 909 1,187 1,510 1,586 1,977
Malicious injuries against property 114 132 180 144 197
Other offences against property 5,206 6,134 6,294 7,018 8,216
Offences against revenue laws, 
municipal, road & other laws relating to 
the social economy of the Territory 6,691 9,252 10,396 12,357 14,887
Miscellaneous other offences 205 335 374 449 677
1951 1952 1953 1954
Offences against the person 2,600 2,674 1,830 2,352
Malicious injuries against properly 248 253 440 241
Other offences against property 9,248 9,258 10,317 9,561
Offences against revenue laws, 
municipal, road & other laws relating 
to the social economy of the Territory 17,225 18,840 17,178 22,041
Miscellaneous other offences 808 791 809 584









praedial larceny and 
others
8,783 9,485 10,650 10,753 11,137 10,382 7,837 11,080
b) Arson 187 231 127 159 168 151 128 168





and others 22,487 20,140 29,328 30,525 31,454 30,925 33,813 22,210
TOTAL (all crimes) 36,094 34,711 45,051 48,338 48,638 47,172 50,441 38,183
Source: Judicial Depl. ARs (Note: The method of recording crimes changed in 1955)
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Salaam itself are extant, surviving records for the territory as a whole indicate a sharp rise 
in criminality (or at least a sharp rise in detected criminality). In 1939 there had been 
convictions in 1,618 cases of crime against property in Tanganyika. By 1946 the number 
of convictions for property offences had jumped by over 300% to 5,208.50 In Dar es 
Salaam itself, the District Commissioner observed in his annual report for that year, 
‘burglary and petty thieving, bag-snatching and the like showed a considerable 
increase.’51 1,963 thefts were reported in the town in the course of the year, as compared 
to 1,115 in 1938 52 ‘Commission of crime’, the Dar es Salaam Superintendent of Police 
informed the Municipal Secretary,
is on ly too prevalent at present in the native quarter: far too m any thefts and burglaries 
occur m onthly in this area m ostly by night, although the individual cases m ay not be very 
serious the cum ulative effect is m ost disturbing to the African residents.53
He reported that ‘a spate of rumours of assaults and robberies [had] been so strong that 
native women were refusing to go out alone after dark and men took to carrying knives 
and sticks to protect themselves against attack.’ ‘It has been emphasized to me again and 
again’, he continued, ‘that the crying needs of the native area are more police and more 
lights, and in this opinion I heartily concur.’ Crime rates continued to rise through the late 
1940s. By 1950, convictions in property cases had risen over the territory as a whole by 
an annual average of around 750. In the first three months of that year 787 property- 
related offences had been dealt with by the police in Dar es Salaam division alone.54 
There had been at least three hundred more cases reported to the Dar es Salaam police 
than in the same period the previous year -  1,092 as opposed to 804 in 1949. ‘Incidents 
after incidents happen’, complained the editor of the Tanganyika Opinion in February. 
How, he asked with characteristic overstatement, ‘can people tolerate any more such 
daily harassments when their mere stepping out of home at night is watched by hooligans 
and night raiders? When their lives and properties are in danger every step they go out?’55
Over the final decade of colonial rule crime rates continued to rise. ‘Offences against 
property’, noted the Commissioner of Police in his 1949 report, ‘are steadily on the
49 See Police ARs for 1941(p.l0) and 1942 (p.19).
50 Police AR for 1939; & Judicial AR for 1946.
51 Uzaratno DAR for 1946, p.8, TNA/61/504/1/46.
52 Answers to D.K.Patel’s questions in the Legco, December 1946, TNA/20219/Vol.II.
53 SP to MS, 4th February 1946, TNA/540/27/20.
54 Analysis o f crime dealt with by police, 1st January-31st March 1950, TNA/41124.
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Table 3.5 Criminal cases in Dar es Salaam's local courts 1950-1960
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Kariakoo n/a n/a 535 804 701 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ilala n/a n/a 535 581 599 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Kisutu n/a n/a 716 1105 765 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Liwali n/a n/a 273 313 282 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total 1,997 2,336 2,059 2,803 2,347 n/a 2,967 3,379 3,990 3,998 4,596
Sources: Dsm DAR for 1951, TNA 61/504/1/1951; TNA microfilm, Dsm Extra-Provincial Dist. Book 
Vol.V.I; & PARs 1956-59.
Table 3.6 Criminal cases presided over by Resident Magistrate, Dar es Salaam 1951-
1961
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
2,532 2,951 2,407 2,795 3,026 2,743 3,068 5,343 5,948 5,516 4,416
Source: Judicial Dept. ARs
Table 3.7 Cases dealt with by Dar es Salaam police, 1953-56
Penal code true cases Breakings Bicycle thefts Thefts from vehicles
1951 5,132
1952 6,166
1953 -  1st Qtr. 1,627
1953 - 2 nd Qtr. 1,756
1953- 3 rd Qtr. 1,333 404 60
1953- 4 th Qtr. 789* 371 124 32
1953 - total 5,505
1954 -  1st Qtr. 1,350 390 105 41
1954 — 2 lld Qtr 1,454 504 150 69
1954- 3 rd Qtr. 1,205 396 108 46
1954- 4 th Qtr. 1,266 420 90
1954 - total 5,275
1955 -  1st Qtr. 1,311 417 98 49
1955- 2 nd Qtr. 1,285 448 86 41
1955- 3 rd Qtr. 1,103 326 69 20
1955 - 4 th Qtr. 1,569 292 81 * Almost disappeared’
1955 - total 5,268
1956-  1st Qtr. 54
* No figure for this quarter survives; 789 has been arrived at through subtracting the other quarterly totals 
from the annual total reported in the AR, Compared to surviving quarterly figures, however, it is 
suspiciously low.
Statistics for other property offences do not survive. As some indication o f  their extent the following were 
reported in the quarterly police report for 1.10.55-31.12.55: Thefts over Shs.500/- - 29 (previous quarter -  
31) and Thefts under Sh.500/- - 466 (prev. qtr. -  516).
Source: Police ARs and Qtrly Police Reports in TNA 90/1011 Vol. 1.
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increase in all areas which are being opened up or developed.’56 The development of Dai’ 
es Salaam in particular considerably outpaced most of the remainder of Tanganyika, and 
this was reflected in the statistics. In 1949 the number of penal code cases dealt with by 
the Dar es Salaam police was 3,864. Three years later this figure was almost matched by 
the number of cases dealt with in the first half of the year alone: 3,092, which represented 
an increase over this short period of approximately 58 per cent.57 During May and June
1952 -which included the months of Ramadhan when crime rates were said to be at their 
peak- 220 cases of housebreaking had been reported to the police.58 In July that year the 
Municipal Council felt compelled to discuss ‘the alarming increase in crime’, urging ‘all 
those in authority to take vigorous steps to meet it’.59 Any action taken appeared to have 
little effect. One year later, in the last quarter of 1953 -which did not coincide with 
Ramadhan- 124 cases of housebreaking were, on average, being reported each month. In 
the same period 32 thefts from vehicles and 124 bicycle thefts were also reported, making 
a quarterly total of 527 of these offences. In the first quarter of 1954 this figure rose 
slightly to 536. The Superintendent of Police reported that ‘vigorous action ha[d] been 
taken to clear the town of would-be thieves.’60 Once again such action appeared to have 
little immediate impact. In the next quarter-year the total of reported breakings, thefts 
from vehicles and thefts of bicycles had increased to a total of 695. ‘Spiv’ raids -which 
had been conducted with ever greater frequency as the decade progressed- did, on the 
other hand, appear to be keeping crime in Dar es Salaam more or less in check. Between 
January 1953 and December 1956 the total number of cases under the penal code dealt 
with by the mmiicipal police actually declined. This appears to have been reflected in the 
territorial statistics also, as convictions for property offences dropped from 10,317 in
1953 to 9,561 in 1954, and further still to 8,783 in 1955. ‘It is correct to assume’, wrote 
the Commissioner of Police in 1955,
that spiv raids carried out throughout the year have done a great deal to keep down crim e in 
Dar es Salaam but these raids are not the final answer to crim e prevention and detection, as 
the crim inal classes w ill soon  learn w ays and m eans o f  avoid ing b eing caught up in these  
raids, as they did in N airobi from the earlier days o f  the Em ergency.61
55 TO, 14.2.50.
56 Police AR for 1949, p. 10.
57 CP to CS, 14th August 1952, TNA/21963/Vol.II.
58 Ibid.
59 TC to CS, 14th July 1952, TNA/21963/Vol.II.
60 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st January-31st March 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
61 Ibid., 1st October-31st December 1955.
75
He was right to express caution. The following year the number of convictions once 
again began to rise. By 1960 the territorial total stood at 10,382. In Dar es Salaam, the 
primary location of reported crime throughout the colonial period, the proportion of 
property offences dealt with by police actually rose in the final years of colonial rule. Had 
crime rates in the capital and Tanganyika as a whole risen at a comparable rate this means 
that in 1960 approximately 4,412 such offences would have been reported in the town.62 
In fact this number was exceeded by a substantial amount; property offences reported to 
the police in Dar es Salaam that year having risen to 6,380. Information from courts in 
the municipality support this evidence, apparently confirming that crime in the capital 
escalated over the course of the 1950s at a rate that exceeded the rise in Tanganyika as a 
whole. In Dar es Salaam’s local courts -presided over by the Wakili and Liwali- the 
number of criminal cases dealt with annually more than doubled between 1951 and 1960 
from 1,997 to 4,596. A comparable increase was recorded in the Resident Magistrate’s 
court.
Judging by colonial records then, the escalation in crime in Tanganyika during the 
period of the British mandate is striking. In 1922, the first year for which statistics 
survive, the number of criminal cases dealt with by the police stood at 4,960. In the final 
year of colonial rule the number of cases in which convictions were obtained alone was 
over 50,000. Property offences had proliferated at an almost comparable rate. From the 
introduction of the Tanganyikan Penal Code in 1930 to the end of colonial rule they had 
increased from around 2,000 to over 11,000. In Dar es Salaam itself, there were 443 
prosecutions for offences against property in 1931. By the end of the colonial period the 
number of cases involving offences against property dealt with by Dar es Salaam police 
stood at 6,380. The escalation was apparent in bye-law offences also. In 1928, 8,005 
offences against the ‘social economy’ of the territory were reported in Tanganyika. In the 
final year of colonial rule the number of such offences had risen to almost 34,000.
62 The number o f cases o f crimes against property dealt with by Dar es Salaam police in 1954 was 4,162, 
which was 43% of the total territorial convictions (the proportion convicted in Dsm stood at 7.8%). In 1955 
3,632 property offences were dealt with by the police in Dar es Salaam, 42% o f  the territorial total o f  
convictions (the proportion convicted in Dsm being 7.5%). Ibid.
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Table S. 8 Main Preventable Crimes Reported to the Police (Dsm) 1957-1960
1957 1958 1959 1960
Thefts under ShslOOO/- 2,876* 2,704 3,003 3,829
Thefts over ShslOOO/- 205* 98 101 95
Thefts by Public Servant 27 35 24 20
Housebreaking** 439 479 482 821
Burglary*** 880 852 1,591 1,494
Cattle Stealing 16 32 20 11
Other Breakings 322 466 — —
Robbery (& Extortion) 55 45 58 110
Total 4,820 4,711 5,279 6,380
* Thefts under and over Shs500/- in 1957 
** 1959 = Breakings by day 
*** 1959 = & Breakings by Night 
Source: Police ARs
Table 3.9 Cases in Kinondoni Native Court 1957-1960
Offence 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Break-ins and burglaries 9 4 4 3 4
Stealing 78 57 43 34 52
Robbery 2 2 2
Assault/Unlawful wounding 82 81 89 79 87
Indecent assault 4 1 1 1
Repatriation 1 1
Rogue and vagabond 7 10 8
Trading without a licence 1 3
Native liquor regulations 17 15 7 15 20
Drunk and disorderly 8 7 5 5 14
Disorderly conduct 27 24 10 26 31
Showing disrespect/Abuse 21 35 16 10 22
Walking at night without a lamp 73 30 5
Riding at night without a light 38 13 163 20 54
Riding bicycle without road licence/or with 
defective brakes/ or carrying a passenger on a 
bicycle
11 3 354 30 74
Possession or smoking o f  Bhang 1 5 1 1
Gambling 11 1
Tax offences 83 34 33 18
Other 30 40 46 28 36
Source: Lists in TNA Acc. No. 122.
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The causes of crime
The increase in crime -particularly property crime- that has occurred in western 
societies since the eighteenth century has been associated with the breakdown of 
communal social structures in the face of both industrialisation and urbanisation.63 
Scholars of crime in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries have turned to 
related arguments to explain the apparent escalation in crime rates there in the period 
since colonisation.64 Economic ‘development5 led to the proliferation of commodities and 
the creation of new patterns of consumption, new needs and desires.65 Urban growth, 
meanwhile, provided an environment in which the opportunities and temptations for theft 
have multiplied considerably at the same time as an impoverished urban class has 
emerged in the midst of relative plenty. Both these developments were highlighted by 
Paterson in his 1939 report on prisons in Eastern Africa:
A  very rapid increase in the demand on life during the last 30  years has led inevitably to 
a[n ]... increase in theft. There are so  m any m ore things that the heart desires, so m any 
m ore things to be stolen. O nce cloth ing w as a sw eaty rag; som etim es the rag w as m issing. 
N o w  the red fe z  is a great prize, a coloured shirt w ill attract attention, braces are not 
beyond the dream o f  a v illage beau. The rage for b icycles in U ganda has produced a fresh  
crop o f  young offenders. The subtler crim es fo llow  a greater m easure o f  education, and this 
tim e for the first tim e in history a case o f  forging a cheque has occurred in Somaliland.
Crim e w ill further increase as this sam e demand to have life, and have it m ore abundantly, 
lures the m ore spirited and am bitious youngster from tending his parents’ cattle to the Gold  
paved streets o f  Nairobi, Kam pala or Dar es Salaam. On arriving at the tow n they find the 
only occupation open to them  is to serve in the m ost m enial capacity for Shs2/- a m onth in 
an Indian shop. They are just as hungry as when their parents fed them at hom e, but food  in 
the tow n has to be paid for, and m oreover there are many things in the tow n besides food  
that they want to buy. So they steal, and the demand for life leads to the loss o f  liberty.66
From the little research that has been done on patterns of crime in developing 
countries, it appears that poverty has tended to be a crucial factor in determining the 
identity of both perpetrator and victim.67 According to Iliffe, in tropical Africa
m ost urban crim e grew out o f  poverty. It w as crim e by individuals against property... and 
m ost o f  the individuals were poor. O f those tried for robbery in B razzaville in 1935-6, 42  
per cent had no trade and 40 per cent w ere unem ployed. ‘I w as w ithout work and destitute 
o f  resources’, one explained. T sto le to eat’, said another. The sam e w as true in Timbuktu
63 See Emsley, Crime, pp.93-4.
64 See Clinard & Abbott, Crime.
63 Ibid., p.35.
66 Paterson, ‘Report’, p.2.
67 Clinard & Abbott, Crime, p.36.
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in 1940, in C otonou in 1952, and in K inshasa during the 1960s. O f  all m ales arrested for 
property offences in Kampala during 1968, 61 per cent were recorded as unem ployed.68
Clinard and Abbott found that in 1960s Kampala most crimes involved property offences 
committed by the poor against the poor.69 In an environment in which ‘even the simplest 
object, such as a used shirt, a light bulb, or a piece of iron pipe, represents a desirable 
increment in wealth/ they point out, ‘the potential market for stolen goods is much 
greater than in almost any developed country/70
The prevalence of petty theft emerging amidst an enviromnent of impoverishment 
echoes the findings of historians of crime in industrialising western societies. The notion 
of a ‘criminal class’, beloved of ‘respectable’ 19th century commentators on crime, has 
been undermined by recent historical research. ‘Criminality, in the form of thefts 
committed by men from the poorer sections of the working class,’ Emsley tells us, ‘was 
transitory behaviour, possibly fostered by economic hardship, probably encouraged by
7 1opportunity.’ The same was true of colonial Africa, and was acknowledged as such by 
officials, in Dar es Salaam at least, where rising crime rates were invariably attributed to 
the lack of employment. In Tanganyika, unlike 19th century Europe, there was no attempt 
to identify a criminal type, someone whose natural proclivities inevitably resulted in 
criminal behaviour. Whilst Victorian commentators may have focused on ‘evil ancestral
• 7 7  •influences’ to explain the tendency to offend, in Tanganyika environmental factors were 
the most frequently cited explanation and the breakdown of customary restraints and 
unemployment were both highlighted.73 Although an anonymous official in the Kisarawe 
district book could describe the ‘character of the Wazaramo’ as ‘peace loving and polite 
(though inclined to theft)’,74 more likely the descent into criminality was understood to 
result from increasing urbanisation. The urban enviromnent, with its concentration of 
population, its disparities of wealth, its lack of rigid structures of control, and most of all 
its lack of opportunities for formal employment, was seen to corrupt the incoming 
African. As the largest town in the territory, Dar es Salaam posed a particular threat. 
Surviving statistics, which show the incidence of crime in the capital to be hugely
68 Iliffe, African Poor, p. 176.
69 Clinard & Abbott, Crime, p.36.
70 Clinard & Abbott, Crime, p.257.
71 Emsley, Crime, p. 175.
72 Victorian pyschologist Henry Maudsley, quoted in Emsley, Crime, p.75.
73 This is not to say that the notion o f individual responsibility was ignored. Simply that criminal behaviour 
was felt to result from the moral weaknesses o f African migrants in a corrupting urban environment.
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disproportionate to its share of the territorial population, appear to confirm this 
perspective. However, statistics are opaque and can prove deceptive. Surviving territorial 
criminal records cover only those areas in which a police officer was stationed and thus 
exclude a large part of rural Tanganyika. In fact crime -and hence criminality- may have 
been much more common in the rural areas than colonial officials thought. Certainly 
recent research into crime in rural Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries has led to a 
reappraisal of assumptions about the coincidence of urban growth and criminality there.75 
That similar assumptions on the part of colonial officials (and non-officials) may have 
been equally ill-informed, or at least exaggerated, should be borne in mind.
Explanations of crime in Dar es Salaam
In 1924 Maj. Orde-Browne, Dar es Salaam’s District Officer, complained that
The A frican com m unity in town m ust unfortunately be regarded w ith  marked suspicion; 
w h ile there is naturally a very large elem ent o f  thoroughly respectable peop le honestly  
occup ied  in a reputable calling, there is also a m ost undesirable floating  population o f  
crim inals, or quasi-crim inals, w ho thrive on the exploitation o f  unsophisticated natives w ho  
m ay pass through the tow n.76
The emergence of such malefactors, according to Orde-Browne in his 1926 report on 
labour, was bound up with the growth of large urban centres where Africans were ‘living 
under demoralising and undesirable conditions.’77 Having left their rural homes for 
waged labour, Africans drifted to the towns where
they find som e sort o f  casual work, but probably fail to get steady em ploym ent; intervals o f  
id leness betw een  jobs tend to increase, until the individual drifts gradually into the class o f  
unem ployable loafer, from  w hich  stage it is fatally easy to jo in  the defin itely  crim inal 
class.78
As we have seen African morals were viewed by colonial officials as prone to corrosion 
through contact with the urban environment. The descent into criminality was the logical 
conclusion to this process. Four years later Fryer, the District Officer for Dar es Salaam, 
observed:
74 Kisarawe District Book Vol.I, TNA microfilm.
75 Emsley, Crime, p.98.
76 DAR for 1924, p.6, TNA/53.4.
77 Orde-Browne, ‘Labour’, para. 114.
78 Ibid.
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W hat I see  go in g  on around m e is m ore the type o f  developm ent w hich  produces from the 
w aifs and strays and street urchins o f  London, the type o f  being that earns his liv ing  by his 
w its, w ho is a good  judge at sum m ing up his fellow  man and has no respect for a law  he 
can break w ith im punity.79
Crime was commonly associated with the process of detribalisation. For the editor of the 
Tanganyika Standard, writing in the wake of an attack on a European woman in 1952, it 
was
quite ob vious that the m ajority o f  crim es such as theft and burglary are com m itted  by 
Africans m any o f  w hom  travel long distances drawn by the glam our o f  the big town. In the 
‘new  com m unity o f  strangers’ these people lose the social responsibility  that c lo se  v illage  
life im posed on them.
‘The evils and dangers which can result if this drift [to the town] is allowed to continue’, 
commented the Member for Local Government in the same year, ‘are well known.’80 
Throughout the colonial period the tendency to criminality remained, as far as most 
observers were concerned, a vice predominantly acquired by Africans on their move to 
the towns.
Within Dar es Salaam itself the shortage of employment was singled out as the key 
contributor to burgeoning African criminality. So in the first district report, in 1920, APO 
West blamed the high levels of crime that had been prevalent in the early years of British 
rule on the presence of a large number of demobilised Africans in the town who were 
eventually repatriated to their districts of origin.81 The following year, DO Brett voiced 
his concern about the return of some of these individuals:
A  number o f  these people are unable to obtain suitable em ploym ent, others have no desire 
to work; these are potential th ieves i f  they have noone w ho is w illin g  to support them , since  
food  is not available in Dar es Salaam  as it may be at their hom es. A  su ccessfu l theft o f  
c lo th in g  or other articles w h ich  are d isp osed  o f  ou tside the tow n sh ip  procures the 
w herew ithal for their m aintenance for several days. During the last quarter o f  the year out 
o f  90 cases o f  o ffen ces against property brought in the M agistrate’s Court, 71 accused , 
ninety one per cent o f  the total, are natives o f  tribes dom iciled  outside Dar es Salaam , eg. 
M aKua, W aNyasa, Baganda, W aBondei etc.
The editor of the Dar es Salaam Times concurred, ascribing ‘an orgy of housebreaking 
and theft on the part of native criminals’ in the same year to ‘an absence of employment
79 DAR for 1931, p.7, TNA/53.4.
80 Memo, no.68, 6th May 1952, TNA/21616A^ol.III.
81 DAR for 1919-20, p.9, TNA/1733:!.
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for natives who turn their energies along the line of least effect.’82 In 1930, after 1,898 
labourers had been laid off by the Public Works Department, the Commissioner of Police 
made the same connection. Instances of crime ‘were to be expected when the fact is taken 
into account that at the moment the town is overcrowded with alien unemployed natives 
who have been thrown out of work through the present economic depression.’83 Six years 
later the Indian editor of the Tanganyika Opinion expressed his opinion that 
‘[i’jnextricably tangled with the question of tackling the criminally-minded native is the 
question of unemployment among the native community of Dar es Salaam.’84 Expressing 
dismay about a case of theft in which an ‘old native’ said he had committed the offence 
because hunger had compelled him to do so, the editorial continued:
[N ]ext to hunger com es the desire o f  the town native to buy wearing apparels, to use cycles  
and taxis, to use cinem as and to enjoy such am enities o f  western life  w hich  necessitate a 
large recurrent expenditure. This m eans that the unem ployed is as dangerous to the society  
as the crim inally-m inded unless he is shown sym pathy and is enabled to eke out an honest 
livelihood.
The lack of work was held to have a particularly bad effect upon African youth. In his 
1931 report, Baker commented on the large number of detribalised youths, ‘piclc[ing] up 
a living as best they can’ who frequently resorted to crime to get by.85 Pike also singled 
out joblessness amongst this section of the community. Between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen children who had originally come to the town as servants seldom found 
permanent employment. ‘[T]he four most impressionable years of these boys lives’ were, 
according to Pike, ‘spent in the company of loafers, petty thieves and card sharpers.’86 An 
African writing to Kwetu in 1942 also bemoaned the pernicious effects of joblessness 
among the young. He regarded ‘the number of unemployed youths as shocking’. Their 
semi-educated status gave them ambitions for urban employment which were not 
matched by the opportunities:
Several o f  these youths w ent to school with the intention o f  rendering their future secure, 
but through no fault o f  their ow n, but because o f  lack o f  finan ce on the part o f  their 
underpaid fathers, they had to leave or w ere ousted from school before com pleting their 
education. N o w  B u sin ess Firms do not accept services o f  these youths because they are 
unqualified, and as the little education they got is all bookish  and they cannot use their 
hands to do any handicrafts. What can these youths be expected  to do? They cannot be
82 DT, 28* May 1921, p.2/3.
83 CP to CS, 12th August 1931, TNA/20219.
84 TO, 20th November 1937, p.7.
85 Baker, ‘Social conditions’, p.94.
86 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’,p.9.
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expected  to be farmers sin ce they w ere not trained in that line. T hey have already been  
initiated in profitable undertakings so  what w ill they be given  to do? N othing? But they are 
people in need and as such in desperation they w ill turn to what w ill appear to them  to be 
the easiest m eans o f  sa tisfy in g  their wants, n am ely theft, p ic k  p o ck e tin g , rob b ery , bank  
h old in g  [sic], e tc . It is true that they w ill have to abye [sic] these felon ies but in course o f  a 
tim e they w ill b ecom e inured to the punishm ents inflicted on them  and belittle sam e and 
grow to like their trade, w hile it is also very true that society w ill suffer intolerably.87
Another correspondent to Kwetu pointed out that it was not only unemployment, but 
also the low level of African wages which was resulting in the escalation of crime. 
Rajabu bin Alfani complained in a letter four years earlier that a monthly wage of 
Shs.25/- was hopelessly insufficient when daily food expenses alone could be Shsl/50, 
and that this was leading to the increasing incidence of theft. From the late-193 Os some 
officials had also voiced concern about the low level of wages. Paterson had observed in 
1939 that ‘ [e]mployment at wages too low to allow a sufficiency of food tempts the 
simple and the hungry to steal.’88 Seven years later, a conference of district officials in 
Eastern Province was told that ‘a partial review of cases of theft and burglary had 
indicated that a considerable number of such offences had been found to have been 
committed by Africans at uneconomic rates of pay.’89 In the same year, the District 
Commissioner observed that whilst an increase in thieving and bag-snatching in 1946 
could be explained ‘largely by the fact that a considerable number of Africans have 
crowded in the town, who having no work, steal to live’, he also acknowledged that a 
contributory factor was ‘an additional large number... employed at wages which do not 
enable themselves to subsist because of the high prices of food and rent, and other 
conditions now ruling.’90 It was the absence of formal employment for the ever-growing 
numbers of rural-urban migrants, however, to which crime waves in Dar es Salaam 
continued to be primarily attributed. So an outbreak of burglaries in 1952 was, according 
to a secretariat official, ‘due no doubt to the end of the boom or the beginning of the 
slump.’91 Down cycles in the urban economy produced not only a shortage of work but 
an increase in lawlessness. ‘It is most noticeable’, wrote the Commissioner of Police in 
1959, that the amount of crime varies with unemployment (which varies seasonally)’.92
87 Kwetu  No.5, 26th March 1942, p.7.
88 Some observations on the treatment o f  the offender against the law [in Tanganyika] by Alexander 
Paterson (1939), p .l, TNA/27062.
89 Mins o f DCs conference, EP, 2nd September 1946, TNA/61/502/Pt.l.
90 Uzaramo DAR for 1946, p.8, TNA/61/504/1/46.
91 Sec. min., 26th August 1952, TNA/21963/Vol. 1.
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From the early 1940s unemployment became less of a cyclical and more of a structural 
phenomenon. The presence of un- or under-employed Africans in the town unsettled 
officials and increasingly the idea that removing the jobless from the town would help 
reduce crime there gained ground. ‘From my position on the bench*, announced the 
Resident Magistrate in judgment on Ramazan bin Saidi (who received a one year 
sentence for the theft of a bedspread) in 1944,
I can see that a great deal o f  stealing is going on and it seem s to m e that this type o f  offence  
w ill tend to increase in Dar es Salaam  rather than dim inish as long as unem ployed  natives 
are a llow ed  to roam the tow n liv in g  by their w its. It appears to be not before tim e for a 
com plete rounding up o f  persons such as the accu sed .. ..93
In 1954, DC Harris complained about ‘drifters’ for whom there was no employment who 
were ‘associated with crime of the most petty order.’ He advocated ridding the town of 
those without visible means of support... [as] it would stop them masking the activities of 
the professional criminal.’94 Vagabonds, he reported, were already regularly being 
cleared from the town. Campaigns against urban undesirables (including the jobless) did 
occur in the mid-1950s. According to an editorial in the Standard in 1957, however, it 
was not sufficient to cope with the situation in the town:
It is . . .  know n that there are far too m any unem ployed adult m ales roam ing the tow n and 
outly ing districts, the majority o f  w hom  have no desire w hatsoever to work so  long as they  
can prey on their neighbours, or w orse still rob them.
W hen there w as full em ploym ent in Dar es Salaam w e cannot rem em ber a sin g le incident 
w hen  the P o lice  had to go into action against a m ob, ...an d  w e fee l con vin ced  that at the 
root o f  all the intim idation, m ost o f  the burglaries and thefts and other ev ils , lies the 
problem  o f  clearing the tow ns o f  the spivs and hooligans.95
Such tactics were unsuccessful, however. Although an initial intensification of campaigns 
against the jobless and other undesirables met with some success between 1953 and 1956, 
at the same time as growing numbers of Africans were repatriated in the late-1950s rates 
of crime began to rise once more. It required more than just influx control to reverse the 
trend towards increasing crime.
92 Police AR for 1959, p.45.
93 TS, 10th June 1944, p. 16.
94 TS, 28th December 1954.
95 TS, 26th September 1957.
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Chapter Four
The Dar es Salaam underworld
Like other urban centres throughout the world Dar es Salaam was the location of 
distinctive forms of criminality. The concentration of wealth and population provided an 
environment in which such quintessentially urban crimes as burglary, street robbery or 
pickpocketing could occur. The opportunities for illicit gain offered by the town 
undoubtedly attracted individuals who were keen to exploit these conditions. A small, but 
active, hard core o f ‘professional5 criminals appears to have emerged in Dar es Salaam in 
the course of the colonial period. At the same time a distribution network for stolen 
property arose, which in providing a market for illicit goods seems to have encouraged 
crime.
Crime against property
Of all African infractions of colonial law it was the danger of ‘detribalised5 Africans 
resorting to property crime, or the threat posed by those who already had, that caused the 
greatest concern to colonial officials. Crime against property occurred throughout Dar es 
Salaam, although offences differed by area, and the incidence of crime appears to have 
differed markedly in the town’s three designated zones. Housebreakings occurred in all 
three zones of the town, but appeared to be particularly common in the African and Asian 
quarters. Petty criminals, such as pickpockets and con-men, were also commonly found 
working the streets of these latter areas. And once again it was the inhabitants of the 
African township and Uhindini who were most likely to be a victim of violent crime; for 
they were also the commonest location of street robberies as well as the occasional armed 
hold-up. The higher incidence of crime in these areas had its roots in the lack of control 
over the urban population: the ineffective ‘native’ administration and the insignificant
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police presence in Zones II and III contributed to the fragile order that held there, 
particularly in the inter-war period. In Uhindini, at several times between the wars, 
reports in the Indian press portrayed this order as verging on the point of collapse. 
Although this is probably exaggerated, it seems that the area was considerably more 
lawless than would have been tolerated in the European quarter. Due to the shortage of 
sources one can only speculate on the situation in the less policed but more densely 
populated African areas. Although in 1954 the Assistant Commissioner of Police in Dal­
es Salaam complained that ‘[t]he crime problem of Dar es Salaam has its roots in the 
densely populated Native Quarter in which the poorly constructed houses are most 
vulnerable and street lighting is either very poor or non-existent.5 ‘A large portion of its 
perimeter consists of rough bush country,5 he observed, ‘affording excellent natural cover 
for bad characters at all times of the day.1
Break-ins and burglaries
In the outbreak of lawlessness that followed WWI, housebreaking was common 
throughout the town. ‘When it is stated that there is hardly a European house that had not 
been broken into, at one time or another,5 complained the Dar es Salaam Times in June 
1920, ‘it will be realised to what extent the natives went in their depredations.52 The rash 
of burglaries was reined in briefly through the arrest of ‘all the more important 
criminals5.3 This respite was short-lived. The following year the Times was speaking once 
again of an ‘epidemic of housebreaking now so prevalent in the town5.4 By 1925 the 
number of housebreaking cases police were dealing with in Dar es Salaam had reached 
256, whilst it is likely that at least as many went unreported. By 1931 a correspondent in 
the Tanganyika Standard was complaining that ‘[t]he state of public security in this town 
is becoming alarming... [b]urglaries are of almost nightly occurrence5.5 The following 
year an official remarked that ‘[b]urglary, housebreaking and offences of the kind are 
most common throughout the Territory and in Dar es Salaam have caused an immense
1 QPR, Dsm Dist, 1st July-30"' September 1954 TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
2 DT, 9th June 1920, p.5.
3 Ibid.
4 DT, 30"1 April 1921, p.6.
5 Letter from Dogberry, TS, 15th August 1931, p.7.
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amount of trouble.’6 Such offences were by no means restricted to Uzunguni. In the early 
nineteen twenties, when property crimes were often reported by the Dar es Salaam 
Times, burglaries in the African areas appeared to slightly outnumber those in the rest of 
the town. It is far more likely, however, that they occurred with much greater frequency 
in the ‘township’ than elsewhere. Not only were Africans less likely to report crimes to 
the police, but also those that were reported were less likely to be recorded in the 
(European owned) Times than crimes against Europeans. Housing in the African areas 
was also much more vulnerable to being broken into. A common means of entry into 
African homes was for the burglar to simply tunnel underneath a wall or door.7
Burglaries in the Indian quarter were also reported in the Dar es Salaam Times, though 
a much fuller impression of the incidence of crime in Uhindini can be drawn from Indian 
newspapers, editions of which survive from 1930. A 1931 editorial in the Tanganyika 
Opinion complained of ‘the daily occurrences of thefts and robberies in some part of the 
Indian area or another.’8 Three years later the editor of its rival newspaper, the 
Tanganyika Herald, suggested ‘not a single night passes without a burglary or theft.’9 
Although most of these offences were more likely to have involved stealing from the 
person, pickpocketing or shoplifting, burglaries from both houses and commercial 
premises in Uhindini were reported with regularity in the Indian press. In one incident in 
February 1935 the shop of Madowji Ukabhai, at Library Square, was broken into in the 
small hours of the morning:
Shouts o f  ‘Thief! T h ie f!’ awakened the people o f  this locality and one native w as seen  in 
the shop and the other w atching in the street w hen they and an A s k a r i  arrived on the 
scen e .10
They fled to Kisutu, an area, the Herald observed, which ‘generally shelters native 
thieves.’ On another occasion in the early 1930s the merchant house of Messrs. Kassavji 
Anandji & Co. were the victims of a daytime hold-up by a gang comprising two Indians 
and two Africans:
A ll o f  a sudden three persons dashed into the o ffice  and one o f  them  sh ow ed  Liladhar [an 
em ployee] his revolver and dem anded from him the key o f  the safe. The other tw o had big
6 Memo by AG, 29th Feb. 1932, PRO/CO/691/125/1.
7 See eg. DT, 28th October 1922, p.9.
8 TO, 5th August 1931, p. 8.
9 TH, 7th July 1934, p. 12.
10 TH, 23rd February 1935, p.4.
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knives in their hands and the fourth one w as standing in the passage door. ...L ilad har was 
ordered to open the safe [from w hich  jew ellery  and S h s4 ,500 /- w as s to le n ]... There w ere  
cheques and docum ents in the safe w hich  they left untouched and on com pletion  o f  their 
business they quietly w alked  out in the street. The w h ole  o f  this b usiness took  not m ore 
than seven  m inutes.11
Whilst armed hold-ups such as this were few and far between, more petty forms of 
theft from commercial premises was common. A widely used ploy of gangs which 
frequented the area was for an African to begin a quarrel with an Indian shopkeeper. His 
cohorts would then come to his assistance and in the ensuing melee goods would be 
removed from the store.12 ‘It has transpired’, wrote the editor of the Tanganyika Herald 
in 1931,
that the native loafer has found h im se lf  encouraged in this profession  by the idea that it is 
alm ost d ifficult [sic] for Indian shopkeepers to get po lice protection either on the spot or at 
the p o lice  station, and the p rofession  is b eing carried on in creasingly  unchecked  and 
undetected.13
The conspicuous absence of a regular police presence meant that there was little the 
storeholders could do about it. According to the Indian press, it was not only Indian 
shopkeepers who felt under threat, residents of Uhindini in general were all too aware of 
the insecurity of their position. ‘No body considers himself safe even in the daytime,’ 
wrote the editor of the Tanganyika Herald in August 1931, ‘not to speak of the intensity 
of terror during the night.’14 Such expressions of anxiety about levels of crime in 
Uhindini were reported with regularity in the Indian newspapers.
If both the settler and the Indian press expressed concern about the level of burglaries 
Dar es Salaam in between the wars, the escalation of such offences in the post-war period 
was viewed with increasing disquiet. The situation in the capital at the end of the war 
was, despite the public anxiety reflected in the newspapers, not too serious. In October 
and November 1945 33 cases of housebreaking and burglary had been reported in the 
capital, which if taken as representative would lead to an annual figure of around 200.15 
This compares favourably with the 256 reported in 1925. It was from this base, however, 
that the dramatic post-war increase in housebreakings and burglaries took place. The
11 TH ,4lh August 1931, p. 12.
12 See for eg. TH, 14th July 1931, p .14; or TO , 12111 November 1937, p.4; or the extract from the African 
Sentinel, 1st March 1942, in TNA/21963/Vol.IL
13 TH, 14th July 1931, p. 14.
14 TH, 11th August 1931, p.9.
15 CS to D.K. Patel M.L.C., 19th December 1946, TNA/20219/Vol.II.
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following October and November saw 49 cases of these offences, which indicates an 
annual total rising to around 300.16 In August that year a correspondent to the Standard 
identified the increasing incidence of burglaries occurring in ‘broad daylight5.17 ‘It is 
indeed a most unhappy state of affairs5, complained the Resident Magistrate the 
following month, ‘that nothing, unless under lock and key, is safe from the teeming 
number of thieves in Dar es Salaam, and even lock and key are not really proof against a 
large number of the thieving population.’18 In the territory as a whole the same year the 
number of cases of housebreaking, burglary and allied offences for which convictions 
were obtained stood at 396. By 1950 this had more than doubled to 938.19 Whilst this 
increase may in small part be accounted for by a growing proportion of cases being 
reported thanks to increasing confidence in the police, it nevertheless represents a 
significant escalation in the number of burglaries in Tanganyika. Being by far the largest 
urban centre in the territory (and expanding at an ever faster pace), the bulk of these 
offences occurred in Dar es Salaam. By the end of 1952 over one hundred house- or 
shop-breakings were being reported in the capital every month.20 The Standard 
commented in May that year that ‘much public concern is being felt at the rising number 
of burglaries and other robberies which threaten the safety and well-being of members of 
all communities5.21 Rates continued to rise. In the last six months of 1953, 775 such 
offences were reported making a monthly average of 129. The number reported in the 
whole of 1954 was 1710 -  the monthly average thus increasing to 143. Whilst 1955 saw a 
slight decline in the national and municipal statistics, the next year they began to rise 
once again. In 1957 the number of cases of housebreaking, burglary and allied offences 
for which convictions were obtained in the whole of Tanganyika stood at 1,717 and by 
the final year of colonial rule the total exceeded two thousand, reaching 2,115 in 1961.22 
In Dai' es Salaam itself, in the penultimate year of colonial rule, 2,315 such offences had 
been reported to the police, bringing the monthly average close to 200.
As between the wars, all of Dar es Salaam’s communities continued to be victim to 
burglaries after 1945, though houses in Zone III remained most vulnerable. Of the 116
16 Ibid.
17 Letter, TS, 31st August 1946, p.5
18 TS, 28th September 1946, p.5.
19 Police ARs for 1939, 1950 and 1961.
20 TS, 1st March 1952, p .l.
21 TS, 31st May 1952, p.24.
22 Police ARs for 1957 and 1961.
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housebreakings reported in May 1952, 67 were into African houses. In June, 56 African 
houses were broken into out of a total of 104.23 ‘Africans going out in the evenings now 
lock and bar their windows’, reported the Standard the same year, ‘a few years ago this 
was unnecessary.’24 The majority of cases of housebreaking and burglary occurred in the 
area served by the Msimbazi police station, which was responsible for the locations 
where the bulk of the African population lived, including Kariakoo, Ilala, Buguruni and 
Magomeni. In the first nine months of 1955 over half of all the burglaries dealt with by 
Dar es Salaam police were reported at this station; 324 out of an annual total of 840 (a 
further 173 cases of housebreaking were also reported). In the same period just 33 and 
105 cases were reported at Kilwa Road and Central police stations respectively.25 
Regarding breakings, the Assistant Commissioner of Police wrote in 1955, ‘[w]ith the 
exception of Msimbazi, the position is not unsatisfactory.’26 Reporting a town-wide 
deterioration in the situation two years later, the same officer noted that burglaries had 
increased particularly in the Magomeni, Kariakoo and Buguruni areas. In the face of this 
new wave of breakings the police asked ‘householders... to report at once cases where 
persons living in their quarters seem to be enjoying a standard of living which is 
obviously beyond their means.’27 Four months later they were forced to put on extra night 
patrols to combat burglaries which the Standard described as being ‘rampant in Dar es 
Salaam’. It was not only the African areas which were affected: ‘In one small area alone 
in Oyster Bay,’ reported the Standard, ‘money has been stolen from some of the houses 
while their occupants have been asleep’.28 Four break-ins in this area were attributed to a 
burglar who ‘generally prefers to gain access to the houses by climbing the verandas or 
drainpipes....’
In many respects targeting European or Asian houses was the wisest course of action 
for thieves in the capital. Whilst they may have been more difficult to enter, their contents 
would generally have been of much greater value, and if apprehended the intruder would 
not have been vulnerable to the ‘instant justice’ occasionally meted out to suspects caught 
in the African areas. The treatment of Maganga Mnameta, a victim of ‘instant justice’ in 
Buguruni in November 1957, gives some indication of the intensity of feeling amongst
23 CP to CS, 14th August 1952, TNA/21963/Vol.II.
24 TS, 1st March 1952, p. 1.
25 Ibid., 1st October-31st December 1955.
26 Ibid., Is' April-30th June 1955. (My italics).
27 TS, 14th May 1957, p .l.
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Dar es Salaam’s African communities arising from the incidence of theft in Zone III. He 
was caught in the house of Asha binti Mwinyikani and apprehended after being chased by 
her son, Rajabu bin Hamisi, and a crowd that had gathered at the scene of the crime. The 
son, according to his own testimony, then went to the police whilst the crowd ‘stood by 
the thief. On his return Maganga was dead:
The p o lice pathologist said that it appeared that M aganga, a night watchm an, had been tied  
at the wrists when b low s were inflicted. Several o f  the injuries show ed the blow s had been  
inflicted w ith extrem e brutal force.
Rajabu s/o  H am isi said that he chased M aganga with the branch o f  a palm tree. H e alleged  
M aganga drew a knife, but threw it down when told to by the crowd. T hose w ho w ere near 
him  started hitting M aganga in revenge.
The coroner said that Rajabu had im pressed him as a person w ho knew  a great deal m ore o f  
the circum stances surrounding the death o f  M aganga than he cared to d isclose. H e did not 
b eliev e  that M aganga had a k nife or that Rajabu could not identify  th ose w ho struck  
M aganga.29
The circumstances surrounding this incident are murky indeed. It is possible that the 
murder victim was not a thief at all and that his assailants had ulterior motives for their 
actions. If this version of events was simply a fabrication, however, it was one that was 
plausible to those who concocted it, as well as, for that matter, to the judge who recorded 
a verdict of murder by persons unknown. On the other hand, were the allegations against 
Maganga true, his treatment was spectacularly disproportionate to the offence committed: 
he had been caught stealing merely a bundle of clothing.
In allegedly stealing clothing Maganga Mnameta would have been far from alone, for 
this modest type of booty was -along with cash- perhaps the most common target of 
burglars throughout the colonial period. That this was so indicates the poverty of both the 
thieves themselves and the majority of their victims. According to the 1924 police report, 
‘property stolen is of infinitesimal value, and very often consists of rags of native 
clothing.’30 Two decades later the situation remained substantially unchanged, with items 
stolen in a wave of burglaries, according to the Standard, consisting mainly of ‘only small 
quantities of clothing and other property.’31 Judging by accounts in the settler press - 
which was more likely to report serious incidents of theft- the reported takings from
28 TS, 7th September 1957, p.2.
29 TS, 16th November 1957, p .l.
30 Police AR for 1924 in PRO/C0691/78.
31 TS, 1st March 1952, p .l.
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burglaries were indeed often extremely modest, even in the case of thefts from European 
or Asian properties. For example, the Dar es Salaam Times of 21st October 1922 reports 
the theft of the following from the house of one K.F. Burt: ‘property comprising shirts, 
collars, handkerchiefs, Cambridge running shorts and singlets, and a Gillette razor.’32 In 
September 1946 the Standard reported the conviction of a burglar who had stolen just 
two pairs of trousers from a house in Uhindini. He received an 18 month sentence for the 
offence (having had previous convictions).33 In October 1959, Haji Salum, of no fixed 
abode, was sentenced to three months for the theft of a handkerchief and a feeding bottle 
teat worth just seventy-five cents.34 European and Asian homes or commercial premises 
were also subject to serious predation. Jewellery and cash were commonly stolen. In 1923 
Sadiki bin Sultani was sentenced to three years imprisonment for stealing watches and 
jewellery worth £80-100 from the tent of one Mr. Grant. He was given a further two 
years for the theft of £12 worth of clothing and other effects from C. S. M. Marchant of 
the King’s African Rifles.35 Saidi bin Mohamed was sentenced to six years imprisonment 
in 1949, for breaking into a warehouse and stealing property to the value of £900.36 In 
1960, Juma Saidi was sentenced to twenty one years for thirty five offences in the Oyster 
Bay area involving property to the value of £430.37 Burglaries in the African townships 
tended more consistently to be modest affairs and were as likely to be the work of 
individuals who would steal anything that was removable. For example, the Dar es 
Salaam Times of 21st May 1921 reported a brass cooking pot, two pillows, a mosquito 
net, several khangas and a blanket being among the items stolen by Salehe bin Abdulla 
from two African homes.38 Even in more crime-ridden times, the objects of theft 
continued to be modest. In September 1957, Maulidi bin Salum was found in possession 
of a number of white shirts, bed sheets, a mattress and blankets, mosquito nets and other 
sundry articles of clothing.39 As in the European and Asian areas, it was money and 
clothing that was most commonly reported stolen.
_ 32 DT, 21st October 1922, p.9.
33 TS, 28th September 1946, p.5.
34 TS, 5th October 1959.
35 D T ,2 5Ul August 1923, p.7.
36 TS, 26th February 1949.
37 TS, 27ti' August 1960.
38 DT, 21st May 1921, p.4.
39 c>ti> g eptem ber 1957
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Theft from the person
If burglaries and break-ins were probably the largest identifiable category of property 
offences in Dar es Salaam during the British period, a variety of other offences, generally 
more petty, variously grouped together as thefts under the penal code (or in other places 
as stealing) were actually much more common. Theft from the person, for example, was, 
in various guises, widespread in the town throughout the period under consideration. It 
could take the form of pickpocketing, bag-snatching, or more seriously of street robbery 
accompanied with violence (or the threat of violence).
The most complete impression of the incidence of such crimes comes once again from 
the Indian newspapers from the 1930s. Theft from the person was an everyday 
occurrence in Uhindini. Jewellery was particularly vulnerable to being snatched, often by 
gangs of thieves who purportedly hung around the Indian quarter. ‘It appears that the 
gang has come out again’, wrote the editor of the Herald after a golden necklace had been 
stolen from a young child on Windsor Street.40 ‘As usual they appear to have confined 
their activities to the Indian quarters’, he continued, ‘[b]ut it is feared they may extend 
them over other parts of town.’ In January 1934 a gang was ‘once again reported to be let 
loose.’41 ‘Petty cases of pilferage, of snatching bangles from children and necklaces from 
old ladies’, observed the editor of the Herald that year, ‘are too numerous to mention.’42 
‘This fortnight is reported to have witnessed a number of Indian ladies falling prey to 
native scoundrels and terrorists in the main streets and in broad daylight’, the same paper 
declared eight months later. ‘People are fed up with reporting cases to the Charge Office’, 
it continued, ‘ [t]hey are required to face examination and cross-examination by police 
with no practical results.’43 According to another editorial from the same year: ‘The 
Indian public, especially ladies, view this state of affairs with great alarm. The latter find 
it unsafe to walk the streets even in the daytime. People see a danger in carrying money 
with them, cyclists must have their eyes fixed on their machines’ 44
Pickpockets were a common hazard of town life. The railway station, where the
40 TH, 27th February 1932, p.7.
41 TH, 13th January 1934, p. 10.
42 TH, 7a> July 1934, p. 12.
43 TH, 16th March 1935, p.4.
44 TH, 23rd March 1935, p6.
92
comings and going of passengers -particularly unwary new arrivals carrying valuables- 
appears to have been a favoured haunt. An Indian victim there in 1926 was relieved of the 
substantial sum of Shs.6,100/-. It was subsequently recovered and a gang of six 
pickpockets convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.45 A few years later 
Juma bin Abdalla was charged with the same offence, stealing Shs.20/- from an Indian. 
According to the Standard, there was no shortage of people to take his place. ‘At least 
twenty young natives in Court during the case showed unwonted attention as they hung 
closely 011 eveiy word spoken by accused and witnesses’, the paper reported. ‘[I]t was an 
excellent opportunity for anyone to study the art of picking pockets -  with particular 
reference to avoiding those slips which may result in an appearance in the dock.’46 
Throughout the colonial period pocket-picking seems to have been an activity particularly 
associated with African youth. In 1955, Assistant Commissioner Brockwell, informed the 
public that although delinquency was not a serious problem there were ‘some clever 
young pickpockets in the towns’. ‘I recommend you’, he warned, ‘to keep your money in 
an inside pocket.’47
Street robberies, which were also categorised as theft, were another Dar es Salaam 
hazard. Once again they were frequently reported in the Indian press. In a case from 
1931, the disappointed thieves rebuked their victims for the slender takings. ‘Big men 
like you’, the robbers were reported to have complained, ‘should be ashamed to go out 
with only fifteen cents in their pockets.’48 ‘Instances of this nature occur daily’, observed 
the editor, ‘and it is difficult for one to get police aid on the spot.’ In June 1932 an Indian 
was reported to have fallen ‘victim to the hold up plan of a native gang in a lane in the 
Indian area -  his pockets were searched and a gold chain was taken from his neck.’49 In 
1937 another victim died as a result of such an attack.50 Later that year Gujarati 
merchants wrote to the Herald complaining that ‘during busy hours a gang of thieves 
armed with sticks and knives, loaf about the bazaar and cany on their profession without 
any fear of being apprehended and that the situation is going from bad to worse’.51 ‘The 
recent development’, wrote the editor the previous week, ‘is that robbery takes place in
45 Police AR for 1926, p.37.
46 TS, 8“' June 1935, p. 12.
47 TS, 13th December 1955.
48 TH, 11th August 1931, p.9.
49 TH, 4th June 1932, p.4.
50 TH, 16th January 1937, p.6.
51 TH, 20lh November 1937, p.3.
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broad daylight and any attempt to chase a thief is answered by him with violence.’52
Such attacks were by no means restricted to Uhindini. Certain areas in the African 
township also became particularly feared because of the high incidence of robberies 
which occurred there. Ilala Road was one such place, which, according to a letter in the 
African newspaper Kwetu, had ‘been infiltrated by enemies who perpetrate violence’:
From time to time, beginning around seven o’clock in the evening, if a child or woman 
passed alone they would appear to her, and ask her, who are you? Give me your money or 
your clothing and be safe, or you shall lose your life. And at ten in the evening you men 
must be seized by a thief hiding any place among the Albizzia trees.’53
Six years earlier the Indian-run Herald had seen fit to complain about the same area: ‘In 
consequence [of] the lack of lighting at this native location, and the absence of police 
supervision, native residents were being seriously molested.’54 Little appeared to have 
been done by the authorities to reduce the danger in the intervening period. Neither did 
the situation improve during WWII, By 1945 DC Bone was complaining of ‘the dangers 
of assault and robbery’ in the area.55 Another place singled out by Bone was Mnazi 
Mmoja - the open space situated between Zones II and III comprising both recreation 
grounds and remnant bush. This was perhaps the most notorious haunt of muggers in the 
British colonial period. Kichwele Street, which bisected Mnazi Mmoja comiecting 
Uhindini with Kariakoo, was, according to a correspondent to the Standard in 1949, 
‘infested with thieves who take advantage of the poor lighting.’56 Both Africans and 
Indians, men and women formed their prey. Complaints were made, for example, in 
Zuhra (the Swahili newspaper printed by Machado Plantan) in February 1951 that 
wahuni were hanging around Mnazi Mmoja (and Tuwa tugawe -  see below) following 
women returning from the cinema and attacking them.57 A year earlier an Indian was 
attacked by two Africans who made off with just a saw, an inner tube and a pair of shoes 
which had been forcibly removed from their victim. Seven or eight similar incidents had 
occurred over the previous month, the Standard reported.58 A correspondent to the paper 
the same day complained that there was ‘not a single day when robbery has not taken
52 TH, 13th November 1937, p.6.
53 Kwetu, 14th Jan. 1939, p.29. Quoted in Anthony, “Culture and Society”, p. 191.
54 TH, 30th September 1933, p.5.
55 DC to Supt.Pol., Dsm, 4.5.45, TNA/540/271/1.
56 Letter from Kichwele resident, TS, 9th April 1949, p.9.
57 Zuhra, 3rd February 1951, in TNA/540/21/8.58 13th February 1950>
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Map 5 Kariakoo, 1940 (note: Mkunguni Street runs past the central Market and out 
across the ‘Open Space’ [Mnazi Mmoja])
Source: Kironde, “Land use structure”
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place in the major road which passes through the open space referred [sic].’59 The 
incident had occurred on Mkunguni Street, which ran across the upper end of Mnazi 
Mmoja, connecting the African and Indian quarters. A similar incident that had taken 
place the previous week was described by ‘Unprotected’ in a letter to the Standard:
On the moonlit night o f Friday past, at as early an hour as 8pm an Indian youth was held up 
by hooligans and robbed o f his fountain pen, wrist watch and money in Mikungani [sic] 
Street. ...I would explain that Mikungani Street is a tarred, not-so-badly lit street, running 
from opposite the Indian junior school towards the new market, and the robbery, I am told, 
took place almost on the edge o f the street, somewhere between the Municipal Lavatory 
and the Mbuyu [tr. baobab] tree. Dozens o f robberies have taken place in this vicinity, so 
that the area in question has come to be known as 'Tuwa tugaw e’ which means ‘put it 
down and let us divide’. And instead o f drastic measures for the safety o f  the public all we 
get from the authorities is the advice to ‘keep to the roads’ and ‘walk in pairs’ !60
Another correspondent to the paper had warned that ‘these natives [robbers] have learnt a 
trick to drag the person from the street into darkness with a neck press until he is 
lightened of his belongings.’61 ‘Undesirable incidents interrupting the peace of Asian 
dwellers of Kariako [sic]’, he reported, ‘take place very often now.’ The notoriety of 
Mnazi Mmoja, and Tuwa tugawe in particular, was also recollected by oral informants:
At Mnazi Mmoja it was a gang, not an individual, consisting o f young people in a kind of 
alliance. They were jobless idlers who had turned to crime. They stayed not exactly at 
Mnazi Mmoja but at a place known as Tuwa tugawe. If they wanted to rob you, at first just 
one o f them would attack and then others -hiding nearby- would help him if  he needed it.62
Women, according to Masudi Ali, were particularly vulnerable:
There was one place at Mnazi Mmoja called Tuwa tugawe. Ladies would pass there at 
night carrying something -  you know it was ladies behaviour to send food to their men. So 
when they came to this place they’d come across gangs who’d demand that they put down 
whatever they were carrying. They were crossing from Kisutu to Kariakoo and they had to 
pass this way.63
The incidence of robberies was not helped by the apparent lack of a police presence in the 
area. ‘H.R.’ reported in a letter to the Standard that:
To look things up for myself, I toured the whole area from Arab Street round Msimbazi, 
Kichwele, New and Livingstone Street, beyond the now notorious Mkunguni Street from 
6.15 to past 8pm for a couple of days in succession. But I could not see even a fleeting 
shadow o f an A ska ri’s ghost. Later on I looked up things in Zone I and found Askaris here,
59 Ibid.





there and everywhere, not solos but mostly in pairs. I still wonder whom or what they are 
generally guarding there.64
The most plausible answer was, of course, European persons and property. However, 
whilst it is probably true that, as in the inter-war period, Zone I continued to be better 
policed than the African or Indian quarters, this did not mean Europeans in Dar es Salaam 
were not beginning to fall victim to ‘muggings’ or ‘snatchings’ themselves. After WWII, 
reports in the Standard of thefts from Europeans grew more frequent. After two failed 
attempts of bag-snatching from Europeans in 1946, the paper reported that this offence 
was on the increase. ‘There is in this town,’ observed Resident Magistrate Platts two 
years later, ‘a considerable number of undesirable Africans who loaf around Acacia 
Avenue [the main European shopping street] and its adjoining streets for the sole purpose 
of stealing ladies handbags and anything which is left unprotected in stationary motor 
cars or in bike baskets.’65 Later the same year it was reported that in two separate 
incidents European women had been attacked 011 Ocean Road, one of them being 
threatened with a knife. Whether the timing of this phenomenon had anything to do with 
a lessening of European prestige amongst the African population is unclear. Within a 
decade though, bag-snatching and attacks on women had become common enough to lead 
to nurses at a Kinondoni hostel being taught self-defence to protect themselves against 
assailants.66
A criminal economy?
The concentration of population and wealth which existed in Dar es Salaam appears to 
have led to the emergence of a criminal network exploiting the multifarious opportunities 
for illicit gain present in the capital. This network consisted of various criminal types 
engaging in the illegal acquisition, receipt and distribution of property. It hinged around 
the market for illicit goods. Links with areas beyond Dar es Salaam were often vital to the 
various groups taking advantage of these opportunities.
Smugglers of contraband goods were one such group. As Tanganyika’s main port, and
64 Letter from H.R., TS, 16th February 1950.
65 TS, 23rd October 1948, p.19.
66 Photo and caption, TS, 19th June 1957, p.5.
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its’ principal urban centre, Dar es Salaam and its environs were the location of 
widespread smuggling throughout the colonial period. Contraband from Zanzibar,67 
located just a few horns away by boat, was particularly common, as customs duties in the 
protectorate tended to be lower than those levied in Tanganyika, and as a consequence 
various items were frequently brought illegally to the mainland. The main smuggled 
items, according to the Comptroller of Customs in 1934, were sugar, matches, playing 
cards and tobacco, although khangas and other types of material such as merikani were 
also popular.68 The points of entry were multiple. ‘Trouble spots’ reported in one file 
included Tanga, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Kisiju, Rufiji and Kilwa along the coast. In 
addition, smuggling was common in the environs of Dai' es Salaam, at fishing villages to 
the north, such as Msasani and Kunduchi, and to the south, such as Mji Mwema.69 In 
Msasani Bay, according to Leslie
they could land... quite safely. In those days it was fairly deserted by authority even though 
it was within the township boundaries. There was a village there o f Washomvi, who 
claimed descent from Persians. They would probably be in charge o f the smuggling trade.
But there were other little villages along the coast there too, certainly as far as Kunduchi -  
fishing villages that wouldn’t be at all supervised.70
In one incident in 1934, acting on a tip-off about smuggling at Msasani, police made 
some arrests on the shore, but not before an incoming dhow had been warned of the raid. 
The dhow turned away and was later found to have unloaded its cargo at the island of 
Mbezi, opposite Kunduchi village, from where it was relayed to Dar es Salaam by 
catamaran. Thirty-seven bags of Java sugar and five cases of matches were found at the 
house of one of those arrested. Commenting on the case a CID officer wrote to the 
Commissioner of Police:
I would not for a moment contend [sic] myself in assuming that the case at issue is an 
isolated one, but rather that smuggling is carried out on broad lines, and the loss of 
Government revenue should be the subject o f serious consideration. It would be equally 
idle to pretend that the Native Authority at Kunduchi or along the coast is not conversant 
with what is taking place although no information from this source is ever received by the 
Police.71
The police and customs officials relied heavily on a system of rewards for information
67 According to Leslie (Interview N o .11) Tumbatu island in particular was ‘a real smugglers cove’.
68 Comptroller o f customs to the Auditor, 15th January 1934, TNA/12402/Vol. 1; and Leslie interview.
69 Reports in TNA/12402; Leslie interview.
70 Leslie interview.
71 Supt. Hornettto CP, 16th February 1934, TNA/12402/Vol.l.
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about such activities. The Comptroller informed the Chief Secretary in January 1935 that 
it was his opinion
that the general dissemination among Coast natives o f the knowledge that substantial 
rewards should be paid for information leading to the detection o f smuggling is the most 
valuable, and probably the only practicable, means o f checking the smuggling which is 
undoubtedly endemic on the whole littoral between Dar es Salaam and Tanga.72
Precious little intelligence was forthcoming. £[L]ocal opinion5, as an official had 
observed a few years earlier, ‘being usually on the side of the smuggler will not as a rule 
bring the facts to official notice.573 Even within the port of Dar es Salaam, the ability of 
the police and the customs department to control smuggling was limited. Here, the 
harbour front was policed by patrols day and night which entered dhows and other small 
craft looking for contraband. The foreshore along Azania Front -where there was ‘danger 
of shore boats landing goods under cover of darkness5- was also subject to nightly 
patrols. The Comptroller acknowledged, however, that in conditions such as existed in 
Dar es Salaam eradication of smuggling was unrealistic. ‘With the harbour full of pulling 
boats, motor boats and sailing craft, all mobile in the highest degree,5 he informed the 
secretariat, ‘complete security against smuggling can only be realised with a small 
preventive army.574 The position in the town, though, was significantly better than that 
which prevailed north of the capital and further along the coast. The coastline between 
Dar es Salaam and Tanganyika’s northern border was under no effective control 
whatsoever. The prevalence of smuggling there ‘by Swahili and Arab dhows' coming 
from the islands of Zanzibar resulted in the introduction of bicycle patrols in 1938 
covering the whole three hundred miles of vulnerable coastline from Moa to Msasani.75 
Whilst this may have had some effect in checking such activities, the smuggling 
continued and arrests were periodically made. In 1945 reports were received of khangas 
being smuggled via Kunduchi. Five years later a gang of smugglers from Zanzibar were 
reported to be landing goods to the north of Dar es Salaam and running them into town by 
car.76 In 1953 a Dar es Salaam man was arrested after being found in possession of 
Shs.3,363/- worth of tobacco and other contraband goods.77 Unfortunately, though, 
thanks to both the scarcity of surviving data relating to smuggling, and to the implicitly
72 Comptroller o f customs to CS, 10th January 1935, TNA/12402/Vol.l.
73 Note on smuggling in Ruflji (1932), TNA/61/454.
74 Comptroller o f customs to Asst. Sec., 9th March 1938, TNA/12402/Vol. 1.
75 Comptroller to PCs, EP and Tanga, 3rd May 1938, TNA/12402/Vol.l.
76 TS, 6th May 1950, p.24.
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‘shady’ nature of the trade in contraband, it is difficult to gain much idea of its prevalence 
in the later colonial period. It is likely that smugglers remained at least as active in Dar es 
Salaam and its environs as they were before WWII. Indeed the rapidly growing urban 
population would have provided an ever more attractive market for the dealers in illegally 
imported goods, and judging by the post-war escalation in other forms of crime it is 
probable that the incidence of smuggling also grew. Leslie recollects the smuggling of 
goods to have been relatively common at the time of his survey, and whilst officials were 
aware of what was going on in Msasani and Kunduchi, it was not considered important 
enough to devote many scarce resources to its control.78
Links between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar were also apparent in the disposal of 
stolen goods. According to Baker, the steamer service to Zanzibar formed ‘an ideal outlet
7 0for stolen property.’ The Commissioner of Police bemoaned the difficulty of dealing 
with theft cases resulting from ‘the proximity of Zanzibar and the facilities which are 
offered for transporting the proceeds of thefts and burglaries for disposal in that island, 
often before the theft has been reported.’80 A more common means of disposal, however, 
was through receivers in Dar es Salaam itself. Receivers were considered to play an 
important role in the incidence of thefts and burglaries. In the 1927 police report it was 
observed that they were ‘undoubtedly the instigators of a large proportion of the thefts of 
property by old offenders among the natives in the townships... [who] turn their attention 
to such articles as are likely to obtain a ready sale with the receivers.’81 Three decades 
later, the Standard was attaching ‘still more blame to those dregs of human society who 
go by the name of receivers, without whom the disposal of stolen property would be a 
difficult and most hazardous process for thieves.’82 ‘Irreparable harm is done through the 
dealings of receivers’, complained magistrate McPhillips in 1954, ‘and our prisons are 
full of many who would not be there but for the [m].’83
Amongst Africans, meanwhile, resentment was voiced towards the numerous pawn­
brokers that existed in the town, with whom -knowingly or otherwise- stolen property
77QPR, Dsm Dist, 1st October-31st December 1953, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
78 Leslie interview.
79 Baker, ‘Social Conditions’, p.93.
80 Police AR for 1926, p.54.
81 Police AR for 1927, p.49.
82 TS, 31st May 1952, p.24.
S3 TS' 2„d September 1954.
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was frequently deposited. ‘These shops', wrote Mary Margaret Mkambe to the Standard 
in 1944,
are consuming the wealth o f the resident African community, encourage theft, burglary and 
smuggling; teach the African not to regulate his cash requirements; thus serve no useful 
purpose to the economic point of view and make us slaves all the way through.84
Between 1931 and 1940 the number of pawn shops increased from four to fourteen,85 
providing, according to Pike, a ‘convenient and profitable method of getting rid of stolen 
goods.’86 In spite of calls for pawning to be more strictly controlled from both officials87 
and Africans88 the number of pawn shops had by the mid-fifties increased to eighteen.89 
All the shops were Indian-owned.
Judging by inter-war police reports it was also Indians, and to a lesser extent Arabs, 
who usually performed the role of out and out receiver in the 1920s and 1930s.90 And as 
late as 1954 a magistrate observed that this ‘mean, low, despicable’ offence was ‘one 
most frequently practised by those who are not natives to this country, but whose very 
business and livelihood receiving has become.’91 As time went on though, it appears that 
more Africans acted as receivers. Three out of six individuals convicted of receiving in 
the second quarter of 1954 were African, two Indian, and one Arab.92 In his notebook 
from the same year ASP Young records receiving information from one Mohamed 
Chande ‘better known to the seamier side of Dar es Salaam as Kinyengu [Kinyenga?] a 
trader in stolen property.’93 The Shark Market in Kariakoo was well known as a place 
where such individuals operated, auctioning clothes and other stolen items.94
Men such as Kinyengu, along with those scrap dealers not averse to accepting items of
84 Letter to TS, 18th November 1944, p. 12.
85 Amendments by Baker to ‘Social Conditions’, 10.1.40, TNA/18950Aft)l.II.
8G Pike, ‘Native Affairs’, p. 16.
87 See, for example, Pike’s report; or Baker’s amendments in TNA/18950/Vol.II; or for a somewhat later 
eg. QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st July-30lh September 1954, TNA/90/1011/VoI.l.
88 See, for eg., the correspondence in TS, 18th November 1944; or the letter from D. Mtonga, TS, 21st 
September 1946, p.9.
89 Leslie, Sw'vey, p. 143. Whilst they continued to provide an outlet for stolen property (consciously so or 
otherwise), it should be stressed that the shops also performed an important legitimate role in the extension 
o f credit to the impoverished urban populace as documented by Leslie (pp. 142-147); just as they had done 
in working class communities in 18th and 19th century England (see Ernsley, Crime, p. 169).
90 There are numerous references to Asian activity in this field in the annual police reports.
91 TS, 2"d September 1954.
92 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st April-30th June 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
93 ASP R.W. Young’s Personal Duty Diary, 29th January 1954, RH/Mss.Afr.s.2293.
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dubious origin, also helped create a demand for the various types of scrap available to the 
resourceful urban scavenger. In sentencing Ali Mwinyishehe for stealing 2libs, of iron 
from the docks in 1959, the Resident Magistrate observed that ‘theft of scrap iron from 
the yards of the East African Railways and Harbours... [was] a thriving industry from 
which many people make a dishonest living.’ Six years earlier, a warning was passed on 
through the Wakili and Jumbe that a ten year sentence would be passed on anyone found 
guilty of stealing items from the railway ‘for sale as scrap metal’; an offence which had 
been occurring too often close to the Ilala Police Post.95 It was not successful. In 1959 a 
corporal in the railway police was beaten by a gang of six men who he had disturbed 
stealing iron from the Ilala Yard and Railways Stores,96 and in the district report the 
following year attention was again drawn to the activities of ‘scrap and metal thieves’ in 
this vicinity.97
Other forms of scavenging occurred away from the railway. The theft of telephone 
wire and electrical cable, which in the 1960s and 1970s went on to become a serious 
problem in Dar es Salaam, was first reported in 1952, when as much as three-quarters of 
a mile of wire was stolen from poles in Kichwele Street.98 According to a quarterly police 
report three years later, ‘serious thefts of telephone wire were talcing place’, whilst a spate 
of thefts of stop-cocks and water meters at one time threatened the town’s water supply.99 
The Assistant Superintendent of Police recommended that legislation be drawn up for the 
control of scrap metal dealers in the town. By the end of the colonial period theft of 
cables was beginning to assume its’ post-independence prevalence. In May 1961, the 
Standard reported that over the previous two months almost eight miles of wire -ranging 
from heavy power conductor cable to light telephone wire, valued at more than £350- had 
been stolen. Thefts had occurred at various places within the town; in the Cameron Road 
area, at Ubungo, and near the Regent Estate. ‘This vandalism’, an editorial observed, ‘is 
believed to be the work of a highly organised gang, which cuts up the wire into short 
lengths for ease of transport and then disposes of it through scrap metal dealers, who pay
9<l DC Harris to CP, 14lh May 1954, TNA/540/3/91.
95 Supt. EAR & H Police, Dsm, to OiC Central Police Station, (1953?), and following Tanganazo, 
TN A /540/21/8.
96 7$, 9th May 1959, p .l.
97 DAR for 1960, p.7, RH/Mss.Afr.s.937.
98 TS, 6th September 1952.
99 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st January~31st March 1954, TNA 90/1011/Vol.l.
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about 50 cents a yard - a fraction of the value of scrap copper.’100 In the same editorial 
attention was also drawn to a recent ‘similar situation when metal covers began to 
disappear from roads and pavements in Dar es Salaam.’ The paper considered that 
‘unscrupulous scrap metal dealers... [were] as guilty as those who cany out the thefts.’
The activities of receivers appeared to be connected to another common form of urban 
crime, that of theft from the workplace. In 1938 a port official noted that ‘stealing from 
broken packages in the Port was taking place, and that there was liaison between the 
thieves and certain traders.’101 However, opportunistic theft was more prevalent. ‘Petty 
theft is common in any dock area in the world,’ observed Leslie, ‘and this is no 
exception; pilfering from cargoes and from lorries is too easy to be ignored, and a man 
who refrained would be considered odd by his fellows.’102 Whether organised or 
opportunistic theft from the workplace was certainly common. A newly appointed Acting 
Resident Magistrate was told on his appointment in 1948 that it was customary to impose 
harsh sentences on dockworkers found guilty of thefts in order to discourage stealing. He 
found, however, that severe sentences in ‘no way acted as a deterrent and cases continue 
to come before me daily in which dock labourers and coolies are charged with stealing 
small articles either from ships or the custom sheds.’103 Having visited the port he advised 
that ‘much tighter control’ was required in the dock area, neither the existing customs 
patrolmen nor the private askaris or detectives employed by the shipping companies 
providing sufficient surveillance.
Depredations by employees were also common outside the port. In analysing records 
of the Probation service in his survey, Leslie found the biggest group of all offenders 
were ‘unskilled labourers, who usually fell from grace while loading or unloading a lorry, 
from which they acquired some item of cargo.’104 In 1950, a railways official wrote to the 
Chief Secretary drawing his attention to the ‘numerous thefts of consignments... and to 
the increase in lawlessness in and near Dar es Salaam.’105 Compensation payments made 
by the East African Railways in January alone totalled £3,247, which exceeded the total 
for the whole of the previous year, and was over twice as much as the figure recorded in
100 TS, 29th May 1961, p.2.
101 Mgr., Tanganyika Railways to CS, 24th March 1938, TNA/12402/Vol.l.
102 Leslie, Survey, p.239.
103 Ag. RM to Chief Justice, High Court, 7th April 1948, TNA/37512.
104 Leslie, Sun>ey, p.208.
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1945. In the preceding half-decade, theft from the railways appears to have gradually, 
though inexorably, escalated, with compensation payments increasing from £1,371 in 
1945 to £3,203 in 1949. Three years later, an amendment to the penal code making new 
provision regarding the unlawful possession of Government, railway and service stores 
was deemed necessary to combat the ‘prevalence of thefts of railway and other public 
stores in the Territory’.106
Perhaps the most prevalent form of theft from the workplace was that of stealing by 
servants. In his 1926 report the Commissioner of Police complained of ‘the natural 
proclivities of the native house boy for helping himself to his master’s property.’107 It is 
difficult to gauge the incidence of such thefts. Many, no doubt, went undiscovered, and 
even in cases where missing items were noticed it is likely that employers often declined 
to press charges, particularly when items stolen were of little value. Nevertheless, by 
1952 as many as 70-90 cases of theft by servants were being reported to the police in Dal­
es Salaam each month.108 ‘Thefts by people holding positions of trust are widespread’, 
complained the Resident Magistrate in sentencing Samuel bin Guli for the theft of money 
and clothing from his employer later the same year.109 There is also evidence that 
professional criminals were by the 1950s - if  not earlier- forging links with household 
domestics to gain entry into employers’ houses. After a spate of burglaries in Oyster Bay 
in 1957 in which burglars gained entry with the use of keys, particular suspicion fell upon 
house servants. In round ups in the area during ‘the hours of darkness’ twelve servants 
were found in possession of keys to their employers’ houses.110 An earlier editorial in the 
Standard ascribed such offences to a ‘black market’ in references:
One o f the greatest and most dangerous [sic] rackets at present being carried on in Dar es 
Salaam is that by which an African possessing good references from his employers passes 
these on to one or more o f his friends -no doubt for some financial consideration- who in 
turn makes use o f them when interviewing prospective employers. As soon as employment 
is obtained the references go back to the original owner and in nine out o f ten cases the 
trick works.111
Professional criminals can be linked with another form of urban crime which became
105 Regional Assistant, EAR & H, to CS, 27th February 1950, TNA/20219/Vol.II.
106 TS, 2nd August 1952, p.16.
107 Police AR for 1926, p.37/8.
108 TS, 1st March 1952, p .l.
109 TS, 14th June 1952.
110 Asst. CP., Dsm to CP, 5th February 1957, TNA/90/2009/Vol.l.
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increasingly common in the colonial period; bicycle theft. In 1931 a correspondent to the 
Standard complained that ‘bicycles cannot be left unguarded for one moment without 
being stolen and an assurance from the Police that there is little hope of recovering 
them.’112 As cycle ownership grew significantly from the 1940s on, the incidence of 
reported bike thefts became commonplace. Between May 1946 and May 1947 155 
bicycles were reported stolen in Dar es Salaam.113 The following year police were 
recommending more care and use of padlocks ‘due to the large number of cycle thefts 
which are occurring in Dar es Salaam.’114 When the use of locks became more common, 
however, thieves armed themselves with sets of keys and small hacksaws.115 In a letter to 
the Standard in 1954, W.N. Paul replied to another correspondent who had accused those 
who had cycles stolen of being careless:
I should think he tries to prove whether these are actual careless or are unfortunate to have 
their b icycles stolen  - to do this I should kindly ask him to ride on his new  cycle  to such a 
place as the Post O ffice, lock  it as usual and go into the Post O ffice for say twenty m inutes 
and see i f  he w ill have ride on his new  cycle for the homeward journey. I think he w ill have 
to foot it to the P olice Station...116
In 1948 bicycle thefts in Dar es Salaam totalled 223 - over four a week. The Standard 
observed that this was a particularly high figure for a town of its size. In Mombasa, a 
larger town at this time, just 67 were stolen the same year.117 By 1953 the number had 
increased to around one a day. In September that year, the Assistant Commissioner of 
Police announced that a special Bicycle Squad had been operating ‘at the most vulnerable 
points in town’, but that despite their efforts ‘bicycles are stolen indiscriminately 
throughout the area.’118 Three locations where bicycle thefts were particularly common 
were subsequently put under constant surveillance by this squad, which by the end of the 
year consisted of three officers and sixteen constables. They were thwarted, however, by 
‘[t]he cunning of these thieves’, which, according to the Assistant Commissioner, was 
‘illustrated by the fact that there has never been a report from any place which has been 
under supervision and as many as five trap-teams have been operating at any one time.’119
111 TS, 5th April 1952.
112 TS, 15th August 1931, p.7.
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114 TS, 18th December 1948, p.3.
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Indeed the introduction of the Bicycle Squad was actually followed by a substantial 
increase in the number of cycle thefts, with 487 being reported in the twelve months from 
October 1953. The response was an intensification in operations against known thieves - 
as well as ‘all loiterers’ at common theft sites who were ‘picked up and searched for 
cycle stealing implements’.120 Of the 81 known bicycle thieves in Dar es Salaam, the 65 
not then in prison were, according to the Assistant Commissioner, ‘being continuously 
harassed.’121 And in the course of 1954 a remarkable 5,986 bicycles were checked by 
police to see if they were stolen - around a third of all licensed bikes in the town.122 Such 
methods had an immediate impact. In 1955 the total number of bicycles reported stolen 
went down to 334, and in the first quarter of 1956 the number decreased further to just 
54. As with other types of property crime in Dar es Salaam, however, after a mid-fifties 
respite bike thefts resumed their upward trend reaching one a day again by early 1958.123
The Dar es Salaam police had great difficulty retrieving stolen bicycles. Immediately 
after being stolen they were dismantled, and any remaining identifying features were 
obscured or removed entirely - the frame was often discarded for this reason. The wheels, 
handlebars, chains and other parts were untraceable and all had a ready resale value, not 
least amongst the capital’s cycle repairers.124 Indeed, such individuals were themselves 
not averse to obtaining their own illicit spares, as was the case with Rajabu Moliamed 
who in May 1955 was convicted for the third time on a charge relating to the theft of or 
receiving a stolen cycle.125 The police were alert to such practices. In the same year, 
attempting to control the circulation of stolen bicycle parts, they ensured that seventeen 
cycle repairers were prosecuted for trading without a licence.126 In other cases stolen 
bicycles were removed to the rural areas where their provenance was easily concealed. In 
one police raid at Maneromango, a village located eighty kilometres to the southwest of 
the capital, in 1953, seven stolen cycles were recovered.127 In another raid two years later 
at Marogoro Shamba, seventy kilometres away in Kisarawe district, a further ten were 
found with their frame numbers obliterated and over-stamped with false ones.128 The vast
120 Ibid., 1st April-30th June 1955.
121 Ibid., 1st October-31st December 1954.
122 In 1957 there were 15,600 bicycles licensed in Dsm. TS, 24th February 1958, p.3.
123 TS, 24th February 1952, p.3.
124 QPR, Dsm Dist, 1st January-31st March 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
125 SN, 22nd May 1955, p.5.
126 QPR, Dsm Dist, 1st July-30,h September 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
127 Ibid., 1st October-31st December 1953.
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majority of bicycles though, remained untraced.
Opportunists and old lags: the Dar es Salaam criminal
As we have seen crime of all sorts was increasingly common in colonial Dar es 
Salaam. Little idea, though, has so far has been gleaned of the identity of the offenders. 
Who were the town’s criminals? Where did they originate from? Were particular areas in 
the town associated with criminals? Did offenders turn to crime mainly at times of want? 
Were they opportunistic thieves? Or did crime become more organised, and individuals 
engage in criminal activity as a profession? Could a criminal ‘class’ be said to emerging 
in Dar es Salaam: a discrete group of organised criminals detached from the rest of urban 
African society as a result of their activities?
Emsley has described how, in 19th century Britain, the notion of a criminal class 
emerged amongst the more ‘respectable’ members of Victorian society. Descriptions of 
this class, he tells us, ‘revealed an organised, hierarchical social group which lacked any 
understanding of religious principles, social duty and virtue -  in short a group which was 
ignorant of the key elements that Victorians liked to think underpinned their society.’129 
This characterisation of the criminal element absolved respectable members of society 
from responsibility for the conditions that may have been causing individuals to turn to
o
crime. It also served to marginalise the criminal. Crime was something suffered by all 
law-abiding members of society and was committed by an alien, maladjusted group.130 
Like Victorian Britain, colonial Dar es Salaam also had its criminal bogeymen. Just like 
their 19th century counterparts the detribalised wahuni were, in the colonial discourse, 
parasitic outsiders. Whilst they may not have been organised or hierarchical, they 
certainly lacked understanding of ‘social duty and virtue’, indeed of any of the key 
elements that officials liked to think (hoped!) underpinned colonial urban society. As 
with the Victorian class such a characterisation of this section of the urban population 
helped to shift responsibility -in  this case away from the colonial organisation of African 
society- onto the shortcomings of individuals.131 Whilst structural and environmental
129 Emsley, Crime, p. 175.
130 Ibid., p.173.
131 This is not too say that officials were unaware o f the environmental and structural causes o f crime also.
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causes for criminal behaviour were acknowledged, such as rural-urban drift and the lack 
of formal employment, it was in the end the wahuni who were condemned for their moral 
weaknesses.
Recent research into crime in 19th century Britain has revealed this picture of a 
criminal class living outside mainstream society to be a spurious one. Rather the 
conclusion has been reached that in fact £no clear distinction can be made between a 
dishonest criminal class and a poor but honest working class.’132 It appears that the same 
was true of colonial Dar es Salaam. Whilst the tendency was to stigmatise one section of 
the population -the wahuni- Leslie, in the only surviving analysis of criminal records in 
Dar es Salaam from the British period, found that there was little to distinguish offenders 
from the general urban population.133 The proportion of Muslim offenders was slightly 
larger than that of the population as a whole, pointing to coastal districts of origin for 
offenders, but the discrepancy was negligible; 92 per cent compared to 87 per cent. 
Single men were slightly more likely to turn to crime (64 per cent of offenders as against 
39 per cent of the general population), although over half of those offenders in the sample 
considered for probation actually lived with wives, children or other relatives and two- 
thirds of those sentenced to imprisonment had relatives in Dar es Salaam. In analysing the 
length of residence of criminals it was found that those of short residence in the town 
provided more than their share, although overall the bulk of offenders were drawn from 
long-term residents. Neither was it possible to detect some distinguishing features from 
the work record. From the sample of nine hundred offenders a quarter had an average of 
under six months a job, half averaged between six months and three years a job, and a 
fifth averaged more than three years. Twelve per cent had no paid employment at the 
time of conviction. Neither length of employment nor the receipt of a better wage, Leslie 
observed, was a ‘guarantee that a man will not succumb to the sudden temptation, often 
for trifling gain.’134 Indeed, in reviewing the available statistics Leslie surmised that:
T he rather d ep ressin g  co n clu sio n  to be drawn from  th ese  figu res is that there is 
com paratively little difference in the circum stances and background o f  the three classes -  
the recid ivists, the first offenders and the general public. There is a sm all bias towards 
crim e o f  those w ith rather less pay, less work, less family responsibility and less continuity;
Indeed as explanatory factors these were given precedence.
132 Ibid.
133 Leslie, Survey, pp.205-8.
134 Ibid, p.208.
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but it is a small one.135
Nor was location a guide. Leslie found just as much difficulty distinguishing criminals 
by area of residence as he had by social type. Some areas in the town did happen to 
develop an unsavoury reputation, becoming associated as the haunts of criminals. From 
early on Kisutu was considered a location favoured by offenders (as well as Dar es 
Salaam’s principal red light area). The Commissioner of Police, writing in 1935 after 
complaints in die Indian press,136 complained that
This settlement has always been a source o f concern to the police, as it lies conveniently 
situated between the residential area and the native area and undoubtedly affords cover to 
thieves on their expeditions to the non-native area.
...The area has for years been under close Police supervision, particularly at night, but the 
only solution would be to move the settlement altogether, for until this is done, despite all 
the efforts o f the Police, the nuisance is bound to continue.137
Unlike other African residential areas in Zone II, Kisutu escaped demolition, and 
continued to be known as a thieves’ haven throughout the colonial period, although its’ 
notoriety was never as pronounced as it became after independence (before finally being 
demolished in 1974). Going on convictions reported in the Tanganyika Standard in the 
1950s, Buguruni was another part of town which had a larger than normal criminal 
element either living or operating in it. By the early 1960s it had, according to Ishumi, 
become known as Alabama ‘on account of its long record of urban crime’.138 Oral 
informants also remember Buguruni as having acquired a reputation as being ‘quite a 
notorious area’ in the late colonial period (not only as a result of the 1959 riot).139 As a 
minimally policed urban ‘village’ on the outskirts of town, it is perhaps not surprising if 
Buguruni was used as a place of residence by criminals (as well as a location to pursue 
their illegal activities). Whilst Kisutu and Buguruni may have acquired reputations as
136 See TH, 23Td February 1935, p.6.
137 CP to CS, 1st March 1935, TNA/23457.
138 A.G.M. Ishumi, The urban job less in East Africa: a study o f  the unemployed population in the growing 
urban centres, with specia l reference to Tanzania, (Uppsala, 1984) p.84. Ishumi accounts for the 
appellation by connecting it with civil rights unrest in southern states o f the USA -including Alabama- in 
the 1960s. However, it is possible that Buguruni became known as Alabama rather earlier than Ishumi 
infers. Mwinyimvua Sultan, Amiri Mngamili and Hassan Mbwana (Interview N o.5) attributed it to the late 
1950s-after the violent 1959 Buguruni riot had resulted in the area acquiring a certain notoriety. Were this 
the case, then the possible reference to the (successful) 1955 Montgomery bus boycott in the USA imbues 




being the haunts of criminals, however, the evidence we have is impressionistic. In his 
analysis of criminal records Leslie could detect ‘no noticeable concentration of 
[offenders] in any one area of town; the proportion living in each tallied well with the 
figures for the whole population.’140 Indeed, an indication of the general prevalence of 
criminality amongst Dar es Salaam’s population as a whole can perhaps be gleaned from 
the outcome of a raid conducted in early 1958. ‘[0]f a total of 331 checked’, the Assistant 
Commissioner of Police reported, ‘about one third were breaking the law in some manner 
in an area selected at random, and without special information regarding its 
inhabitants.’141
Whilst it was difficult to distinguish criminals by social type from the general 
population, a core of repeat offenders, who appeared to have turned to crime as a 
profession, was present in Dar es Salaam from relatively early on. The earliest surviving 
statistics on recidivism amongst detainees in Dar es Salaam (from 1927)142 numbers 132 
recidivists out of a total of 892 convicts; a proportion of 14 per cent. Within five years the 
number of recidivists had risen to 337, which constituted 43 per cent of a total 780 
convicts. The average percentage of recidivists in the 1930s as a whole was just under 35 
per cent. Interestingly, over the following years the number of first time offenders, and 
those with just one previous conviction increased at a greater rate than the number of 
recidivists. In the first half of the 1950s the average percentage of recidivists of all those 
admitted to Dar es Salaam prisons was down to just 19 per cent. Even the actual number 
of recidivists, considering the rapid growth of both the town itself and crime within it, 
grew at a remarkably slow rate: the 337 of 1933 actually outnumbering the 316 admitted 
to Dar es Salaam’s prisons twenty years later. Whilst an increasingly professional 
criminal class appeal's to have emerged by the 1950s, the vast majority of crime remained 
unorganised. In the final year for which statistics are available recidivists made up just 21 
per cent of admissions to Ukonga prison. This relatively slight number of recidivists 
would have made up the hard-core of Dar es Salaam’s underworld, such as it was. Whilst 
numerically small it was the activities of this group of hardened offenders which was the 
principle source of anxiety for the inhabitants and administrators of Dai' es Salaam.
140 Leslie, Sw'vey, p.207.
141 QPR, D sm Dist., 1st April-30th June 1958, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
2 Dar es Salaam (and later Msasani and Ukonga) was the main prison for all coastal districts in Eastern
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Table 4.1 Recidivism amongst admissions to Dar es Salaam prison 1927-1938
1927 1929* 1930 1932 1933 1935 1936 1937 1938
Recid
ivists








14.79 13.94 24.65 43.2 43.13 30.64 25.49 39.45 37.13
* Figures for 1928, 1931 and 1934 unavailable 
Source: Prisons Dept. ARs
Table 4.2 Recidivism amongst admissions to Dar es Salaam, Msasani (from 1944) and 
Ukonga prisons (from 1952), Dar es Salaam 1939-1960_____ _______ _______ _______
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
First timers 724 756 808 608 594 800 556 783
Non-recidivists 84 53 130 192 162 178 113 130
Recidivists 296 370 299 164 154 167 197 370
Total admissions 1104 1179 1237 964 910 1145 866 1283
% Recidivists 26.81 31.38 24.17 17.01 16.92 14.58 22.74 28.83
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
First timers 871 754 689 1100 1169 1072 1358 1369
Non-recidivists 162 100 136 173 282 362 466 571
Recidivists 385 274 298 384 281 316 358 447
Total admissions 1418 1128 1123 1657 1732 1750 2182 2387
% Recidivists 27.15 24.29 26.53 23.17 16.22 18.05 16.42 18.72
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
First timers 1170 855 2302 2344 1656 887
Non-recidivists 453 473 813 784 509 409
Recidivists 445 356 575 670 614 662
Total admissions 2068 1684 3690 3798 2779 1958
% Recidivists 21.51 21.14 15.58 17.64 22.09 33.81
* For imprisonment 
** Ordinary 
*** Star
Source: Prisons Dept. ARs
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That there were professional criminals in Dar es Salaam was apparent from the earliest 
years of British rule. On several occasions between the wars the simultaneous release of a 
number of ex-convicts was held to be responsible for a mini wave of housebreaking in the 
capital. Discharged convicts, complained the Commissioner of Police in 1926,
com e out o f  gaol one day, and im m ediately return to crime. Prison life  in the territory is 
absolutely  no deterrent to the crim inal. The discharge o f  a batch o f  crim inals from  gaol 
usually synchronises w ith  a w ave o f  burglary, w hich  continues until the w h ole  gang are 
back in prison. Orders are passed by the courts... for these habitual crim inals to report their 
addresses to the P olice for a given  term, on discharge from prison, but this does not prevent 
them  returning to crim e and to prison. It m erely enables the p o lice  to locate them  
q u ic k e r ...143
The situation was exacerbated by prisoners from the rural part of the district staying in 
the capital on release from prison.144 Attempts were made to prevent ex-convicts 
remaining in Dar es Salaam. It was not always a straightforward matter, however. 
‘Machinery is provided’, the Commissioner observed in his 1926 report, ‘for repatriating 
such persons to their homes and such action is invariably taken by the prison authorities, 
but it is surprising how many of the habitual criminals belong to the towns and are 
detribalised.’
At least the small numbers involved in serious crime meant that the situation in Dar es 
Salaam was containable. The recidivism rates appeared to confirm that the control of a 
relatively small number of hardened criminals was the key to crime prevention. This was 
borne out for the Superintendent of Police in the early 1940s, who ascribed the reduction 
of reported crime at this time in part to ‘ [t]he successful conviction before High Court of 
an appreciable number of old offenders, who are the instigators of crime, which has been 
a marked achievement during the past year.145’ By the mid-1950s a system of supervision 
was in place in which known criminals had to report daily to a local police station 
(mostly to Msimbazi station), although this regime was insufficiently strict for the 
Assistant Commissioner who argued for a night-time curfew for all supervisees.146 The 
numbers reporting to police were relatively modest; between 26 and 43 in 1954/55.147 
According to the Assistant Commissioner these constituted ‘the hard core of the criminal
Province, including Dar es Salaam itself.
143 Police AR for 1926, pp.57/8; see also 1928, p. 18.
144 AO, Kisarawe to PC, EP, 27th October 1943, TNA/540/3/46.
!45 Supt, Dsm to PC, EP, 15th February 1943, TNA/61/3/XV1I.
146 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st July-30,h September 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
147 See QPRs, ibid.
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element’.148 Whilst, at any one time, the number of supervisees was small there was a 
relatively high degree of re-convictions. In the first quarter of 1955, for example, 11 of 
the 43 persons being supervised returned to prison. It is perhaps easier to get a grasp of 
the activities of this ‘hard core’ by turning to examples of individual cases.
An impression of the criminal careers of some persistent offenders can be gleaned 
from the Dar es Salaam press, and from official sources. As early as 1922, for example, 
the Dar es Salaam Times reported the conviction -for housebreaking and stealing- of one 
Musa bin Hassani. In the short period of British rule up till then, he had already acquired 
three previous convictions.149 Two years later, the same paper was reporting a seven year 
sentence received by Mahomed bin Mursal for housebreaking, theft and assault. Mursal 
had acquired six previous convictions under British rule.150 The police report of 1927 
recorded the arrest of another persistent offender who had an inter-territorial range of 
activity:
A li bin Sefu w as arrested at Tanga in D ecem ber. This man had been convicted  previously  
o f  f iv e  housebreakings. H e broke out o f  prison in Zanzibar, m ade his w ay to Dar es 
Salaam , thence to Tanga, and at both places com m itted several burglaries. H e w as very 
pluckily arrested at n ight carrying a loaded revolver, by a native constable and property to 
the value o f  Shs2 ,200/- w as recovered.151
The most notorious of inter-war criminals was Omari bin Masua, a Bajuni who made 
his way to Dar es Salaam from his home district of Mombasa. He was first singled out by 
the Tanganyika Herald -described as an ‘old convict’- in November 1932, after his 
escape from jail and his subsequent recapture with his fellow prisoner, Juma bin 
Mohammed. He had been awaiting trial on charges of resisting arrest and attempting to 
stab an askari, although a subsequent report in the Herald noted that he was also ‘alleged 
to have committed a number of burglaries’.152 Six months later Masua escaped once 
again and committed at least two fresh burglaries before being re-arrested at Kilwa 
Kisiwani, the former slaving town on the southern Tanganyika coast. ‘It will be a matter 
of great relief to the public and authorities concerned’, commented the Herald, ‘that the
148 Ibid., 1st January-31st March 1955.
149 DT, 9th September 1922, p.9.
150 DT, 13th September 1924.
151 Police AR for 1927, p.42.
152 TH  8th November 1932, p.6 and 24th December 1932, p.9.
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dangerous convict Omari bin Masua... has been re-arrested.’153 Later that year he was 
tried and convicted on four counts; entry into a King’s African Rifles officers’ house, two 
counts of theft, and escape from jail, receiving six months for each charge, which brought 
the time he had to serve up to ten years,154 Just 18 months into his incarceration, though, 
Masua, to the apparent delight of sections of the African population, had escaped once 
again, this time with his fellow prisoner, Hamisi bin Bakari (aka Hamisi bin ICiko - 
described as a Manyema or Zaramo from Dar es Salaam).155 ‘Last night the town was 
terror-stricken’, wrote the editor of the Tanganyika Herald  with characteristic 
melodrama, ‘[i]t will remain so until Omari bin Masua has been recaptured.’156 Masua 
was declared ‘Public Enemy No. 1’ and considerable police resources were devoted to his 
recapture. The African community of Dar es Salaam was said to be abuzz with rumours 
about his whereabouts and future movements.157 Three detachments of police were 
engaged in the pursuit of the escaped felons, who travelled north through Bagamoyo and 
Tanga districts.158 In early March, Masua turned up in Mombasa. Reportedly ‘well- 
known’ to the police there, a European and an Arab(?) officer had recognised him 
walking down a central street in the town and attempted to effect his arrest. Masua 
responded violently, knifing Sub-Inspector Abdalla Said in the face, before making good 
his escape. Shs.300/- was offered for information leading to his arrest. According to the 
Mombasa Times, however, Masua once again ‘vanished into thin air’.159 He moved 
further north still, to Kismayu in Somaliland. Here he was apprehended in mid-April by 
the Italian authorities. Once again Masua got the better of his captors. ‘Like love,’ 
declared the Tanganyika Standard in the wake of his latest escape, ‘Omari laughs at 
locksmiths.’160 It was not until the following month that Masua’s peregrinations of the 
East African littoral were finally ended, when he was wounded in a shoot-out with Italian 
police after being caught breaking into a European house in Kismayu.161
It is not clear to what extent Masua was, in his sphere of activity, representative of a 
wider group of criminals operational along the Swahili coast. Both he and Ali bin Sefu
153 TH, 5th June 1933, p. 11.
154 TH, 19th August 1933, p.4.
155 TS, 26th Jan. 1935, p. 19.
156 TH, 2nd February 1935, p.3.
157 TH, 2nd February 1935, p.3.
158 9tu p e b r u a , y  1 9 3 5 5 pp 3  & jq; TS, 23rd February 1935, p.3.
159 TS, 2,ld March 1935.
ieo TS, 20dl April 1935.
161 719, 4th May 1935, p.20.
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obviously travelled widely in pursuit of criminal opportunities. Meanwhile, the 1926 
police report complained that ‘the difficulties in the way of intercepting... stolen property 
are insuperable, as the thieves travel by Dhows and often from ports other than Dar es 
Salaam. ’ Experienced criminals on the Swahili coast were clearly willing and able to 
relocate when a particular town got ‘too hot’. Criminals who operated inter-territorially 
were probably uncommon. However, the activities of Masua and Sefu indicate the 
presence of a criminal type who was the source of particular anxiety to non-Africans in 
Dar es Salaam, officials and settlers alike.
By the second half of the British colonial period the arrests and convictions of 
offenders with substantial criminal records were being reported. In November 1942, 
Hamisi bin Punje (alias Mohammed bin Omari) was given a seven year sentence for 
breaking into the house of a European police officer. This brought the total number of 
years to which he had been sentenced to imprisonment between 1918 and 1942 to thirty 
three.162 Issa bin Abdallah (alias Selemani bin Abdallah), convicted of burglary and 
stealing in 1957, had an equally long criminal career, with a list of previous convictions 
which ran ‘almost continuously’ from 1935 to 1956.163 Similarly Hassani Abdullah, 
convicted on five charges of ‘highway robberies’ in 1960, was found to have previous 
convictions stretching back to the 1940s.164 Not only were criminals with long records 
emerging, but also prolific thieves were being uncovered and apprehended. Two ex­
offenders -reporting to the police as supervisees- who were re-convicted in early 1953 
had sixteen and fourteen previous convictions each.165 In August 1960, Juma Saidi, 
received a 21 year sentence for the grand total of 35 offences in the Oyster Bay area of 
Dar es Salaam.166 Six years earlier, the ‘notorious th ief Augustino Yusif had been 
prolific enough for a noticeable reduction in the number of breakings in the town to have 
been attributed to his arrest.167
In addition to rates of recidivism, a further measure of the degree to which crime 
becomes professionalised is the extent of co-operation between criminals. In the case of 
Dar es Salaam, it is noteworthy that organised crime was at an extremely low level
162 TS, 27th November 1942, p. 8
163 TS, 29th March 1957.
164 TS, 9th September 1960.
165 QPR, D sm D ist, 1st October-31st December 1953, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
166 TS, 27lh August 1960.
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throughout the colonial period, criminals tending to operate singly or in pairs, although 
(tellingly) this appeared to be changing towards the end of the period when gang activity 
seems to have become much more common. In the earliest years of British rule, during 
the outbreak of criminality after WWI, there is evidence of criminals collaborating in 
their activities. In 1921, the Dar es Salaam Times was noting ‘a strong desire on the part 
of the authorities to stamp out gangs of thieves which have been so active of late’.168 The 
degree of organisation involved, however, was not high; in the one case to be reported by 
the press, the supposed gang was composed of just three people. Before WWII serious 
gang activity made its only appearance in Dar es Salaam in 1931, when an armed gang of 
four robbed an Indian merchant house making off with valuable jewellery and 
Shs.4,500/- in cash (see above). One reason to which the lack of organised crime was 
attributed was selective use of the township rule which enabled the police and district 
officials to repatriate undesirables. This was repeatedly singled out in annual police 
reports. In 1939, for example, it was described as being ‘of great value and very 
materially assists in preventing the formation of criminal gangs within the township of 
Dar es Salaam.’169 That repatriations were so few at this time gives some indication of the 
scarcity of serious criminals in the town prior to 193 9.170
It was not until after WWII that more widespread and serious gang activity in Dar es 
Salaam began to be recorded. It was most prominent -in the form of petty crime- in the 
vicinity of Mnazi Mmoja, which by this time had become a rather notorious area thanks 
to the predatory activities of loosely organised groups of muggers (see above). 
Meanwhile, a greater degree of co-operation in house- and shopbreakings was also 
beginning to emerge. Three gangs of housebreakers operating in the Oyster Bay area 
were reported to have been broken up by the police in 1953.171 An increase of 170 
breakings in the last quarter of 1954 was attributed to the actions of numerous small 
gangs. ‘Every effort’, the Assistant Commissioner of Police reported, ‘is being made to 
exterminate these gangs.’172 The following quarter he was able to record nine convictions 
resulting from police infiltration of gangs, although by its very success this method of
167 QPR, Dsm D ist, 1st July-30th September 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
168 DT, 21st May 1921, p.4.
169 Police AR for 1939.
170 Up to the early 1940s repatriation legislation was mostly used against criminals.
171 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st July-30til September, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
172 Ibid., 1st October-31st December 1954.
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policing had subsequently been ruled out for the foreseeable future.173 Intensified police 
activity, however, was failing to prevent a trend towards more organised crime, which by 
the final years of colonial rule appears to have reached a peak. In 1960 the Commissioner 
of Police bemoaned the increase in motorised gangs. Meanwhile, towards the end of the 
1950s, reports on the activities of armed gangs were increasingly to be found in the pages 
of the colonial press. In 1959, the Standard reported that a woman was fatally injured by 
a gang armed with pangas in the course of a housebreaking in Kinondoni.174 The 
following year, in Ubungo, an Arab was stabbed in the course of a raid on his duka by a 
gang of Africans. In the preceding six weeks eleven such attacks had taken place on Arab 
shops on the outskirts of town.175 The leader of one of these gangs was sentenced to a 
total of sixty seven years in April 1961, having been convicted on thirty three charges 
relating to a series of raids on shops in Dar es Salaam, Kisarawe and Morogoro. In each 
case:
The gang surrounded the shop at night all armed with p a n g a s, swords or knives. W atchmen  
or v illa g ers w h o  tried to in tervene had torches flash ed  in their fa ces to  prevent 
identification o f  the gang or they w ere chased away (som etim es w ith v iolence).
The shop doors w ere then battered in and the occupants threatened w ith death and bodily  
harm so as to induce them to hand over all the m oney and jew ellery  on the prem ises.176
The wide sphere of operation of this gang was another indication of the increasing 
sophistication of criminals in Tanganyika. Increasingly criminals switched areas of 
activity as circumstances allowed. The District Commissioner of Bagamoyo in 1941, for 
example, blamed a crime-wave on a number of recidivists ‘who have made Dar es 
Salaam or Zanzibar too hot for themselves and who spend a while in Bagamoyo picking 
up easy money.’177 Similarly, two years later, the Ruvu and Kikonga sisal estates, situated 
just to the east of the capitol, were identified as being used as havens by criminals from 
Dar es Salaam.178 Indeed, the Ruvu minor settlement and nearby Ngeta Kikonga were 
somewhat notorious locations in themselves, singled out by a district official two years 
earlier as ‘one of the worst areas in the district from the point of view of crime’.179 Ruvu 
was home to receivers of stolen property and also served as headquarters to one or two
173 Ibid., 1st January-31st March 1955,
174 TS, 25th February 1959, p .l.
175 TS, 14th September 1960, p .l.
176 TS, 7th April 1961, p.3.
177 DC Bagamoyo to PC, EP, 13lh May 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
178 DC, Dsm to SP, Dsm, 28th July 1944, TN A /540/21/8..
115
gangs led, according to the official, by ‘such well known criminals’ as Idi Mwinyikondo 
(alias Idi Benafiri) and his brother Mzee Mwinyikondo (or Benafiri).180 It is highly likely 
that these Ruvu gangs were linked to criminal activity occurring in the capital. It is 
equally likely that they were implicated in crime associated with the central railway line 
which passed through Ruvu. The presence of professional pickpockets there, using Ruvu 
as a base whilst they ‘worked’ the passenger trains, was commented upon by the 
Provincial Commissioner in 1942.181 Eight years later, a Dar es Salaam railways official 
wrote complaining of ‘the numerous thefts of consignments from wagons en route from 
Dar es Salaam to up-country stations’.182 He reported the activities of an organised gang 
armed with firearms operating in the district, stealing goods from trains. Thirteen persons 
were arrested in connection with one incident in January 1950, four of whom were 
railway employees. In October that year, a further series of burglaries along the railway 
line culminated in the death of a Khoja railway official.183 Another instance of the 
criminal links being forged between Dar es Salaam and its hinterland was the trade in 
stolen bicycles discussed above.
Gamblers and tricksters
Alongside more serious criminals the urban economy was also fruitful ground for 
those who sought to profit from their fellow townsmen’s recklessness and/or gullibility. 
Professional gamblers were particularly common. Card games were popular amongst Dal­
es Salaam’s African population. A modest profit on the part of the professional gamester 
was probably considered an acceptable price by his customers for the provision of 
entertainment and the chance of a windfall. In addition, informal gambling ‘clubs’ existed 
without the input of professionals. On the other hand, it appears there were many 
gamblers who used their skills in this area to yield a dishonest profit, whose deceptions 
would have been condemned by all sections of the community. Dar es Salaam’s police 
failed to make this distinction, though, taking action against all forms of gambling 
indiscriminately.
179 Political, Kisarawe to Political, Dsm, 12th March 1942 TNA/540/21/8..
180 ADO, Kisarawe to DC, Uzaramo, 3rd February 1942, TNA/540/21/8.
l8! PC, EP to Crime, Dsm, 16th February 1942, TNA/540/21/8.
182 Regional Assistant, EAR & H to CS, 27th February 1950, TNA/20219/Vol.II.
183 PAR for 1950.
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Gambling, as the Commissioner of Police observed in 1923, was ‘very rife in the 
towns among the native population.’184 Games of ‘find the lady’, known in Swahili as 
kara/a tatu (tr. three cards) or, alternatively, kuona Mzungu (tr. find the European), were 
played quite openly all over town, including the Indian areas. Less common was nje 
ndani (literal tr. outside inside) in which stakes of Shs.2/-, Shs.5/- or even Shs.10/- were 
placed on top of cards - to be won by the customer who selected the correct one.185 In 
1934, the Herald commented on the prevalence of gambling in Zone II:
The Indian bazaar has again become gambler ridden. Yesterday afternoon a gang o f native 
gamblers playing the three card game was seen in Market Street. It is reported that this 
gang is in the habit o f  roaming about in the bazaar and o f choosing any place for their 
business, sometimes even before the eyes of the police. This is not only a nuisance but a 
menace to the public moral [sic]. In some places they are surrounded by Native and Indian 
children offering them temptation to get rich quick. That they can do so in broad daylight 
calls for explanation from the Police.186
Gambling took place most commonly in the African areas, though. Three card tricksters 
were a frequent sight in the nooks and crannies of Kariakoo; even on street corners 
there.187 Jangwani became particularly well-known for its karata tatu stands, located to 
take advantage of the large numbers of people working in the area.188 There were also 
stands operating on Mnazi Mmoja and in Gerezani.189 In addition, gambling occurred in 
informal ‘schools’, as described by Leslie in his 1957 survey:
Many o f these groups [labour gangs] re-form in the evening into clubs, or ‘schools’, where 
small-scale gambling takes place, for penny points, on bao, snakes and ladders, dominoes, 
or cards. Particularly these clubs are used by those who are paid daily or by the job, for 
they have ready money. The sums lost or gained are not large, and often the rule is that a 
man who loses must drop out to give another his turn, thus curtailing still more his losses.
Attempts to control ‘professional’ gamblers were usually foiled by a well organised 
system of look-outs.191 ‘It is not often’, complained the Commissioner of Police, ‘that the 
gamblers give the police the opportunity of catching them playing for gain in a public
184 Police AR for 1923, p.26.
185 Interview No.7; see also TS, 8th June 1946, p. 12.
186 TH, 13th January 1934, p.10.
187 Leslie interview.
188 Interviews N os.l & 7.
189 Letter from SJDW, TS, 16th February 1950; and Interview No. 1.
190 Leslie, Sw vey, p .l01.
191 Police AR for 1927, p.60.
117
place.’192 ‘They weren’t easily caught’, recalled Masudi Ali of karata tatu operators at 
Jangwani, ‘as they always kept an eye out for the police and fled if they saw them.’193 
Nevertheless, repeated attempts were made to apprehend offenders throughout the 
colonial period. In 1923, the Commissioner reported that ‘the police have been able to 
increase their activities against this vice, and there has been a substantial increase in the 
number of convictions obtained.’194 Three years later, when gambling was said to be 
‘noticeably on the increase in the larger towns’, police were ‘constantly rounding up 
groups of natives for gambling.’195 If gamblers were periodically removed from the 
streets, though, it was never long before they returned. Once again, in 1935, the 
Commissioner reported it was necessary for there to be ‘determined vigilance on the part 
of the police to put a stop to this nuisance’.196 Such actions had the support of elements 
amongst Dar es Salaam’s African population. In 1936 the president of the Tanganyika 
African Commercial and Welfare Association wrote to the Provincial Commissioner 
complaining of the situation in the town:
[T]he gambling o f three cards in Dar es Salaam streets by Africans is immensely growing, 
as such the association is being requested to make a very strong representations [sic] to you 
that if the malefactors are expulsed from Dar es Salaam to their own countries, the offences 
would diminish considerably.197
The Provincial Commissioner responded by pointing out the difficulty police had in 
controlling ‘three card tricksters’ and requesting TAWCA assistance ‘in this matter by 
reporting any flagrant offenders as and when they become known to it.’198 The 
difficulties in apprehending offenders remained, however. In 1945 the District 
Commissioner recommended that the powers of the headmen ought to be increased in 
order ‘to put a stop to such evils as gambling, which now takes place openly, the police 
force being quite inadequate to cope with it.’199 By the mid-1950s gamblers had become 
one of the prime targets of the wahuni raids which were carried out with increasing 
intensity as the years passed and the African urban population burgeoned. In a series of 
such raids carried out over one week in June 1952, twenty nine people were ‘found
192 Police ARfor 1923, p.26.
193 Interview N o.7.
194Police A R for 1923, p.26.
195 Police AR for 1927, p.60.
196Police AR for 1935, p. 13.
197 TAWCA (E. Fiah) to PC, EP, 31st March 1936, TNA/22444.
198 PC, EP to TAWCA, 4th April 1936, TNA/22444.
199 Uzaramo DAR for 1946, p.9, TNA/61/504/1/46.
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gambling in the back streets and the open spaces.’200 Of these two were escaped prisoners 
and twelve had previous convictions.
Controlling gaming in the town was considered an indirect form of controlling other 
forms of crime. According to the Commissioner, gambling losses were ‘responsible for a 
good deal of the thieving which goes on in the towns, as the victimized natives seek to 
recoup themselves by such means.’201 A 1945 letter to the Liwali from one Saidi bin 
Selemani -complaining of gambling taking place at Mahiwa Street- quickly found its way 
via the District Office to the Dar es Salaam police accompanied with the observation that: 
‘The money used by these people for the proceeds of gambling, may well be the proceeds 
of thefts and their dwellings might bear searching.’202 Action subsequently taken in this 
case, though, only resulted in convictions on charges of gambling. Five years later, after a 
spate of robberies at Mkunguni Street had been reported in the press, one correspondent 
to the Standard implicated the ‘many ne’er-do-wells’ who frequented the gambling 
stands on Mnazi Mmoja.’ Concern was also expressed about the corrupting effect of 
gambling on juveniles. In 1932 twelve children aged 16 or under were picked up for 
gambling in the street.204 Pike in his 1939 report on Native affairs in the township 
expressed his anxiety at the number of 14-18 year olds spending their most 
impressionable years with ‘loafers, petty thieves and card sharpers.’205 Such concern was 
not confined to colonial officials. In 1936 Erica Fiah wrote to the Provincial 
Commissioner complaining that gamesters were ‘at present attracting school boys to 
follow their bad evils.’206
In addition to card-sharps, other types of con-men or tricksters preyed upon the urban 
population. It was observed in the 1928 police report that ‘cheating’ was ‘considerably on 
the increase, not only among the non-native community but among the more enlightened 
coast natives who practise at the expense of their less wide-awake brethren from the 
hinterland.’ The ‘plan of campaign’ of one such individual was
200 TS, 2 1st June 1952, p .l l .
201 Police A R for 1927, p.60.
202 Letter from Saidi bin Selemani to the Liwali, 5th February 1945, and accompanying notes, 
TNA/540/21/8.
203 Letter from SJDW, TS, 16th February 1950.
204 Annual Return, 1932, in TNA/21522.
205 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’, p.9.
20(5 TAWCA to PC, EP, 31st March 1936, TNA/22444.
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to ingratiate himself with some unsophisticated African traveller at Dar es Salaam railway 
station and undertake to purchase his ticket for him. In return for the money the accused 
would hand over a previously used ticket, see his dupe on the train and decamp,207
Oral informants also recalled tricksters operating at the expense of newly arrived rural 
immigrants, bus stands being a favoured haunt.208 In one case from 1957, for which 
records survive, Abdallah bin Ali was convicted of cheating Soga bin Kobezi, a recent 
arrival from Mwanza. Ali had claimed that with Shs.40/- to give to the clerk at his office 
he could get Kobezi a permanent, well-paid job. Kobezi, it was reported, waited a long 
time at Msimbazi, but after taking the money and purportedly going to see his clerk Ali 
failed to return! Abdallah bin Ali was an old hand. Two decades earlier the same 
individual had been convicted for cheating a man out of Shs. 15/50, for which he served 
an eight month term of imprisonment. It was noted at the time that he already had five 
previous convictions of a similar nature.210
People were often duped by fraudsters posing as public officials. In 1939, the
Information Officer told the Chief Secretary th a tc<askaris’ or more probably individuals
impersonating askaris or government messengers waylay the simpler of the peasantry on
the roads leading to the townships and levy toll of the produce which they are bringing to 
211 *sell.’ Thirteen years later, an announcement was necessary to warn householders and 
employers of labour to ascertain that tax-clerks doing the rounds were genuine, as there 
had been at least one successful attempt made by a fake collector to obtain money from a 
houseboy.212 Meanwhile, in 1959, Saidi Mohamed Magongo, posing as a municipal 
official, levied from Shs.50/- to Shs. 100/- per plot from some Africans building huts in 
Dar es Salaam.213 The same individual collected sales fees from pombe vendors operating 
illegally from their homes, who perhaps thought they had regularised their business 
through the payment. Magongo was said to have accumulated considerable sums of 
money through his deceptions.
Con-men did not restrict their activities to Africans. In 1952, the Standard reported the
207 Police A R for 1928, p. 19.
208 Interview No.2.
209 Native Court Case record, 11th November 1957, TNA/540/3/38B.
210 Record from 1936 in TNA/20219/Vol.II.
211 Information Officer to CS, 6th October 1939, TNA27565.
TS, 23rd August 1952, p.5.
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conviction of John bin Ngawagala for obtaining money by false pretences from five 
separate Europeans, including a secretariat official and A.M. Dyer, the District 
Commissioner of Dar es Salaam! He was apprehended after subsequently approaching 
R.H. Gower, Dyer’s counterpail: in Kisarawe. Ngawagala had nine previous convictions 
relating to activities in Iringa, Tanga and Dar es Salaam.
213 Ndewa Saleh Asumani to MS, 26th August 1959, TNA/540/DC/3/3.
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Chapter Five
Social crime in colonial Dar es Salaam
[T]ax d efaulters... together w ith a large number o f  m en (and som e w om en) w ho break the 
licen sin g  law s, and other batches w ho wander w ithout permit outside the reserve, or break 
the b y -law s that govern  agriculture, health and em ploym ent, constitute a large body o f  
petty offend ers, for w hom  im prisonm ent m ust in the last resort be used. They are not 
crim inals, and their consciences are untroubled. They are just unwary pawns in the gam e.1
Much criminal activity in Dar es Salaam arose from the apparent incongruity of 
colonial legislation. Laws and by-laws that prohibited customary activities such as the 
tapping of palm trees, which without a permit was disallowed, or a mendicant’s right to 
beg in a society which retained alms-giving traditions, were widely disregarded, as were 
laws restricting the freedom of movement. To colonial officials these activities were held 
to be contaminating the town. To Africans it was simply a matter of ‘getting by’. Some of 
these ‘social’ crimes form the subject of this chapter.
Alcohol and order in Dar es Salaam
One particularly prominent area in which colonial law clashed with African notions of 
legitimacy were the regulations controlling the production and consumption of alcohol. 
The illicit trade in ‘native liquor’ was a highly remunerative one, and these restrictive 
regulations were routinely ignored by both producers who brewed and sold alcohol 
illegally, and by the consumers who preferred these outlets to those which were licensed 
and supervised by the state.
A variety of regulations controlled the production and consumption of alcohol from 
the arrival of the British in Dar es Salaam during WWI. Initially brewing had been 
allowed for personal use alone and not for sale. In 1921, though, it was alleged that under 
such a regime ‘drunkenness was rife amongst Africans’ and in an attempt to restrict
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consumption the decision was made to permit the sale of pombe -African beer made by 
fermenting sorghum, bananas, or various other grains and fruits- in licensed premises 
only, and to prohibit liquor production elsewhere.2 By the end of the year ten premises in 
the African quarter had received licences to engage in the production and sale of pombe. 
This system, however, proved be to be equally undesirable to British officials, who 
hankered for Government to ‘take an active part in the direct control of the liquor traffic 
in town... by the establishment of a single compound for the manufacture of beer’ along 
the lines of ‘native beer compounds’ in South Africa.3 So, in May 1926, the production, 
sale and consumption of ‘native beer’ was forbidden anywhere other than the Kariakoo 
pombe market ‘under the immediate supervision of the police’.4 Within Dar es Salaam 
itself, officials congratulated themselves on the more efficient surveillance and control of 
the trade in alcohol which had done much ‘to reduce the drunkenness and disorderliness 
which once was not uncommon in privately-owned licensed premises.’5 One immediate 
result, however, was ‘that the native residents... wandered to outside pombe markets so 
as to escape from the exacting supervision to which, under the Native Liquor Ordinance, 
they were subjected in the pombe markets of the townships.’6 Africans commonly left 
Dar es Salaam 011 Saturday night after the termination of their urban ngoma1 in order to 
continue them outside the town boundary -where the restrictive urban laws relating to 
alcohol didn’t apply- returning on Monday mornings, often ‘much the worse for liquor’ 
according to a disapproving Provincial Commissioner.8 Bars servicing discontented urban 
residents fringed the township at Kinondoni, Kigogo, Segerea, Mwali, Temeke, 
Chang’ombe, Buguruni and Keko.9 Whilst the majority of these bars, being outside the 
township boundary were technically legal (the exceptions being those bars located in 
Keko, a popular destination for African imbibers within the boundary), they undermined 
attempts by officials to order the social life of urban Africans. Accordingly, the Native 
Liquor Ordinance was extended to cover the whole district in 1940.10
1 Paterson, ‘Report’, p.2.
2 DAR for 1921, p.22, TNA/54.3.
3 PC Brett to CS, 21st June 1927, TNA/10491.
4 Police AR for 1927, p.52/3.
5 Ibid.
6 Police A R for 1928, p.21.
7 Ngoma were celebratory gatherings -often competitive- involving drumming and dancing.
8 Chief Insp., CID to SP, Dsm, 25.8.30, TNA 61/76 (and Ag.PC, EP to CS, 12th August 1930, TNA/61/76)
9 Ibid.
10 GN No. 102 o f 1940.
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Within Dar es Salaam itself prior to 1940, the illegal production and sale of alcohol 
continued to occur. When East African Breweries took over responsibility for all legally 
produced ‘native beer5 in the township in the mid-1930s, it was noted by one secretariat 
official that ‘[t]he illicit brewing of probably better beer has continued to flourish.’11 Four 
years later an editorial by Erica Fiah in Kwetu announced that ‘[a]t present in Dar es 
Salaam many persons are arrested and fined being found in possession of Kangara 
liquor12 made by Natives in houses privately’.13 The Police, the editorial observed, ‘were 
in great difficulties to stop such contraband. ’ Meanwhile, it is also most probable that the 
tapping of tembo (palm wine), both for personal use as well as sale, was widespread in 
the town, although 110 records of any prosecutions survive. Restrictions on the 
consumption and sale of tembo were widely resented. The ‘prohibition of tapping cocoa- 
nut [sic] trees’, complained the President of the African Association to the District 
Officer in 1934, ‘is one of the enormous scourges in the history of the Tanganyika 
Coast.’14 ‘So far as I know’, he continued, ‘Opium and Bhang are the only noxious drugs 
condemned by the majority of Africans’. Awareness amongst officials of the customary 
consumption of tembo in coastal societies may in fact have led to a relative tolerance 
being adopted towards its unlicensed tapping and consumption in Dar es Salaam.15 Whilst 
serving as District Officer for Tanga, E.C. Baker had come to the conclusion that 
‘prohibition or no, tembo will be drunk by young and old alike no matter how severely 
offenders are punished.’16 Still, it is clear from the comments of the African Association 
President, and others,17 that Africans in Dar es Salaam and other coastal towns by no 
means felt at liberty to freely indulge their taste for palm wine. Indeed, whilst the illicit 
tembo trade in Dar es Salaam had by 1937 been allowed to grow to such an extent that it 
was seriously affecting business at the Kariakoo pombe market, the following year saw a 
crackdown by the police and the native administration aimed at checking the 
consumption of tembo in the town and its environs.18
Restrictions governing African consumption of alcohol proved unsustainable,
11 Sec. min., 5th December 1935, TNA/18893/Vol.II.
12 Kangara is a type o f  honey beer.
13 Kwetu No. 10, 27th June 39, p.3.
14 Pres., Afr. Assn., to DO, Dsm, 6th December 1934, TNA/12356.
15 This would help explain the lack o f  evidence o f prosecutions in surviving documents.
16 Cited in PC, Tanga to CS, 28th September 1935, TNA/12356/VoI.l.
17 See for eg. editorial in Kwetu, n o .ll ,  15lh July 1939, p.3.
Ag.PC,EP to CS, 24th June 1938, TNA/12356/Vol.II. It is likely that illicit spirits were also being 
manufactured and sold in Dar es Salaam between the wars, although there is little indication o f  its extent.
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however. In May 1940, the tapping of tembo under licence was authorised, and by the 
1950s a handful of tembo bars were dotted about the African residential areas in Dar es 
Salaam. Similarly, from 1947 restrictions governing African consumption o f ‘European’ 
beers and liquor were slowly removed. Such innovations, however, were in part designed 
at facilitating administrative control over the trade in alcohol. It had been recognised, for 
example, that inter-war prohibitions relating to tembo had, if anything, simply resulted in 
its unregulated production, consumption and sale. With the introduction of licences for 
the tapping of palms, and for its sale in African bars, it was hoped that the urban 
administration would not only boost its revenue, but also play a greater supervisory role. 
Continued government intervention was apparent in the small number of licences 
awarded to African retailers of alcohol and the simple fact that should an individual 
desire to tap his palms he required a licence issued from the district office in order to do 
so legally. As a consequence, the illegal production and consumption of all sorts of 
alcohol continued to be widespread. In Mtoni, the year after licensed palm tapping had 
been authorised, 46 illegal tappers were found ‘in one small area’.19 The following year 
the AO at Kiserawe noted:
Illegal tapping o f palm wine with its attendant evils o f illegal selling o f liquor is... very 
prevalent in the neighbourhood of Dar es Salaam. Drunkenness and hooliganism were as a 
result, on the increase especially among the youths o f the suburban areas who patronise 
illegal tembo clubs to a very large extent.20
Illegal bars were patronised by more respectable urban residents also, partly thanks to the 
poor condition of those licensed by the government.21 ‘There is nothing more horrible in 
this lovely town of Dar es Salaam than the African bars which have been constructed by 
the government for us’, wrote one ‘Non-Abstainer’ in a letter to the Tanganyika 
Standard}2 Drinking in unlicensed bars, however, exposed you to arrest. In 1946 another 
African correspondent to the Standard complained about the criminalisation of such 
practices:
When Natives drink from private places where conditions are sweet and sound, but after
19 PC, EP to CS, 16th July 1941, TNA/12356/Vol.l.
20 AO i/c Kisarawe to DC, Uzaramo, 8th September 1942, TNA/61/118/1.
21 TS, 24th August 1946, p .l3.
22 European constructed bars were unpopular elsewhere in Africa. In Northern Rhodesia, according to Gray, 
‘to Africans the beer-hall was a striking example o f  the way in which segregation, or the belief that the 
towns were by right part o f  the European’s preserve, resulted in a rigid refusal to recognize the needs of
urban Africans, intruded into the intimacies o f  their lives, and destroyed their happiness.’ Gray, Two
Nations, pp.220/1.
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enjoying for few minutes, there comes the Police -  ‘Kamata Hawa’,23 both the consumer 
and the beer maker or keeper appears before the Resident Magistrate who offers them a 
heavy fine as penalty for drinking in a bar in their own Native Land.24
In spite of the possibility of arrest, in the 1940s and 1950s pombe, kangara, and tembo 
were commonly sold unlicensed from peoples’ homes in the African areas of Dar es 
Salaam.25 In 1957, the Wakili of Kinondoni complained that the town was ‘full of 
crime... because people are selling tembo in their houses without a licence.’26 In addition, 
illicit breweries and stills continued to operate on the outskirts of town; in the unplanned 
African ‘villages’ where police patrols or municipal inspections were infrequent and 
where control was left to the Jumbe or Wandewa (Native Administration officials),27 who 
tended to be more sympathetic towards, or even have a vested interest in, the trade in 
alcohol.28 Pombe was consumed at unlicensed bars at the place of production as it was 
difficult to transport.29 Moshi, gongo (the commonest spirits produced) and tembo, on the 
other hand, frequently found their way into town and were consumed there by both 
Africans and (to a lesser extent) by Asians.30 Raids on the stills and breweries were 
carried out every two to three months depending on information received by the police 
from the native administration.31 In addition to the consumption of illegally manufactured 
alcohol there was also, according to Leslie, ‘a fair sale of legal liquor but in unlicensed 
premises.’ ‘European’ beer and spirits were sold at inflated prices to cover the potential 
cost of the bar-o wner’s arrest, although if surprised the seller was ‘always ready with the 
excuse that he was only throwing a party for his friends.’32
In his social survey Leslie noted that in comparison to other East African towns the 
restrictions on the production and consumption of alcohol were not strict in Dar es 
Salaam. Nevertheless, he remarked,
the restrictions have bred contraventions, as they must do in any society where they are not
23 ‘Seize these people’.
24 Letter from E.J.C. Second Non-Abstainer, TS, 24lh August 1946.
25 Interviews Nos.2 & 5.
26Wakili Kinondoni to DC, Dsm, 17th June 1957, TNA/540/3/91 A. (Original in Swahili).
27 Personal correspondence with D.J.G. Fraser (Superintendent in the Tanganyika police, 1952-1962), 7th 
March 1999; Leslie, Survey, p.250.
2 8  i *
Baker, in 1941, noted that minor Wandewa from the peri-urban fringe were ‘loth to enforce the permit 
system, probably because they themselves derive considerable revenue from the illegal sale o f  tem bo: PC, 
EP to CS, 16th July 1941, TNA/12356/Vol.II.
2 9 Correspondence with D.J.G. Fraser.
30 Ibid; Leslie, Survey, p.251.
31 Ibid.
32 Leslie, Survey, p.251.
126
backed by public opinion, and the prevalence o f  such petty contraventions all contributes to
the ‘sp iv ’ m entality,33
The liquor laws in Dar es Salaam were ostensibly formulated (and applied) for the 
preservation of public order. In actuality they represented one way in which the colonial 
administration sought the social control of the African population. As Leslie points out, 
far from encouraging the preservation of order within the town, instead they promoted 
disobedience and illegality. Such logic appeared to have little impact on the municipal 
authorities and the police, however, who continued to target illegal bars and their 
customers up to 1961, displaying a Sisyphean determination to impose an alien order.
Petty trade and its control
Unlicensed hawkers were another group who were vulnerable to arrest and removal 
from town in the name of colonial order. The principal objection to hawking voiced by 
colonial officials was that of the risk to public health. This did not apply to those petty 
traders of goods other than foodstuffs, however, nor was it the whole story with regard to 
food-sellers. When, in 1921, DO Brett counselled for the relaxation of the prohibition on 
hawking that had been introduced during WWI, so that ‘fit and proper persons’ might be 
granted the licence to hawk as they had in German times, he was informed by his seniors 
that hawking was not to be encouraged. A secretariat official, before going on to 
articulate concerns about sanitation, observed that c[t]he more hawkers wander about 
European houses the more the chances of theft and probability of annoyance to European 
ladies.’34 From the begimiing of the British colonial period official opposition to itinerant 
trading within the town had as much to do with public order as public health.
In the inter-war period, whilst unlicensed trading occurred in the town, it was not 
widespread enough to cause much concern. A sudden increase in hawking from the early- 
thirties -probably stemming from the reduction in formal employment caused by the 
depression- resulted in vociferous complaints from Asian traders about unfair 
competition, along with a more muted official response raising the health risk and the loss
33 Ibid.
34 Undated sec. min. (1921?) in TNA/2618.
127
of revenue from licences.35 The numbers involved though, were small enough so that by 
the end of the year street trading had been regularised, hawkers having been issued with 
permits.36 It was after 1940, when the growth of the town’s population outpaced the 
capacity of the urban economy to provide formal employment, that hawking became 
more commonly adopted as a means of generating an urban income. Setting up as a 
hawker was relatively straightforward. The capital required tended to be minimal, and 
whilst returns were usually similarly modest they at least provided a subsistence. More 
established traders could actually prosper through informal trade. In his social survey, 
Leslie noted that ‘many [women] have managed to save quite large amounts, enough in 
some cases to build a house with, from the sale of small quantities of firewood, fish or 
beans, a few cents at a time.’37 In the 1940s a wide range of products were sold by 
itinerant traders. They included charcoal, firewood, earthenware pots (vyungn) and raffia 
mats (ukindu). Fresh fish was hawked around all parts of the town by local fishermen, so 
too was fresh fruit. The most common items offered for sale, though, were prepared 
foodstuffs: vitumbua and maandazi (types of fried pastries), samaki wakukangaa (cooked 
fish), and togwa (a non-alcoholic millet drink).38 Itinerant coffee and tea vendors were 
also common.
Municipal and district officials tended not to view unlicensed street trading as a useful 
means of achieving a subsistence for the urban jobless. Instead it was considered either a 
public health threat and/or an activity which undermined the licensed and controlled trade 
conducted (predominantly) in the official markets such as those at Kariakoo and Ilala. 
Meanwhile, on the Township Authority, the unofficial Indian members also supported the 
restriction of African informal trade. They appeared to be more successful in serving the 
interests of small retailers amongst their community than those supposed to be 
representing African interests. Neither the nominated African member nor the Liwali 
were inclined to support the cause of African hawkers. After the war, as more people took 
to informal trade, the Authority decided to restrict the number of licences issued to 
itinerant traders in Dar es Salaam. 4[B]y limiting the number of street hawkers, the
35 For eg., TH, 22nd September 1934, p.9, for Asian grievances; and correspondence in TNA/22243 for the 
official discussion o f the problem.
36 1934 Report on Township Affairs by MS, [hereafter: MS, ‘Township affairs’] TNA/625.
37 Leslie, Siwvey, p .l 17.
38 See DC Bone to MS, 5th November 1945, for some o f the items traded in the 1940s. I have restricted my 
discussion to African itinerant traders. Arab Hadhrami traders were also common, associated particularly 
with the sale o f  second-hand clothing, although existing sources shed little light on official attitudes 
towards their presence.
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Township Authority’, explained Dr. Malik, its’ first unofficial chairman, in 1947, ‘aimed 
at a long term policy to eliminate street hawking altogether, ...by not licensing any new 
street hawkers except those who had been in business for not less than five years, who 
would go off in the course of time.’39 ‘The Police’, it was reported the following month, 
‘were taking the necessary steps to round up the unlicensed squatters selling foodstuffs in 
the streets.’40 This policy was retained into the 1950s. ‘Police prosecute those [hawkers] 
they don’t like as fast as possible’, a district official pointed out in 1953, ‘but many still 
persist.’41 Some explanation for this persistence may be gleaned from the grievances 
voiced by three itinerant traders about restrictions on the sale of foodstuffs in the same 
year:
we are not trading because we want to, it’s because we have a problem. And our problem is
there is no work for residents o f Dar es Salaam... we are dependent on this business to pay
our rent and tax.42
Despite the shortage of work, however, the number of trading licenses were highly 
restricted as the Municipal Council (which had succeeded the Township Authority in 
1949) maintained their long-held policy ‘to keep street trading to an absolute 
minimum’.43 Although in 1955 the Town Clerk declared that ‘the vexed question of 
Itinerant Traders Licenses require[d] close consideration’,44 there was no relaxation of the 
restrictions on hawking. Earlier that year a special police squad was set up to apprehend, 
amongst other undesirables, unlicensed hawkers.45 In the first quarter of 1955, 111 were 
prosecuted for trading without a licence and fined a total Shs.2,402 as a result of police 
raids.46 In the next quarter 31 were apprehended for the same offence.47
According to the picture painted by Leslie in his 1956 survey what is perhaps most 
remarkable about these figures is that so few were arrested. Judging from the survey, 
unlicensed trading was widespread in the town by the mid-1950s. It included adult men
39 TA mins., 21st March 1947, TNA/540/27/3.
40 Ibid., 18th April 1947, TNA/540/27/3.
41 Hand-written note, 3.9.53, TNA 540/3/75A.
42 Rajabu Tawaleni, Omari Mfaume and Juma Mwinyimvua to DC, TC, and Council o f 40, 26th August 
1953, TNA/540/3/75A. Orig. in Swahili; my trans.
43 TC to MAAO, 11th November 1955, TNA/540/3/75A.
44 Ibid.
45 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st January-313' March 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 1st March 1955-30th June 1955.
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selling fruit between bouts of formal employment,48 housewives selling cooked beans or 
fried fish,49 and children hawking kashata (a peanut sweet) or dafu (drinking coconuts).50 
‘Small traders there were in plenty’, observes Leslie,
pedlars o f  hot co ffee , tea-stall holders, se llers o f  fruit in season , o f  roast m eat, fish , 
coconu ts, firew ood , charcoal, on ions, or palm -w ine, water-carriers, pedlars o f  m ilk , old  
bottles, flattened kerosene cans for roofing, old clothes, and peanuts.51
Bugunmi was alive with economic activity when Leslie visited the area, most, if not all, 
almost certainly unlicensed:
som e w om en have bought lengths o f  w ood and are chopping them for firew o o d ... w om en  
m ostly , but one man too, have fish  s izzlin g  in a pan over a charcoal brazier... to be sold  
either to one o f  the Arab shops or to the m en direct w hen they com e hom e from  work; 
others again have bought a sack o f  charcoal and laid it out in heaps for s a le .. ,.52
In Keko Magurumbasi the main street was ‘blocked with hawkers selling oranges, 
vegetables, charcoal, firewood, anything that one can get in Kariakoo market; and 
throughout the morning... this street is thronged with shoppers.’53 Hawking and peddling 
were, according to Leslie, ‘the standard expedients of those unable to find paid 
employment.’54 In part the trade was seasonal. Each July, wrote John Cairns a DO in the 
capitol in the mid-1950s,
Dar es Salaam is flooded  with oranges. The spivs and vagrants and the hundreds o f  youths 
w ho drift in from  the neighbouring v illages have suddenly b ecom e fruit sellers. A ll over 
tow n, and particularly in the African areas, they squat by the roadside and under trees with 
piles o f  bright oranges heaped before them .55
Few of these petty traders were licensed: ‘the casual pedlars’, observed Leslie, ‘seldom 
bother to comply with the law.’56 Various strategies were adopted to combat the 
unwanted attentions of the police and the municipal authorities in order that unlicensed 
traders could continue to ply their business. In some cases, a meeting of the Municipal 
Council was told in 1957, ‘hawkers disappear* for a day or two when the Police or Health




52 Ibid, p .180.
53 Ibid, p.209.
54 Ibid, p.286.
55 Cairns, Bush, p. 140.
56 Leslie, Survey, p.250.
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Officers are on the look out for them, and then come back again.’57 In other cases those 
rounded up simply reappeared on the streets after a few days.58
Despite the obvious inefficacy of municipal policy, the attempt to control itinerant 
trading through restricting the number of licences was persisted with. Unlicensed 
hawkers continued to be apprehended and taken to court. Records survive of the 
conviction of one Kasim Abdallah, who, in December 1957, was sentenced in the 
Kariakoo Native Court to a fine of Shs50/- or one month in prison for trading without a 
license. In the same court seven months later Idi bin Muhamed received a two month 
sentence for the same offence, and two other unlicensed traders were sentenced to a fine 
of Shs 100/- or three months imprisonment.59 In May 1959, a round up of hawkers from 
Kisarawe Street led to a boycott of business at the Kariakoo fruit auction organised by the 
Tanganyika African Traders Union. Farmers boycotted the auction in support of the 
petty traders who bought their produce for resale on the streets.60 It appears such action 
had little impact on council officials, however. Later the same year it was reported that 
instead of increasing the number of itinerant traders licences (which at that point stood at 
no more than 80) the Municipal Council had decided to reduce the amount available.61 
Members of the Kariakoo Ward Council bemoaned the decision, pointing out that ‘many 
genuine town residents, particularly widows with young children and the temporarily 
unemployed had no choice but to scrape together a living by small trade.’62
It was not until the election of Dar es Salaam’s first African mayor, Amri Abedi, a 
Manyema poet and Ahmadi missionary,63 that there was a reconsideration of the long- 
held municipal policy of restriction. On coming to office in early 1960, Mayor Abedi 
proposed that ‘street tea and food sellers should be given licenses to trade freely and 
hawkers licenses to move freely.’64 By this time ever growing numbers were resorting to 
informal trade as a means of getting by. A review of policy was conducted by the council 
sub-committee. With its block of newly-elected African councillors, there were for the
57 TS, 24th May 1957, p. 17.
58 T ,^  J 9 th S e p t e m b e r  i 9 5 7 j  p . 4 .
59 Information from TN A/540/3/3 8B and 561/DC3/17.
60 Council minutes, June 1959, p. 189.
61 DC Winstanley to TC, 26th November 1959, TNA/540/DC9/3.
62 Ibid.
63 Iliffe, Modern History, p.551.
64 TS, 7th April 1960, p.3.
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first time elements on the Municipal Council who were more sympathetic towards the 
plight of these unlicensed traders. ‘The high rate of unemployment in the Municipality is 
forcing many people to obtain an honest living through street trading5, Councillor 
Kungulilo told a Municipal Council meeting in May 1960. ‘These people cannot 
understand why their efforts should be frustrated by what they consider to be an 
excessively rigid application of by-laws made in days when circumstances were very 
different from those of today.’65 Nevertheless, Indian councillors, keen to protect the 
interests of sections amongst their own community, remained stubbornly opposed to the 
relaxation of trading restrictions. ‘To reverse this policy5, complained Councillor Jaffer, 
‘would appear a retrograde step both from the point of view of public health and general 
tidiness of the town and the abatement of nuisance to traffic and pedestrians.’66 
Councillor Sarda declared his opposition to a change in policy for similar reasons: street 
traders were ‘a public nuisance5 and there was ‘every danger of a public incident 
occurring5 as a result of their activities.67 The outcome of these exchanges was a 
compromise in which itinerant fruit and vegetable traders were allowed to operate 
unlicensed as long as they had acquired written permission to trade from the Town Clerk, 
whilst regulations were introduced restricting traders of other goods -who coincidentally 
must have posed a greater competitive threat to established Indian retailers- to operate 
from approved sites. 192 licenses were made available to such traders. Meanwhile the 
Police were ‘requested to take action against any such traders operating on the streets or 
sidewalks and against any other persons (excluding approved fruit sellers) trading on the 
streets with no permit.568 ‘[Tjhe new controls’, announced a satisfied Councillor Jaffer, 
‘should go a long way towards solving the indiscriminate trading which was going on 
‘briskly5 in Dar es Salaam.’69
Such hopes proved misplaced. Four months after the new regulations had been 
introduced, the Markets, Housing and Fire Committee of the Municipal Council were 
being informed of unauthorised markets in Magomeni and Temeke, along with the 
emergence of itinerant traders at the junction of Acacia Ave and Suleiman Street in
65 TS, 5lh May I960, p.3.
66 TS, 8th April 1960, p.4.
67 TS, 5th May 1960, p.3.
68 Council mins., Markets, Housing and Fire(MHF)Cttee., 15th March 61.
69 TS, 5th January 1961, p.3.
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central Dar es Salaam.70 In June, the Medical Officer of Health observed that ‘over the 
past few months there has been a marked increase of ‘pavement restaurants.5 ‘A large, 
flourishing one exists every mid-day along Azania Front,’ he pointed out, ‘and most 
central parts of town now have these places where the by-laws are being flagrantly 
violated.’71 The Municipal Authorities lacked the ability or resources to devise a solution 
to the problem of unlicensed trading in the town. With perhaps 10,000 or more Africans 
entering the city annually after 195772 -when Leslie had estimated unemployment 
amongst men between 16 and 45 to be about 18.6 per cent73- and employers making more 
economical use of African labour, the chances of municipal control being exerted over 
the burgeoning informal economy were slender. In the absence of a more lasting solution 
though, and faced with the proliferation of pavement restaurants and other unlicensed 
activities, members of the Public Health Committee in June 1961 resorted to a tried, 
though hardly proven, response: ‘that the Town Clerk be directed to seek Police 
assistance to clear all unauthorised street traders in the town.’74
Dealing with the defaulter: tax evasion in Dar es Salaam
Discussion of the commonest form of social crime in colonial Dar es Salaam has been 
left till last. Throughout the British colonial period Dar es Salaam was used by many 
Africans living or working in the surrounding districts of Eastern Province as a refuge 
from the demands of the state, private employers or the Native Authorities. Of the various 
fugitives to be found in the town though, the most common were those avoiding payment 
of taxes.75 They came mostly from within Eastern Province, both near and far: from the 
relatively distant districts such as Morogoro and Rufiji as well as from the rural areas of 
Kisarawe and Dar es Salaam district itself. In addition, evasion of taxes was by no means 
uncommon amongst the town’s resident African urban population either. These tax 
defaulters, along with Africans who had committed criminal offences and, to a lesser
70 Council mins., MHF Cttee., 12th May 61.
71 Council mins., MOH’s Report to Public Health(PH) Cttee., 15th March 1961.
72 The difference between the African population o f Dar es Salaam recorded in the 1957 census (93,363) 
and in the 1965 Marco Survey (182,959) is 89,596. Divided by eight this works out at 11,200.
73 Leslie, Survey, p. 122.
7'' Council mins., PH Cttee., 16th June 1961.
75 It must be stressed, though, that the commonest form of migrant would have been those who came to the 
town in order to earn money to meet their tax requirements.
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extent perhaps, those without formal employment, were the prime target of colonial 
actions to preserve urban order. Failure to comply with the fiscal demands of the state 
represented an indirect challenge to colonial legitimacy. ‘It is fundamental’, noted the 
Acting Municipal Secretary in 1937,
that the basis o f social organisation rests upon respect for authority and that from time 
immemorial authority has been recognised in most communities by service or payment in 
lieu thereof. Where such service or payment is not rendered there is danger o f social 
disorder resulting.76
In addition, unsolicited movement to the town occurred in defiance of the colonial 
organisation of space. Those who avoided payment of taxes through coming to Dar es 
Salaam then, posed a double challenge to colonial officials and as such remained a 
primary focus of attempts to control the urban arena.
The imposition of taxes
Hut and poll taxes were introduced by the British throughout Tanganyika Territory 
from April 1923.77 Native house tax was payable by the owner of eveiy ‘native dwelling’, 
and poll tax by every able-bodied male member of the indigenous population aged 
sixteen and over who was not liable for house tax. Initially taxes were paid to 
representatives of the central government, with the introduction of indirect rule in 1926, 
however, tax collecting duties were conferred upon Native Authorities. In Dai' es Salaam, 
which as a result of its’ cosmopolitan urban population remained under direct 
administration, taxes continued to be paid to central government representatives as well 
as African representatives of the town’s native administration. African property-owners 
in the town paid Municipal House Tax whilst the remainder of the population was liable 
for poll tax. Throughout the territory women were exempted from the payment of poll 
tax, whilst children and more elderly African men were exempted from all taxes. The 
assessment of those deemed eligible for exemption, however, was notoriously imprecise 
in the case of both juveniles and the elderly. According to one colonial memorandum the 
latter were exempted from paying tax when they were considered ‘too old to wield a
76 Memo on the administration o f  Dsm by MS, [hereafter: MS, ‘Administration’] 22nd February 1937 
TN A/61/207/Vol. 1.
77 Kenneth Ingham, Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron 1919-31, p.558, in Harlow and Chilver, 
History o f  East Africa vol. II, (Oxford, 1965).
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hoe’, which usually meant between the ages of forty five and fifty.78 With the 
overwhelming absence of birth certificates such criteria for exemption could result in 
somewhat bizarre rituals of inspection:
To pay or not to pay is usually decided by the number of wrinkles on a man’s belly and the 
lines on his face and neck. It is most difficult at times to decide whether an applicant 
should or should not pay tax. He may get the benefit o f the doubt, on another occasion he 
may be unlucky and leave the Boma or Baraza with his neighbour a younger man than 
him self but who as a result o f  a few extra wrinkles has won for him self the coveted 
certificate. This frequently happens at little visited Native Authority headquarters when 
possibly a hundred old men are paraded. By the time seventy or so have filed past, the 
Administrative Officer is so exhausted that he either exempts the remainder or chases them
79away.
The imprecision of this process could be a matter of great irritation to Africans. ‘Men are 
required to pay tax after reaching the age of eighteen’, complained a correspondent to 
Kwetu in 1939, ‘but what we don’t know is the age at which one is exempted.’80 The 
assessment of those youths deemed liable for tax could be equally arbitrary, with officials 
frequently miscalculating. It was, one official declared in 1931, ‘difficult to tell whether 
an African is sixteen or eighteen.’81 Once deemed old enough to pay tax the 
consequences for African youths could be momentous, as an unusually frank official 
pointed out in 1931:
African males who are not the owners o f huts and are, therefore, liable for poll tax are, in 
the vast majority o f cases, the young unmarried natives who, in normal tribal areas have no 
land or stock or other property and, therefore, no taxable capacity. When they are assessed 
to tax, they must either evade payment or obtain the monies from their elders, or go out 
into the employment areas to labour for wages. In practice, they do all o f these things, and, 
certainly large numbers obtain their monies in the labour market. In point o f fact their can 
be little doubt that the poll tax was first introduced in East Africa for the purpose o f getting 
the African into the labour market, and not as a revenue measure. It is, in principle, 
contrary to the instructions contained in the Memo on Native Policy in East Africa: - 
‘The levy of direct taxation on the native should definitely be limited to his capacity to pay 
such impositions without hardship and without upsetting his customary method of life.
Every care should be taken to provide that taxation, whether central or local, does not in its 
result actually oblige the native to labour for wages as the only practicable means o f  
obtaining the money wherewithal to pay his tax.’ (Para 14 (iv))
Circumstances forbid us at present to abolish the tax (even if against HM Government 
policy) ...but we shall take a long stride towards getting rid o f its most objectionable
78 Undated memo (circa. 1946?) on Native Tax Exemption TNA/61/502/Pt.I.
79 Ibid.
m Kwetu, 3ld May 1939, p.14 (original in Swahili).
81 Sec min by Tr. to CS, 31st July 1931, TNA/19925. The European inability to judge the correct age o f  
African youth is exemplified by the discovery in 1944 that the age o f many young offenders at ICazima 
Approved School had been underestimated by as much as five years. See Court Circular N o.9 o f  17th 
November 1944 and the list o f offenders, TNA/28692/Vol.l.
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features if  we raise the age to 18 or 20 years.82
The age was indeed raised by the Native Tax Ordinance of 1934; rendering it payable to 
‘every native of an apparent age of eighteen years.’ However, evasion remained common 
throughout the British colonial period, particularly amongst young Africans, and the 
burden of taxes on Africans of all ages resulted in not only labour migration but also a 
flow of defaulters to towns in general and to Dai- es Salaam in particular.
Tax evasion in Dar es Salaam
Non-payment of taxes first came to the fore as an issue of concern in the late 1920s. At 
their conference in 1929, Senior Administrative Officers drew attention to the 
interconnected problems of African migrancy, mobility and evasion in Dar es Salaam. 
They bemoaned the great difficulties in collecting tax from ‘the floating population of 
labourers, stevedores, motor drivers etc., who are immigrants from upcountry or from 
neighbouring territories.’ The trouble with these people was that
(i) They are naturally glad to evade tax.
(ii) They seldom, if ever, have the amount of it (usually ShslO/-) at any one time.
(iii) Usually they dispose o f their cash earnings as soon as received by purchasing 
trade goods and depositing them with an Indian on the box system.
(iv) They have no fixed abode.
(v) They frequently go by names adopted for work purposes, which they change at 
will, and not by their own names.83
Causing particular concern were those jobless defaulters who drifted in from outlying 
districts in Eastern Province. ‘[Frequently’, DC Fryer complained in his annual report 
the following year, ‘there have appeared before the Tax Officer fifty or a hundred natives, 
eighty per cent of them youngsters, all without work, from Rufiji, Kilwa, Bagamoyo and 
Morogoro Districts, and they are all loafing round town waiting for the time when they 
can safely return home without being worried for tax.’84 In researching his social survey 
the following year, Baker also found that young immigrant defaulters were numerous in 
the town:
Early in March I spoke with a group of over a hundred men who had been called up by the
82 Sec Min, 13th August 1931, TNA/19925.
83 Conference Mins., Dsm, 1929, TNA/54.2.
84 DAR for 1930, p.8, TNA/53.4.
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Jambe as they had failed to pay their Hut and Poll Tax. Some o f them were in employment 
and others not, but only one o f them lived in the township and one other in the plantations 
nearby. The remainder were youths who had, according to their own statements, arrived in 
Dar es Salaam within the previous three months many of them having come in only a few 
days before. On the same day another town Jumbe told me that he had rounded up a group 
o f tax defaulters which he estimated at 150 all of whom were strangers and had come into 
the township during the previous three or four months.85
Meanwhile, even residents of Dar es Salaam district itself provided grounds for concern. 
According to Fryer, by 1931 the position was being reached where there was in the 
district ‘instead of a small percentage of passive resisters a large percentage [who] do not 
pay.5 ‘For fifteen years’, he complained, ‘we have administered Tanganyika Territory and 
we are as lacking today in effective measures for dealing with tax defaulters as we were 
fifteen years ago.’86 More coercive methods employed in the collection of tax the 
following year, however, had the desired effect:
The Police have been used for house to house or hut to hut visits when those occupants 
who had not paid anything were ordered to go to the Tax Collector to show the cause why 
they should not be made to work as Tax Defaulters. It was surprising and instructive to find 
what a large percentage had the money and paid up without further argument.87
Evasion of taxes remained common nevertheless, particularly so during the depression 
years. In 1933 it was estimated in the district report that at the close of the year three 
quarters of the assessed number of taxpayers were in default. This did not even include 
the town’s floating population, who were distinctly less inclined to meet the fiscal 
demands of the state than more permanent residents. In these recessionary times people 
were hard pressed to obtain the ShslO/- required for house or poll tax, citing as reasons 
for non-payment
(i) drought
CO low prices for produce
(iii) damage by wild animals
(iv) reduced rates of wages
(v) abuse o f the instalment system
(Vi) no money being in circulation88
‘Much of this is true’ commented the District Commissioner. The following year, the 
Municipal Secretary was highlighting the difficulties encountered in collecting tax from 
casual dock labour:
85 Baker, ‘Social Conditions’, p.88/9.
86 DAR for 1931, p. 17, TNA/53.4.
87 DAR for 1932, p.6, TNA/53.4.
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To station tax collectors at the wharf in order to make collections from the labourers as 
they leave with their daily pay is sufficient to ensure that no labour will be offered for 
further work until a definite assurance has been given that the collectors have been 
withdrawn. To approach these same labourers after they have arrived at their homes is to 
find them without the means to pay.89
Meanwhile, ‘[t]he announcement of a tax baraza to be held by an AO5 was observed in 
the 1937 district report to be £a general sign for all defaulters to disappear from the 
locality’; the phenomenon of ‘the young unmarried man who immediately makes for the 
township as soon as tax pressure is making matters difficult for him’ being a particular 
problem90; adding further to the already ‘large number of tax defaulters both in the 
township and in the surrounding district.’91
In a memo the same year Acting Municipal Secretary Huggins described tax affairs in 
Dar es Salaam as being in a parlous state. No proper poll tax registers were kept; many 
Africans were paying the wrong taxes; there was no ‘real system for controlling tax 
defaulters’; and with no reliable population statistics it was not even possible to make a 
proper estimate of African tax receipts.92 He advised that a comprehensive tax register 
should be compiled. The following year an attempt was made to do this when the town 
was broken down into six separate sections, and further sub-sections based on streets, 
both for tax and administrative purposes.93 District Office staff subsequently compiled 
Native Tax Registers which by November 1938 had been completed. The District Officer 
responsible, however, was not happy with the results:
I regret I am unable to agree these registers are completely satisfactory. It would appear 
that the present system of town headmen need to be altered so that they are in closer touch 
with the native population and until this has been done the compilation o f accurate tax 
registers will be almost impossible.94
No solution was found to counter the shifting and impermanent nature of a large 
proportion of Dar es Salaam’s population. It remained a perennial problem for those 
responsible for collecting taxes. In 1941, Provincial Commissioner Baker complained
88 DAR for 1933, p.2, TNA/53.4.
89 MS, ‘Township affairs’, p.5.
90 DAR for 1937, p.3, TNA/53.4.
91 DO, Dsm to PC, EP, 28th May 1938, TNA/61/577.
92 MS, ‘Administration’, pp.7/8.
93 DO, Dsm to PC, EP, 20* June 1938, TNA/61/207/Vol.l.
94 DO Pike to PC, EP, 27th November 1938, TNA/61/207/Vol. 1.
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that ‘the frequent movement of tax payers from one area to the other either for economic 
reasons or in a deliberate attempt to avoid payment of tax’ obstructed ‘the collection of 
Native Tax in the township and district.’95 That year an amendment to the Native Tax 
Ordinance was passed conferring 011 tax collectors the power to arrest without warrant 
‘persons whom they suspect upon reasonable grounds of wilful neglect to pay tax.’96 
According to the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the amendment:
The persons whom this provision is intended to effect are those who have no settled area o f 
residence and who are frequently unknown to local authorities. It is considered necessary 
that collectors should have this power to enable the tax to be collected from this class of 
natives who would otherwise escape with impunity.97
The new legislation had negligible impact on the floating population of defaulters in the 
territorial capital, however. Nine years on, the problem remained the same; it had simply 
been exacerbated by the rapid growth of the urban population. The District Commissioner 
complained that:
Collection o f tax in a town this size is far from easy. A fair percentage o f the population is 
a shifting one, with a goodly collection o f spivs included who move their lodgings from 
place to place overnight. Assessment roles are out o f date before they are completed and 
are in fact quite useless. ...It is the bird o f passage... who flits from lodging to lodging, 
changing his job and his address a dozen times a year who creates the problem.98
These difficulties persisted up to the closing years of colonial rule. In 1957, Leslie 
observed that there was no possibility of keeping tax registers up to date, when up to a 
quarter of the ‘younger people’ in town were moving house every three to four months, 
and there was no registration system or restrictions on movement into the town. As a 
result, he concluded, tax was far more easily avoided in the town than elsewhere.99 
Ironically, the territorial capital -where more officials were in closer touch with a large 
concentration of Africans than anywhere else in Tanganyika -  was acting, as it had 
throughout the British colonial period, as a sanctuary from the fiscal demands of the state 
for significant numbers of Africans.
95 PC Baker to CS, 25,h July 1941, TNA/30263.
96 Explanatory Memo, to Native Tax (Amendment) Ordinance 1941, PRO CO/691/181/42003.
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The extent of evasion
It is hard to construct a statistical picture of the extent of tax evasion in the town 
throughout the period. Existing records are patchy and unreliable, and, being cobbled 
together from different sources, are unsystematic as comparative indicators. Nevertheless 
what information has survived does tend to confirm the impression that tax evasion was 
common in Dar es Salaam, even amongst those who were registered to pay tax in the 
town. In late November 1936, for example, 48 per cent of the district’s estimated tax 
yield for 1935 was still outstanding and 62 per cent for 1936 itself.100 Evasion was likely 
to have been considerably more widespread than this appears to indicate, as the amount 
of taxes due were usually underestimated by district officials;101 meanwhile, the bulk of 
Dar es Salaam’s floating population would not have been factored into the estimates. 
Another indication of the extent of evasion can perhaps be gleaned from the number of 
defaulters employed on labour tickets. The totals were surprisingly small, however. Use 
of defaulter labour appears to have been adopted as something of a last resort. In 1936 
just 716 defaulters were employed on labour tickets in the whole of Dar es Salaam 
district, working a total of 21,480 days (an average of 30 days per defaulter) on forestry 
and the upkeep of stations and roads. Judging by the number of defaulters employed, the 
extent of evasion in the district may have risen considerably over the next two years, as 
by 1938 the total had grown to almost 2,000, working 39,520 days on road maintenance 
(around 20 days per defaulter).102 In part this can be accounted for by the high rate of 
Shs.il/- demanded of those liable to taxation in the district. By the early 1940s the 
district office had, according to Pike, acquired ‘a tremendous accumulation of arrears of 
nearly £50,000 which was hanging like a millstone on the Native Administration’.103 
People’s difficulty in paying the Shs.il/- tax was acknowledged as an important 
causative factor. In 1942 the arrears were wiped off by central government. Meanwhile, 
the rate in the rural areas of the district was reduced to Shs.9/- in an attempt to induce 
payment. In Dar es Salaam town, the rate remained unchanged in order to discourage 
rural-urban migration at a time of rapid urban growth.104 Thanks to the changes, 1,217
99 Leslie, Siwvey> p.250,
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101 Reminiscences o f  life as a DO 1947-64 by T. Mayhew [hereafter: Mayhew, ‘Reminiscences’], p.18, 
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more taxes were paid in 1942 than 1941105 and a full tax collection was achieved in the 
rural areas. In the town, on the other hand, evasion continued.106 It remained common 
throughout the decade. By 1950 the District Commissioner estimated there were 3,000 
defaulters in the Municipality alone. Whilst he was confident that many of these would be 
caught in time, he concluded that even a 90 per cent tax collection was ‘merely a pipe 
dream5.107
Raids carried out by the police in conjunction with the Native Administration and tax
collectors, which became increasingly common over the final decade of colonial rule,
brought to light more and more defaulters in the course of the 1950s. A single raid in
November 1952 resulted in the arrest of 676 African ‘spivs’ and tax evaders. Meanwhile,
in 1954, 1,574 defaulters were apprehended as a result of campaigns against undesirables
in the course of the year.108 Continuous raids briefly appeared to be having the desired
effect. The amount of tax collected in the first nine months of 1954 far exceeded that for
the whole of the previous year.109 However, whilst it may temporarily have resulted in
enhancing collection, it seems that few defaulters were persuaded to mend their ways as
the number of tax-evaders caught in raids the following year actually -a t 1,576- just
exceeded the 1954 total.110 Two years on, the Provincial Commissioner was complaining
that the collection of tax had been ‘even more difficult than in previous years.5 ‘Despite a
seven-fold increase in prosecutions,5 he wrote in his 1957 annual report, ‘collections were
the lowest for some years and investigations reveal that at least 6,000 persons avoid their
tax liability.’111 Partly as a result of this state of affairs, the campaign against undesirables
was intensified yet further. By 1958 raids had become a daily occurrence. The statistics
resulting from these raids reveal how widespread tax evasion had become by the late
1950s. Of the 930 persons screened in the first quarter of 1958, 761 were found to be in
default; the proportion remained at similarly high levels throughout the year. The annual
total of defaulters apprehended as a result of raids in the whole of 1958 exceeded 
1124,000. Of these, 1,563 were eventually prosecuted for non-payment (the remainder
105 PAR for 1942, p.20.
106 DAR for 1942, p.3, TNA/3/XVII/A.
107 DAR for 1950, p.4, TNA/61/504/1/II/56.
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paid up after their arrest).113 The position continued to deteriorate in 1959. In round-ups 
which took place in the latter half of February that year at Bugurani, Kinondoni, ICipawa, 
and Keko Juu, as many as 1,400 individuals were arrested for tax evasion.114 At a March 
meeting of the Legco, Rashidi Kawawa, the TANU politician (former unionist and ‘film 
star’) elected as Dar es Salaam’s representative in the first territorial elections of 1958, 
attacked ‘the present system of checking tax-defaulters in the towns’ which ‘was causing 
unnecessary hardship to law abiding citizens.’115 Despite the scale of apprehensions, 
though, action against defaulters was not resulting in an enhanced collection of tax. The 
total amount of personal taxes collected in Dar es Salaam Municipality declined from 
24,704 in 1958 to 23,584 the following year. In 1960 it dropped more dramatically to just 
17,173. Such high levels of evasion at the end of the colonial period are an indication of 
the declining legitimacy of the colonial administration in the face of the nationalist 
challenge. Certainly the Native Administration was anxious about ‘the less responsible 
members of TANU... suggest[ing] that ‘Uhuru’ would mean the end of taxation.’116 By 
1959 tax officials appeared to be losing the stomach for the fight. In that year only 284 
prosecutions for non-payment of taxes were made. In 1960 it declined yet further to just
117  • *185. Raids for tax collecting purposes appeal’ to have been abandoned. In his report for 
1960, Durdant-Hollomby recorded that:
Tax was collected by purely administrative means and AOs in charge o f Wards gave 
priority to the matter. Arrangements were made for broadcasts, newspaper handouts and a 
poster campaign. Street Elders with detailed knowledge o f their immediate neighbourhood 
were used and a full scale publicity exercise was launched by the Minister o f Information 
Services.118
These initiatives failed to arrest the slide in taxes collected, however, the total for 1960 
declining by over 25 per cent. Durdant-Hollomby held that ‘unemployment, industrial 
unrest and the railway strike can be blamed to some extent for the poor response’. He also 
reported ‘there was a feeling in some quarters that as taxes were likely to be reduced as 
soon as the present [TANU] Government took office, there were good reasons for 
delaying payment.’ As an explanatory factor, though, the suspension of campaigns 
against defaulters was likely to have been most influential. As we have seen, at their
1,3 DAR for 1960, p.5, RH/Mss.Afr.s.937.
114 See TS reports, 27th February 1959, 5tl1 March 1959 and 19th March 1959.
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height they were responsible for picking up over 4,000 defaulters annually; around 7.5 
per cent of the male population of the town, from whom it was considerably easier to 
extract taxes than the ‘uncaptured’ majority.
Tackling the defaulter, 1941-1961
Campaigns against tax-evaders became a perennial feature of life in Dar es Salaam 
township in the last two decades of colonial rule; their frequency increasing as the scale 
of evasion became ever more apparent to urban officials.119 Diverse departments of the 
colonial administration would be mobilised -the Township administration, tax collectors, 
and most importantly the police- in order to apprehend defaulters. The first major raid of 
this type took place in October 1941. A Tanganyika Standard editorial provides the 
background to events:
We have been informed on good authority that tax defaulters among Dar es Salaam 
Africans are far more numerous than in most other districts, and casual enquiry seems to 
confirm that the number of Africans who have not only not paid this years tax, but also the 
tax for last year and the year before, is very considerable. The causes for this would be 
pointless to seek at present. The effects are clearly that any action taken now would have to 
be drastic to be useful, and, if  drastic, would round up a very large number o f local 
Africans. This is apparently exactly what happened.120
Indeed, the intensity of action was such that the editor was forced to criticise officials for 
o ver-zealousness:
Correspondence that we have now received alleges not that law has merely been applied 
arbitrarily, but in fact that it has been far overstepped.
...V iew ing the events o f  last week -again, we speak as laymen- with their wholesale 
rounding up, arrests, detentions and incarcerations, it seems doubtful whether provisions 
[of the law] were not in one case or another exceeded, and the excesses were for more than 
could be explained or made tolerable by the circumstances -a great deal of tax default, and 
limited staff to deal with it, in Dar es Salaam- to which we have been careful to give full 
value.121
‘Some sort of arrangement must be devised’, the editor concluded in an earlier editorial, 
‘that will allow the taxpaying African through and spare undue delay and the ignominy of
119 The primary purpose o f these campaigns, though, was to attempt to assert control over the urban African 
population.
120 TS, 10th October 1941, p.6.
121 Ibid., p.15.
143
being herded along with the delinquents without his having to cany on his person (where 
he has usually little suitable storage capacity for old and well-thumbed papers) receipts 
dating back several years.’122 Nothing of the sort emerged, however, and checks 
continued to be made on the basis of chetiya kodi (tax receipts) for the next two decades. 
Meanwhile, whilst they may not have matched the scale of the action taken in October 
1941 -excepting perhaps those which occurred in the wake of the 1947 strike- raids 
continued intermittently throughout the 1940s, in the course of which abuses no doubt 
occurred. The only description of such an instance to have survived comes from Arusha, 
but it stands as an example of what must have also resulted from tax drives in the capital. 
In this case an African carpenter employed by an Arusha school was apprehended in the 
course of a raid. He was fortunate enough to have an employer -the headmaster of the 
school- who recognised the injustice perpetrated and took up the matter with the district 
office. In a letter to the Tanganyika Standard the headmaster described what had 
occurred:
He states that he was forcibly detained (with rough handling) by the tax clerks who refused 
to let him go to his house to produce his receipts, or to come to school to establish his 
identity. At the Boma he was instructed by the Senior Clerk to sign a conscription form, 
which he did protesting, but his appeals were ignored. He was then sent to the labour camp 
with others and put on to jobs such as sweeping. The matter was dealt with entirely by 
African clerks; he did not see the DO at all. He brought a charge o f rough handling and 
detention, and claimed loss o f wages for four days, and Shs.200/- compensation... The 
hearing o f his case involved four days absence from work, at the end o f which after an 
appeal to the DC, he has been told that his conscription was legal, and he has been given 
Shsl2/- ex gratia payment for the four days o f work lost while in the labour camp, and 
allowed no compensation.
It thus appears to be legal for African tax clerks to conscript for rubber production a skilled 
workman engaged in permanent employment o f national importance, who has paid his 
taxes and has committed no offence - without any reference to his employer. Had I not 
intervened, he would undoubtedly have been sent to Tanga. My strong representations on 
his behalf have served only to secure his release, while at the cost o f four mornings’ delays 
over litigation he has been given Shsl2/-.
Press-gang methods such as these savour more o f Nazi Germany than o f British justice, 
and if an educated, experienced man finds he has no escape without European intervention, 
one wonders what happens to the many others less fortunately placed.123
An editorial written in response to the above noted: ‘We have had similar complaints, 
from even more authoritative correspondents and dealing with cases even more striking,
Ibid., p.6.
123 T S ^ j s t  December 1945j p 16
144
about tax collection in Dai- es Salaam.’124 These incidents almost certainly represented the 
mere tip of the iceberg. As the Arusha headmaster pointed out, if educated, experienced 
and employed men were subject to such treatment, what happened to those uneducated, 
young and/or unemployed individuals who constituted the bulk of the persons screened in 
raids in Dar es Salaam and other urban centres?
From the early-1940s the fate of the defaulter was increasingly either repatriation to 
his area of origin or his removal to plantations to work. In a letter to the Provincial 
Commissioner in 1941, DO Revington pointed out that it was now ‘considered that any 
native who has neglected to pay tax... is an undesirable’ (and hence subject to removal 
from the town).125 As the decade wore 011 more systematic methods for collecting tax 
were introduced, involving more frequent ‘raids’ and increasing numbers of repatriations. 
‘Almost every week the District Office mounted a tax drive’, recalled former DO 
Mayhew,
and all those many found without valid tax tickets were brought to the borna.... Those who 
could establish residence in the town were given the option o f finding the money 
immediately, under escort, or being sent to a camp outside the town for extra-mural labour 
in lieu.126
Those who could not establish residence, meanwhile, were removed from the town. As a 
result of these efforts the amount of tax collected rose considerably: 1945 was the highest 
on record, and in the following year, whilst it was not quite so high, thirty six per cent 
more tax was collected than had been estimated. By 1948 feelings amongst those bearing 
the brunt of this onslaught appeared strong enough to force the African member for Dar 
es Salaam, Juma Mwindadi, a Tanga-educated Muslim teacher,127 to raise the issue of tax 
collection in the Legislative Council. In November of that year he controversially alleged 
‘that the collection of tax was being carried out under conditions resembling the old slave 
trading days and that the Africans were being hunted like animals in order to get them to 
pay their tax.’128 Under pressure from colonial officials he apologised for -and withdrew- 
the strong words used whilst maintaining, nevertheless, that he ‘only wished to draw the 
attention of the Government to the fact that sometimes those responsible for collecting
124 Ibid., p. 15.
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tax were inclined to use harsh methods.’129 The emotional nature of the original 
allegations, however, perhaps provide a truer reflection of the strength of feeling amongst 
the African population with regard to tax collection in the Township at the time. Colonial 
officials were insensitive to such feelings though, dismissing accusations of brutality and 
endorsing current methods of dealing with defaulters. ‘In these days of high wages and 
opportunities for work’, wrote Provincial Commissioner Robinson in 1948, ‘there is no 
reason why the ordinary law abiding native should not tender his tax without being called 
upon to do so. If this were done there would be no necessity for compulsory attendance 
under escort at the Tax Office.’130
Up to 1951 many of those caught without cheti who failed to settle their debts were 
sent to work on public projects in order to make good what they owed, a process 
described in hindsight by the DC in his annual report for that year:
In the days o f tax defaulter labour there was one answer [to a floating population o f  
defaulters] and that was to have lightning raids in the small hours o f the morning and grab 
everyone who couldn’t produce a tax receipt and then allow employers or relatives to come 
along and redeem the defaulters. Those who were not redeemed were sent to Government 
Departments....131
By 1951 Government policy was dedicated to abolishing tax labour -which it viewed as 
forced labour- in order to fall in line with other British African territories where the 
system had already been suspended.132 ‘The present provisions regarding discharge of tax 
by labour’, according to an official statement, were ‘not in accordance with the present 
state of development of the territory’.133 An amendment to the Native Tax Ordinance was 
discussed by the Legco in due course, in which it was proposed to do away with tax 
labour and instead deal with defaulters through the courts. Significant settler opposition 
was raised to the Bill. Brigadier Scupham, a former Administrative Secretary from Iringa, 
went so far as to describe the proposal to abolish tax labour as ‘revolutionary’.134 He was 
backed up by another settler representative from Arusha, Major du Toit:
I really can’t understand how it can be said that taxed labour is forced labour. It is not 
forced labour at all. A defaulter is told he has not paid his taxes and he is going to work. I
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support the objection to the passing o f this measure. I submit it would be detrimental not 
only to the authority who are responsible for the collection o f the taxes but it will 
encourage spivs and drones.135
In the estimate of Major du Toit the only fault with ‘the old form of tax labour [wa]s that 
it was not hard enough.’ ‘Where a man got eight days’, he concluded, ‘he should have 
been forced to work 48 days or a month: Instead of that we are easing up.’ There is some 
irony to this resolute defence of the current system. Whilst the amendment conveniently 
removed the charge of forced labour, the onerousness of the tax regulations and 
punishment for evasion were actually enhanced by the Bill. Those in default of taxes after 
October each year became liable to a fifty per cent surcharge. Meanwhile those who 
refused to pay their taxes were not only on conviction subject to a possible Shs. 100/- fine 
or a three month term of imprisonment, but they were also still liable for the original 
taxes and open to further prosecutions. A more perceptive interpretation of the proposed 
amendments came from another unofficial Legco member, Mr. Carnegie Brown, from 
Dar es Salaam. ‘Reading the Bill for the first time,’ the Standard reported, ‘he said he had 
thought it was a measure to promote the flow of labour.’136 Many Native Administration 
officials, aware of the potential impact on African households, were also ambivalent 
about the proposed amendments. In his memoirs former DO Mayhew recalled arguments 
against the abolition of tax labour:
Extra mural labour on Public works could be done in lieu of a cash payment; the defaulter 
would be fed and housed and issued with a tax receipt on completion o f his task, but the 
UN ruled that this was forced labour and had to be stopped, to the distress and detriment of 
the really poor taxpayer.137
‘Perhaps it would have been better to abolish poll tax’, he mused in hindsight. Despite 
opposition from various quarters, though, after a 16-10 vote in the Legco the Bill passed 
into law as the Native Tax (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 25 of 1951).
In the final decade of colonial rule the intensification of tax collecting activities 
continued. Whilst this may have resulted in more taxes being paid, it also had the 
paradoxical effect of bringing to light the scale of evasion which was going on seemingly 
unaffected. In the 1950 district report, DC Cadiz complained ‘[i]t was indeed depressing
135 ibid.
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to find that the more we increased and improved our methods of collection the more 
defaulters there appeared to be, and it is estimated that there must be some three thousand 
outstanding.’138 Three years later, after the fifty per cent penalty for non-payment by 
October each year had been introduced, the same problems remained:
It became quite clear during the year that the answer to the difficult problem o f native 
house and poll tax collection is still to be found... Collection to the end of the year was 
3,905 taxes below that for 1952. While the introduction o f the penalty is successful in 
ensuring payment by the majority by the end of September, the hard core o f professional 
[sic] defaulters is undoubtedly relieved by the abolition o f tax labour; even if  sufficient 
magistrates were available for all these people to be prosecuted, they are not nearer 
payment after conviction and imprisonment than they were before it. The value o f  
collection by ‘kodi5 stamps is limited with such people, since the stamps can be sold at a 
discount and are, I believe, also used as ‘chips’ in gambling schools. New assessment rolls 
have been prepared for 1954 for use in a new system o f collection by Wards, and pressure 
will be applied from the beginning o f the year, but the problem o f the professional defaulter
139remains.
Pressure was indeed applied the following year with the introduction of more rigorous 
and more frequent ‘spiv raids’ resulting, according to a quarterly police report, in a 
dramatically enhanced collection.140 A further intensification of raids in the late 1950s 
resulted in ever larger numbers of defaulters being apprehended. However, it appears 
from the high proportion of defaulters amongst the persons screened in the raids that 
these increasing numbers tended to indicate more strongly the greater prevalence of tax 
evasion as much as increased efficiency in detection. Whilst colonial taxation had been 
unpopular throughout the British period, in the final years of colonial rule it appears, 
perhaps not surprisingly, to have had less legitimacy than at any time previously.
African resistance to colonial taxation
Throughout the period under consideration, in Dar es Salaam African resistance to the 
fiscal demands of the colonial state was widespread. Most commonly this resistance took 
a passive form, on occasion though resistance to taxation became physical. The District 
Commissioner in 1937 reported ‘frequent incidents between authorised tax collectors and 
alien natives.’ In the most serious incident that year, at Msasani (at that time on the 
northern border of the township), ‘the headman and his staff were attacked by a gang of
DAR for 1950, p.4, TNA/61/504/1/II/56.
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WaYao; it was necessary to despatch a force of twelve policemen under a European 
officer to their assistance.’141 In the same year a minor riot resulting from a tax dispute 
amongst temporary railway employees at Ruvu, in Dar es Salaam district, saw the 
headman there also requesting police assistance as a result of which twenty arrests were 
made.142 According to Westcott, during the 1940s an ‘annual tax war’ broke out every 
October involving ‘Revenue Officers chasing tax defaulters down the alleys and 
passageways of Kariakoo.’143 Meanwhile, F.H. Page-Jones, the Provincial Commissioner 
in 1948, observed that ‘the hooligan element, especially in the township, who have no 
regular abode have to be subjected to a certain amount of restraint when required to 
appear before a tax officer.’144 In another letter later that same year he reported several 
cases of violence being offered against tax collectors.145 It was in the 1950s, however, 
when really serious violence against collectors began to be reported. Between 1952-1956 
at least ten violent assaults were recorded in Dar es Salaam.146 In one incident at 
Magomeni in February 1957, the house of Wakili Mwenyeshehe was attacked by ‘[a] 
crowd of about a hundred people... shouting that he was the man causing trouble in 
Magomeni by persuading Police to enter the area and arrest them for evasion of tax.’147 In 
response the Wakili rallied some of his supporters and eventually arrested 14 people, 
although not before his son had been assaulted, sustaining injuries which later required 
hospital treatment. An even more serious incident occurred the following year, when 
Namna aka Salum Maluka, a Native Court Messenger, was killed by Hussein Masuko 
after an altercation had arisen as Maluka was checking tax receipts in Mbagala.148 Thanks 
to such violent assaults on tax-collectors it was by this time routine for large numbers of 
police to accompany them for protection. Maluka, however, had the misfortune to be 
working alone.
Whilst there is plenty of evidence documenting physical resistance to the burden of 
taxes, the passive avoidance of those responsible for the collection of tax was much more 
common. As we have seen, it remained relatively simple to conceal oneself in the
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township’s shifting population in order to escape the fiscal demands of the state. In 1931 
the Provincial Commissioner noted that amongst the detribalised Africans in the district 
there was ‘a considerable proportion of tax-defaulters’ who recognised ‘payment of tax 
may be resisted by passive resistance and migration from one part of the country to 
another.’149 As the largest concentration of population, Dar es Salaam was a favoured 
place to seek concealment. In the early years of British rule Africans in the town were, 
according to DC Fryer, fully aware of official powerlessness to prevent evasion. ‘A 
considerable proportion of the tax defaulters’, he wrote in 1931, ‘belonging to the more 
sophisticated class of the Native Community... fully realise the present weakness of the 
law on the subject and the ease with which he can if he likes avoid payment.’150 Even 
after tax collection had become more systematised thanks to the introduction of raids in 
the 1940s, evasion could be facilitated by an overwhelmed Native Administration. In his 
reminiscences Mayhew recalls a farcical incident from the late 1940s:
On one o f these tax-drive occasions I was walking past the window o f the tax office and 
noticed a continuous stream o f cheerful young men climbing out o f  the window and 
walking away; I went round the corner to the door and found yet more tax defaulters being 
pushed into the office. I mentioned the open window to the Head Tax Clerk.151
Evasion occurred as a result of both disinclination as well as inability to pay. DC Fryer 
estimated in 1931 that ‘fifty per cent at least of the defaulters have at one time or another 
during the year been in a position to pay their tax but did not and probably will not next 
year.’152 Fourteen years later, DC Bone noted that it was not only the poor who showed a 
disinclination to settle up:
Dar es Salaam has the reputation o f being a happy sanctuary for the tax defaulter. If you are 
poor and lowly, you escape the eye of authority: if  you are a highly paid clerk or personal 
servant o f  an influential employer, you are not molested and seldom pay o f your own 
volition. Something has been done this year to prove both theories wrong but constant 
European supervision is necessary to hold the balance between firmness and tyranny.153
The perceived need for European supervision indicates an awareness of the abuse of 
their position by those Africans responsible for the collection of tax. Such abuses would 
only have reinforced the perception of colonial taxes as unfair. When in 1945 the highest 
collection of tax on record was achieved -thanks to ‘constant pressure, more systematic
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collection and a determined attempt to touch the more highly paid members of the 
community’- it was noted by the District Commissioner that whilst it ‘may be a financial 
triumph its chief significance is political and disciplinary.’154 A decade later, judging by 
an imagined dialogue between two Africans (written by an African informant for the 
benefit of Leslie in the course of his social survey) which captures perfectly African 
attitudes towards the burden of taxes both in, and out of, town, these political and 
disciplinary lessons appeared still to be learnt:
Joseph: ...This countryside o f ours is awful. Every year you hear ‘tax tickets, tax tickets’. 
Who are you to collect tax off me? Aren’t you an African like myself? If I give you this 
money what will you do for me? If the game just consists o f giving me a bit of paper, well,
I don’t understand it. You, Bakari, do you get this money for yourself? These Europeans 
who use it don’t see what’s going on, they don’t say anything, or go following people 
round saying ‘tax, tax’. Since you put on that uniform you have turned into a European 
yourself. This place is getting too small, I’ll go o ff to town. In town they don’t know who 
is who, which came today and which left yesterday. Here everyone knows everyone else, 
and however we twist and turn these tax clerks follow, oh, the son o f so-and-so hasn’t paid 
yet, and that young chap over the hill by the big tree. Tax, tax -  but where’s the job to earn 
money? Lucas is it like that in town?
Lucas: Well, it is, but tax in town goes by seasons, and also it goes by areas or villages, but 
we who live in the European parts aren’t afraid of it because they don’t come into the 
European parts; it’s only when you go into town or go visiting in the built-up areas or for 
other business and happen to go in when they are having a tax raid, then you may get 
caught, but many slip through even so. Often people help each other: if one man has got 
through without being caught he passes the word on and it doesn’t matter if  you are his 
tribe or not, lie’ll stop you and say, ‘Brother, there’s a raid in such and such a place, if you 
have paid fair enough but if  not have a care. ’ Those who have paid can most easily pass the 
word on in this way as they don’t reason that as they have paid why shouldn’t the others.
So the word gets around quickly and it is not difficult to escape the net.
Joseph. Thanks, that’s the land for me.155
To a large degree throughout the colonial period Dar es Salaam was indeed the ‘land’ 
of the defaulter. Its’ large and shifting African population provided the perfect 
environment in which tax evaders from the rural areas sought anonymity. Meanwhile, the 
same conditions facilitated evasion amongst the resident urban population also. The town 
was a place where, according to C.C. Harris, District Commissioner in the mid-1950s, in 
order to receive payment ‘every individual ha[d] to be physically captured.’156 In the last
153 Uzaramo DAR for 1945, p.5, TNA/61/504/1.
154 Ibid.
155 Leslie, Survey, pp.29-30.
156 Undated (1954?) confidential memo, RH/Mss.Afr.s.l 157.
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two decades of British rule, through ever more frequent raids on the urban population, 
this is exactly what urban officials endeavoured to do. These raids could result in an 
increased tax yield. In the end though, they simply brought to light more evasion. At the 
same time, perhaps as much as any other factor, amongst the influential urban population 
the raids helped undermine the legitimacy of the British administration. Without 
legitimacy the fiscal demands of the state appeared ever more arbitrary, and it is no 




An unwelcome presence: African mobility and urban order
To the non-African in Dar es Salaam, whilst criminals were a persistent source of 
inconvenience or even menace, they were hard to differentiate from the bulk of the 
African population. As we have seen, even the best-informed colonial officials, such as 
Leslie, had difficulty separating the criminal from the non-criminal elements. This 
inability to differentiate often led, amongst officials and (European and Indian) settlers 
alike, to the perception of an African ‘mass’ amongst whom the general breakdown of 
tribal discipline and consequent predilection to miscreancy posed a constant threat to the 
wider urban community. Of particular cause for concern was the presence of jobless 
Africans, numbering in the thousands from the early-1940s, who by colonial reasoning 
had no place in the town. Anxieties such as these found expression in the various bye- 
laws which proscribed African mobility in the European and Indian areas of the town. 
They were magnified yet further by the increasing numbers of migrants making their way 
to Dar es Salaam. An emerging community of un- or under-employed Africans, over 
which the powers of supervision or control were negligible, was a major cause of 
concern. Other groups too threatened the fragile colonial order. Beggars who reached Dal­
es Salaam from far and wide cluttered streets and accosted respectable pedestrians, 
providing an unwelcome reminder of the shortcomings of the colonial regime. 
Meanwhile, unruly African youth, who had either come unaccompanied to the town or 
who were beyond parental control, were also a persistent nuisance. On occasion the 
position in the capital did deteriorate to the point of the serious breakdown of order. 
These periodic outbreaks of violence simply served to justify and to re-affirm anxieties 
over the African urban presence.
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Loiterers, loafers and rickshaw pullers
Alongside by-laws in the Township Regulations prohibiting unlicensed trade and 
mendicancy, drunkenness and prostitution, were others aimed at controlling African 
mobility within the town. Sections 10 and 11 of the 1920 rules stated:
10. No native shall loiter within the ‘prohibited area’ between 6pm and 6 am.
11. No native shall be within the ‘prohibited area’ between 11pm and 5am unless in 
possession o f a dated certificate signed by a responsible householder, stating the purpose 
for which such native is in such area, which certificate shall only be available for 12 hours 
from 6pm on the date thereof.
The ‘prohibited area’ covered the main Indian and European residential areas and the 
administrative headquarters; from Uhindini east to the seashore. Other regulations 
disallowed ‘use of streets’ anywhere in the town (by bicycle or on foot) without a light 
between 9pm and sunrise, failing which an individual could be arrested and was then 
obliged to satisfy the police or a magistrate of his/her respectability.’ The existence of 
such restrictions indicates official anxiety over the administration’s inability to control 
the African population. This anxiety was well placed. Africans in the town frequently 
acted in ways contrary to European expectations and desires. Amongst other things, they 
entered prohibited areas at proscribed times, and wandered light-less at night. In addition, 
daytime ‘loitering’ in Zones I and II was common, which although not technically illegal 
was certainly regarded as offensive by many Europeans and Indians, officials and non­
officials alike. The presence of unoccupied Africans in Uzunguni and Uhindini 
discomfited occupants of those areas. Many preferred the perceived cultural distance 
between themselves and ‘natives’ to be reinforced by a physical distance; certainly 
outside the workplace or the commercial sphere.
Concerns were periodically expressed in the European and Indian press. So, in 1922, 
the editor of the Dar es Salaam Times grumbled: ‘[S]o far as the movement of natives is 
concerned the thief, and prospective thief, feels himself absolutely under cover besides
1 Township Rules, 1923, 149(4).
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finding it opportune to commit his nefarious acts.’2 A decade later his counterpart on the 
Tanganyika Herald complained that ‘native loafers find free access to any comer of this 
locality [Uhindini] even after midnight even before the eyes of policemen.’3. Zones I and 
II, though, remained technically off limits to Africans at night throughout the colonial 
period. Hamisi Akida remembers that those not employed by Europeans or Asians 
weren’t allowed there after 8pm. ‘And after 10pm you will never be there’, he recalled.4 
Exceptions were made for those returning from cinemas in the town centre, although 
even then movie-goers had, after a show, to go directly from the theatre to Kariakoo, and 
those using more circuitous routes or travelling in the wrong direction were liable to be 
apprehended.5 Prosecutions against Africans ‘abroad at night without a light’ were 
amongst the most commonly enforced of the township rules. Out of 149 reported bye-law 
infractions in 1931, 44 were for this offence, four more than for those found drunk and 
disorderly, the next most common offence.6 Judging by the records of repatriations in the 
mid-1950s, it is clear that two decades later this bye-law continued to be enforced with 
regularity, with offenders receiving anything up to one month’s imprisonment for being 
in the wrong place at the wrong time (followed by repatriation).7 In addition, prosecutions 
for loitering and sleeping under a tree at night are also recorded. In February 1957, the 
Assistant Commissioner of Police reported that ‘intensive police action’ in the Oyster 
Bay area had, amongst other things- resulted in the arrest of 15 Africans for using the 
streets without a light and in the prosecution as ‘rogues and vagabonds’ of four men 
(living in Magomeni) who were found in Oyster Bay itself during the night.8 In 
Kinondoni local court the same year, it was once again (by a long way) the most 
commonly enforced township regulation, with 73 individuals being prosecuted in the 
course of the year (quite possibly including the 15 caught by the Oyster Bay police). 
From 1958, however, it appears that the bye-law prohibiting individuals from walking 
light-less at night lapsed into disuse, with no prosecutions whatsoever for this offence 
arising in the Kinondoni court in the last two years of colonial rule. The restrictions on 
African mobility in Dar es Salaam were probably amongst the most unpopular colonial 
legislation, as well as being difficult to justify to those who suffered from their
2 DT, 7th November 1922, p.7.
3 777, 7th July 1934, p. 12.
4 Interview No. 1.
5 Ibid.
6 Report on the Question o f  Imprisonment in Tanganyika Territoiy (Dsm, 1932), App. C, p.l 3.
7 See repatriation records from 1955/56 in TNA/540/55/10/1.
8 Asst.CP, Dsm to CP, 5th February 1957, TNA/90/2009/Vol.l.
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enforcement. In the changing political circumstances of the late 1950s, the prosecution of 
un-illuminated night-walkers would have become increasingly untenable.
Concern was also expressed by Indians and Europeans about the daytime African 
presence. A 1925 editorial in the Dar es Salaam Times complained of ‘a disgraceful state 
of affairs, which... old residents of Dar es Salaam have viewed with increasing alarm’:
The system of groups o f native loafers sprawling across our pavements, in main streets as 
well as in others, coughing and spitting, as our correspondent points out, and occasionally 
gambling, as we know from personal observation, would not be tolerated in other countries, 
Surely our trusteeship o f the native does not justify such a degree o f pampering o f loafers.
Psychologically, the tolerance o f such a condition increases in intensity the contempt o f 
this type o f native for White authority. They come to look upon the pavements for 
sprawling purposes as theirs by right, and no way is willingly made for passers-by, men or 
women, European or non-European. Forceful demand to make way for White women is 
met unwillingly, accompanied by insolence and disagreeable muttering, which fortunately 
is not always understood.
Such an evil might be rigorously dealt with by the authorities without in any way infringing 
the ‘rights o f the natives,5 for it is practised not by the main body o f workers, but by a 
number o f loafers, by whose removal the community would not be the losers.9
A decade later the same prejudices were being voiced. A correspondent wrote to the 
Tanganyika Standard demanding that idlers be cleared from the streets. The editor of the 
paper wholeheartedly agreed that steps should be taken to combat this ‘obvious evil’:
In suggesting that natives who are dawdling to no good purpose should be dealt with, our 
correspondent voiced what must have been in many people’s thoughts. There is more in 
this than just a dislike o f untidiness (streets can look ‘untidy’ with loafers just as they can 
with scraps o f paper and orange peel). It is really necessary to lay stress on the ills -evils- 
that can accompany the presence o f street corner idlers, if they are not checked in time.10
‘Not only’, continued the editorial, ‘are they an offence to the eye but an offence to 
themselves and the township as a whole.’
Such anxieties about the presence of Africans in the business centre were not restricted 
to the settler press. The editor of the Indian-owned Herald complained in 1934 of 
‘unemployed and unemployable natives roaming about in the heart of the township’11; 
and five years later of ‘Natives, having no work... found in crowds of 4 to 15 people
9DT, 19l]l September 1925, p.2.
10 TO, 4th May 1935, p.6.
11 77/, 21st July 1934, p.9.
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sitting or sleeping on footpaths, talking and shouting... [who] will not move on from the 
places but on the contrary sometimes will abuse.’12 Nor was it confined to the 
unemployed. Casuals who frequented the docks were another target of the settler press.
We wonder when boat natives are going to be controlled’, wrote one correspondent in 
the Dar es Salaam Times in 1920, ‘They are a danger to the life and property of any 
European who puts in an appearance on the jetty, with their jostling, pushing and 
screaming for ones custom.’13 A later correspondent to the paper elaborated on the 
situation in 1923:
It is a common occurrence to see passengers luggage, and in the case o f non-Europeans 
even their persons, forming the centre o f a violent struggle for possession among the 
loafers o f the town and boat boys. The one or two bewildered Askaris on the pontoon are 
no match for the gang o f toughs composing the boat crews, and their futile attempts to 
control them is a common source o f wonder to lookers-on that their numbers are not 
strengthened and that they are never supported by a responsible officer.
...Would it be too much to expect one o f the local European Officers o f the Police to put in 
an appearance at the wharf occasionally to see that the rabble which collects at the wharf 
for the purpose o f fleecing inexperienced travellers is under proper control and that their 
persons and luggage are not subjected to violence and damage.
The pandemonium prevailing on the occasion o f the presence in the harbour o f the SS 
Karapara this week was beyond description, and I trust that something will be done to 
prevent the possibility o f such a scene in the future.14
‘We took up this matter once before,’ the editor wrote in response to the letter, ‘and a 
certain amount of orderliness resulted, but the boat-natives have again been allowed to 
get out of hand. Strictest discipline must be maintained if passengers are not to be unduly 
molested.’
Once ashore —according to this way of thinking- hapless European travellers were then 
at the mercy of unscrupulous ‘native’ rickshaw pullers. ‘One hears from time to time’, 
wrote the District Superintendent of Police in 1926,
o f instances o f the gross overcharging o f passengers who come ashore from liners and 
engage rickshaws to see the sights. They are charged say Shs.10/- for a Shs.4/- ride, they 
protest, the rickshaw boy becomes vehement and to save a scene they pay the amount 
demanded.15
12 777, 18th January 1939, p.8.
13 DT, 3rd July 1920, p.6.
14 DT, 20,h January 1923, p.9.
15 Dist. Supt., to CP, 17th September 1926, TNA/61/206.
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Africans pursuing this line of business were, above ail others, the focus of concern on the 
part of Europeans in Dar es Salaam (less so other non-Africans, judging by the Indian 
newspapers). Rickshaw pullers had an enhanced right of access to European and Indian 
areas, particularly at night, and although in the central area they were supposed to remain 
at designated stands this rule was frequently ignored.16 Their presence in Zones I and II 
made many uneasy. The vehicles and their operators were considered the vectors of 
disease. In 1921 the Dar es Salaam Times drew attention to a new disease which had 
been identified by the Minister of Health in Nairobi, spread by lice which were found in 
the upholstery of rickshaws there. They were, according to the paper, ‘present owing to 
the irregular habit of the ricksha boys, who often sleep in the vehicles.’17 The following 
month, the paper reported satisfaction ‘that among the proposed new laws for rickshas in 
Nairobi, ricksha boys lying or sitting in a ricksha shall be found guilty of a punishable 
offence.’18 Having noted that ‘[i]n Dar es Salaam the risk is equally great’ the paper 
recommended ‘to the authorities here the adoption of similar measures, and insistence on 
clean and washable covers to all rickshas, as well as 011 periodical examinations.’
An additional danger of the close encounter between colonial subjects and masters 
arising from the rickshaw trade was that it might result in the undermining of the 
mystique of European superiority. According to Orde-Browne their ‘employment at night 
is apt to show an unedifying side of the European character.’19 ‘Every ricksha’, he 
observed anxiously five years later, ‘must have a considerable experience of helplessly 
drunk passengers’.20 If we accept the criticisms of the Dar es Salaam Times, the 
rickshaw-pullers’ experience of Europeans was resulting in Africans who refused to 
know their place. A 1925 editorial on ‘the growing insolence of the native’ singled out 
‘Rickshaw Boys’ for particular ire:
One can see these lolling in their own rickshaws, which are hauled up on the footpath, 
whilst the owners casually invite passing pedestrians to ‘N ’joo! N ’joo! Rickshaw;’ or else 
they pester one in a most impudent and embarassing manner, refusing to take ‘N o ’ as a 
reply unless they believe that the person importuned is not likely to stand much nonsense.
16 77/, 28th October 1933, p. 10.
17 DT, 7th May 1921, p.6.
18 DT, 4th June 1921, p.4.
19 DAR for 1924, p. 10.
20 Orde-Browne to CS, 18th January 1929, TNA/11205.
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We have seen Rickshaw boys, dressed in their filthy clothes, lounging on their rickshaw, 
which was drawn up on the footpath running along the sea front, leering in a most bestial 
manner at passing European ladies.
During the week an askari attempted to ‘move on’ a rickshaw boy who had drawn his 
’shaw up on the path. As the boy refused to move it the askari pushed it out o f the way but 
the rickshaw boy returned it to its former position. This occurred twice, to the 
accompaniment o f much bad language on the part of the boy and much jeering by a crowd 
of Swahilis, who enjoy seeing authority in any form defied by one o f their number.
These instances can be multiplied greatly and are the outward signs and warnings that out­
laws cannot protect us from persons who do not respect the conventions and duties that 
modern civilisation expects from us.21
The relationship between puller and passenger was frequently a tense one. It is likely 
though, that the experience for the African puller tended to be significantly more 
demeaning than for the occasional European whose pride was wounded. Indeed, for all 
the ‘native insolence’ that the Times complained of, an angry European had recourse to 
violence in a way which was unimaginable the other way round. ‘Last Saturday 
afternoon’, a correspondent to the newspaper wrote in 1919,
a certain white man was seen in Third Street knocking a ricksha boy about in a most 
disgusting fashion, kicking him in the abdomen, and punching his face until the poor boy 
could hardly stand. The boy was so badly hurt that he had to call a small mtoto  to pull his 
ricksha for him, whilst he did his best to hobble along by the side o f it.
After completely satisfying himself that he could not do much more harm to the boy 
without killing him, the said white man got into another ricksha and went on his way.22
In fact, regardless of the -probably slight- risks of such abuse, pulling a rickshaw was 
physically (and, no doubt, psychologically) punishing enough in itself. Orde-Browne, in 
1929, described the ‘disgusting and disgraceful sight’ of ‘two large and portly passengers 
being dragged up the little hill past the European hospital by one wretched youth, bent 
almost double and gasping for breath.’23 Such a spectacle in Dar es Salaam, he wrote to 
the Chief Secretary, ‘should be made impossible.’24
Whilst the unsalutary effects of the encounter between Europeans and Africans which 
occurred as a result of the rickshaw trade were widely deplored, it was the rickshaw 
pullers purported criminal tendencies which were the focus of greatest concern. The
21 DT, 9th May 1925, p.2.
22 £>T24,h December 1919, p.2.
23 Orde-Browne to CP, 9111 February 1929, TNA/61/206.
24 Orde-Browne to CS, 18th January 1929, TNA/11205.
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‘class of native’ employed in this occupation, complained the District Commissioner in 
1924, ‘is a decidedly undesirable one, and it is unfortunate that public convenience 
necessitates the employment of so many natives in this work.’25 Even those who entered 
the profession as upright and honest were considered to be soon corrupted. Orde-Browne 
stressed what an ‘unedifying education this life must be for an unsophisticated African.’26 
‘The occupation’, he pointed out, ‘is a demoralising one’:
Profits depend largely upon the success with which the passenger can be deceived, or even, 
threatened, over the amount o f fare due; while the owner from whom the vehicle is hired,27 
is not exactly an elevating influence.
The rickshaw puller, Orde-Browne complained,
is in almost every case an actual or potential criminal. The occupation is an ideal mask for 
theft; it is perfectly easy for an excuse to be found for the presence o f a ricksha almost 
anywhere, at any time; one keeps watch, while the other collects any available loot, which 
can be conveniently hidden and carried away in the vehicle; and nothing but detection red- 
handed is likely to lead to discovery.28
The Commissioner of Police, whose subordinates were responsible for the supervision of 
rickshaws, refuted this characterisation of those Africans engaged in the trade. ‘The 
character of every applicant for a licence is very closely enquired into’, he assured the 
Chief Secretary, ‘and there is not one licensed puller with a criminal record which would 
rightly debar him.’ However, even if, in 1929, the Commissioner’s impression was 
correct, over time it was Orde-Browne’s fears that appeared to be confirmed. Twelve 
years later it was a senior police officer who was bemoaning the
idle and unsavoury character o f rickshaw boys normally employed here. Many so 
employed are not natives o f Dar es Salaam and very few actually keep to rickshaw work, 
while those who are old hands are without exception persons with criminal or other records 
against them. There is the famous ‘Mumba’ who has over fifty previous convictions against 
him for ‘drunk and disorderly’: he is still pulling a public hire rickshaw about the town.
25 DAR for 1924, p. 10.
26 Orde-Browne to PC, EP, 19th January 1929, TNA/61/206.
27 According to the D T  o f  28th May 1921, reporting a strike by rickshaw pullers: ‘The method hitherto has 
been for the boys to hire the rickshas by the day, anything they earn over and above the bike fee being their 
own profit.’ The ethnicity o f  the vehicle owners is not reported, but it was almost certainly Indians who 
controlled the rickshaw trade in Dar es Salaam. The strike had occurred due to a fall in pullers’ earnings. 
The Times was surprised by the high degree o f organisation the strikers displayed. ‘The deputation of 
ricksha boys’, it reported, ‘which met the authorities was based on the best European lines, having eloquent 
spokesmen, and their points clearly and concisely outlined. We wonder if a Ricksha Carriers Trade Union 
exists?’ Such a characterisation o f the rickshaw pullers actually contradicts the disparaging tone to be found 
in other discussions -including Times articles and editorials- o f this section o f the urban population.
28 Orde-Browne to CS, 18* January 1929, TNA/11205.
29 CP to CS, 2,,d February 1929, TNA/11205.
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Another famous character is Juma bin Hamisi; with over thirty previous convictions also 
plying a rickshaw for hire. These boys are broadly speaking nothing but ‘pimps’; they tout 
for work on boat days and are a perfect nuisance to the visitor when he comes ashore. 
When the harbour is idle they have very little work and it is not possible for them to earn 
an honest living. None o f them own a rickshaw and therefore have no responsibility 
attached; consequently most rickshaws are in poor repair and in a filthy condition.30
As a result of the condition of both the vehicles themselves and the persons operating 
them, the Superintendent recommended the complete removal of rickshaws from Dar es 
Salaam. The Municipal Secretary brought forth further evidence to support this course of 
action. ‘[T]his trade’, he pointed out, attracts the worst kind of native’; 16 out of the 18 
licensed pullers having been ‘convicted for various offences, some of them on several 
occasions.’31 As is apparent from the small numbers of rickshaw pullers in the town at 
this time, however, it was a dying trade, the rickshaw’s place being usurped from the 
early 1930s on by the faster and more comfortable -not to mention humane- taxis. Instead 
of banning their use, licensing procedure was made more strict and they were otherwise 
left to fade away. The small number of rickshaw operators left though, proved tenacious, 
refusing to recognise that their time was up. They continued to function as late as 1951, at 
which time they were reportedly being utilised by prostitutes in the town.32 After a 
number of complaints against them in this year, however, the municipal authorities 
finally opted for their removal.33
By the time the last rickshaws had ceased operating on the streets of Dar es Salaam the 
heightened racial consciousness (at least on the part of Europeans) that was a feature of 
inter-ethnic relations in the period between the wars appears to have dissipated. Whilst 
the editor and readers of the Tanganyika Standard -which had taken the place of the Dar 
es Salaam Times as the settler mouthpiece- in the 1950s may have fulminated on the 
presence of idlers in the town, such complaints were no longer informed by the racial 
anxiety that appears to have informed similar complaints in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
public articulation of concern over ‘native insolence’, over Africans leering at European 
women or failing to accord their social betters the respect they felt was their due, was no 
longer acceptable. In its stead more commonplace worries were expressed over
30 Ag.SP. to MS, 26th August 1941, TNA/30218.
^  MS to CS, 20th November 1941, TNA/61/206.
-  The same appeared to be true in Nairobi, where the Resident Magistrate had in 1946 come to the 
conclusion that ‘rickshaws are used chiefly for illegal purposes, that the pullers are mostly pimps and 
procurers and that these vehicles assist them in their trade.’ TS, 30th March 1946, p. 10.
CP to CS, 28th February 1951, TNA/41119; and personal correspondence from Joan Thompson, 1st
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increasing unemployment in the town, and the associated incidence of crime. As part of 
the effort to address these worries, municipal bye-laws restricting the nocturnal mobility 
of Africans within the town continued to be enforced. By the late 1950s though, as we 
have seen, even these had to be relaxed. The strength of TANU was the ultimate 
indication that the colonial ‘native’ 110 longer knew his place.
The ‘beggar problem’ in Dar es Salaam
Mendicants were another group who persistently refused to recognise their allotted 
colonial space. Whilst the presence of beggars may, as Iliffe observes, ‘have performed a 
necessary function where almsgiving was a religious obligation’,34 colonial officials were 
not inclined to accept such visible reminders of the shortcomings of the regime in the 
territorial capital.
Legislation aimed at the prevention of mendicancy included the Destitute Persons 
Ordinance of 1923, which allowed for the imprisonment and/or repatriation of ‘any 
person without employment and unable to show he has visible and sufficient means of 
subsistence.’ More explicitly aimed at beggars were sections of the 1930 Penal Code 
which targeted both ‘every person wandering or placing himself in any public place to 
beg or gather alms, or causing any child to do so’; and ‘every person wandering abroad 
and endeavouring by the exposure of wounds or deformation to obtain or gather alms.’35 
Such legislation suggests that mendicancy existed in the territory from the earliest years 
of colonial rule. Since Dar es Salaam represented the principal concentration of 
population and wealth in Tanganyika, it is likely that beggars were present in the capital 
from this early stage, although the first surviving evidence of mendicancy in Dar es 
Salaam comes from the 1930s. In 1934 an editorial in the Tanganyika Herald drew the 
attention of the authorities to ‘crippled, unemployed and unemployable natives roaming 
about the heart of the township, some with a bowl, others pickpocketing and a few 
gambling in broad daylight.’36 The editor displayed little sympathy for these unfortunates. 
‘[N]eeding serious consideration at this stage of the native evolution’, he considered, ‘is
March 99.
34 Iliffe, African Poor, p.33.
35 Penal code (No. 11 o f  1930) section 166 (2) and (4).
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[the] begging habit. It is necessary to do everything possible to root out this growing 
evil.’ His counterpart at the Tanganyika Standard concurred. ‘One of the nuisances which 
come under public notice’, he wrote in 1935,
is the growing habit o f children to beg on the streets. It is not haphazard; the children 
clearly have been taught. They make a very cautious approach and inform the passer-by 
that they are hungry. Others may be seen methodically turning out dustbins. It is an 
uncomfortable thought that any child in Dar es Salaam should go hungry, but if there are 
any who do they must not be left either to beg or to hunt for food amongst the rubbish. We 
do not suggest that in the first instance it is a matter for the Police, though to judge from the 
proceedings o f the Magistrate’s Court quite a number eventually do make the acquaintance 
of members o f the Force in their official capacity. It is the prevention o f this growing evil 
that must be sought.37
Early the following year, in response to a request in the Legco by Mr. Adamjee for 
control to be exercised over the increasing number of beggars in Dar es Salaam, the 
Provincial Commissioner reported that there were ‘twenty Natives... who have no means 
of subsistence and beg for a living.’38 He complained that ‘the religious custom of 
distributing, indiscriminately, alms to door to door supplicants on Holy days, which 
prevails amongst Mahomedan and other communities, tends to encourage a class of 
professional beggars.’ He recommended the organisation of a central fund through which 
‘deserving cases’ could receive alms and begging could be controlled. Nothing was done, 
and the situation continued to deteriorate. The following year Municipal Secretary 
Huggins informed the Commissioner that the town was ‘full of mendicants, the lame, the 
halt, the lazy, the unemployable.’39 By this time there were forty habitual mendicants 
(including fifteen women) residing in the town. In addition there was ‘a large number of 
destitutes who come in periodically to beg.’40 Of the forty, twelve were blind, the others 
‘paralysed, deformed and deficient of limbs.’ The majority were aged. ‘The conditions 
under which they now live are pitiable’ commented Huggins. ‘Those who cannot obtain 
lodging from some charitable organisation sleep in temporary shelters and forage in the 
garbage and refuse of markets and eating houses.’ Periodically they had been charged and 
convicted. They were unable to support themselves except through begging, however, 
and repatriation was not possible in most cases as they had no surviving relatives. In the 
circumstances they were only warned and, according to Huggins, ‘[t]he Police now direct
36 TH, 17th July 1934, p.9.
37 TS, 25th May 1935, p.6.
38 PC, EP to CS, 30th January 1936, TNA/61/261/Vol.II.
39 MS to PC, EP, 8th March 1937, TNA/61/261/Vol.II.
40 MS to PC, EP, 15t!l October 1937.
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their efforts to keep these people away from the residential and commercial quarters of 
the town where in the past they have been accustomed to wander on Sundays and Fridays 
in search of charity.’
It was recognised that such a state of affairs could not be allowed to persist, and in the 
late 1930s, on the instigation of the Township Authority, a paupers’ camp was built at 
Kipawa, eight miles from the town centre. Here, reported Pike in 1939, ‘the deformed 
beggars who were such a pest and an eyesore in Dar es Salaam have been sent.’41 The 
camp received scant resources, however. Just three years after its establishment, DC 
Revington declared it was ‘squalid and uncared for and should be entirely rebuilt.’42 
Whilst seventy men, women and children were housed in the camp this did not appear to 
have had a significant influence on the numbers of destitute and disabled persons to be 
found in the town centre. ‘ [T]he number of natives in Dar es Salaam who by reason of 
old-age, ill-health or physical incapacity are forced to eke out a precarious livelihood by 
begging appears to be increasing’, the Solicitor General told the Chief Secretary in 1942. 
‘I am informed that a shop-keeper can reckon on being accosted by thirty to forty such 
natives who parade the streets, particularly on Fridays and Sundays.’ It must be 
recognised by now’, he continued,
even by the extreme die-hards, that the obligation to remove this social evil rests on the 
Government. Such a view is in accord with the Atlantic Charter which stipulated that every 
person, however humble, is entitled to live in freedom from want. It is idle to seek to rely 
on the social sense o f responsibility among natives in a detribalised area like Dar es 
Salaam. A camp should be established where such persons could be fed, clothed, 
accommodated and provided with a little pocket money. In return they should be required 
to do such work as they are able. Only if such accommodation is available, is it legitimate 
for the police to prosecute such persons for begging.43
However, the only response to what was described at the end of WWII as the ‘swarm of 
beggars perambulating from house to house and shop to shop... to the annoyance of the 
public’44 was the tightening of Police control.45 In July 1946, 24 beggars were rounded up 
and charged with vagrancy 46 Three weeks later, the President of the Township 
Authority, Mr. Bryant, thanked the Police ‘for the good job carried out by them recently
41 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’, p.12.
42 DC Revington to PC, EP, 23rd January 1942, TNA/30134.
43 Ag. Solicitor General to CS, 5th January 1942, TNA/22360.
44 The correspondent identified five categories o f beggar in the town: the blind, crippled, diseased, insane 
and paupers. Dsm Social Service League to TA, 15th June 1945, TNA 30134.
45 TA mins, 19th July 1946, TNA/540/27/3.
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in rounding them up, and for the Police drives still being carried 011 to rid the town of this 
nuisance.’47 At the same meeting, proposals were belatedly put forward for enlarging and 
improving Kipawa. Government continued to try to absolve itself of responsibility, 
however. An attempt to hand over the camp to the Salvation Army in 1948 was only 
thwarted by resistance from prominent Muslims, who feared inhabitants would be 
vulnerable to conversion, and any hopes for its improvement remained dependent on 
substantial donations such as the Shs2,000/- received from the East African Muslim 
Welfare Society in the same year.48 Although by the end of 1948 the Social Welfare 
Department appear to have assumed responsibility for Kipawa, it provided a refuge for 
just forty five paupers, eighteen less than in 1942 49 By 1954 the number had fallen to 
twenty four.50
Within Dar es Salaam itself mendicants continued to represent a nuisance to the 
respectable citizens of the town. In 1950 the Women’s Service League of Tanganyika 
requested for ‘arrangements to be made for Africans to be allowed on the streets on 
Fridays only which is the recognised begging day’.51 ‘Beggars’, the Commissioner of 
Police informed the Chief Secretary in response to this request, ‘are a perennial problem 
and are dealt with periodically when other more pressing duties permit’.52 ‘Although busy 
on a big ‘spiv’ drive’, he assured the Chief Secretary, the ‘Police will do what they can to 
discourage beggars’. According to one secretariat official, though, the ‘beggar problem’ 
was actually exaggerated thanks to the activities of a handful of particularly conspicuous 
destitutes who were ‘so persistent... that they give the impression of being more 
numerous than they are’:
There are three in particular - a fat, elderly man, a youth o f about 14 who crawls about on 
the pavement with great agility (he has something wrong with his legs) and an elderly blind 
woman who is led with a stick by a small boy - whom one sees in Acacia Avenue almost 
every other day. I believe that if the police could manage to eliminate these few ‘regulars’ 
the problem would be urgently solved, at least as far as the European shopping areas are 
concerned.53
46 TS, 6th July 1946, p. 17.
47 TS, 27th July 1946, p.9.
48 See TA mins 23rd April 1948, 18th June 1948, and 16th July 1948 in TNA/540/27/3.
49 First [and only surviving] monthly report by the Social Welfare Officer, 3rd October 1948, TNA/30134.
50 DC’s Min., 2.2.54, TNA/30134.
51 Sec. o f  the Women’s Service League to MLO, 13lil January 1950.
52 CP to CS, 13th April 1950, TNA/30134.
53 Sec min., 23rd April 1950, TNA/30134.
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The narrow concern with the ‘European shopping areas’ perhaps gives some indication as 
to why this official remained more complacent about the problem than other observers.
By the mid-1950s, with the problem of urban mendicancy becoming increasingly 
severe, it was discovered that large numbers of beggars were coming from further afield 
than had previously been thought.54 ‘In the last few months, and probably due to famine,’ 
complained the District Commissioner in 1954, Targe numbers of blind beggars of ages 
ranging from 6 to 60 have been coming into Dar es Salaam from Dodoma.’55 He wrote to 
the Traffic Superintendent for ‘help or suggestions for preventing what is now a serious 
public nuisance.’ ‘The only action you could take’, he suggested, ‘would be unofficial -  
advising the booking clerk at Dodoma, which is the main trouble spot, not to accept fares 
from obvious travelling beggars. They are easily recognisable by their blindness and their 
guides.’ ‘[T]he only real solution is action by the Dodoma Police’, responded the Traffic 
Superintendent. ‘I fear however this will simply result in them joining from another 
station.’56 Two years later it was reported that police surveys had revealed the existence 
of a ‘professional class of beggar’ in the capital. The Tanganyika Council of Social 
Service was told that ‘over half of the beggars in Dar es Salaam were indigents who came 
from long distances, remained a few weeks and returned home.’57 Meanwhile, a 1957 
editorial in the Tanganyika Standard reported ‘a well-organised ‘racket’ behind begging 
in Dar es Salaam’. Whilst offering no evidence to support this, an overblown, but 
nonetheless revealing portrait of the extent of mendicancy in the town was painted:
Something really drastic must be done to rid the streets o f Dar es Salaam o f the countless 
beggars which [sic] molest pedestrians, poke their heads -and at times hands- into cars 
parked in the main thoroughfares and are an extremely bad advertisement for Tanganyika 
so far as tourists and passengers from the ships are concerned.
During the four days before Christmas, when the streets and the shops were crowded, the 
beggars simply flocked into town. There were young ones, well able to do a day’s work, 
leading the deformed and the blind, the latter trying to make their pitiful plight still more 
apparent to passers-by by being clad in the filthiest o f rags. One such group o f beggars 
consisted o f a young and dirty woman leading an old and allegedly blind man while 
another young and better clad woman, with a healthy and well-fed youngster o f about three 
strapped to her side, went from shop to shop, or from passer-by to passer-by, all with their
54 Whether this discovery was evidence o f a new trend or simply the belated recognition o f the mendicants 
mobility is hard to say.
55 DC, Dsm to Traffic Supt., Dsm, 10th November 1954, TNA/540/3/1.
56 Ag.Dist. Traffic Supt. to DC, Dsm, 17th November 1954, TNA/540/3/1.
57 Tanganyika Council o f Social Service [TCSS], mins. o f  meeting, 24th September 1956, TNA/540/1/78.
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hands out, even the toto calling out for money. But they were only four o f what must have 
been hundreds.58
Whilst mendicancy appears to have become increasingly common in the European and 
Indian areas in the final decade of colonial rule, thanks to the dearth of published sources 
it is hard to get any impression of its incidence in Zone III. It is likely that beggars were 
seeking alms here just as they were elsewhere in the town. Although the African 
township may not have been so prosperous, the chances of operating undisturbed were 
probably greater than in the more strictly policed Uzunguni and Uhindini. Masudi Ali, 
who was living in Kariakoo in the 1950s, remembers one particularly prominent female 
beggar, Binti Hassani Kulomba, operating there. He also recalls that beggars were 
periodically rounded up and repatriated by the Social Welfare department, although it 
was never long before they re-emerged on the streets of the capital. According to Mzee 
Ali, however, orthodox begging was not particularly common in the African areas. 
Although sometimes people adopted the Kalamwani style, in which mendicants 
performed dances in return for alms.59
By the late-1950s growing numbers of beggars were making their way to Dar es 
Salaam. This was partly the product of structural destitution, such as the diminishing 
capacity (or inclination) for rural communities to care for the disabled. In 1960 the 
Superintendent of Tanganyika’s main mental hospital, Cyril Smartt, complained:
There is an increasing denial of social responsibility on the part o f  the African people 
themselves for their dependants and there is also a tendency to send vagrants, beggars and 
other social nuisances to mental hospitals as the line o f least resistance.60
However, cyclical destitution -such as weather failure- was at least as significant a factor. 
Whatever the causes, the authorities could not tolerate the presence of such large numbers 
of indigents appearing on the streets of the capitol. Several recommendations were made 
in response to the situation. First, that ‘the Police should undertake the regular round-up 
of persons found begging in the town.’61 Second, it was proposed that the former Nunge 
Leper Settlement on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam should be re-opened in order to 
accommodate 30-40 destitute persons in addition to those already residing at Kipawa.
58 TS, 28th December 1957, p.2.
59 Interview No.7.
60 Quoted in Iliffe, African Poor, p.212.
61 TCSS, mins., 5th January 1957, TNA/540/1/78.
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This was done in 1958.62 Finally, echoing the proposals’ of the Provincial Commissioner 
two decades earlier, ‘[i]t was agreed that an attempt should now be made to try to 
canalise the generosity of Muslims and others whose indiscriminate charity was having 
the effect of encouraging begging in the towns.’63 However, little headway was made in 
the attempt to institutionalise alms-giving in order to exert greater control over Dar es 
Salaam’s beggars. By the end of the colonial period, whilst growing numbers of indigents 
were making their way to the capital, the official response was much the same as it had 
been for the past two decades. The police, the Municipality and the native administration 
cooperated in the periodic removal of ‘the various beggars who were infesting the streets 
[who] would be summoned to the Local Courts... so that a decision could be made as to 
whether they should be maintained by the Government in the Nunge Pauper Camp or be 
repatriated to their home districts, if they do not belong to Dar es Salaam.’64 This was, as 
ever, a makeshift solution. It was simply a matter of time before indigents drifted back to 
the town and the whole process had to be started over. A lasting solution to the forces 
driving the destitute and the disabled to mendicancy in the capital was beyond the 
capacity of the colonial state.
Delinquency in Dar es Salaam, 1919-1961
Unruly adolescents formed another group whose presence in town officials deplored. 
They included unaccompanied youth who made their way to Dar es Salaam from the 
rural areas, as well as the troublesome offspring of town-dwelling parents. The growing 
number of crimes committed by young offenders first came to be regarded with special 
concern by the administration in the early 1930s. Crime figures from 1928 and 1929 had 
revealed a ‘disturbing increase in the incidence of juvenile crime’.65 The phenomenon 
was blamed on the growth of vagrancy in the territory.66 In Dar es Salaam the usual 
response to such a state of affairs was to repatriate young vagrants to their area of origin. 
Frequently those sent home returned to the capital, however.67 In other cases repatriation 
proved impracticable. When, in 1931, the District Commissioner looked into the
62 See TCSS mins., TNA/540/1/78.
63 TCSS, mins., 24th March 1958, TNA/540/1/78.
64 MC, mins., 17th February 1961.
65 ‘Imprisonment’, Appendix D.
66 Ibid.
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background of several boys who had been brought to him by Dar es Salaam police for 
repatriation, he found himself in a quandary:
On investigation I have found these boys claimed to have been brought by their parents 
from other districts when they were very young and that they now have no parents living 
and do not know o f the existence o f any relatives. To repatriate these lads did not seem to 
me to be a practicable solution. To whom are they to go? What are they to do? They are a 
problem.
It was, wrote the DC, ‘not desirable to leave them to grow in Dar es Salaam.’ For 
parent-less juveniles in town were vulnerable to a descent into criminality:
They thieve to obtain the wherewithal to live, and they are tools o f habitual criminals who 
teach them the trade and relieve them o f the proceeds o f the theft, very often paying the 
toto a few cents and getting off with the swag themselves, leaving the youth to get off with 
caning if subsequently detected and convicted.
These homeless waifs and strays become the catspaws o f adult rogues and swell the 
numbers o f the criminal class.68
By this time, however, there had already emerged in Dar es Salaam juvenile gangs 
who appeared quite capable of operating independently of adult mentors. In his 1931 
report, Baker noted the presence of ‘particularly impudent’ groups of youths who were 
known collectively as the kompania ya sinzia; kuwevi sinzia being Swahili for the method 
used by thieves who stole whilst one of their number distracted the victim.69 According to 
Baker, the youths would
mark down a man with money, notes or perhaps a watch in his possession. One of the band 
will either abstract the valuable from the pocket o f the victim or grasp the latter round the 
arms while another does so. In either case the booty is at once passed on to a second and 
often a third confederate and when the case is brought up it is merely the word o f the 
victim against that o f the original thief.70
Baker noted that, in true delinquent fashion, their ‘amusement after dark [wa]s to annoy 
the respectable members of the community by acts of discourtesy, assaults or petty 
thefts’.71 Y An editorial on hooliganism (uhuni) in Kwetu later in the decade complained 
of young trouble-makers ‘[n]o longer subject to the influence of their parents.’ ‘Among 
them,’ the editorial observed, painting an almost Dickensian scene, ‘will be found a fair
67 See Statistics o f juvenile offenders for 1934 in PRO/CO/691/144/7.
G8 DAR for 1931, p.20, TNA/53.4.
69 The definition is from the Standard Swahili Dictionaiy.
70 Baker, ‘Social Conditions’, p.93.
71 Ibid., p.70.
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percentage of tax-dodgers, street ruffians, pickpockets, as well as our best athletes... Most 
of the petty thefts are committed by them; they are suborned by weaker men to fight out 
their differences with other people, and they rob our children.’72 They also victimised 
Indian residents of the town; snatching jewellery ifom women and children and harassing 
shopkeepers in Zones II and III, and mugging lone pedestrians in the early evenings. In 
1938, sixty-six Indian retailers from the New Market area wrote a letter to the 
Tanganyika Herald to complain of their activities:
For the last three months we are being harassed in broad daylight in our shops as well as in 
streets, by five or six gangs o f loafers: and on being approached, the Police are showing 
their unwillingness to apprehend them: they are replying that they could do something if  
we ourselves caught them and brought them to the police.
How they steal?
As you are aware, it is almost impossible for shopkeepers to leave their shops and chase 
thieves. The method employed by them is that one o f them comes to a shop which is 
surrounded by a crowd o f customers: takes with his own hand whatever article he finds 
within his reach: passes it to another member o f his gang who goes away to be at large and 
he remains there a while having no proof o f his skilful act.
Show of knives
In these circumstances and in the absence o f Police it is very difficult to catch any one of 
them. If an attempt is made by either by the shopkeeper or his man to chase the thief he is 
prevented from doing by other members o f the gang. It also happens so that in order to 
help them accomplice members o f the gang make assault on the shopkeeper who goes after 
the running loafer and in that event he loses articles and is beaten for nothing.73
At the end of the day, the retailers complained, the youths would keep up their mischief 
by throwing stones at Indians’ houses late into the night.
The gangs contained up to 60 individuals, and their size was increasing. According to 
police records, forty eight of their number had had dealings with the police in 1937, of 
whom forty three had convictions recorded against them that year. Their ages and 
backgrounds were varied. The Commissioner of Police informed the Chief Secretary that 
some of the kompania ya sinzia
are orphans while others are boys who have run away from home, children who have been 
neglected and abandoned, and those over whom parents can exercise no control. Their ages 
average between 8 and 18 years, and they are comparable to the ‘street arabs’ to be found 
in any city in the world. With the exception o f six who have homes in Dar es Salaam, the
72 Kwetu, 21st Feb. 1939. Quoted in D.H.Anthony, ‘Culture and Society’, p.159/60.
73 TH, 11th May 1938.
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remainder have no regular abode, sleep anywhere they can find shelter and obtain food in
any way they can,74
The backgrounds of individual gang members were described by the Commissioner of 
Police. Seven were Zaramo, one was Makonde, one Tivi, one Ngindo, one Doe and one 
Nyamwezi. The youngest, Juma Nassoro was a 12 year old Tivi youth, whose father was 
working as a tailor in Ruvu (a railway town west of Dar es Salaam) and who had been 
abandoned by his mother in Dar es Salaam after she went off with another man. He was, 
according to the Commissioner, ca precocious child and leader of a small gang’ who had 
been dealt with many times by the police. In contrast, the eldest, Nasib Salim, who was 
25 years old, from Bagamoyo and had no living relatives, was considered ‘of weak 
intellect’. He had eight previous convictions. The others were aged between 16 and 19 
years. Some had parents living in Dar es Salaam or in the rural part of the district, others 
had relatives there or in neighbouring districts, whilst others had no living relatives.
Officials had difficulty devising a response to the problem of crime amongst 
Tanganyikan youth. In their 1932 report, members of the committee on imprisonment in 
the territory, troubled by evidence that ‘frequently children are deliberately employed by 
thieves and rogues’,75 had recommended that a reformatory be established to ‘reclaim’ 
convicted juveniles and to prevent them entering the schools of crime that many took the 
prisons to be. An approved school was eventually opened at Kazima, near Tabora, in 
1938, after initial opposition by London on financial grounds.76 The 1932 report also 
recommended more use of corporal punishment in place of prison sentences. Judging by 
surviving breakdowns of juvenile crime in the 1930s this advice appears to have been 
partially acted upon.77 Up to twelve strokes with a ‘light rattan cane’ were commonly 
administered. Contrary to the report’s recommendations, however, these were often 
reinforced by short terms of imprisonment.
74 CP to CS, 13th May 1938, TNA/21963/Vol. 1.
75 Ibid.
76 Memo, in P R 0/C 0691/132/6.
77 The ages, offences and sentences received by young offenders for 1934-36 can be found in 
P R 0/C 0691/144/7, CO691/149/42086 & CO691/155/42086.
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Whilst the Kazima approved school had some early success with its inmates,78 these 
initiatives proved to have little impact on the problem of delinquency in the Tanganyikan 
capital. In 1942, the Superintendent of Police warned the Provincial Commissioner:
There still remains... the problem o f unemployable youths, who with some precocious 
youngsters as hangers-on, band themselves into small groups and pester the bazaar and 
native residential areas. They are mentally unoccupied and by being semi-sophisticated are 
ripe for any mischief that presents itself from stone-throwing to shoplifting. They are most 
difficult to control and by their association with bad influences present both a social as well 
as a police problem which will have to be faced.79
The following year it was estimated there were in Dar es Salaam ‘about 2,000 young 
scamps, living on their wits and without any form of parental or other control.’80 Baker 
counselled that to have any chance of solving the problem three measures needed to be 
taken. Child labour had to be prohibited in the town. All parent-less children in Dar es 
Salaam were to be removed and the town was to become a restricted area into which 
children could not enter. Meanwhile, those children who remained in the town should be 
made to attend school compulsorily.81 Whilst child labour was prohibited the same year, 
London opposed introduction of controls over movement within the territory, and there 
were never enough resources devoted to education in Dar es Salaam to establish 
compulsory school attendance. The problem of delinquency refused to go away.
By the early 1950s it had emerged once again, according to a quarterly police report, 
as ‘the problem of major importance’.82 In 1952, the Labour department estimated that 
there were as many as 10,000 children and juveniles in the town without a parent or 
guardian (although this is surely an over-estimate).83 Leslie, in his survey of the African 
areas four years later, uncovered further evidence of ‘freedom from parental discipline’. 
38 per cent of all children between the ages of 6 and 15 were found to have no father in 
town, while 29 per cent had neither parent (the proportions were as high as 45 per cent 
and 34 per cent in the central suburb of Kariakoo).84 Leslie detected signs in Dar es 
Salaam of ‘the revolt of the adolescent, in age and in culture, against the authority of
78 Up to 1943, o f the 44 boys discharged from the school just 4 had re-offended. Memo attached as App. Ill 
to PC’s conference mins. 1943, p.13, TNA/61/702/3.
79 SP to PC, EP, 20,h February 1942, TNA/61/3/XVI.
80 PC’s conference mins. 1943, p .13, TNA 61/702/3.
81 Ibid.
82 Extracts from QPR(Tanganyika) in TNA/540/22/3.
83 Labour Dept. AR for 1952, p.41.
84 Leslie, Siu'vey, p.244.
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elders, of the superior and the supercilious.’ He found successors to the kompaniaya 
sinzia in ‘the groups and the gangs who occasionally defy administrative authority, and in 
their lifelong struggle to avoid paying tax are waging an unceasing though usually 
personal and defensive battle of wits with the Jurnbes and the police.’85 Ironically, it was 
a combination of both action and inaction with regard to Baker’s recommendations a 
decade earlier that was contributing to the incidence of juvenile crime. Thanks to the 
shortage of school places, boys who did not make the grade were leaving school after 
Standard VI, aged eleven, four years before they could legally obtain employment. 
According to a 1954 police report, they found themselves ‘thrown on the streets... and 
for three or four years they are at a loose end with nothing to do but learn the ‘tricks of 
the trade” .86 DC Harris urged that in tackling delinquency ‘priority should be given to the 
building of middle schools to receive as many Standard VI leavers as possible.’87 The 
Assistant Commissioner of Police meanwhile, was stressing the ‘need for a Remand 
Home in Dar es Salaam for children and young persons who have fallen foul of the law 
and who, at present, constitute something of an embarassment for all who have to deal 
with them.’88
Despite the substantial growth of the town and the consequent increase in the number 
of youths to be found there, however, delinquency did not appear to be the problem it was 
in the 1930s. ‘Having regard to the size of Dar es Salaam and the absence of social 
services responsible for neglected juveniles,’ the Assistant Commissioner of Police wrote 
in 1955, ‘the amount of crime attributable to this class of the community is by no means
* RQexcessive.’ ‘A number of African youths do come in from the districts in search of work 
and these men are somewhat of a problem to the Administration’, the same official noted 
the following year, ‘although this view cannot, as yet, be shared by the Police.’90 In an 
informal survey in 1956, the probation office interviewed 160 children believed to be of 
school age who were encountered on the streets and open spaces between 2pm and 4pm 
over the course of a week. As many as 112 of these children were found to be living with 
parents (frequently one parent only, though), and a further 38 were staying with their 
relations. Just 10 were ‘living rough’. Meanwhile, 115 of the 160 were receiving some
85 Ibid., p .112.
86 QPR, Dsm D ist, 1st October-31st December 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.I.
S7 DC Harris’ comments, 19th March 1955, on QPR(Tanganyika), TNA/540/22/3.
88 Snr.Asst CP, Dsm to DC, Dsm, 8th January 1958, TNA/540/22/3.
89 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st October-31st December 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
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form of schooling.91 ‘I am satisfied’, wrote the Commissioner for Social Development in 
response to the survey, ‘that with the exception of the children found to be ‘living rough’ 
there is very little child neglect in the true sense.’ ‘[Tjhough’, he added, ‘many children 
are getting near to the state of being classified as being beyond the control of their 
parents.’92
It is hard to pinpoint exactly why the situation in Dar es Salaam had improved since 
the 1930s, or at least had not deteriorated considering the huge increase in the urban 
population. The Kazima approved school, which by the early 1950s was dealing with a 
daily average of around 200 offenders ranging in age from 8 to 18, appears to have had 
some impact on delinquency.93 On their return to Dar es Salaam ‘a good deal of trouble’ 
was taken over discharged inmates from the school by district officials.94 Often they were 
helped to find employment to prevent their returning to crime. Within two weeks of their 
release in February 1947, for example, Ali bin Hassan and Hamisi bin Hassan had, thanks 
to the efforts of the district office, been taken on as carpenters in the PWD; Mohamed bin 
Selemani and Rashidi bin Swedi had joined the Kings African Rifles; Selemani bin 
Hamisi and Juma bin Abdallah had become registered labourers; and three others had 
been given chits to assist them in obtaining employment. Of the discharged inmates only 
Saleh bin Selemani, who had been given a trial by the PWD, had proved to be ‘a bad 
egg’.95 ‘The criterion of any school is the type of boy turned out’, the Commissioner of 
Prisons noted with satisfaction two years later, ‘I cannot overemphasize how impressed I 
am with the ex-Approved School boys keenness, good outlook and above all, their spirit 
of independence and confidence in themselves.’96 Indeed, Kazima’s successes had 
filtered down to African parents. In 1944 Asmani Juma Muna, a government clerk living 
in Dar es Salaam, sought to have his son committed to Kazima:
My son Ramadhani Athmani Juma, who is about 15 years, is leading a very notorious 
conduct. He has the habit o f being away from home... I have instructed him so many times 
and even punishments but no sign o f changing. Moreover I have taken up the same case 
with the local Jumbe Mohamed Sultani who alternatively took the real advice on this boy 
but merely he despised o f and ran away as a rascal young chap.
90 Asst.CP, Dsm to CP, 9th March 1956, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
91 Cmmr. for Soc. Devt. to TCSS, 15th December 1956, TNA/540/1/78.
92 Ibid.
93 Prison ARs 1950-53.
94 Report o f PCs’ conference, 1943, PRO/CO/691/184/42397.
95 Supt., Kazima to DC, Dsm 14th February 1947; and note dated 3rd March 1947, TNA/540/22/3.
96 Cmmr. for Prisons to CS, 31st August 1949, TNA/28692,
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...He is my real son, a son amongst others. For his bad example I am afraid he may 
scandalize the rest and turn up my happy family to be dark one. There is immigration o f the 
school children o f such boys, I heard, to somewhere, I here too would take consul to 
recommend for him.97
The following week Muna’s son was sent to Tabora. Records survive of another anxious 
parent requesting the removal of his offspring to the school. In 1950 Dominico Salcatu, a 
junior Municipal Health Office employee, wrote to the District Commissioner:
My son is a problem having been thrown out o f schools in Dar es Salaam and Ufipa... I 
have made up my mind to take him to Kazima School, Tabora. Rashid, a fellow worker o f  
mine had some troubles with his son and Thomas Plantan too... [They sent their sons to 
Kazima.]
Mr. Rashid is back and making wonderful progress at his new school. The two sons o f  
Plantan are still there and have begun to improve in class-work and character.98
Offloading troublesome sons appears not to have been uncommon amongst educated 
Africans living in Dar es Salaam. For all its achievements, however, Kazima hadn’t the 
resources or the staff to provide a true solution to the problem of delinquency in Dar es 
Salaam. In 1943 Commissioner Brown had recommended the need to build ‘a second 
school, on the lines of Kazima, to cope with the congestion now existing there.’99 After 
his tour of Tanganyika in 1951, W.H. Chinn, the Social Welfare Advisor to the Colonial 
Office, noting that the facilities at Kazima (and its location) were sorely lacking, advised 
‘the need for more than one approved school... [which] institutions should be sited within 
easy reach of the main centres of population from which most cases will come.’100 It was 
not until 1958, however, that a new institution for young offenders was opened at 
Malindi, near Dar es Salaam. It had accommodation for 400 boys and was according to 
Chinn, who saw it in the process of being built in 1956, ‘a fantastic institution’.101 
Despite the scale of the operation at Malindi though, the ability of the prisons department 
to process young offenders still did not expand to the extent that many had considered 
necessary, as by then the original approved school at Kazima had been closed down.102
97 Asmani Juma Muna to DC, Dsm, 12th January 1944, TNA/540/22/3.
98 Dominico Sakatu to DC, Dsm, 27th November 1950.
"Report o f PCs’ conference, 1943, PRO/CO/691/184/42397.
100 Report on a tour o f Tanganyika by W.H. Chinn, 1951, PRO/CO/822/675.
101 Extract from report by Chinn in mins. o f  a meeting o f  the Committee, on the Treatment o f Young 
Offenders in the Colonies, 18th December 1956, PRO/CO/822/1169.
102 It had been closed in 1954, from then up to the opening o f Malindi the approved school was housed at
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Whilst Kazima and its successor may have taken some credit for the relative lack of 
delinquency in Dar es Salaam in the 1950s, there were more likely factors at work in the 
capital itself. The first of these was the introduction of a probation office in 1950, 
established in part as a means of punishing young offenders without exposing them to 
prison life. In 1953 it dealt with 97 probationers under the age of 21. By the end of the 
decade this had increased to 221; not an insubstantial number.103 The close supervision 
under which offenders were placed was sure to have had some sort of impact on the 
incidence of juvenile crime, although without detailed statistics it is impossible to know 
how great this was. The final factor likely to have been responsible for the relative lack of 
delinquency was the huge escalation in campaigns against undesirables -wahuni raids- 
that occurred in the 1950s. Even before this escalation, youths in Dar es Salaam who had 
no parents or relatives living in the town were frequently repatriated to their home areas. 
For those organising the raids in the 1950s this section of the population represented one 
of their main targets. However, whilst we know that large numbers of Africans were 
being removed from Dai' es Salaam by this time, there is no surviving breakdown by age 
of those repatriated. One can only speculate on the proportion of youths that were ejected 
from the town. It is likely that they formed a large proportion, perhaps even a majority. 
This in turn may help explain why delinquency had not become more of a problem in the 
capital.
Riot and the breakdown of order
European and Indian concerns over the African urban presence were at their peak after 
the occasional outbreaks of disorder which periodically occurred in Dar es Salaam. 
Whilst crime against property and petty bye-law offences were easily the commonest 
forms of crime in the town, riot was by far the most explosive and threatening. The 
causes of such outbreaks were manifold. Most commonly they could be characterised as 
ethnic violence, though disorder was also associated with strikes and, towards the end of 
the period under consideration, with the rising anti-colonial sentiment which emerged in 
the town.
Mkono wa Mara prison, Kingolwira.
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The best documented outbreaks of ethnic violence are those which occurred in 
Uhindini in the inter-war period. The first of these appears to have taken place as early as 
1918, although no reference to it survives other than in a 1932 Tanganyika Herald 
editorial bemoaning the high level of crime in the area which states: ‘We do not think the 
authorities have forgotten the 1918 bazaar loot.’104 That this breakdown of order was 
referred to fourteen years after it had taken place -and when similar, though presumably 
less serious, incidents had occurred in between- indicates that it was fresh in the minds of 
at least one section of Dar es Salaam’s population, and presumably testifies to the 
severity of what had taken place. Unfortunately, it was not until the 1920s that the first 
Indian newspapers were established in Dar es Salaam, whilst the first surviving district 
report dates back to 1919-20, so we are left with just this oblique reference from 1932. 
An impression of what occurred, however, can perhaps be gained from details of later 
outbreaks of violence between Africans and Indians which received prominent —and 
doubtless somewhat sensationalised- coverage in the Indian press. In one such case in 
1929 the Herald complained of a ‘Reign of lawlessness’ in which a ‘native mob’ 150 
strong (the police estimate was 100) terrorised the Indian community in Ring Street 
between nine and ten pm on a Saturday night in December. A description of events gives 
an impression of significant tension existing between Indians and Africans in the town:
A group of some three or four natives were passing near an Indian shop. They were drunk. 
They found some Indian children playing in the street. They slapped some o f the little boys 
and began to abuse their parents. They lost all control over their tongues and went further 
in that the whole community became the subject o f their filthy language. Some Indians 
came out and requested these loafers to shut their mouth; but they would not. The latter lost 
their temper and began to show their strength. With the exchange o f few blows both the 
parties dispersed.
A few minutes afterwards they came back and challenged Indians to come out and fight.
The latter gave no reply. That encouraged the native ringleaders to work their plans. The 
mob had come prepared and equipped with stones and sticks. They rushed on every Indian 
house and every Indian passer-by in the vicinity and took command o f the field. Whistles 
were blown, but it was not until half an hour that police assistance was available. Whistles 
served the purpose o f drawing attention o f neighbours who began to amass on the scene.
But their assistance proved of no avail. The native mob was divided into groups o f four or 
five persons having scattered in many directions so as to meet outside people coming to 
help Indians. Many Indians were hit with stones and sticks as they approached the spot. 
One Indian was hit with heavy sticks till he fell down unconscious and his pocket was 
emptied by a group of natives in a corner on the scene. Windows and doors o f many houses 
were broken and a number o f persons were seriously injured. The mob had controlled the
103 Prison ARs for 1953 and 1959.
104 TH, 4th June 1932, p.8.
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situation in such a systematic way that all avenues from where outside help could be 
expected were closed for nearly half an hour.105
The Herald hints that there was more to the violence than simple racial animosity. 
“‘Wacha huyu muhindi, piga huyu baniani”106 were the only two sentences the members 
of the mob used to exchange between themselves whenever they saw any Indian passing 
between them,’ the paper reported. Baniani is the Swahili for non-Muslim (or Christian), 
ie. Hindu, Indians.107
The next serious outbreak of violence in Uhindini, in November 1937, also occurred in 
Ring Street. The immediate origins of the disturbance lay in a shopkeepers attempts ‘to 
chase a thief and developed into a riot of a veiy serious nature as crowds of natives began 
to swell.’108 For forty five minutes that afternoon chaos reigned in the area around Ring 
Street:
Indian shops were raided and several people are repotted to have been injured in the affrays 
that took place in the beginning.
For the first half hour the whole street became flooded with truculent natives and it looked 
as if a riot o f  a very dangerous nature was developing.
Indian children, who had poured into the street, were freely beaten by natives who had 
sticks in their hands.
The spirit ran very high when it became known to the rowdy gangs that the efforts o f the 
people to obtain police protection had gone in vain.
At about a quarter past three one Indian youth, who was passing on this street, was knocked 
down and beaten by a furious mob. He managed to find shelter in Mr. Manshuklal’s shop.
The rowdy mob could not tolerate the escape of its prey and soon stones and empty bottles 
rained down 011 the shop.
...The mob then turned its activities in the opposite direction.
Ambika Hindu Hotel was raided. Nearly fifty natives rushed with sticks and stones... and 
broke doors and windows.
...About five o ’clock the situation was well in hand and by seven peace was restored.109
Although serious outbreaks of violence were few and far between, the potential for 
them appeared always to be present in Uhindini. Indian communities in smaller 
upcountry towns within Dar es Salaam district were also victims of violence. In February 
1938, the ‘Indian Public’ of Soga requested ‘that adequate police protection be granted 
them against the local natives who have now acquired the habit of being rowdy and
105 TH, 18th December 1929, in TNA/13986.
106 Tr.:‘Leave this Muhindi, hit this Baniani’.
107 Standard Swahili-English Dictionary,
108 TH, 13th November 1937, p.7.
109 Ibid.
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quarrelsome on the slightest pretext.’110 The following month Indian residents of Ruvu 
wrote to the Commissioner of Police asking for a police station to be established there:
As the natives o f this place have become so daring that they insult and beat Indians o f this
town even at their own shops, consequently we have become greatly alarmed at this state o f
affairs, we feel that our life and property is always at stake.111
The Commissioner felt the danger exaggerated and suggested that the weekly patrol 
conducted from Dar es Salaam provided adequate protection. Commenting upon the case, 
however, the editor of the Tanganyika Opinion saw fit to disagree, claiming that c[a]n 
askari who appears to have been detailed the area once a week is stated to be too fond of 
pombe to resist being thrashed by his warsail [sic] comrades.’112
Between the wars, Indians in Dar es Salaam seemed constantly to be anxious about the 
threat of violence or theft perpetrated by ‘gangs of natives’. After a scuffle between 
Africans and the police had occurred on Kitchwele Street in 1939, for example, Indian 
shopkeepers were reported to be ‘fearing rioting as in their opinion such disturbances 
created by hooligans generally develop into rioting if not suppressed at once.’113 Police 
officials at the time tended to discount the potential dangers.114 That the Indian response 
was not unduly alarmist, however, is supported by testimony from the Commissioner of 
Police, who, in the early 1950s -when there was a significantly larger police presence in 
the town- warned the Chief Secretary that in Dai' es Salaam it was indeed easy for a riot 
to develop in a matter of minutes.115 The Commissioner was writing in response to a 
serious fracas between Arabs and Africans that had occurred in Magomeni in April 1952. 
An argument had arisen after an African had struck a cat belonging to an Arab 
shopkeeper, found sprawling asleep on foodstuffs exposed for sale. Fighting broke out 
resulting in the injury of several Arabs and Africans, two of whom were hospitalised. 
‘The Arabs and Africans at Magomeni’, a secretariat official pointed out, ‘have not been 
on the best of terms for some time.’116 Bad blood between the two communities resulted 
in further violence the following month, when a fight between 150 Africans and ‘at least
110 Sec., Indian Association to CS, 28* February 1938, TNA/21062.
111 Letter signed by 17 Indians from Ruvu to CP, 2nd March 1938, TNA/21062.
112 TO, 25* July(1938?) in TNA/21062
1,3 TH, 18* February 1939, p.8.
114 For eg. CP to CS, 11* May 1938, TNA/21963/Vol. 1.
115 CP to CS, 21st April 1952, TNA/50075.
116 Sec. Min., 22nd April 1952, TNA/50075.
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seven’ Arabs was reported in the Standard.117 The tinder that sparked the fire this time 
was an Arab shopkeeper purportedly trying to swindle an African out of Sh.l/-. In the 
same year, violence was reported at football matches in which African spectators 
physically threatened the non-African side. On one occasion, the Standard recorded that 
‘ [s]everal hundred Africans stormed on to the football ground and set about the Agakhan 
eleven and their handful of supporters with feet, fists, stones and sticks.’118
Notwithstanding such isolated incidents, few serious outbreaks of ethnic violence were 
reported in the period between 1945 and independence. This may simply reflect the 
different news priorities of the settler press (Indian newspapers from after 1948 are 
unavailable). It may reflect an increased police presence acting as a deterrent against such 
outbreaks. On the other hand, it may be taken as a sign that there actually had been some 
improvements in relations between Dar es Salaam’s ethnically -and racially- diverse 
communities. In his survey, written in the closing years of colonial rule, Leslie portrayed 
African relations with other races as being at worst ambivalent:
many dislike ‘the Arab’ because, they say, he is hot-tempered, quarrelsome and 
overbearing; on the other hand there is a great deal o f respect remaining, particularly in the 
older generation, for the older type o f Arab, recalling the days when Arabs were the ruling 
caste. Similarly ‘the Indian’ is often said to be crafty, overbearing and contemptuous: yet 
by comparison with Arabs many find them more quietly behaved, though perhaps less 
accessible. Europeans most o f all have the reputation o f being too proud to see the earth 
beneath their feet: in all three cases the language barrier is the great divider.119
Leslie observed that ‘the European’s love of segregating himself increases the feeling that 
he is over-proud.’ On the other hand there was a degree of ‘friction generated between 
African and both Indian and Arab whom he sees all day, in the areas surveyed, usually at 
a disadvantage.’
It is possible that tensions did ease in the post-war period. However, two of the most 
serious eruptions of violence to have occurred in Dar es Salaam in the 1950s can quite 
plausibly be attributed to the persistence of such tensions, although in both cases the 
incidents were blamed on the fear of mumiani -  a local superstition involving the 
abduction of individuals who had their blood removed for use as a medicine. The 
disturbances took place in Buguruni, an unplanned African residential area to the west of
117 TS, 10.5.52, p. 17.
118 TS, 19.8.52, p.19.
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the town centre, at either end of the 1950s. The first occurred on a Tuesday evening in 
January 1950, when, according to Provincial Commissioner Walden, ‘a house occupied 
by two elderly non-British Europeans was stoned and attempts to set it on fire were made 
by a mob of several hundred Africans.’ ‘This mob’, he continued
gathered at an obviously pre-arranged meeting place and marched to the house in question, 
which belongs to an Indian who has leased it to these Europeans and is in an area which 
has been scheduled for African housing. The mob over-turned the motorcar belonging to 
the occupants o f the house, ripped the tyres to pieces, smashed all the glass in the car and 
tore open the cushions. But for the arrival o f the Police, it is the opinion o f the 
Superintendent that the mob, having once gained ingress into the house, would 
undoubtedly have murdered the occupants. 120
Walden attributed this incident to ‘the vexed question of availability of land for Africans 
to build in the township’, due to the fact that the land in question was earmarked for 
Africans but little had been done about instituting government policy in this area. The 
word from the African community, on the other hand, was that fear of mumictni had 
caused the attack, after recent murders in the Keko area had been blamed on an unknown 
European. Whatever the motives for resorting to violence were, it was clear that Africans 
in the area were not comfortable with a European presence there. ‘It has been said’, 
Walden observed, ‘that occupation of this house by any European would not be tolerated, 
but such opposition would not apply to an Indian or African.’ A reporter for the 
Tanganyika Standard appeared to concur with this analysis. He reacted with dismay at 
events in Buguruni. ‘The driving out of this European family’, he wrote, ‘was considered 
a very serious matter as it had led to the African believing that his concentrated action 
had been successful - successful in removing Europeans from an area in which natives 
did not wish them to live.’121
As it turned out suspicion appeared to attach itself to whoever occupied this house, 
regardless of racial origin, A recurrence of mumiani fears led to particularly serious 
disturbances when an African was living in the same house nine years later. Once again, 
according to African testimony, the violence was linked to the disappearance or murder 
of several Africans in the town.122 This time rioting involving plantation askaris, three
119 Leslie, Sui'vey, p.280.
120 PC, EP to MLG, 28th January 1950, TNA/50075.
121 TS, 11th February 1950, p.15.
122 See James R. Brennan, “Mumiani and Uhuru: Buguruni on the eve o f Tanganyika’s independence”,
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police officers and around two hundred Buguruni Africans, resulted in the death of one 
officer, the looting of a house and an Arab shop, and the destruction of a police patrol car. 
The same Indian-owned house that had been involved in the 1950 incident was also at the 
centre of the 1959 riot. In the later case, however, mumiani activities appear to have been 
blamed on the Indian owner rather than the African askari, Juma Mkuyu, living in the 
house at the time.123 In both cases the events in Buguruni give some indication of the high 
degree of suspicion that could exist between different communities in Dar es Salaam, and 
of the potential for violence which could result from these tensions. The two disturbances 
involved attacks by Africans against individuals from each of the Tanganyika’s three 
main immigrant communities: the original European residents, an Arab shopkeeper, and 
(indirectly) the Indian who owned the house.
Whilst ethnic factors appeared to be operating in Buguruni, an additional factor that 
ought to be taken into consideration in connection with the 1959 disturbances is the anti­
colonial fervour sweeping Dar es Salaam’s African communities at that time. Both the 
Tanganyika Standard and the Swahili weekly Baragumu reported that chants of ‘nhurtf 
had accompanied the crowds’ attacks against the Arab’s shop and the police patrol car.124 
TANU, however, were quick to dissociate themselves from the events in Buguruni, so 
these events cannot be portrayed as a straightforward example of organised (or explicit) 
opposition to colonialism. They nevertheless took place at a time when British rule was 
losing its legitimacy. As early as 1955 Machado Plantan, the editor of the Swahili 
newspaper Zuhra , was receiving ‘many reports of... people openly defying the law 
purporting to recognise TANU as the only authority capable to administer justice in the
125 , »country.’ The disturbances at Buguruni fit in with a pattern of outbreaks of violence in 
the town which occurred as British authority was undermined by nationalist activism in 
the late colonial period. These incidents were often associated with the attempted arrest 
by police askaris of African malefactors. In the late-1950s policemen were frequently 
impeded by hostile crowds which rapidly materialised at the scene of an arrest. In August 
1958, for example, around a hundred Africans attacked two detectives attempting to re- 
apprehend an escaped prisoner in Sikukuu Street.126 The following June, in Ilala a crowd
paper given at AS AC, 1998, for a full account of the riot.
123 Ibid., p .10
124 Ibid., p.8.
125 Said, Abdidwahid Sykes, p. 178.
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of 50-60 persons obstructed the arrest of one Molidi Sultan, thus facilitating his escape.127 
The most serious incident of this kind, though, occurred in Msimbazi in September 1957, 
when a petty arrest degenerated into a minor riot. According to the Standard:
The riot started after the police arrived to investigate a disturbance at a duka owned by an 
Indian. When attempts to arrest a man failed, reinforcements were called for.
On the arrival o f  an inspector and six constables, a crowd o f about 100 gathered at the 
shop. They became wild and tried to prevent the inspector reaching the wanted man. The 
inspector did, however, get the handcuffs on one o f the wrists o f the wanted man.
The duty officer, Assistant Superintendent A.S. Ross, was attacked by some o f the crowd 
and his clothes were torn. He then sent for a platoon of the Motorised Company.
When Assistant Superintendent F.C.M. Walker arrived with the riot squad the crowd had 
grown to about 500. The crowd was warned and told to give up the wanted man, but stones 
were thrown at police.
The riot squad quickly went into action and made a baton charge. The crowd then dispersed 
to the other side o f the Msimbazi market and picked up more stones, throwing them at the 
police as they advanced. It was not until seven smoke grenades had been thrown into the 
marketplace that the crowd dispersed.
An Assistant Superintendent received injuries to his arm from stones and an Inspector 
received minor abrasions, but no other casualties were reported.128
‘Until the last three or four years’, wrote the editor of the Standard in response to these 
events, ‘there were no more friendly men or women in the whole of East or Central 
Africa than the average Tanganyika African. No matter where one went, or what one’s 
race or religion, all greeted each other as friends with the familiar greeting of ‘Jambo’.’(!) 
‘It is’, he concluded, ‘a different story in Dar es Salaam today.’129 The growing racial 
tensions implied by the editor arose in a context of increasing disrespect for colonial 
authority and a diminishing reluctance on the part of Africans to oppose the often heavy- 
handed actions of the British and their agents. It is in this context, as Brennan has argued 
for the 1959 Buguruni riot, that we should place such outbreaks of violence in the late 
colonial period.
As we have seen both ethnic tensions in the town and growing disillusionment with 
government in the late colonial period could result in major disturbances. The two most 
serious breakdowns of order to have taken place in Dar es Salaam during the British 
colonial period, however, arose out of the labour disputes of 1947 and 1950. Whilst the 
violence that occurred can in both cases be seen as expressions of wider alienation, the
J2? TS, 8th June 1959.
128 TS, 26th September 1957, p.5.
129 TS, 26th September 1957.
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primary causes were economic grievances. In setting the context for the 1947 strike, Iliffe 
observes that *[t]his was probably the worst period in the town’s history’:
The population roughly doubled during the war, while the number o f African houses 
actually fell slightly between June 1939 and July 1944. At the latter date there were sixteen 
water kiosks in the African town to serve an estimated 40,000 people. Before 1943, the 
immigrant worker was spared the burden o f rising rent. Now rents doubled between 1943 
and 1947... the government’s casual labour rate kept pace with the official cost of living. 
However, necessary goods were increasingly either sold on the black market or were 
simply not available.130
Such was the backdrop to the dispute. The strike began on 6tl' September and escalated 
over the following days. ‘For two days’, wrote Norman Pearson a British trade unionist 
stationed in Dar es Salaam at the time, ‘mobs ranged the town with their sticks and 
stones, and organised trade was grinding to a stop.’131 By the 11th September, according 
to Iliffe, Dar es Salaam ‘was dead... [t]he strike was general and pickets were out 
throughout the town.’132 The violence and intimidation that accompanied the strike are 
attributed by Iliffe not to the workers who began the action but to unemployed Africans 
who joined in shortly after the dispute began.133 That events took on the form of being 
more than just a straightforward labour dispute is confirmed by Pearson’s first hand 
testimony:
[TJhere were a number o f unruly, lawless and excitedly impulsive mobs. These mobs were 
augmented by good-for-nothings who were not strikers, but joined in with the mobs merely 
for the licence o f things and any pickings that may come by. The strike took on the nature 
o f a gigantic spree, and the infection spread, and there were soon gangs o f men having no 
connection at all with the dockers, and just taking advantage o f what they thought was an 
opportunity not to be lost.
...Thus we found gangs of Africans rushing about the town brandishing sticks and stones. 
They considered that all Africans should join them in this grand saturnalia and show the 
Wazungu ‘what was what’. Most joined only too willingly -after all, they thought, it isn’t 
often one is able to get into the middle of a first class spree like this one- and they found it 
most exhilarating. Others were reluctant to leave their work -many o f them were conscious 
that they had very good jobs which they did not wish to sacrifice- but threats o f personal 
violence to them and their families usually brought them to heel. Unfortunately these 
threats were not always empty threats. Some Africans who did not want to strike hid 
themselves on their works premises (this applied particularly to domestic servants who 
lived on the premises), but the mobs searched for them and, on a few occasions, even 
invaded the privacy o f the premises to do so.134
130 Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p. 131.
131 Pearson, ‘Safari’, p.218.
132 Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p .131.
133 Ibid., p .132.
134 Pearson, ‘Safari’, pp.215-217.
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One such incident, at the East African Tobacco factory on the Pugu Road on the 10th 
September, was described by the manager of the factory in a letter to the Superintendent 
of Police:
At about one o ’clock a gang o f some 200 natives, mostly armed with sticks, passed from 
the front o f our factory. They were shouting at our labourers to leave work, and threatening 
to beat them if they did not do so. Some o f them also picked up pieces o f our firewood 
lying outside the premises and banged our oil drums perhaps to bring home to our workers 
that their threats were forceful.
This unpleasant event shows that when our Factory labourers try to come for work 
tomorrow morning at 6am, there may occur serious trouble.
From what has happened today, we consider our property and ourselves to be unsafe 
tomorrow morning and we may have to close our Factory in face o f such insecurity.135
The following day, despite 45 arrests being made and the presence of three hundred 
special constables patrolling the town, the dockers, according to Iliffe, ‘still dominated 
the situation.’136 Two days later ‘little commercial activity’ and ‘no tangible 
improvement’ were reported in the town.137 Police patrols, though, were said to be 
‘beginning to have effect’ and signs were that the strike was breaking. By Monday 15th 
September the situation was ‘much improved’. After a meeting the previous day, dockers 
were drifting back to work, although interestingly casuals were reported to be ‘returning
n o
better’ than permanent employees. All other labour -government and commercial- was 
back at work, including African civil servants, many of whom had participated in the 
strike.139 The president of the African Association, though, made clear that the members 
of his organisation had played no part in originating or inciting ‘ [fjhis hooliganism 
[uhuni\\m  According to Pearson ‘only the fairly-well educated Africans stood out 
against the mob hysterias which swept the town and the threats which accompanied it.’141 
What happened to those unemployed Africans who took part in the dispute is not 
recorded although a wave of repatriations occurred in the following months. As a result 
of the strike, the dockworkers and other Africans in the town won pay increases of
135 E. African Tobacco Co Ltd to SP, Dsm, 10th September 1947, TNA/540/27/13.
136 Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p .132.
137 PC, EP to Political, Dsm, 13th September 1947, TN A/540/27/13.
138 CS to PC, EP, 15th September 1947, TN A/540/27/13.
139 Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p. 132.
140 Quoted in Iliffe, Modern H istoiy , p.404. Whilst they may have disapproved o f the violence once the 
strike spiralled out o f control, the African Association did have a connection with the dispute through 
Abdulwahid Sykes (son o f Kleist Sykes and the Association’s Dar es Salaam secretary), who according to 
Said liased with ‘the underground labour movement’ in 1947. See Said, Abdulwahid Sykes, pp.60-67.
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between thirty and fifty per cent. Government meanwhile, was served notice of the 
danger of combination between the disparate elements that made up the urban African 
population. The threat posed by a similar configuration in Mombasa the same year led, 
according to Cooper’s analysis, eventually to a policy of the bureaucratisation and 
differentiation of African urban labour in Kenya.142 In Dar es Salaam the official 
response did not occur until after a further outbreak of strike-related violence three years 
later.
The disturbances which took place in the course of the 1950 strike do not appear to 
have convulsed the whole town in the way that events in 1947 had. According to the 
Governor’s Deputy those responsible were ‘an insignificant portion of the dock 
labourers’. ‘The vast majority of Africans living within the municipal area’, he wrote, 
‘appear to dissociate themselves from any sympathy with the dock labourers who are 
regarded with disfavour as tainted with irresponsibility and hooliganism.’143 The 
disturbances, however, were the most violent in the whole of the British colonial period, 
and judging by the large numbers of people involved it seems unlikely that disgruntled 
dockworkers had not been joined by other disaffected elements amongst the town 
population -  prime candidates being, of course, those people dismissed by officials as 
spivs or wahuni. The origins of the strike lay in the introduction of a new gate for 
labourers entering the docks. The Port Authorities claimed this had no connection with 
the implementation of a registration scheme which was proposed to take place at a future 
date. Union leaders were convinced by these reassurances. The rank and file, on the other 
hand, remained deeply suspicious of the motivations behind the introduction of the new 
entry point, described in a Tanganyika Standard article in the wake of the strike:
The outer fence has only one main entrance, through which the workers will pass. Inside
this, the men pass through another fence and finally go past the administrative buildings
and down a stairway to reach the dock.144
It appeal’s that dockworkers were right to be suspicious. Such a system greatly facilitated 
the control of dock labour, particularly when used in conjunction with the registration of
141 Pearson, ‘Safari’, p.219.
142 Cooper, Waterfront.
143 Governor’s Dep. to Creech Jones, 11th February 1950, P R 0/C 0691/209/42540.
144 TS, 20th Feb. 1950.
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workers and issue of ID cards which occurred immediately after the disastrous events of 
February 1950.145
In the period leading up to the strike, dockers’ attitudes towards registration had been 
divided. According to the Deputy Governor, registration had actually been encouraged by 
union leaders in the late 1940s in order ‘to protect old established dockworkers whose 
position seemed threatened by continued demands for and increasing numbers of casual 
labourers arising from continued pressure of work at the port during the past two 
years.’146 ‘These casual labourers’, wrote the Deputy Governor,
largely comprise the less responsible element, desiring to work only perhaps once or twice 
a week and laying up for the remainder. This element gradually gained control o f the Union 
and was opposed to measures favouring permanent employment and insistence on 
comparatively regular attendance.147
With the advent of the new entry procedure in late January 1950, union members 
overruled their leaders, who had recommended acceptance.148 They were forced to 
declare a strike on 1st February. Support was by no means total (the port labour force was 
not completely unionised), with at least 330 labourers working in the port on the first day 
of the strike, and as many as 783 on the second. The large number of strike-breakers 
gives some clue to the obvious frustration felt by those who had opted to strike. This, 
along with the determination of the police to avoid strikers intimidation of those who 
chose to work, led to the eventual resort to violence. On 2nd February, the Secretary of the 
Stevedores and Dockworkers Union wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary, articulating the 
frustration of the strikers and predicting that disturbances would occur:
Union Members refused to pass though in the new gate mentioned, however, in stoping 
[sic] trouble the Union representatives approached the Senior Superintendent Police, in 
charge, that whether permission can be gallanted to stop the Union Members to go on duty, 
however, the Police stated that there is no rule that some people can be stoped going on 
duty, however, still the Policemen use to get hold o f people through the dock area, 
therefore, the Union is only forwarding this letter to you for information, that surely there 
will be some great troubles amongst whole Africans o f Dar es Salaam as they are fighting 
for their colour, should not wonder when the matter appears.149
145 TS, 20th Feb. 1950.
146 Dep.Gov. to CO, 7th February 1950.
147 For tensions between Union members and leadership in the late-1940s, see Said, Abdulwahid Sykes, 
pp.70-77.
148 Internal report in PRO/C0691/209/42540.
149 Sec., SDU to CS, 2nd February 1950, PRO/CO/691/209/42450.
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A second letter, presented the following day (presumably written earlier), adopted a 
significantly more threatening tone;
I am directed by all Union Members to inform you that as far as the matter effect that, the 
Policemen o f Dar es Salaam, and their Police Officers interferes with the Dock Labourers 
Strike and try to fight the Labourers o f the Dockworkers Union, therefore, there will be a 
heavy fight this morning or afternoon between the Policemen and the Union Members, 
however, this will be for all Africans in Dar es Salaam, all ranks o f Africans will be fighted 
while found going on duty.150
This was indeed what came to pass. Early on the morning of 3rd February pickets at 
the harbour entrance were being moved on or arrested by the police.151 Those arrested 
were found to be carrying concealed weapons including knives, axes, iron bars, bottles 
and clubs. The arrests appeared to aggravate strikers congregating at the harbour:
At about 7.00 am in the vicinity o f the port a party o f men attacked Assistant 
Superintendent Stewart with a blow from behind. In the melee which followed a number of 
policemen and rioters received injuries. Eight arrests were made and loiterers were then 
cleared from the dock entrance. Information was received that those dispersed had retired 
to collect re-inforcements and arm themselves with weapons with which to fight the police, 
attack their barracks and release arrested persons. The situation in the dock area appeared 
calm and patrols were sent to detect any concentration of rioters elsewhere.
Reports of such a concentration came in at 8.25am. A patrol car was despatched and, 
according to an internal report, was stoned ‘by a disorderly crowd estimated at some 
2,000 men’ -the estimate of the Tanganyika Standard was a more plausible 400 to 600- 
at the corners of Mkunguni Street and Pemba Street152 at Mnazi Mmoja. A request was 
sent for reinforcements. After their arrival a force of 36 constables armed with long 
batons and shields, and three officers armed with service revolvers and ammunition, 
faced an increasingly hostile crowd ‘armed with clubs, knives, pangas and rocks,’ 
According to the internal report;
The party was stoned at a range o f some thirty yards and several constables were injured. 
Assistant Superintendent Stewart warned the crowd that if it did not desist he would have 
to shoot. They continued to attack and the two Assistant Superintendents and the Sub- 
Inspector fired without effect, and the mob proceeded to further violence... Assistant 
Superintendent McLoughlin and Sub-Inspector Bannerjee... were cut o ff and brutally 
hacked, receiving ghastly wounds from head to foot. At this point the crowd, apparently 
satisfied with the damage done, dispersed and Assistant Superintendent Stewart recovered
150 Sec., SDU to CS, 3rd February 1950, PRO/CO/691/209/42450.
151 The following account is drawn from an anonymous internal report in P R 0/C 0691/209/42540.
152 4 1h February 1950. The paper actually gives a non-existent street -Nmumgumi- along with Pemba 
Street; this must be Mkunguni Street, which was the street north o f  Pemba Street, and, perhaps 
significantly, also the haunt o f  a number o f wahuni muggers.
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the wounded officers and brought them back to barracks. ...it is not possible to say 
precisely how many rounds were fired.
The reinforcements, which arrived too late to assist, collected one dead rioter. 
Subsequently six other rioters were admitted to hospital with bullet wounds and one 
subsequently died. In addition to Assistant Superintendent McLoughlin and Sub-Inspector 
Bannerjee, Assistant Superintendent Stewart was admitted to hospital having sustained 
further injuries in the second clash. Eighteen constables were injured, five o f them 
receiving serious injuries requiring admission to hospital.153
The position was deemed serious enough for detachments of the King’s African Rifles to 
be placed on standby at the central police station in case of further disorder. Meanwhile, a 
platoon from a British navy boat, the HMS Loch Quoich, then moored in Dar es Salaam 
harbour, had briefly come ashore —‘armed with rifles and fixed bayonets’- to guard the 
docks in case the strikers were to break through.154 After the rioting at Mnazi Mmoja had 
been suppressed, however, no more violence occurred and the strike was soon broken. 
The day following the disturbances the Captain of HMS Loch Quoich wired London:
Mob appears still to be in existence but has withdrawn from town. Riots yesterday, Friday 
arose suddenly and unexpectedly and police were unarmed. Today, Saturday they are 
armed in force and even if further riots take place my platoon is unlikely to be required.155
In his despatch the next day London was informed that the mob had finally been 
dispersed ‘in face of a large show of force.’ By this time the strike had collapsed and the 
port was working normally. 145 men were charged with offences connected with the 
strike and the ensuing violence, including eight ‘alleged union leaders’ prosecuted for 
conspiracy.156 In May, Abdelrehman Musa -not one of the leaders- was found guilty of 
the attempted murder of Asst. Supt. McLoughlin and sentenced to ten years. The events 
of 3rd February led to the dissolution of the dockers’ union by a High Court order later in 
the year. Meanwhile, advantage was taken by the Port Authorities and the Labour 
Department to introduce the new registration scheme.157 ‘Registration’, the Governor’s 
Deputy informed Whitehall, ‘is favoured by both Government and the employers with a 
view to stabilising the dock labour' force and building up a more efficient industry.’158
153 Internal report in P R 0/C 0691/209/42540.
154 TS, 4th February 1950; & Despatches from HMS Loch Quoich, P R 0/C 0691/209/42540.
155 Despatches from HMS Loch Quoich.
156 Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p.137/8; TS, 22nd February 1950.
157 TS, 20th February 1950.
158 Dep.Gov. to CO, 1 Ith February 1950, PRO/CO/691/209/42450.
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The riot had a deep impact on all sections of Dar es Salaam’s population, official and 
non-official, African, Indian and European alike. The police stepped up efforts to recruit 
special constables, and, starting the month after the riots, engaged in intensive campaigns 
aimed at the repatriation of undesirables from the town.159 It also lead to the introduction 
of tear gas to the police armoury.160 Meanwhile, a meeting of officials convened by the 
Member for Law and Order in late February arrived at the conclusion ‘that recent 
experience in Dar es Salaam particularly in regard to the disturbance at the beginning of 
the month showed that changes in the administration of African affairs in the Municipal 
area were essential.’161 The strike-related violence had a more general impact also, 
leading to heightened awareness amongst all communities of crime and policing in the 
town. After the riot, the correspondence pages in Dar es Salaam’s newspapers became 
filled with missives from anxious (and angry) correspondents complaining of a 
breakdown of discipline and/or the lack of security.162 Memories of the violence lingered. 
In conducting their preliminary survey of the town the following year, the Sofers 
observed that ‘ [ajmong problems relating to the maintenance of law and order in Dar es 
Salaam, the topic most frequently mentioned to us has been the riots of February 1950.’ 
‘It is commonly said’, they continued, ‘that the riot took the community completely by 
surprise.’163
As we have seen riot was by no means an uncommon event in Dar es Salaam during 
the British colonial period. These outbreaks of disorder were many and varied. They 
could take the form of anything from a minor skirmish with the police to serious 
communal violence or organised and widespread strike-related intimidation. The causes 
of the violence were equally diverse, each disturbance resulting from a combination of 
factors which might include racial tensions, economic grievances, political 
disillusionment, or even straightforward criminal intent.164 In all the disturbances to 
occur, however, there was one constant. In every case those elements of the urban 
population categorised by officials as undesirable were directly involved, if not always as 
the instigators. The spivs and loiterers, semi-employed, unemployed and wahuni not only
159 TS, 14th March 1950; see also CP to CS, 13th April 1950, TNA/30134.
160 See post-strike correspondence in PRO/CO/691/209/42450.
161 Meeting mins., 22nd February 1950, TNA/50070.
162 See clippings in TNA/20219/Vol.II.
163 Sofers’ Report, p.63, TNA/18950/Vol. III.
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formed a potential (or actual) criminal class, but they also were responsible for the most 
dramatic breakdowns of urban order in the period under consideration. As such the 
control of this section of the population became a primary goal of the colonial 
administration. It is to this which we turn in the concluding section.
164 Incidents in Uhindini were often initiated by thieves in order to provide cover for their activities.
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Part Three
Removing the undesirable: Influx control in Dar es Salaam, 1919-1961
Nearly eveiywhere natives are on the move.
P.M. Henry, The African Townee, New Commonwealth, 4.3.54, p.221,
It was the old case of ‘Bright lights and empty pockets’ or ‘How’re you gonna keep ‘em
down on the farm’.
E.G. Rowe (PC, Eastern, 1954) RH Mss.Afr.s. 1698, p.38.
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Chapter Seven
Undesirables and colonial urban order, 1919-1941
Although in the first two decades of British rule action against Dar es Salaam’s 
marginal population was relatively modest1 concern over the movement of Africans into 
the town was nevertheless a prime anxiety of colonial officials, and one which received a 
frequent airing. Indeed one of the administration’s first actions after the consolidation of 
their hold on the town at the close of WWI was a forceful assertion of spatial 
organisation. In the first amiual report for Dar es Salaam, for 1919-20, the unwelcome 
presence in the town of a residue of demobilised askaris and military porters is noted:
A lthough great care w as taken during the dispersal o f  m ilitary native organisations that 
none, excep t those w ith  right, should remain in this District, yet m any hundreds m anaged  
in various w ays to avoid return to their districts o f  origin, w hile others w hose right place  
w as cultivating outside remained in the town to spend their military pay.2
The official response to this situation was instructive of how colonial officials envisaged 
the future of their newly conquered capital and its relationship with the remainder of the 
territory. During the last half of 1919 ‘not less than about four thousand with no right or 
no employment were forced out of town either to their own districts or to the country to 
cultivate.’3 So, at the very inception of British municipal administration, certain criteria 
for urban residence were alluded to. Those with ‘right’ to remain in Dar es Salaam and 
those in employment were unaffected. Conversely those without ‘right’ (ie. those without 
work who originated from outside the capitol) were removed to their home districts, or to 
the rural parts of Dar es Salaam district itself. The total of four thousand repatriatees 
represents the largest amount in any one year for which records remain. With the 
presence of such large numbers of ‘alien’ natives, and serious concern over the high
1 This was more probably a result o f the limited resources available to urban officials than any 
disinclination on their part to tackle the surplus African population.
2 DAR for 1919-20, TNA/1733:1.
3 Ibid. ‘The local town population’, the report continued, 4 has been further depleted by the departure o f
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levels of crime in the town towards the end of and following WWI, the newly established 
British administration were determined to demonstrate their effective control over the 
urban arena.
Having removed the town’s ‘surplus’ population, the first (British) legislation aimed at 
controlling Dar es Salaam’s African inhabitants was published in the form of the first 
Township Regulations in 1920.4 Alongside by e-laws prohibiting hawking of goods, and 
public entertainments, ngomas or ceremonies of mourning without permission, were 
others aimed at controlling African movement within and to the town. Sections seven and 
eight of the regulations were directed at urban immigrants. Section seven required 
incoming residents to register at the district office within one month of arrival (when 
presumably an individuals’ employment status could be looked into). Eight stipulated that 
Africans were not allowed to stay longer than six days in the town without written 
permission from the DC. It appears that these sections were not strictly enforced, 
however - either through the inability or neglect of officials. Sections ten and eleven of 
the regulations, as we have seen, restricted the presence of Africans in a ‘prohibited area’ 
between 6am and 6pm. Meanwhile, section twelve endowed district officials with powers 
to remove unwanted individuals from the town:
The A dm inistrative O fficer m ay repatriate to his hom e or D istrict o f  origin, w hen such is 
w ithin  the con fines o f  the Territory, any native w hom  he m ay consider an undesirable 
inhabitant or sojourner in the tow nship , and any native, concern ing w hom  an order for 
repatriation has been m ade, and w ho may be found thereafter w ithin the tow nship, shall be 
guilty o f  an o ffen ce.5
Neither the dramatic action taken against the former military employees in the second 
half of 1919, nor these regulations, appeared to exercise sufficient influence over the 
mobility of the ‘native’ population. Less than two years later the District Commissioner, 
F.W. Brett, was complaining that
A lthough thousands o f  military em ployees were repatriated or turned out o f  tow n after their 
d em obilisation , there w ere apparently not satisfactory m eans to prevent a large num ber, 
representative o f  m any tribes, returning to the tow n life  to w h ich  they had b ecom e  
accustom ed  and w hich  they prefer for various reasons, viz. the am enities o f  civ ilisation  
w hich  are not as a rule to be had in the reserves, desire for independence as an individual
natives, compelled to return to an agricultural life through non-employment.’
4 GN no.6 o f  1920.
5 Township Rules, GN no.6 o f 1920. The ‘prohibited area’ formed what would become -from 1923- zones 
one and two where the majority o f Europeans and Asians lived.
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free from fam ily or tribal ties, som e difference o f  opinion with relatives or chief, or evasion  
o f  ju stice . A  num ber o f  these peop le are unable to obtain su ita b le  em ploym ent [my 
em phasis] and others have no desire to work; these are potential th ieves i f  they have noone 
w ho is w illin g  to support them, since food  is not available in Dar es Salaam  as it may be at 
their h o m e s ....6
According to the 1921 annual report, the problem faced by the administration in ridding 
the town of undesirables was first and foremost a financial one. No vagrancy act was in 
force in the Territory, and whilst section 12 of the Township Regulations provided for 
orders of repatriation to be served against individual Africans, the cost was debited from 
the District Travelling votes. This, according to Brett, was beyond the means of the native 
administration, rendering ‘such a course [ie. repatriation] impracticable in Dar es Salaam, 
except in a case of extreme emergency.’7
In response to such criticisms, the government revised and introduced further 
legislation aimed at preventing the growth of a class of un- or under-employed Africans 
emerging in the urban centres. The Destitute Persons Ordinance was the first piece of 
legislation of this type, enacted in early 1923. The explanatory memorandum that 
accompanied the bill highlighted the link between rural-urban migration and crime. ‘It is 
common’, the memorandum observed, ‘for natives from the interior to come to the coast 
attracted by stories of high wages. Such natives often become destitute and are then 
tempted to become criminals.’8 Punishment under the terms of the ordinance, however, 
was not restricted to those who had committed crimes. To be destitute was an offence in 
itself: a ‘destitute person’ was defined by the ordinance as ‘any person without 
employment and unable to show he has visible and sufficient means of subsistence.’ 
Where it was ‘shown to the satisfaction of a magistrate that a person is a ‘destitute 
person” the magistrate could, under the ordinance, order that person to:
(a) find work and report back before a named date
(b) be detained for a period not exceeding one month with v iew  to work being found for 
him
(c) i f  the native is not dw elling in his usual place o f  residence to be returned to that place.
In addition, the bill continued,
i f  the native fails to com ply with the order [to return ‘h om e’], or having com plied with the 
order leaves such place w ithout the licen ce o f  an administrative o fficer  or o f  his headman
6 DAR for 1921, p.8, TNA/53.4.
7 Ibid., p.9.
8 Destitute Persons Ordinance, Explanatory Memorandum, PRO/CO/691/57.
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acting w ith  the general or sp ecial directions o f  an adm inistrative officer , he shall on 
conviction  be liable to  a fine not exceeding ten pounds or to im prisonm ent ...fo r  a term not 
exceeding six  m onths, and may again be ordered to return to his [h om e].. .9
The ordinance also empowered police officers to arrest without warrant any person who 
was ‘apparently a destitute person’. In the same year, sections 8 and 12 of the old 
Township Regulations -aimed at the control of immigrants to the towns and removing 
undesirables from them- were enshrined in a new version of the regulations as Section 
146 (1) and (2).
The introduction of this new legislation failed to quell official concern over 
unrestrained African mobility in the Territory. This was in part a product of its neglect. In 
1924 the Commissioner of Police complained of the lack of application of either the 
ordinance or section 146 of the Township Regulations observing th a t:
A dm inistrative O fficers m ight m ake far m ore extensive use o f  this latter regulation for 
ridding the larger townships o f  the horde o f  unem ployed natives from the outside districts, 
w ho eke out a precarious existence by liv ing  on other people and w ho are responsible for 
the majority o f  petty thefts w hich occur in the A siatic or native quarters.10
The reason for this inactivity does not appear to have been a disinclination to tackle those 
deemed undesirable, rather it was the machinery in place to effect their repatriation 
which, according to the Minutes of the SAOs conference of 1925, was ‘cumbersome and 
required simplification.’11 These shortcomings were also noted by Orde Browne in his 
1926 report on labour in Tanganyika:
There can unfortunately be no doubt that the present lack o f  control or supervision o f  the 
travelling native is leading to a serious increase in the number o f  vagabonds in and around 
all the urban centres; the ex isting law s admit o f  such people b eing detained by the p olice  
and taken before a m agistrate, w ho investigates their means o f  livelihood  and either orders 
them  to find work, or repatriates them  to their hom e district. This procedure, how ever, is 
som ew hat cum brous, and it necessitates the production o f  p roof that the man is a vagabond, 
and then, that he is the native o f  som e other district. The latter is frequently d ifficult to do 
under ex istin g  con d itions, and in any case, the p o lice  naturally on ly  take action  w hen  
som ething occurs to bring the case o f  a particular native to their notice; in other words, 
w hen he is som ehow  associated with crim e.12
Despite these limitations Orde-Browne nevertheless recommended that more use should 
be made of the legislation in order to tackle ‘undesirables’. ‘This drifting mass of
9 No. 1 o f 1923, Laws o f Tanganyika, 1923.
10 Police AR for 1924, p.58.
11 Despatches 1925, PRO/CO/691/78.
12 Orde-Browne, ‘Labour’, para.l 13.
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doubtfully employable, and potentially criminal, natives’, he observed in his labour report 
for 1927,
is in m uch need o f  closer control; whatever reluctance m ay be felt at interference with the 
native in his v illage, there can be little objection to m easures o f  supervision  over those  
people w ho leave their ow n surroundings in order to live under non-native conditions.13
The answer was more systematic use of the existing legislation:
I have d iscu ssed  this matter w ith  the C om m issioner o f  P o lice  and Prisons, w ho w ould  
w elcom e any suitable m easures for purging the townships o f  this objectionable elem ent. H e  
has inform ed m e that he w ill issue instructions to his O fficers to take action  under the 
[Destitute Persons] Ordinance in all suitable cases. A s so little use has, up to the present, 
been m ade o f  this Ordinance, it w ould be advisable to issue a circular to D istrict O fficers 
advising them that it is the intention o f  the Governm ent to endeavour to free the tow nships 
o f  th ese  parasites by the strict application o f  the Ordinance, and that this can on ly  be 
effected  by c lose  co-operation with the P o lice .14
Tf the police can get a conviction and arrange with the AO concerned for the repatriation 
of the offender’, a secretariat official concurred, ‘we shall shake the vagrants up.’15
Whilst the decision was made to apply existing legislation with greater rigour, to many 
officials it was clear it was not, as it stood, adequate to deal with the situation in the 
towns. ‘There are very few magistrates’, G.F. Sayers, a secretariat official, observed of 
the Destitute Persons Ordinance, ‘who would convict a native under the Order as it 
stands, for the reason that no native, unless he is a complete stranger, is ‘unable to show 
that he has visible means of subsistence’. If he wishes to stay in town he ‘borrows’ from 
those of his tribe.’16 A further problem with the legislation of the 1920s, was financial 
responsibility for the repatriation of unwanted Africans. Whilst officials were agreed on 
both the potential damage which exposure to the conditions of life in urban areas may 
have had 011 the ‘unsophisticated’ African, and about the need to forestall this process 
through the removal of Africans who had no place in the town, there was widespread 
reluctance to assume financial responsibility for repatriation. Sayers used the example of 
a former Mkamba employee of his to illustrate the problem:
I had w orking for m e for a short tim e a M kam ba from the K enya highlands. I discharged  
him  for drunkenness but at the sam e tim e wrote to his DC in K enya (getting no reply) and
13 Labour Dept report for 1927, p.8.
14 Extract from Labour Commissioner’s letter o f 13th January 1927, TNA/3775/Vol.II.
15 Sec Min, 28th February 1927, TNA/3775/Vol.II.
16 Sec Min by G.F.S., 10th February 1927, TNA 3775 Vol.II.
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asked the P o lice  to assist in his repatriation. They said they had no funds. T he b oy’s fare to  
his hom e is about 50 /- w hich, in v iew  o f  his short service and o f  the fact that he had been  
here since the war in the em ploym ent o f  m any others before m e, I saw  no obligation to pay, 
though I expressed m y w illingn ess both to K enya and to the P o lice  to ‘go h a lv es’ i f  they  
w ould  do their bit. The boy w as then w illin g  to go but (I have seen  him  sin ce) is now  so  
thorough ly  d etribalised  that he has no intention  o f  returning to  his hom e. I have
 [illeg ib le] him to em ploym ent from w hich he is discharged, but he is not a destitute
person as he can alw ays raise su ffic ien t friends from his ow n tribesm en here to escape  
P olice action i f  they decided to prosecute under the 1923 Order.17
In Sayers opinion, what was required ‘in order to rid the town of workless natives is some 
enactment (?a repatriation of Natives Order) which will empower the police to apply for 
the repatriation of a native who has no work and has been so many weeks without it, and 
has no house, [illegible], shamba, or other interest in the town.’18
However, whilst sections of the new penal code, which was introduced in Tanganyika 
three years later, further criminalised those without formal employment, the legislation 
aimed at removing ‘undesirables’ was left unchanged. Sections 166 and 167 of the new 
code singled out ‘idle and disorderly persons’ and ‘rogues and vagabonds’. The former 
included ‘common prostitutes’; those gambling in a public place; beggars; those likely to 
cause a breach of the peace; and anyone committing indecent acts in public; who, on 
conviction, were liable to one month’s imprisonment or a fine not exceeding Shs40/- or 
both. Rogues and vagabonds, meanwhile, were defined as:
i) persons convicted as an idle and disorderly person for a second time;
ii) persons beggin g  under false pretences;
iii) every suspected person or reputed th ie f w ho has no v isib le  m eans o f  subsistence
and cannot g ive a good  account o f  him self;
iv) any person found w andering in or upon or near any prem ises or in any road or 
highw ay or any place adjacent thereto or in any public p lace at such  tim e and under such  
circum stances as to  lead to the con clu sion  that such person is there for an illega l or 
disorderly purpose.
Upon conviction an offender was liable for a first offence to three months imprisonment, 
and to one year for every subsequent offence. Whilst this new legislation perhaps made 
the conviction of ‘undesirables’ more straightforward, it in no way facilitated their 
removal, and throughout the colonial period prosecution of individuals under these 




Those officials responsible for the administration of Dar es Salaam and Tanganyika’s 
other urban centres then, entered the second decade of British rule with the machinery to 
tackle the perceived menace of rural-urban migration and a surplus urban African 
population substantially unchanged; limited mainly to use of the Destitute Persons 
Ordinance and regulation 136(2) of the Township Rules.19 With the onset of the 
depression in the early-193 Os, the efficacy of this legislation was severely tested, as 
increasing use was made of it to deal with the growing problem of urban unemployment. 
The 1931 district report speaks of an ‘exodus of natives from the Township... most 
noticeable in the past six months.5 Many had ‘voluntarily returned to their homes 
elsewhere owing to the inability to obtain employment locally.’ On the other hand, the 
report continued, ‘[t]he number of repatriations of undesirables under Township Rule No. 
136(2) has been considerably in excess of normal years.’20 A July census in that year had 
discovered 1,876 Africans without work in the town, of whom 530 were ‘alien natives 
who had never been employed at any time.’21 The following month the Provincial 
Commissioner, F.W. Brett, stated his intention to ‘clear the town of certain natives who 
are known to be unemployed and of undesirable character, but who may not come within 
the definition of a ‘destitute person5’22 under the Destitute Persons Ordinance. These 
included all 530 of the aforementioned unoccupied ‘alien natives’. As ever, there were 
financial problems associated with their removal. The treasurer recommended that Brett 
be authorised to incur the not inconsiderable expenditure of repatriating all these 
undesirables against the existing votes. It was anticipated that this may not be sufficient, 
however, and that he would have to apply for a further allocation of funds. Maintaining 
an orderly town was an expensive business. ‘Repatriation’, Brett informed the Chief 
Secretary the following year, ‘is not as simple as it may seem.’23 Indeed, as a secretariat 
official observed in a 1933 minute, whilst the ‘DPO and Rule 136(2) of the Township 
Rules make adequate legal provision for the repatriation of destitute or undesirable 
natives... the question of financial provision is another matter.’ ‘Financial 
considerations’, the minute continued, ‘and the lack of other machinery, have often 
deterred DOs Rom having recourse to the enactments quoted above.’24
19 In the new penal code section 146 o f the 1923 Township Regulations became 136.
20 DAR for 1931, p.20, TNA/53.4.
21 Sec. Min., 22nd August 1931, TNA/21616/Vol.l.
22 PC Brett to Treasurer, Dsm, 11th August 1931, TNA/21616/Vol.l.
23 PC to CS, 14th May 1932, TNA/18950/Vol. 1.
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Although urban administrators -painfully conscious of the perceived threat to urban 
order posed by a growing jobless class- were keen to remove this section of the 
population, their arguments do not appear to have always prevailed amongst fiscally 
sensitive officials at the cash-strapped secretariat. When, in 1933, the request was made 
by the provincial office in Tanga, Tanganyika Territory’s second largest town, for money 
to repatriate ninety three jobless Africans who were ‘only too anxious to return to their 
district of origin, but are unable to do so owing to lack of funds’25 it was turned down. To 
officials in Tanga it was
quite ev id en t that u n less the eco n o m ic  situation  im proves the num ber o f  potential 
repatriatees w ill considerably increase, and w e m ay be faced  w ith  a crim inal force with  
w hich it w ill not only be extrem ely difficult, but practically im possible, to cope.26
However, after calculating the probable cost of repatriation of these ninety three 
unemployed Africans at Shs. 2,249/70 the potential threat to urban stability was not 
deemed serious enough by secretariat officials to deserve support. According to one 
secretariat minute ‘ [a] very strong case would have to be made out before considerable 
sums of public money could be used to repatriate people who can readily maintain
97  •themselves if they will work.’ Such decisions were being made in spite of an 
unemployment rate in Tanga around this time being recorded at as much as 32 per cent of 
the adult male African population.28 As the depression eased in the mid-thirties though, 
and job opportunities once again began to increase, the numbers of surplus urban 
Africans in Dar es Salaam and the other main urban centres, began to diminish to the 
manageable levels of the previous decade. The low rates of migration experienced by the 
territorial capital at this time, coupled with a recovering urban economy, relieved the 
pressure felt by urban officials that had arisen from the high unemployment levels 
prevalent at the height of the depression. This respite was brief, however. The experience 
of the depression was simply a foretaste of what was to come.
By the end of the decade a dramatic (and sustained) increase in the rate of rural-urban 
migration had led to the re-emergence of African unemployment on a greater scale than 
had occurred in the early 1930s. In 1939, Pike estimated that a quarter of the 6,000 able­
24 Sec. Min. by W.D.E.A., 14th June 1933, TNA/21616/Vol.l.
25 PC Tanga to CS, 29th May 1933, TNA/21616/VoI./l.
26 Ibid.
27 Sec. Min. by W.D.E.A., 14th June 1933, TNA/21616/Vol.l.
28 List o f wage rates cited in Iliffe, Modern History, pp.3 52-3.
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bodied men available for employment in the town were, at any one time, unemployed. 
Rural-urban migration simply exacerbated the problem:
A  constant, uncontrolled influx o f  immigrant Africans from the hinterland m akes the lot o f  
these u nem p loyed  unenviab le as m ost o f  them  are su ffering from m alnutrition -  they  
sim ply have not the m eans to buy food and many o f  them  are not on ly  unem ployed  but 
unem ployable.29
In his report on unemployment two years later, Molohan confirmed the gravity of the 
situation. Although he felt that ‘no accurate figure of the number of unemployed is 
ascertainable because of the unchecked ebb and flow of natives into and out of the town’, 
he urged that ‘Government must accept the fact, held not only by the writer but by other 
officers, that unemployment does exist to an alarming extent in Dar es Salaam.’30 In the 
report, the ranks of the unemployed were broken down by Molohan into three sub-sets:
(a) able bodied natives out o f  em ploym ent, w hose numbers m ay have decreased as a 
result o f  conscription and enlistment;
(b) able bodied natives w ho eke out a bare existence by accepting casual em ploym ent 
as water boys, porters etc; they have little inclination for regular em ploym ent. Their number 
w ould not be so  great were it not for the fact that the Indian has alw ays been ready to exploit 
this cheap supply o f  labour;
(c) natives w ho are already, or are becom ing, unem ployable because they sim ply have  
not the physique to undertake regularly em ployment, due to constant malnutrition.31
All three categories were regarded with suspicion by urban officials who continued to 
link unemployment with crime. In 1939, a marked increase of offences under the ‘rogues 
and vagabonds5 section of the penal code was remarked upon in the annual Police 
report. Two years later Provincial Commissioner Baker observed that ‘too often 
persons... [who] fail to make good eventually swell the number of criminals.’33 In 
addition to fostering African criminality, the presence of such large numbers of un- and 
under-employed persons was also considered to be having a deflationary effect on the 
wages of those in employment, and hence contributing further to the poor living 
standards experienced by the majority of the African population. Officials in Dar es 
Salaam were only too aware that similar conditions in Tanga had contributed to a serious 
outbreak of disorder in 1939. This had been precipitated by a dockworkers strike on the 
8th August and by the -government authorised- use of ‘redeemed tax-labourers’
29 Pike, ‘Native Affairs’, p. 9.
30 Molohan, ‘Unemployment’, pp.1-2.
31 Ibid.
32 Police AR for 1939, p.8.
33 PC Baker to CS, 12th March 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
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(defaulters, in other words) as ‘black-leg labour’ by the port employers. According to the 
Provincial Commissioner’s annual report, the following day
several gangs, w hose ranks were sw elled  by numbers o f  m en w ho w ere prepared to admit 
that they w ere doing it only from a spirit o f  enjoym ent or an unthinking display o f  bravado, 
ran through the tow n shouting and sin gin g and on the 10th a large m ob gathered and the 
p olice w ere obliged  to resort to force in order to disperse them. This brought an end to the 
actual disorder...
‘Professional or genuine’ unemployment, the Commissioner complained, was ‘large in 
the town, and... likely to increase as the war goes on.’ Steps had ‘therefore been taken to 
help workless men to leave and by the end of the year 55 men had been repatriated to 
their homes in other parts of the Territory.34 According to a report on the strike submitted 
the following year, ‘to the upcountry native Tanga is regarded as a Klondyke where 
money is easy to come by and food plentiful’. The authors of the report recommended 
that, whilst ‘it was unfortunately, inevitable that a certain number of casual labourers 
should exist in every town... no effort should be spared to keep their number as low as 
possible.’35 Baker, Commissioner for Eastern Province, concurred. ‘It is vital’, he wrote 
to the Chief Secretary a year after the Tanga report had been submitted,
that unem ploym ent and ill-doing m ust be checked so far as is p ossib le in urban areas and, 
with this end in v iew , it is im perative that those w ho can find no work or are habitual 
crim inals m ust be repatriated for their ow n good as w ell as that o f  the com m unity.36
Urban administrators, however, still felt that fiscal constraints, along with insufficient 
manpower, undermined official capacity for action against unregulated African 
movement into (and within) the town. Township Rule 136(1) remained pretty much the 
dead letter it had been when discussed by senior administrators at their 1929 conference. 
A decade on, Provincial Commissioner Longland considered it to be ‘an impossible rule 
to carry out, at least in Dar es Salaam, because natives come and go without anybody 
being any the wiser.’37 The following year, his successor, Baker, declared he would be 
happy to enforce the rule but he had too few staff to do so.38 The Provincial 
Commissioner of Tanga, facing the same problems as his opposite number in Dar es
34 Tanga PAR for 1939, p.94.
Report o f the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances which occurred in the port o f Tanga 
during the month o f August, 1939, para. 13, PRO/CO/691/179/42191/13.
36 PC Baker to CS, 12“' March 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
37 PC Longland to Ag.DO, 17lh January 1939, TNA/61/443.
38 PC Baker to CS, 21st May 1940, TNA/28685.
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Salaam, was of the same opinion.39 Similarly DO Pike, in 1940, also complained -this 
time with rule 136(2) in mind- that although £ [legislation existed to enforce the 
repatriation of natives who were not in employment... the agents for its enforcement 
were lacking.’40
In an attempt to check the unsupervised movement of Africans into and out of the 
town (as well as to enhance control over the township population) a short-lived system of 
identification was introduced in 1938. Each ward was given a letter and the streets within 
it a number. Africans registered in a house on a particular street would then receive a 
number which would identify them. For example P/6/134 would be an individual living 
in Gerezani, Keko or Kurasini (P), in a particular street or area (6), and a resident of a 
particular house or hut (134).41 During the remainder of 1938 a concerted attempt was 
made to record in Native Tax Registers the town’s African inhabitants using the new 
system. The official responsible for conducting the registration, however, complained 
after completion about the persistent shortcomings of the town headmen. In response, the 
Provincial Commissioner shortly afterwards augmented the town’s native administration. 
At a meeting in January 1939 Longland informed the six headmen of Dai- es Salaam that 
each mtaa (ward) should be organised along the following lines:-
E very street should  have a headman, m n y a p a ra 1 or policem an, it did not matter what you  
called  him  as lon g  as he w as a man o f  character. A s his duties w ere entirely honorary he 
w ould  not be expected to do m ore than keep an eye on all activities in his street:- H e w ould  
report the arrival o f  strangers to the M kubw a  o f  his M ta a . ..  In short he w ould  be the ‘e y e ’ 
o f  the M kubw a  o f  a street in the M ta a 43
Effective methods of facilitating the social control of the urban population, however, 
remained stubbornly hard to implement. Neither the system of registration by location nor 
the introduction of wanyapara as the ‘eyes’ of the native administration appeared to 
outlive their proponents term of office in Dar es Salaam as they soon fell into abeyance,44 
and a truly effective means of monitoring the shifting urban populace remained a pipe 
dream of officials throughout the colonial period.
39 PC Tanga to CS, 27th May 1940, TNA/28685.
40 Record o f first meeting o f Native Welfare Cttee., 19th September 1940, TNA/61/708.
41 See DO, Dsm to PC, EP, 20.6.38, in TNA 61/207 Vol. 1, for areas allocated to each headman.
M nyapara  was the term used for overseers on plantations, which indicates how the urban African
population was viewed primarily as a labour force. (I owe this insight to Jim Giblin).
43 PC, EP to DO Pike, 31st January 1939, TNA/61/443.
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When Baker took over as Provincial Commissioner in 1940 the old problems 
persisted. Movement into Dar es Salaam had accelerated with the onset of war and all the 
complications associated with rapid urbanisation, from high levels of unemployment to 
overcrowding, had been accentuated in the town. Meanwhile the machinery for dealing 
with the surplus population remained inadequate. In Baker’s opinion though, it was not 
solely a matter of material or human resources. In the amendments to his 1931 report on 
Dar es Salaam, written in 1941, he argued that in order for such legislation to be effective 
it was necessary to establish its legitimacy amongst the town’s resident African 
population first. Township Rule 136(1), he stated:
w ould , i f  it cou ld  be enforced, be o f  value in controlling this [job less] class o f  African. 
Such a rule, h ow ever, cannot be effec tive  w ithout the good w ill o f  the resident population: 
unless it has its w holehearted support only a few  o f  the less cunning o f  the im migrants w ill 
be arrested by p o lice constable [sic] and its enforcem ent m ay b ecom e a source o f  irritation 
to the respectable m em bers o f  soc iety  ow in g  to their being continually  asked to produce 
their perm its. U n less , by m eans o f  b a r a z a s  [m eetings] at w hich  the n ecessity  for the 
enforcem ent o f  the rule is explained  to all and sundry, the tow n headm en, house-ow ners, 
regular lodgers, and associations can be induced to g ive their assistance to the enforcem ent 
o f  the rule, it is better not to attempt to apply it. Repatriation o f  undesirables under section  
2 o f  the sam e rule w ill, i f  undertaken w ith  energy, assist to keep d ow n  the num ber o f  
vagrants but it is desirable that steps should be taken to prevent vagrancy.45
The McRoberts ruling
There is some irony in the timing of this call to seek the assent of Dar es Salaam’s 
African residents. Under two months later Township Rule 136(2), the legislation most 
frequently used to remove unwanted Africans from the town, was declared ultra vires 
(beyond legal authority) by a Dar es Salaam magistrate, in part because of a lack of 
consent for it amongst the general population. In a case of repatriation against one 
Ramazani bin Mbendo -a ‘rogue and vagabond’ with six previous convictions for 
offences against property, who had originally been expelled from the town in 1932- Mr. 
Justice McRoberts, whilst acknowledging that the prisoner was ‘the kind of person who is 
best kept out of town’, ruled that the regulation invoked for his removal offended ‘against 
every canon of legality which has ever been established whereby such rules are to be 
judged.’ The Township Rules, he complained, ‘are not made ‘by the people and for the
44 There is no surviving record o f either in subsequent years.
45 Memo, by PC Baker, 10th January 1940, TNA/18950/Vol.II.
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people’, nor are they subjected to public criticism by a vigorous press or by public bodies 
before they become law. ’
Rule 136(2) was deemed invalid on three counts. The first was for technical legal 
reasons. To be valid, the by law had to be within the authority of the ordinance which 
enabled it to be made. This, McRoberts concluded, 136(2) failed to do. More relevant to 
our discussion though, were the second and third counts: the arbitrariness of the 
offending regulation and its ‘unreasonable’ character. ‘We might observe’, McRoberts 
pronounced,
that the public, and every m em ber o f  the public, is entitled to know  under w hat law he 
lives, and though the law  m ay be changed, yet it m ust at all tim es have at least such a
degree o f  fixity as w ill allow  the law-abiding public to know what it is...
In the matter before m e any N ative in the place can be thrown out o f  it [town] at the behest 
o f  the AO w ithout any reason assigned, or without such a one as any reasonable man m ight 
consider to be any real reason at all. The test is, what the particular D O  considers to be an 
'undesirable inhabitant' and this m ay d iffer w ith  every o fficer  w ho ex erc ise s  th ese  
functions. Just as equity w as once said to vary w ith the length o f  the Chancellor's foot, so  
m ight 'undesirability' vary with the length o f  an AO's temper...
Can it be said that any N ative com ing to this tow n can be sure that the D C  w ill not think 
him 'undesirable' and w ill have him  ejected? W here then is the certainty, and what N ative
could w ith  absolute safety, build a house, 0 1* sink capital in this place?
To validate the third count on which he ruled regulation 136(2) ultra vires, McRoberts 
quoted authority to show that by-laws were unreasonable ‘if, for instance, they were 
found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they 
were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such gratuitous or 
oppressive interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no 
justification in the minds of reasonable men....’ Regulation 136(2), in his opinion, failed 
011 all counts. In McRoberts’ judgment:
That this by-law  is partial and unequal in its operation betw een the different classes o f  the 
com m unity cannot be gainsaid. It applies only to N atives, and both Europeans and Indians 
are exem pted from  its operation. It is unjust and oppressive, for it renders any African who  
is not a native o f  the place subject to expulsion without process o f  law , w ithout appeal, and 
w ithout law ful reason, for it must be remembered that in exercising this pow er the D O  acts 
adm inistratively and not as a Magistrate. It is a gratuitous interference w ith the rights o f  the 
subject w ho is entitled to travel where he w ill throughout the country, and to use the public 
roads for passage wherever they are established.
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T he right o f  transit is preserved by A rticle 7 o f  the M andate46 to all and sundry, but no 
N ative m ust show  his face in A cacia A ve i f  the fiat has gone forth against him for whatever 
reason, or for no reason at all. It precludes him from liv ing  here even  though he m ay have 
established  his hom e years before and have his relations, his property, his business, and 
everything w hich  m akes life  worth living, here, and he m ay have no other p lace in w hich  
he m ay live. But all this is nothing. The DC does not like him. H e m ust go.
It is no good tellin g  m e that no DC could be so  unreasonable. G ive a m an despotic power, 
m ake him  accountable to noone for his actions, excuse him from g iv in g  reasons for what he 
does, and it is perfectly astonishing what such a man may do.47
That McRoberts came to this judgement at this time was remarkable. With the inflow 
of immigrants adding substantially to Dar es Salaam’s problems in the early 1940s, there 
was a firm consensus amongst colonial officials (and the European non-official 
population) -including both those who were more liberal in their outlook as well as the 
chard-liners’- that there was an urgent need for increasing the powers available to urban 
administrators for dealing with the surplus urban population. The concern expressed by 
McRoberts about the civil liberties of the African was incomprehensible to most officials, 
particular those with some responsibility for administering the urban areas. Rule 136(2) 
had, as far as they were concerned, been applied only against an unrespectable class of 
Africans whose removal from the town benefited the entire community. According to Dar 
es Salaam’s District Commissioner:
The ruling by Mr. Justice M cRoberts on Township R ule 136 has created a m ost undesirable 
situation, further he has created a right never recognised  in any native law  -  that is the 
professional crim inal is at liberty to live in any place he considers he can m ost profitably  
carry on his nefarious trade.48
The possibility, raised by McRoberts, that the wide powers conferred by the regulation 
could be abused by an over zealous official were dismissed.49 The application of 136(2) 
in order to repatriate jobless Africans in 1931 (and no doubt on other occasions for which 
no records survive) was conveniently forgotten, as were the demands by contemporary 
officials to apply the same regulation against the growing number of unemployed in Dar 
es Salaam at that time. Indeed, the ultra vires ruling turned out to be an aberration. 
McRoberts appears to have been something of a maverick, and whilst his judgment found
1,6 The League o f Nations Mandate which conferred upon Britain power to govern Tanganyika.
47 McRoberts5 ruling is reported in TS, 14th March 1941, p. 10.
48 Proposals for Agenda of PC’s 1941 Conference by DC, Dsm, 28th March 1941, TNA/61/702/1.
49 PC Baker, for example, could not ‘but take exception to Mr. McRoberts criticism o f members o f the 
Provincial Administration who are I maintain, as a class, very sympathetic towards the African and careful 
o f his just treatment whether as an individual or as a community.’ PC Baker to CS, 12th March 1941, 
TNA/61/68 8/5.
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some support from the settler press-the Judges’ strictures, commented an editorial in the 
Tanganyika Standard, were ones ‘with which any ordinary member of the public will 
fully agree,50-his counterparts in the native administration were aghast. Circumstances in 
the capital were far too pressing for officials to concern themselves with the moral force 
of the magistrate’s argument. According to Baker it was
v e iy  necessary that the rule should be retained in its entirety and legalized  i f  necessary. On 
its en forcem en t depends, to a large extent, the w elfare and com fort o f  the native  
com m unity o f  a large town such as Dar es Salaam .. .51
Within a month of the ruling the Chairman of the Township Authority was bemoaning 
the consequent return of natives who had been expelled under 136(2) and the resultant 
increase in crime in the township.52 The Tanganyika Standard reported that steps were 
being taken to meet the new situation. Indeed, less than three weeks after 136(2) had been 
declared ultra vires it was replaced by Removal of Undesirable Natives regulations which 
were passed under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act that endowed the colonial 
government with special powers for the duration of the war. These replacement 
regulations reinstated a DC’s powers to ‘repatriate to his home... any native he may 
consider an undesirable inhabitant or sojourner in the township’ of Dar es Salaam.53 They 
differed from rule 136(2) only in as much as they were not a by-law and hence not 
subject to the tests by which McRoberts found the original legislation wanting. The speed 
with which a repatriation mechanism was re-introduced indicates its importance to 
colonial officials. The ability to remove unwanted residents was clearly central to the 
colonial administration of the town.
50 75, 2nd May 1941, p.6.
51 PC Baker to CS, 12th March 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
52 75, 11th April 1941.
53 GN N o.l 13 o f  1941. The regulations were extended to ten other Tanganyikan towns on 12th June, 1941.
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Chapter Eight
Urban growth and influx control, 1939-1961
Whilst the first two decades of British rule had seen the comparatively modest growth 
of the African community in Dar es Salaam from around 20,000 to approximately 33,000, 
the final decades under the British saw a significant expansion of the capital’s African 
population, which by the early 1960s was approaching 120,000 people. Over a little more 
than twenty years the town’s African population grew almost four times over. Neither the 
town’s infrastructure nor its’ formal economy, meanwhile, developed at a rate which kept 
pace with this rapid expansion. The heightened rates of urban growth experienced by Dal­
es Salaam first became apparent shortly before WWII. In the early to mid-thirties the 
capital’s African population had actually contracted slightly. By the end of the decade, 
however, migration from the rural areas into the towns was occurring on a previously 
unprecedented scale, and was set to increase still further with the onset of war.
The reasons underlying this phenomenon are somewhat mysterious. Unskilled wage 
rates in Dar es Salaam had actually fallen since the depression, at a time when the cost of 
living in the town was rising.1 In 1938, the District Officer, estimating there were ‘some
1,500 men in Dar es Salaam who are either not employed or employed for such periods 
that they only work one day in three’, observed that ‘[t]he result of this excess supply of 
labour over demand ha[d] resulted in wages being forced down below the subsistence 
level.’ There were cases of labourers being paid as little as Shs.8/- for thirty ten hour 
days, when in Dar es Salaam Shs.10/- was considered the barest minimum. ‘It is 
obvious’, the DO commented, ‘that wages have now reached a sub-marginal limit.’2 
Nevertheless, he went on to report that ‘the drift to the town from the country districts 
continues so the problem tends to get worse’. Furthermore, it was observed that even the 
fact that ‘wages on the estates outside Dar es Salaam are now higher and the cost of
1 See Iliffe, Modern Histoiy, p.353.
2 Ag.DO to PC,EP, 31st October 1938, TNA/25912.
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living lower than in the Township... does not seem to check the flow.’3 As the effects of 
the war began to impact upon the colonial economy, inflation further exacerbated living 
conditions in the capital. A 1942 enquiry found that ‘87 per cent of Government 
employees in Dar es Salaam are in receipt of a wage on which they cannot possibly 
subsist without getting into debt and remaining in debt.’4 Whilst wages were (just) 
sufficient for a bachelor, expenditure exceeded incomes by at least Shs.7/97 each month 
for a married man without children, and Shs. 14/85 for a man with a family (only 317 out 
of the 2,901 surveyed were found not to be married, or living with a woman). ‘It is 
certain’, observed the author of the report,
that any su p p lem en tary  sou rces o f  in co m e w h ich  the em p lo y e e  m ay h ave are 
in co n sid era b le  and gen era lly  in su ffic ien t to  bridge the gap b etw een  in co m e and 
expenditure. A t the end o f  the m onth the em ployee has to pawn his clothes and the v ic ious  
circle o f  interest on  pawnbroker’s tickets com m ences again.
Sixty per cent of government employees were found to be in debt to the extent of a 
month’s salary or more. Private sector employees were, on the whole, even worse off, 
earning on average less than half of those with government jobs -  Shs. 12/50-15/- per 
month compared to the Shs.29/50-33/50 earned by an unskilled government employee.
6 [Bjecause of a lack of proper food’, the report concluded, ‘a considerable portion of the 
population of Dar es Salaam are becoming unemployable.’ African discontent at the 
situation was expressed in the columns of Kwetir.
Our c h ie f  lam entation  today is Pay, every corner, o ffic ia l and u n offic ia l, sk illed  and 
unskilled, o ffice and field, house and kitchen, grumble for better pay.5
The tendency of wage rates, however, was to continue to lag behind inflation. It was not 
until after the general strike of 1947 that this trend was reversed, when the 40-50 per cent 
wage rise received by the dockworkers produced increases of a third or more in other 
sectors.6
Housing conditions were also deteriorating in the 1940s. Thanks to the unprecedented 
influx of population, Governor Jackson informed the Colonial Office in 1943, that in the 
‘badly congested’ African quarter ‘slum conditions have been accentuated’; the
3 Ibid.
4 Report o f  enquiry into wages and cost o f living o f  low grade African government employees in Dar es 
Salaam’ [Sept. 1942], p.7, TNA/30598.
5 Kwetn, 6th December 1942, cited in Iliffe, “Dockworkers”, p. 128.
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approximate density having risen by 50 per cent since 1939 from 10 to 15 persons per 
house.7 Four years later more than two-thirds of the houses in the African township 
contravened the overcrowding rules.8 Indians moving into those areas of Zone III closest 
to Uhindini in the course of the 1940s had further exacerbated the shortage of African 
housing. By 1950, the Provincial Commissioner reported, ‘areas which before the war 
were considered African are now almost entirely Asian.’9 As a result, unauthorised 
African shanties had begun to appear on the outskirts of town.10 Neither these nor the 
new government estates at Ilala, Temeke and Magomeni, however, did much to reduce a 
population density which by 1954 had reached an average of eight persons per 16ft. x 
20ft. room.11
Despite the depreciation of the value of wages and deteriorating living conditions in 
Dar es Salaam -alongside widespread unemployment- Africans continued to enter the 
town undeterred. In a little over a decade the African population more than doubled from
23,500 in 1937 to 50,765 in 1950.12 Such movement, in the circumstances, seems hard to 
account for. Why should people move from rural areas, where both food and 
accommodation were apparently more easily accessible, to the town where inflation was 
resulting in the increasing impoverishment of both wage-earners and the unwaged alike? 
The relative freedom of town life was probably part of the attraction, as was, no doubt, 
the glamour of the capital; its’ modernity, variety and the fast pace of life there. It is 
unlikely, however, that these aspects played as large a role in immigration to the towns as 
contemporary officials ascribed to them. As Sabot observes:
there is no reason w hy rural residents should not see the difference in environm ents as a net 
p sych ic cost rather than a benefit. This w ill depend on preferences. For som e rural residents 
the traditional fam ily  structure prevailing in the rural areas m ay be oppressive, w hile  for 
others it m ay be a source o f  support w hich is left only with reluctance.13
Modem economists, in discussing the great post-war drift to African cities, have
6 Iliffe, Modern History, p.404.
7 Governor’s Despatch, 27th November 1943, PRO/CO/691/185/42423.
8 Iliffe, Modern H istoiy , p.372.
9 PAR for 1950, p.41,
10 Development Organisation AR for 1950, p. 17.
11 EARC Report, p .211.
12 These figures are from the DARs.
13 R.H. Sabot, Economic development and urban migration: Tanzania 1900-1971, (London, 1978), p. 16.
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tended to stress the economic rationality of such internal migration.14 Whilst 
unemployment may have been a common feature of urban life, the opportunities available 
in the towns nevertheless outweighed those available in the underdeveloped rural areas. 
Even if waged employment was not secured on arrival in the town, either the risk of 
benefiting in the long term from formal sector employment made the move worthwhile or 
informal sector activities provided a subsistence at least equivalent to that enjoyed by 
many in the rural areas. In the case of Dar es Salaam, its’ rapid growth in the 1940s can 
be accounted for by a mixture of poor conditions in the rural areas along with the 
opportunities present in the urban environment to get by through informal economic 
activity, as well as the possibility of obtaining waged employment, albeit at reduced 
wage-rates. Such a conclusion concurs with that reached by Westcott in his work 011 the 
impact of WWII on Tanganyika. During the 1940s, writes Westcott,
it was probable that conditions o f  life  in rural areas were getting w orse. T hose not recruited 
or con scrip ted  w ere constantly pressurised by ch iefs and o ffic ia ls  to  increase crop  
production. T ow n s w ere therefore an escap e from  rural op pression  for both m en and 
w om en . T hey provided  greater freedom  and w ider opportunities. F ood  w as scarce, 
exp en sive  0 1 * in d igestib le, but nobody starved in the tow ns. There is ev id en ce that the 
prospect o f  rations in Dar es Salaam attracted many from the hinterland during 1943-44. In 
the ports, increased war-tim e exports, military construction works and v isitin g  troop ships 
all provided em ploym ent and m oney.15
Whilst the move to the town might have made sense to the incoming African, 
however, to colonial officials the extent of rural-urban migration was both 
incomprehensible and, worse still, deeply inconvenient. Accelerated immigration put the 
town’s administrators under growing pressure by placing increasing strain on an already 
inadequate urban infrastructure; by adding to a growing class of the unemployed, and -as 
a consequence- by forcing down wages; and by adding to concerns about public order. To 
officials who already envisaged an African’s natural place as being in the countryside, 
growing rural-urban movement at a time when urban living conditions were so poor 
simply provided further evidence of ‘native’ irrationality.
14 See ibid.; or for the Kenyan case J. Harris and M. Todaro, “Urban unemployment in East Africa”, IDS, 
University ofNairobi, Discussion Paper No. 71, September 1968.
15 Westcott, ‘Impact’, p.285. Evidence o f the increased mobility o f the African population o f  Tanganyika at 
this time is dramatically illustrated by the huge increase in railway passengers that occurred during and 
after the war, the numbers rising from 470,000 in 1939 to nearly two million ten years later. At the same 
time bus services were also becoming increasingly common. Ibid., p.285.
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Influx control initiatives
Despite the immediate re-introduction of repatriation legislation after the McRoberts 
ruling, colonial administrators were nevertheless soon complaining once more about the 
continuing inadequacy of the legal machinery to deal with the surplus urban population. 
What officials desired above all were some measures to control the rural-urban 
movement of Africans. Action under the existing legislation, however rigorous, was in 
itself inadequate, addressing the symptom rather than the cause. What was required, 
many argued, was a more comprehensive solution addressing African mobility in 
Tanganyika as a whole.
The introduction of some form of territory-wide identification aimed at restricting 
unauthorised movement of Africans had been raised on a number of occasions between 
the wars. Each time the political will proved insufficiently strong for action to be taken 
on the proposals. Orde-Browne first raised the issue in his report on labour in 1926. He 
recommended the introduction of a pass system -based on the retention of tax tickets by 
‘travelling natives’- aimed at ‘increasing control of the travelling native’ along with 
‘more drastic measures for dealing with vagrancy.’16 Whilst no organised pass system 
was introduced, the cheti ya kodi (tax receipt), which Africans were obliged to carry, 
became the principal means used by officials to identify Africans throughout the colonial 
period. The issue re-emerged during the Senior Administrators’ Conference of October 
1929, at which a ‘Report on the Identification of Travelling Natives’ formed the basis for 
discussion. Those officials present who had some experience of township conditions felt 
the proposals in the report -the introduction of identity cards for Africans outside their 
home areas- did not go far enough, advocating instead a full pass system. Capt. F.C. 
Hallier, former DC, Dar es Salaam, and acting Commissioner for Eastern Province, 
suggested ‘a committee be appointed to examine the South African Urban Areas Act, 
which he thought contain[ed] much that is useful and suitable for application in this 
country’ -  including ‘the control and protection of natives in proclaimed areas.’17 The 
majority of officials present, however, were rather more cautious. Whilst it was 
acknowledged that ‘the lack of a proper means of identification is having a rapidly
16 Ibid., paras. 118 and 119.
17 Mins, o f  the Senior AOs Conference, Dar es Salaam, October 1929, p. 100, in E. Africana, UDsm  
Library.
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demoralising effect on people who are quite honest by nature5, and that ‘it was definitely 
to the advantage of a native that he should provide himself with an identity card when he 
left the Province in which his home was situated5 (along with all up-country Africans 
entering a town), the Conference ‘emphasized that pass laws were not in question.518 
Moreover, it was considered that on the introduction of the system, possession of an 
identity card should -at least initially- perhaps be optional. Some residue of concern for 
African ‘liberty of action5 evidently remained. Enough, it appears, to have -once again- 
prevented any action being taken on the recommendations of the conference. Whilst the 
need for some form of identification system was continually voiced by officials 
throughout the colonial period, other concerns -no doubt connected with the Territory’s 
Trusteeship status- hindered the endorsement of such proposals by senior administrators 
both in the Tanganyika secretariat and at the Colonial Office. Further evidence of this 
reticence, and also perhaps of the tension between different levels of the administration, 
is to be found in the fact that six years later an Identification Ordinance -which required 
people leaving their province of origin to be in possession of an official letter of 
identification- although being passed into law as No. 13 of 1935, was never actually 
brought into force.19
In 1940, as the problems of rapid urbanisation became ever more apparent, the subject 
was back on the Provincial Commissioners5 conference agenda. The participants 
blanched at the introduction of anything as severe as a pass system. It was decided that 
‘no case could be made for the compulsory identification of Africans generally or African 
labourers.5 On the other hand, it was proposed
that an experim ent m ight w ell be m ade in the issue o f  identity cards by N ative Authorities 
to any native w ho w ished  to leave his ow n district for any purpose w hatsoever and desired  
to provide h im self w ith a form o f  travel document. This ID docum ent w ould serve the sam e 
purpose in the case o f  the African as the passport does in the case o f  the European.20
Native Authorities did begin to issue ruhusaya njia (travel permits) in the early 1940s. 
However, it was soon apparent that such limited action was not enough to satisfy officials 
responsible for the administration of Dar es Salaam. The following year, in response to
18 Ibid., p .109.
19 The reasons for this are unclear; any correspondence relating to the ordinance appear to have been 
destroyed or lost. The fact that the ordinance was not enforced is mentioned in the PCs’ 1940 Conference 
Report (para. 6 -  PRO/CO/691/184/423 97).
20 Ibid.
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police complaints about ‘destitute natives... found sleeping on open verandahs, and in
public markets etc.’ (and their inability to deal with this phenomenon), the Native Affairs
Sub-Committee of the Township Authority observed the necessity to ‘endeavour to limit
the immigration into the Township of the class of person without any fixed abode who
are likely to become a public nuisance.’21 Provincial Commissioner Baker considered that
control of immigration from country to town was essential and could ‘best be achieved by
the resurrection in legal form of the old Township Rule no. 136(1) prohibiting an
immigrant from remaining in the township for more than six days without a permit from
00an Administrative Officer.’ Meanwhile, Molohan, in his report on unemployment also 
bemoaned the shortcomings of the current legislation:
The only control the authorities have over this m ass o f  unem ployed is that supposed to be 
granted by the D efen ce  (Repatriation o f  U ndesirable N atives) R egu lations, 1941 w hich  
replaced R ule 136 o f  the T ow nship Rules. It m ay for all intents and purposes be regarded 
as a dead letter sin ce (a) it only operates after a native is w ithin a tow nship  (b) the P olice  
have no initial pow er to arrest or order any native to appear before a M agistrate, and (c) it 
is extrem ely doubtful w hether any m agistrate w ould consider an unem ployed  native an 
“undesirable inhabitant or sojourner”.23
What was required, according to Molohan, were ‘comprehensive regulations (i) to control 
the entry of natives into the town, and (ii) to repatriate the existing surplus unemployed 
back to their home districts’. As an appendix to his report Molohan attached draft 
legislation -The Townships (Restriction of Entry of Natives) Rules- which he proposed 
would rectify the position. This envisaged a strictly enforced pass system in which 
Africans leaving the rural areas would be required to obtain a road pass to enable them to 
proceed to a township. On arrival in the township they would then be obliged (‘at the 
earliest opportunity’) to report to the local administrative authority from whom they 
obtained a permit to remain in the town. Powers of arrest were granted to ‘[a]ny 
administrative officer, labour officer, police officer, Liwali or recognised native headmen 
of a township on receiving instructions from an AO’ over anyone suspected of 
committing an offence against these regulations, and upon conviction an offender would 
be liable to a fine not exceeding Shs.300/- or three months imprisonment.
Whilst it is clear that many officials sympathised with Molohan’s proposals, senior
21 Ag.MS to CS, 27“' August 1941, TNA/30134.
22 PC Baker to CS, 3r September 1941, TNA/30134. McRoberts’ ruling on 136(2) was held to have 
invalidated the whole o f  section 136 o f the Township Regulations.
23 Molohan, ‘Unemployment’, p.2.
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officials at the secretariat and the Colonial Office remained reluctant to endorse the 
introduction of a pass system in what was a mandated territory. Those administrators with 
first hand experience of the situation in Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, were 
unanimous in the opinion that there was a pressing need to enhance the current 
legislation. According to Baker, in 1941, ‘drastic measures are urgently necessary in 
order to reduce the numbers of unemployed and underfed natives, both adult and juvenile, 
who infest the township.’24 That year’s provincial annual report commented that such 
measures were under consideration.25 No action appears to have been taken, however, 
and the following year the District Officer in Dai* es Salaam was once more complaining 
to his counterparts in neighbouring districts that ‘ [njumbers of Wahuni and unemployed 
continue to drift into the town’. 26
Whilst the drift of ‘undesirables’ into the township continued to cause much 
consternation during 1942, the potentially much greater problem of demobilised soldiers 
arriving in Dar es Salaam began to arouse equal concern amongst urban officials in the 
course of the year. In June, DC Pike drew Baker’s attention to
A  d ifficu lt situation that has started in Dar es Salaam and w hich  sh ew s every sign  o f  
develop in g  into an acute administrative problem after the war, that is, the disinclination o f  
discharged sold iers, whether disabled or otherw ise, to leave the tow n and to return to the 
land. T heir gratuities and pensions are spent in an incredibly short tim e and they then  
com plain  bitterly that the G overnm ent w ill not g ive them work, - by work, they m ean  
em ploym ent as m essengers and watchm en not manual labour.
...T h e  num bers at present returning from  Arm y L ife  are on ly  a trick le but they are 
increasing and w hen  the war ends there w ill be an absolute avalanche. Such a state o f  
affairs w ill m ake adm inistration o f  Dar es Salaam  T ow nship , already d ifficu lt, quite 
im possible.27
Baker told Pike he was ‘endeavouring to organise machinery, of which Government will 
approve, for prohibiting Africans from residing in Dar es Salaam unless they are in 
possession of a permit to do so.’28 By the end of the year such approval had still to be 
won. In his annual report Baker complained that existing sanctions could not ‘ adequately 
deal with the situation.’29
24 PC Baker to CS, 29th September 1941, TNA/30134.
25 PAR for 1941, p.10.
26 Political, Uzaramo, Dsm, to Political, Kisarawe, Pugu, 12th June 1942.
27 DC Pike to PC, 4th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
28 Provincer, Dsm to Political, Uzaramo, Dsm, 9th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
29 PAR for 1942, p.20.
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Conditions in Dai' es Salaam deteriorated yet further. In spite of taxes being reduced 
the previous year from Shs 11/- to 9/- in districts surrounding the capital -as a 
disincentive to rural-urban movement30- the drift actually accelerated during 1943. Whilst 
migrant youth and the presence of discharged soldiers remained a problem, the situation 
was exacerbated by the introduction of rationing in the town in May, which, according to 
the District Officer, ‘acted like a magnet in attracting natives to the town who wished to 
be ensured a regular means of procuring foodstuffs.’31 The situation was not helped by 
the fact that food was in short supply elsewhere when, as the 1943 provincial report 
observed, ‘Dar es Salaam is the standby for peasants whose crops have failed or who for 
various reasons are unable to earn the wherewithal to pay their tax in their home areas.’32 
In December, Pike complained to Baker:
T he increasing number o f  natives from other districts o f  the province (esp ecially  Rufiji and 
M orogoro) w ho are com ing to Dar es Salaam in search o f  em ploym ent sh ow s no sign  o f  
decreasing, and in v iew  o f  the food  situation they should be discouraged. I f  they are in 
gen u ine need o f  em ploym ent, then they should be advised  before leav in g  their hom e  
districts that there is plenty o f  w ork availab le on sisal estates in th is district, but that 
em ploym ent in and around Dar es Salaam township is difficult to obtain. They may indeed  
be successfu l in obtaining em ploym ent i f  they are lucky, at a reasonable w age for a month  
or so , on som e special works, but subsequently they w ill find them selves out o f  work and 
are then forced to take up em ploym ent with Indians at veiy  low  w ages.33
At the Economic Control Board meeting in January 1944 it was reported that as a result 
of a poor harvest ‘six hundred natives had entered the town from Western Rufiji alone’.34 
‘This drift’, observed Baker,
b esid es in creasin g  the d iffic u ltie s  o f  the A dm inistration  m eans the w ithdraw al o f  
agricu lturalists from  food  production  to non-productive, n on -essen tia l jo b s and the 
ten dency  m ust be stopped . T his constant stream  o f  m en further contributes to  the  
considerable difficulties o f  the food situation and rationing in Dar es Salaam .35
In a letter to the Chief Secretary, Crawford, the secretary of the ECB, raised his concerns 
about the big increase in the consumption of ‘native foods’ in Dar es Salaam that year36 -
30 The rate in the town remained at Shsl 1/-. PAR for 1942, p.20.
31 Report to the Labour Commissioner, Third Quarter 1943, TNA/61/14/30. See Bryceson, “Food supply”, 
for a discussion o f  rationing.
32 PAR for 1943, p.25.
33 DC, Dsm to Provincer, Dsm, 14lh December 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
34 Mins, o f meeting o f ECB, 4th January 1944, TNA/61/443/1.
35 Provincer, Dsm to Political, Rufiji, Morogoro and Bagamoyo, 21st 1943.
36 Crawford to CS, 13th January 1944, TNA/28685.
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consumption had increased from 3,000 bags in June to 7,000 in December.37 Meanwhile 
the registration of all African townsmen that had preceded the introduction of rationing 
had revealed that Dar es Salaam’s population had increased by over 10,000 since the 
outbreak of war.38 Indeed, by late 1943, conditions in Tanganyika’s main towns had 
become so severe that —‘in order to prevent further overcrowding and the concomitant 
aggravation of existing conditions’- it was decided to restrict the immigration of non­
natives into Dar es Salaam and Tanga.39
It became increasingly clear, even to those without first hand experience of conditions 
in the town, that something had to be done. Starting in 1943, a vigorous debate was 
conducted amongst officials at all levels of the colonial administration, from district 
officers to Whitehall mandarins, over the best means of controlling accelerated migration 
to the towns. Those officials who were most directly affected by this phenomenon 
pressed for legislation which established more than just the power to expel undesirable 
occupants from the urban areas. The Labour Commissioner, Hickson-Mahoney, for 
instance, envisaged the need for both the control of immigration to the town and the 
restriction of juvenile employment, in addition to the repatriation of ‘unemployed 
undesirables’.40 Baker agreed, but was anxious that there should be as little interference 
as possible with the freedom of the individual.41 He was also keen that any new 
legislation should apply to all races, something Whittle, another senior government 
official, considered impractical, the proposed legislation being in his opinion ‘only 
needed and only politically possible for Africans’.42
In effect any machinery to restrict African movement within the territory amounted to 
a pass system. There was still resistance to the introduction of such drastic measures. 
With the situation in the towns so serious, however, and -thanks to the return of growing 
numbers of demobilised soldiers- only likely to get worse, it was pointed out to the Chief 
Secretary that such a move should now be contemplated:
w e m ust exp ect a considerable influx into the larger tow nships o f  m en discontented with
37 ECB Mins., 4th January 1944, TNA 28685.
38 PAR for 1943, p.24.
39 Governor Jackson to Sec. State for the Colonies, 27th November 1943, TNA/31751.
40 Sec. Min. 11th March 1943, TNA/28685.
41 Baker min., 17th March 1943, TNA/28685.
42 Sec. Min. by Whittle, 26th March 1943, TNA/28685.
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tribal conditions and attracted by the m ore sophisticated conditions o f  tow nship  life . This 
raises a very important question in a pressing form, as to whether it w ill not be essential 
that som e system  o f  closer control over townships w ill not becom e necessary. There have 
been various d iscussions at different tim es on the advisability o f  som e type o f  pass system , 
and I think that on the w hole the general opinion is opposed  to it, and it has o f  course  
aspects w hich  are m uch d isliked  by m any shades o f  op inion. N o n eth eless  I think the 
question calls for serious consideration under the new conditions w e w ill have to face after 
the war and I think this point is one o f  the m ost important that should  be seriou sly  
discussed in all its aspects at the Provincial C om m issioners’ conference.43
The previous year, Baker had studied the pass regulations in place in Natal under the 
Native (Urban Areas) Act but had considered them ‘harsh and unsuited to Dar es 
Salaam’.44 Seven months on, he was inclined to look upon the South African system in a 
more positive light.45
By the time of the 1943 Provincial Commissioners’ conference, held between 23rd and 
27 August, draft legislation to facilitate the removal of undesirable elements had been 
prepared for discussion. Addressing the conference, Balter stated that this legislation was 
fine as far as it went, but -like the temporary legislation passed under the wartime 
Defence Regulations in the wake of the McRoberts ruling- it only allowed for removal 
after entry, which was not enough. Further legislation was required to prevent the original 
movement to the urban areas. Only this initial legislation was endorsed by the conference 
participants, however, eventually passing into law in early 1944 as the Townships 
(Removal of Undesirable Natives) Ordinance (Cap. 104). According to the accompanying 
‘objects and reasons’:
T he powers to be taken under this B ill to rem ove undesirable natives from the tow nships  
and other populated areas to their districts o f  origin or to other suitable locality  w ithin the 
Territory are considered necessary in the interests both o f  the natives them selves and o f  
orderly life  w ithin such areas.46
The ordinance incorporated a number of safeguards designed to ‘avoid the appearance of 
arbitrary or discriminating treatment’ (my emphasis) including definitions of potential 
culprits and powers of appeal to Provincial Commissioners and (eventually) the 
Governor. Whilst the ordinance did provide a stricter definition of who may be deemed 
an undesirable than previous legislation, it remained broad enough to include a good 
proportion of the urban African population. Alongside those who had ‘no regular means
43 Sec. Min. by W.E.J., 7th May 1943, TNA/61/702/3.
44 Baker to CS, 16,h July 1942, TNA/28685.
45 Baker to CS, 16"' March 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
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of employment or other reputable means of livelihood’, ‘natives having 110 settled home 
within the township’ were subject to repatriation -  the ‘settled native’ being one who was 
either liable to house tax or who had paid poll tax for the current and previous year.47 
This meant that any labourer engaged in casual employment could be classed as 
undesirable; as could any African who, arriving in town within the current tax year, had 
not paid municipal poll tax the previous year. The ordinance was also racially 
discriminatory in character (it was the ‘Removal of Undesirable Natives' Ordinance).
Despite the wide powers bestowed by the ordinance upon urban officials to deal with 
the surplus urban population, the Governor made it clear in a letter to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies that yet further legislation was required. According to the 
Governor, the bill was ‘a first instalment of legislation of a more drastic character which 
will be required to deal with post-war conditions’:
The ex istin g  problem s resulting from  the drift o f  population from  rural to urban areas - 
u nem ploym ent, vagrancy and ju v en ile  delinquency - are such  as to  ca ll for p o sitiv e  
rem edial action  and are likely  to increase rather than dim inish. W hen th ese  problem s  
becom e further com plicated by the presence o f  the dem obilised elem ent, it w ill probably be 
necessary to re-inforce the pow ers o f  com pulsory repatriation under the leg isla tion  now  
proposed by introducing wider measures to control entry into tow nships.48
In response to the Governor’s letter, J.V. Wild, a Colonial Office official, pointed out that 
the problem of the drift to the town was not restricted to Tanganyika; both the Governor 
of Uganda and the British Resident in Zanzibar having expressed similar concerns. He 
remained sceptical, nevertheless, of any initiatives to restrict African mobility:
Personally, I do not think that leg islation  to prevent entry into the tow nsh ips w ould  be 
justified  unless it w ere com plim entary to developm ent plans in the native areas. It is clear 
from the G overnor’s despatch that he is not m erely concerned w ith  ju ven iles, corner boys, 
or d egenerates. The m easures w h ich  he forecasts are to be d irected against w hat he  
describes as the dem obilised  elem ent. It is a little unfortunate that the first hint w e  should  
have had o f  the G overnor’s plans for dealing w ith dem obilised  soldiers should have been  
this n egative, not to  say repressive, m easures. T hese m en have b ecom e accustom ed to 
cinem as, canteens, and the like, and unless such facilities are m ade availab le to them  
elsew here, I do not think it w ould be right to deny them where they already exist.
T he solution  may be to teach Africans to build and run their ow n v illages and tow ns, but at 
present life in the native areas is not sufficiently attractive to justify  us in forcing all m en to 
remain there.49
4(5 Draft bill in PRO/CO/691/185/42431.
47 See sec.2 o f the Townships (Removal o f Undesirable Natives) Ordinance, GN. N o.6 of 1944.
48 Letter from Governor Jackson, 15th November 1943, PRO/CO/691/185/42431.
49 Min. by J.V.Wild, 6th December 1943, PRO/CO/691/185/42431.
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Such concerns were shared by others at the Colonial Office. K.W. Blaxter, the Assistant 
Secretary for Social Services, concurred with Wild’s view that the improvement of rural 
conditions was an important factor in stemming the rural-urban flow:
[T]he G overnor speaks o f  the need for powers to control m ovem ent etc., that is to say, 
m easures o f  restraint, but he does not seem  to have considered  very c lo se ly  w hether  
som ething cannot be done by way o f  m aking v illage life m ore interesting etc, as a m eans o f  
ch ecking the m ovem ent to the towns. W hen the dem obilised  sold iers return to their mud 
huts, they w ill hope for som ething m ore by way o f  local activity to keep them  interested  
than they did before they en listed .. ..50
Officials in Dar es Salaam, under increasing pressure from the persistent drift to the 
town, were less mindful of rural initiatives as a solution to the problem. In January 1944, 
the secretary of the Economic Control Board had recommended to Government that:
som e form o f  restriction should be im posed on the entry o f  natives to the tow nship o f  Dal­
es Salaam  and that com plem entary pow ers should be g iven  to the A dm inistration  to 
repatriate natives found in the tow n w ithout the necessary authority. It had now  b ecom e a 
m atter o f  the first im portance that the native population o f  Dar es Salaam  should  be 
stabilised, or if  possible, decreased, and steps should be taken to prevent the influx o f  non­
resident natives into the town due to food  conditions obtaining in the areas outside.51
In response to these demands Baker and Whittle drew up draft Defence (Entry of Natives 
into Townships: Restriction) Regulations -prohibiting the entry into (specified) towns of 
all but residents and those with permanent employment- which were sent to London for 
approval.
At the Colonial Office, information coming in of the deteriorating situation in 
Tanganyikan towns had caused Wild to reassess the situation:
Som ething clearly has to be done about the entry o f  natives into tow nships... when the food  
and housing shortage is acute. M aking life  in the native areas m ore attractive and building  
m ore h ouses in the tow ns are m easures w hich  at present are unfortunately out o f  the  
question on a sufficiently large scale and more direct action is needed.
He considered that conscription of unwanted migrants to work on plantations ‘would 
probably have a salutary effect on the townward trend, and would be a better form of 
direct action than merely driving them back to idleness in the tribal areas.’52 In the event
50 Min. (by Mr. Blaxter?), 1 l'h January 1944, PRO/CO/691/185/42431.
51 ECB mins., 4 th January 1944, TNA/61/443/1.
” ‘Something o f this sort has been tried in Zanzibar with some success’, Wild observed. ‘Idlers in town 
have been made to cultivate food crops on plots allotted to them in the neighbourhood o f the towns, and
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it was decided simply to go along with the proposals from Tanganyika, and the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies duly communicated his assent to the introduction of the 
proposed legislation which was passed as the Defence (Entry of Natives into Townships: 
Restriction) Regulations.53 The regulations made it illegal for an ‘alien’ native to remain 
in the town for longer than 48 hours without reporting to the Township Authority and 
obtaining a permit allowing him to do so.
In the wake of the regulations becoming law, disagreements surfaced amongst 
Tanganyikan officials over whether permits should be required of all residents in the 
town or only those who were new arrivals.54 It appears that this -and a lack of staff to 
implement the legislation- eventually resulted in the complete neglect of the 
regulations.55 Instead, within months of their being passed, officials began clamouring 
once again for further, more permanent legislation.56 At a meeting held to discuss the 
problem of urban drift in May 1944, both the Municipal Secretary, Helps, and Pike, now 
acting as Deputy Provincial Commissioner, argued that control of entry into Dar es 
Salaam would be necessary after the war, and in conclusion Governor Jackson stated that 
he wanted new legislation to be ready for this eventuality.57 At a subsequent meeting in 
September, agreement was reached that a system of native registration should be 
introduced. This, the meeting concluded, would not involve any hardships for natives, 
being on the contrary a beneficial measure. It was decided that all male Africans -it was 
considered undesirable to apply it to Europeans or Asians- liable to tax in the town should 
be issued with a permit. Women and children under twelve were exempted.58 A draft bill 
was drawn up ‘for the registration of inhabitants and control of entry into the towns’.59 If 
the town was not to be ‘flooded with unemployed loafers and potential criminals’, wrote 
Governor Jackson, then more effective legislation had to be introduced for ‘this serious 
social evil’ to be dealt with 60 Others were more dubious about the proposals. Chief 
Secretary Sandford warned against a ‘walled city policy’, observing that an unfeasibly
this action has had a good effect throughout the Protectorate and not merely in the urban areas directly 
affected.’ Min. by J.V.Wild, 26th February 1944, PRO/CO/691/191/42431.
53 GN N o.80 o f  1944.
54 See Min. by Lamb, 22nd February 1944, TNA/28685.
55 See comments by PC, EP in rnins. o f meeting, 511' September 1944, TNA/28685.
56 See mins. by Lamb, 12th May 1944, and Jackson, \3 U May 1944, TNA/28685.
57 See mins. o f meeting, 19th May 1944, TNA/28685.
58 Mins, o f meeting, 5 1 September 1944, TNA/28685.
59 At f. 123 a, TNA/28685.
60 Min., 13th October 1944, TNA 28685.
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‘huge apparatus of control’ to check daily entry to and occupation in the town would be 
required to implement such a scheme.61 In the end, the proposed legislation (which had 
the firm support of Governor Jackson) fell victim to changes in the administration; both 
in London and Dar es Salaam. On hearing of the proposals, Andrew Cohen -the new head 
of the Africa department at the Colonial Office- wrote to Sandford that they bore too 
great a resemblance to South African and Rhodesian systems of population control.62 
Meanwhile, at a meeting in Dar es Salaam to discuss the draft bill, William Battershill, 
who had just replaced Jackson as Governor of Tanganyika, opened proceedings by 
declaring his ‘vast objections’ to the proposed legislation both in principle and detail.63 
Four days later Battershill informed Cohen that he would ‘hear nothing more about this 
Bill.’64 Whilst concern over conditions in the African township of Dar es Salaam was 
widely felt, in the end political considerations ruled out the introduction of legislation 
aimed at restricting African mobility. Although it was never explicitly referred to as a 
factor, Tanganyika’s mandatory status made any kind of pass system untenable.
Rural initiatives
Thwarted in their attempts to legislate against rural-urban migration, district officials 
were forced to turn their attention to the principal source of their woes; the rural areas of 
Eastern Province, Starting in the early 1940s, Dai* es Salaam district office requested that 
Tangazo (Notices) discouraging the move to town be announced in villages throughout 
Eastern Province. In June 1942, for example, the DC contacted his counterpart in 
Kisarawe requesting that:
notice be sent out again to the effect that 1) NO WORK [emphasis in original] is obtainable
in the town 2) and any person from the district found in the town without good reason will
be severely dealt with. ‘Good reason’ does not include sporadic work with Indians.65
Five days later a similar message was communicated to the DC in Utete.66 The following 
(amended) notice was forwarded by the Utete-Rufiji District Office to headmen to
61 Min., 13th October 1944, TNA/28685.
62 Cohen to CS, 10th April 1945, TNA/28685.
63 Mins, o f  meeting, 1st August 1944, TNA/28685.
64 Battershill to Cohen, 511' August 1945, TNA/28685.
65 Political, Uz., Dsm, to Political, Kisarawe, Pugu, 12th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
66 Political, Uz., Dsm, to Political, Utete, 17th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
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announce to their villagers:
Many people -especially youths- are coming from Rufiji District to Dar es Salaam 
Township to look for work. Residents themselves cannot get jobs now as they have been 
outnumbered by l WahmV  who are increasing day by day. Every effort is being made to 
return these youngsters and I would be most grateful if you would announce to the youths 
over there that there are no job opportunities and that they should not come to Dar es 
Salaam if  they do not have a confirmed job as anyone without a job will be severely 
punished.67
The letter which accompanied the announcement exhorted the headmen to put pressure 
on the parents of young adults:
It is up to the elders to convince their youths to stay at home. It’s up to the elders to help 
them find a wife.
This year the father o f a child who has gone to Dar es Salaam will pay his tax without 
hesitation and all those who have been exempted from taxes will be re-entered in the tax 
book if their children leave to go to Dar es Salaam without permission.
The childrens’ mistakes are the elders mistakes because it is up to the elders to teach their 
children from childhood to behave properly.68
Such propaganda appears to have had limited success. As a result further initiatives 
were forthcoming. In response to complaints received from Uzaramu headmen in 1943, 
who asked for permission to prohibit any person -man, woman or child- from coming to 
the town without obtaining a written permit from his Wakili to do so, Baker 
recommended that the most appropriate course of action was for Eastern Province Native 
Authorities to begin issuing ruhusaya njia:
2. It would be simple for the Uzaramo Native Authorities to issue an order under Sec 8(j) 
o f the Native Authorities Ordinance but I am uncertain whether AOs, the Liwali and the 
town headmen have power to remove persons found in Dar es Salaam without the required 
permit.
3. Such an order would carry a very much wider range than is contemplated in the draft 
‘Township (Restriction o f Natives) Rules, 1943’, but the initiative displayed by the Zaramu 
Wakilis and elders is worthy o f encouragement and I shall be glad to see brought into effect 
an order which will help considerably to control the immigration o f undesirables into Dar 
es Salaam.
67 P.L. Nairac for the DC, Utete-Rufiji to M wenyemzi/Mtawala wote [all headmen and chiefs], 2"d July 
1942, TNA/540/27/13 (Original in Swahili). The original (English) text from which this notice was adapted 
survives in Political, Uzaramo, Dsm to Political, Utete, 17th June 1942.
68 P.L. Nairac for the DC, Utete-Rufiji, 2™* July 1942, TNA/540/27/13. Original in Swahili -  my translation.
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4. It is possible that the Native Authorities o f Rufiji district and possibly those o f Morogoro
may wish to issue a similar restriction of Africans moving into Dar es Salaam.69
Two months on, DC Pike lent his weight to such measures to inhibit movement to the 
capital, arguing that all natives proceeding to Dar es Salaam should be given a travel 
permit by their Native Authority.70 The message was passed on accordingly to the district 
commissioners in Rufiji, Morogoro and Bagamoyo, who were asked to relay it to their 
Native Authorities, whilst simultaneously adopting c[a]ll other possible means... to keep 
these people on the land and to stop the drift to the town.’71 Without allocating increased 
resources to controlling unregulated movement into the towns, however, the ploy of 
getting Native Authorities to issue travel permits was merely a stopgap measure, and not 
a particularly effective one at that. Whilst it may have discouraged the initial movement, 
once an African had left his home district lack of a permit to travel did not constitute any 
offence against the territorial laws. When, two years later, at the 1946 Eastern Province 
District Commissioners’ conference, the feasibility of a Native Authority prohibition on 
entry into towns was discussed, it was ‘decided that the machinery required to make such 
an order effective was impracticable at present.’ ‘It was agreed’ instead, ‘that Native 
Authorities should constantly be advised to discourage by active propaganda the drift of 
their people to the townships.’72 A regime which could not afford to implement some 
form of pass system, either financially, or, in the final analysis, politically, and which 
simultaneously was hard pressed to effect any improvement in conditions of life in the 
countryside, could in the end only resort to ‘active propaganda’ amongst rural 
communities to attempt to stem the drift to the towns.
Influx control in the 1950s
As had occurred in the latter part of the previous decade, the unemployment problem 
in Dar es Salaam faded somewhat in the late-1940s. A post-war building boom and 
enhanced port activity, along with a generally more vibrant economy, helped absorb 
surplus labour within the town as well as providing employment for enough of the large
69 Baker to CS, 6th October 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
70 DC, Dsm to PC, 14th December 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
71 PC, Dsm to Political, Rufiji, Morogoro and Bagamoyo, 21st December 1943, TNA/61/443/1.
72 Mins, o f  DCs’ Conference, EP, held week commencing 2,ld September 1946, TNA/61/502/pt.l.
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numbers of migrants entering the capitol for it not to become a serious problem.73 
Unemployment, the DC observed in 1949, was ‘generally voluntary’.74 However, by the 
early-1950s the situation had once again begun to deteriorate. In 1953, the Labour Officer 
recorded ‘noticeable unemployment’ in the town for the first time in many years.75 The 
following year, the Tanganyika Standard was reporting the presence of around 20,000 
unemployed Africans in and around town.76 Whilst this figure is implausible, and was 
refuted by the Labour Department at the time, it is clear that unemployment had once 
again re-emerged as a serious problem. A growth rate which between the censuses of 
1948 and 1957 worked out at over seven per cent per annum was largely responsible, 
although by the end of this period stabilisation and the more economical use of labour by 
employers was also leading to a contraction in the job market.77 Despite the re-emergence 
of serious joblessness, Africans continued to stream to the town. Wages were rising, and 
whilst acquiring employment immediately was unlikely, informal economic activities 
provided an opportunity to obtain a subsistence whilst awaiting a formal job, or failing 
that relatives could be relied upon for support. An increase in school-leavers (Standard VI 
and above) after WWII, whose education fitted them for work in the ‘modern’ as opposed 
to the agricultural sector, was also partly responsible for the influx of immigrants.78
Whilst unemployment emerged once again, the problem of overcrowding had never 
gone away. By 1950, Dar es Salaam’s public health committee was drawing attention to 
extreme overcrowding in the African and Asian areas, which, according to the Medical 
Officer, was ‘affecting the health of the community and especially the normal 
development of children.’79 Although the situation was to some extent ameliorated by the 
construction of public housing in the course of the 1950s, crisis was only averted through 
the relaxation of building regulations, and by unauthorised African building in urban 
‘village’ areas such as Buguruni, Keko and Mikorosheni. Meanwhile, with limited 
resources at its disposal, the municipality was unable to provide public services for all the
73 Between the end o f  the war and 1952 the Tanganyika economy experienced a healthy rate o f  growth, 
principally thanks to rising sisal prices. In 1953, however, there was a downturn in foreign trade and it was 
not until 1959 that 1952 rates were once again reached. See C. Ehrlich, “The Poor Country: The 
Tanganyika Economy from 1945 to Independence”, in Low and Smith, History o f  East Africa , (Oxford, 
1976).
74 Kisarawe AR for 1949, para. 16.
75 Labour Office DAR for 1953, p.2, TNA/61/503/Vol.III.
76 TS, 28th December 1954.
77 Leslie, Sw vey, p. 123.
78 Cttee o f Enquiry into problems o f African housing mins, 18th December 1953, TNA/225/DC01/3/23.
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planned areas, never mind the numerous ‘village’ communities within the town.80 It was 
this over-stretched urban infrastructure, alongside increasing un- and under-employment, 
which formed the backdrop for a renewed outbreak of official anxiety about urban growth 
in the early 1950s, in the course of which arguments about the desirability, practicality 
and morality of influx control all resurfaced once again.
The issue of influx control had slipped off the agenda in the period after WWII. This 
can be related to the decline in unemployment. Equally though, it can be attributed to the 
difficulty in coming up with a system of controlling African mobility which would satisfy 
both urban administrators and officials in the Secretariat and at the Colonial Office who 
were sensitive to potential criticism from UN overseers. ‘This problem’, wrote the 
Uzaramo DC in response to a request for items for debate at a forthcoming conference in 
1946, ‘has been discussed without much profit at the last two conferences and further 
discussion may be equally inconclusive.’81 Thanks to these difficulties, any proposals for 
restricting rural-urban migration had been abandoned after the war. In the absence of 
more comprehensive legislation, Dar es Salaam officials relied upon Cap. 104 (the 
Townships (Removal of Undesirable Natives) Ordinance) and the Employment of 
Women and Young Persons Ordinance to deal with the surplus population. In order to 
stem the flow of juveniles to the town, ‘continual and active steps’ were taken to ensure 
that Sections 3(a) and 4 of the employment ordinance -which prohibited the employment 
of children except under certain conditions- were being observed.82 The principle weapon 
against unwanted immigrants though, remained Cap. 104. As more and more Africans 
found their way to the capital, repatriation through the use of this ordinance became an 
increasingly common phenomenon.
Despite its importance to urban administrators, however, Cap. 104 was not immune 
from criticism. ‘[A]ny severe application of this law,’ acknowledged the acting Chief 
Secretary in 1946, ‘or any extension of the control of movement of persons, would be an 
invasion of the liberty of the subject.’83 Meanwhile, officials in Whitehall remained 
distinctly uneasy. The Kenyan government had, in May 1946, attempted to have an
79 TS, 15Ih April 1950, p.10.
80 Min by Director o f  Town Planning, 23rd February 1953, TNA/225/DC3602.
81 Political, Uzaramo to PC,EP, 1st August 1946, TNA/61/502/pt.l.
82 Mins o f DC’s conference, EP, 2nd September 1946, TNA/61/502/pt.l.
83 Legco questions 25th July 1946, TNA/20887/Vol.II.
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ordinance along similar lines endorsed by the Colonial Office. It was reported later that 
Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary,
objected to ‘its discriminatory nature, which is reflected both in its title and provisions’. In 
addition he considered that the provisions imposed drastic conditions on the rights o f  the 
individual which could not be justified in normal peace time conditions, and he doubted 
whether there were adequate safeguards to ensure its proper administration.84
He went on to state his desire that early steps be taken to repeal the equivalent ordinance 
in Tanganyika.85 The Tanganyika government was instructed to consult with Kenya over 
the terms of a new ordinance which would replace Cap. 104.86 In response to these 
criticisms the application of the ordinance was, in January 1947, restricted to six major 
townships; Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, Korogwe, Moshi and Arusha. However, 
this remained the extent of the action taken by officials, who, appearing to stall for time, 
failed to respond to further Colonial Office correspondence on the issue after a revised 
ordinance was passed in Kenya in September 1949.87
If these were indeed delaying tactics, then the motivation behind them is readily 
apparent. Far from going away, concern over rural-urban migration re-emerged with 
particular force after the violent outcome of the 1950 strike. The heightened public 
awareness of urban lawlessness that arose in the wake of the strike led to growing 
demands to tackle the ‘surplus5 urban population. ‘No law-abiding citizen5, wrote the 
editor of the Tanganyika Standard in March 1950,
will oppose any step taken to eliminate all doubtful characters from our midst... [T]he 
faster these undesirables o f no fixed abode or occupation are sent out o f town and back to 
their own villages, the sooner will it be possible for their housing accommodation to be 
made available to really deserving cases at present living in overcrowded quarters.88
A correspondent to the newspaper advocated the introduction of a pass system along the 
lines of that which operated in Kenya,89 a view which was endorsed later in the year by 
the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce who ‘wanted to see a system of registration as 
comprehensive as possible -  like the kipande system in Kenya, which recorded past
84 Quoted in Memo, no.68, 6th May 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
85 Min. by E.L. Scott to P. Rogers, 30th November 1950, PRO/CO/691/208/42431.
86 Ibid.
87 Letters in February and April 1950 from the CO were ignored. PRO/CO/691/208/42431.
88 TS, 18th March 1950, p.21.
89 Letter from ‘Old Resident5, TS, 9th February 1950.
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employment and wages.’90 The Standard thought the Chamber’s proposals deserved ‘full 
support’:
A good start has been made by the Labour Department over registration o f dock workers. 
Carried a step further and made a universal practice, it would enable the authorities to 
check up immediately on all and sundry; it would eliminate the presence in the towns o f  
parasites living on their fellows and would make the task o f those concerned far easier in 
running to earth any illegal immigrants in our midst.91
To the dismay of the Standard, however, no such system was introduced. After a series of 
crimes and muggings occurred later in the decade the paper’s editor returned to the 
subject:
From such lawlessness it can be assumed that there must be hundreds, probably thousands, 
o f people wandering the streets o f the town without regular employment which would do 
away with the necessity to resort to crime for a livelihood, and it is a known fact that most 
o f these are Africans without any means o f support whatsoever, who pass the night on the 
lookout for easy money, unless asleep in the corner of some hovel or other.
These homeless, jobless, ne’er-do-wells have no intention o f doing an honest day’s work, 
and what is worse, they never will work so long as they can remain in town with little fear 
of being found out.
How different it would be if  every person had to satisfy the police as to where he worked, 
where he lived, and -at night- what he was doing in the streets or open spaces. We hazard a 
guess that a real round-up in Dar es Salaam alone would reveal the presence o f at least 
10,000 ‘o f 110 fixed occupation or abode’.
It is a very serious problem and one that can only be dealt with by the fullest co-operation 
between the residents o f the town and the police. Some people say it is a disgrace to carry a 
passport or registration card or other form o f identification, or have his fingerprints taken...
But why should anyone object, unless he has something to be ashamed o f and wants to 
hide?92
Whilst settler opinion lined up behind some form of registration of Africans, however, 
Africans themselves were resolutely opposed to such measures. ‘Experience has shown’, 
wrote one correspondent to the Standard,
that non-native business people and settlers plan and do things to their advantage; and they 
achieve the ends on objectives with ease because they receive little or no opposition from 
the natives who (at the present stage o f their development) are less intelligent, and less 
vocal than their non-native counterpart.
It must be clear to all concerned that the Africans do not want to have that silly system of  
kipande  that inconvenienced so much our African brothers in Kenya. Time and again
90 TS, 1st July 1950.
91 TS, 1st April 1950, p.20.
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Africans used to be stopped by the Kenya police who would ask them to produce their 
kipande.
.. .It is premature at present to introduce any system of identification upon the African. Do 
you think your kipande  or ID card will have any meaning to a Mgogo or Mporoto? The 
answer is: No, thank you. The African wants nothing of a passport for his identification. If 
you think he has not got to the stage o f having such a ‘Universal ID document’ as defined 
by one o f your readers on April 8 then leave him alone. If you want to be o f service to the 
African don’t idle time away by sitting down and talking o f identification and other trivial 
things. If you want to help the African give him sound education by establishing more and 
better schools and technical colleges; help him to achieve better health by establishing 
better and more modern organisations and schemes; concentrate in teaching him better 
ways o f agriculture to preserve the fertility o f the soil, then the whole world will 
congratulate you.93
In April 1950, when the municipal Public Health Committee recommended that the 
attention of central government be drawn to the need to control migration to the town so 
that overcrowding could be alleviated, an African councillor, Ali Meli, had argued 
against the proposals on the ground that this was ‘a political measure rather than one of 
health’; unsurprisingly, perhaps, his amendment was defeated.94
Despite African disquiet over population control measures and Colonial Office anxiety 
about Cap, 104, the Tanganyikan administration were unwilling to concede ground on the 
issue. In his eventual reply to correspondence from London, Surridge, the Chief 
Secretary, dismissed such concerns over the liberty of the colonial subject under 
prevailing conditions:
at this time o f rapid development, especially in Dar es Salaam, it is already difficult enough 
for the supply o f food and accommodation to keep pace with demand, and we feel that 
methods o f control which might not be justifiable in normal times should be allowed to 
continue for the time being.95
Cap. 104, he argued, was in any case regarded by Dar es Salaam officials ‘more in the 
light of a humanitarian measure by which the DC can repatriate quasi-criminals rather 
than imprison them.’ The Colonial Office nevertheless continued to urge the 
Tanganyikan administration to consider substituting Cap. 104 with milder legislation. 
Officials in Dar es Salaam retorted that the maintenance of the existing ordinance was the 
very least that was required in the circumstances. The Attorney General, for instance,
93 Letter from Kenneth Msomali, Sumbawanga, TS 6th May 1950, p.27.
94 TS, 15th April 1950, p. 10.
95 Surridge to Rogers(CO), 4th January 1951, TNA/21616/VoI.III.
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held that ‘the most effective course would be to have Cap. 104 plus  provision for 
registration.’96 (My emphasis).
In May 1952, as a sop to Whitehall, it was suggested that Cap. 104 be scrapped but that 
repatriations should continue as usual under the Destitute Persons Ordinance which gave 
similar powers over unemployed Africans. After discussion by the Executive Council, 
however, the proposal was rebuffed as the time was ‘inappropriate’. c[I]n view of the 
opposition to the withdrawal of the Ordinance locally,’ it was observed, ‘it would be very 
difficult to make any change now.’97 Indeed, towards the end of the year, Governor 
Twining requested permission from the Colonial Office to extend the application of 
Cap. 104 to three more towns; Mwanza, Musoma and Shinyanga. ‘I consider’, he wrote,
that in spite o f the objections which have been raised to its continued use, the Ordinance 
should continue in force and I must emphasize that I am supported in this view by 
responsible public, as well as official, opinion.98
In the face of the persistent defence of Cap. 104 by Tanganyikan officials, the Colonial 
Office finally conceded that it could remain on the statute book. However, it was insisted 
that the ordinance be amended. First, to remove the ‘unfettered discretion of the 
executive’ bestowed by the existing legislation (under which appeal against decisions by 
a DC was to the Provincial Commissioner), and second, to address its’ racially 
discriminatory nature. In July 1953 an amended ordinance was passed.99 It enabled (in 
theory) action to be taken against undesirable persons not just natives, and appeal was 
allowed to the District Court (with eventual appeal to the High Court). Meanwhile, the 
stipulation to be liable to house tax or to have paid poll tax for the current and previous 
year in order to prove urban residence was also changed to one of parents legally residing 
in the town or able to prove residence there for at least 18 months out of the last two 
years.
Whilst officials in Tanganyika may have been satisfied with the retention of Cap. 104, 
many of those responsible for urban administration were soon stressing once again the 
necessity for further controls over African mobility. Between 1948 and 1952 the African
96 Min. by AG, 31st March 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.IIl.
97 Note for PCs’ conference, July 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
98 Twining to Rogers(CO), 21st November 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
99 Townships (Removal o f  Undesirable Persons) Ordinance, No. 15 o f 1953.
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population in Dar es Salaam had increased by over 50 per cent, with 26,565 more 
Africans residing in the capital in the latter year. ‘Constant, uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable immigration’, complained the DC in 1953, ‘is a very serious problem and 
must if  allowed to continue, ultimately threaten the whole working of the 
Municipality5.100 He bemoaned the inefficacy of the existing machinery for tackling the 
surplus population. Those responsible for housing in the city were equally concerned. 
Earlier in the year the Director of Town Planning had written of a ‘basic error ...in 
quietly accepting the phenomenal increase of African population in towns.’101 ‘Some 
means’, he concluded, ‘will have to be found of limiting this continual immigration from 
country areas, if only to put a firm limit on the urban housing problem.5 The Labour 
Commissioner was another who viewed the situation with some anxiety:
The movement from rural into urban areas o f adult males and to a lesser extent o f  juveniles 
still gives cause for concern. Ostensibly such individuals may be said to be seeking 
employment but judging from the relatively small number who register for work at 
employment exchanges it is probable that the greater proportion are attracted to the towns 
by the possibility o f making a living by dubious means.102
A number of proposals were put forward from various quarters to address the 
situation. The Labour Commissioner considered that compulsory registration at an 
Employment Exchange of all incomers to Dar es Salaam would be a solution to the 
problem.103 After a visit to Elisabethville, DC Harris advocated the introduction of 
identity cards such as those used in the Belgian Congo.104 The issue was a perennial on 
the agenda of the Provincial Commissioners’ conferences in the mid-1950s. Each time 
different recommendations were made, yet none were acted upon. In July 1954, 
Provincial Commissioners urged that businesses using casual migrant labour in Dar es 
Salaam be restricted to employing just three or four casuals (unless the Labour 
Department permitted more), as was the case in Mombasa.105 In January the following 
year it was decided ‘that a system of voluntary registration could with advantage be 
introduced in Dar es Salaam, and that this, while providing a most useful measure of
™ DAR for 1953, pp.7-8.
101 Min., 23rd February 1953, TNA/225/DC/3602.
102 Labour Dept. AR for 1953, p.33.
103 Ibid.
104 Harris’ scheme was vetoed on the grounds that ‘it would probably be said to be an infringement o f the 
liberty o f  the subject and liable to arouse political opposition.’ Harris, Donkey’s Gratitude, p.320.
105 PCs’ Conference mins, July 1954, Item 39(B).
231
control, would be acceptable generally to the African population.’106 Five months later, at 
their June conference, Provincial Commissioners were discussing no less than fourteen 
measures aimed at solving the problem of African immigration into towns (a problem ‘of 
long standing but one which is progressively becoming of greater urgency’).107 These 
included action to be taken in Dar es Salaam itself; such as the introduction of an African 
Authority in the township with the powers and responsibilities of a Native Authority; the 
registration of new arrivals; and compulsory education to the age of fifteen. Meanwhile, 
several rural initiatives were promoted for discussion by the Commissioner for Eastern 
Province, who stressed that in Dar es Salaam it was ‘apparent that unilateral action can do 
no more than maintain an already unsatisfactory status quo, at considerable expense.’ 
Only one of the fourteen proposals received the whole hearted endorsement of the 
conference -  the uncontroversial suggestion that a social survey of the immigrant and 
floating population be carried out in order to ascertain its seasonal fluctuations and 
motivations for the move to the town. On the other hand, compulsory registration, 
improvement of the machinery for removal of undesirables, and the application of a cheti 
cha njia (pass) system in the rural areas were all rejected once again. Even propaganda to 
emphasize the expense and difficulties of urban life to rural dwellers was ruled out, on 
the grounds that it could lead to a shortage of labour or to a demand for higher wages by 
urban workers.108 Measures to control African mobility were, throughout the 1940s and 
1950s, repeatedly repudiated on the basis of being too complicated or politically 
unacceptable or both. However, with the urban economy and infrastructure being put 
under increasing strain by the rural-urban flow of migrants, officials responsible for the 
administration of the capitol continued to lobby central government for influx control 
measures which for political reasons it was compelled to refuse.
In his report on detribalisation in 1957, Molohan, who had previously been a strong 
advocate of such measures, appeared to understand this predicament. He completely ruled 
out the introduction of a pass system to Tanganyika, principally on the basis of its cost 
and likely (in)effectiveness. However, the drift of population to the town was 
acknowledged as a pressing problem, and Molohan put forward a number of other
106 Ibid., Jan. 1955, p.31.
107 Ibid., June 1955, App. D.
108 For discussion o f  proposals see Ibid., June 1955, pp,25-27.
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proposals to address the phenomenon, most of which were, for a change, acted upon.109 
To facilitate the operation of Cap. 104, power to repatriate individuals was extended to the 
Liwali and Wakili. Another amendment to this ordinance made proof of urban residence 
more demanding; the length of time necessary to have dwelt in the town being stretched 
from eighteen months out of the previous two years to four out of the previous five years. 
As a further measure to discourage migration, an attempt was made to shift the cost of 
repatriation from Government (up till then costs had been covered by the provincial 
budget) onto the Native Authorities in the district to which undesirables were removed. 
Meanwhile, a voluntary registration scheme was initiated in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and 
Moshi, which, the Chief Secretary informed the Colonial Office, it was hoped would 
‘strengthen the status of the respectable.’110 No records remain detailing the success or 
failure of this scheme, although with TANU so effectively organising opposition to the 
colonial government it is unlikely that there was much demand for the new identification 
cards. Molohan also recommended that a system of reporting the presence of new arrivals 
on a ward basis should be implemented in the town, and that the rules regulating casual 
labour in Mombasa should be examined with a view to duplicating them in Dar es 
Salaam. These proposals though, like countless others over the years, do not appear to 
have been acted upon.
Molohan’s recommendations predominantly covered measures to be taken in the 
towns themselves. He was, however, also aware of the effect that conditions in the rural 
areas were likely to have on the drift to the town. ‘If the rural areas are systematically 
developed’, he wrote in his report, ‘the attractions of town life may possibly diminish and 
immigration into the towns should be reduced.’111 Molohan was bullish about improving 
conditions in the rural areas, and the impact this was already having on internal 
migration:
Since the end of WWII and more particularly during the last five years... it is possible to 
detect a new trend in Tanganyika. Whilst the urban areas continue to prove a magnet and 
attract the younger African... there are signs that economic development o f the tribal areas 
and the introduction o f more intensified and modern systems o f agriculture, Africans are 
beginning to realise that with the greatly increased prices o f agricultural products there are 
now as many, if  not more, lucrative means o f livelihood to be found on their own doorsteps 
than there were in the past and that it is as, if not more, profitable, and certainly less
109 The ‘Ndola report’ documents action taken upon Molohan’s recommendations.
110 CS to Gorell-Barnes(CO), 27th March 1957
111 Molohan, Detribalisation , , para.94.
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irksome, to work for oneself than for another for an equal and perhaps greater gain. The 
consequence has been a falling off in the number of men proceeding from certain tribal 
areas to the areas o f employment, and I think it is unlikely that this tendency will 
decrease.112
It was an over-optimistic appraisal of the situation. Whilst a more dynamic rural 
economy was emerging in areas such as Chaggaland, and Buhaya, and other areas were 
the focus of colonial development initiatives (for example, cotton production in 
Sukumaland or the Ubena Wattle Scheme), the rural parts of Eastern Province -from 
which the bulk of Dar es Salaam’s population was drawn- were mostly underdeveloped 
and vulnerable to drought. In 1959, Eastern Province had the second smallest number of 
African agricultural marketing co-operatives in Tanganyika after Tanga Province (whose 
agriculture was dominated by the plantation sector) -  just 27 compared to the 324 in Lake
• | n  , 4 4
Province. Conditions in the villages of Kisarawe, Rufiji, and Bagamoyo districts did 
little to diminish the allure of the metropolis amongst their younger inhabitants. 
Meanwhile, the introduction of a minimum wage in Dai’ es Salaam in 1957 was followed 
in 1958 by a poor harvest in Eastern Province, both of which made the urban option 
considerably more attractive to rural folk.114 The adoption of the minimum wage 
compounded the problem doubly; whilst attracting migrants it also stimulated more 
economical use of labour on the part of urban employers, thus leading to a contraction in 
urban employment at a time of rapid population growth.115 By 1958 the decision was 
made to use propaganda once again in the rural areas in order to discourage movement to 
the capital. Upcountry, labour officers stressed the restricted opportunities for 
employment there, whilst weekly radio broadcasts from Dar es Salaam transmitted the 
same cautionary message.116 These efforts appeared to have little, if any, impact. The 
situation was complicated by the inappropriate schooling many officials felt rural 
children were receiving, which triggered dissatisfaction with rural life and work amongst 
African youth. ‘Districts sending their young folks to schools’, concluded a meeting of 
the Eastern Province Advisory Council in 1958, ‘were ‘rewarded’ by losing them to the 
towns.’ Members of the council criticised
112 Ibid., para.4.
113 A. Coulsen, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford, 1982), p.68.
! 14 Labour Dept. ARs for 1957, p.43 (and 1958, p. 19).
115 Ibid., p.43.
116 Labour Dept. AR for 1958, p.5.
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Rural education... [for] breeding discontent, putting too much emphasis on book learning 
as opposed to crafts or husbandry, and producing people who wrongly despised the 
agricultural worker. It was felt that rural communities must be made more attractive, with 
the ci aftsman holding a more respected position in order to preserve a skilled and contented 
peasantry.117
Whilst lip service was paid towards the need to improve conditions in the rural areas, 
however, both the political will and the financial resources to take any action in this 
regard were noticeable by their absence.
This absence was highlighted by the arrival of a ‘responsible’ African government in 
1960. Partly thanks to the anxiety felt by leading African politicians about the political 
threat posed by a large unemployed underclass in the towns, a number of rural 
development schemes aimed at drawing surplus labour away from the capital were 
initiated soon after TANU’s assumption of internal self-rule.118 Short-term ‘palliatives’ 
for urban unemployment were announced in November 1960. These included the 
conscription of 1,000 workers for road building in the rural areas. A further 500 were sent 
to clear land in the Kilombero Valley.119 Once cleared, Kilombero was to serve as a 
location for longer term measures aimed at alleviating urban unemployment. According 
to the minutes of a cabinet meeting, these would entail: ‘creative developments in new 
communities, thus offering counter-attractions to the excitements which led people to 
endure the discomforts of unemployment in large towns.’120 Anticipating future national 
policies of population re-location and concentration it was recommended that 4[l]ong- 
term schemes should be reviewed against the need for a full community life; they should 
therefore take account of the need for schools, villages and community development 
generally, as well as the provision of land and water.’ Whilst these policies were to prove 
no more successful in arresting the rural-urban flow, in tackling the problems of over­
urbanisation the first African administration -in  contrast to its colonial predecessor- did 
at least show a willingness to adopt substantive measures other than those aimed simply 
at influx control.
117 TS, 26th June 1958, p.5.
113 Mins o f  Meeting o f Council o f Ministers, 14th November 1960, PRO/CO/822/2962.
119 Press Release, 15th November 1960, PRO/CO/822/2962.
120 Mins o f  Meeting o f Council o f Ministers, 14<h November 1960, PRO/CO/822/2962.
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Chapter Nine
Purging the town: the removal of undesirables, 1941-1961
The rapid growth of Dar es Salaam’s African population in the last two decades of 
colonial rule placed a district administration, lacking the financial resources, the 
manpower, and even -having as it did but limited knowledge about the movements, 
motivations and activities of African urban residents- the imagination to deal with this 
phenomenon, under increasing pressure to retain control over the urban arena. The formal 
economy was over-stretched, incapable, for most of the period, of providing sufficient 
employment opportunities for incoming migrants. Housing and the basic infrastructure in 
the African areas of town were similarly overburdened. The period saw the growth of 
self-help initiatives on the part of African urban residents. Unauthorised construction of 
housing boomed, with urban ‘villages’ such as Buguruni expanding apace, and ‘shanty’ 
settlements emerging in Makaburi and Chang’ombe after the war and at Mikorosheni 
(and elsewhere) in the 1950s.1 Informal economic activity became increasingly common. 
The municipal and district administrations had limited influence over such informal 
initiatives, and whilst these activities provided needy individuals with a home and an 
income, they remained technically illegal, and were generally perceived of as illegitimate 
by urban officials. Their emergence signalled a loss of colonial control; as did the rise in 
crime in the post-war period. In apportioning blame for these urban ills, officials were 
inclined to point to African immigration as the principle factor. Tackling the ‘surplus’ 
urban African population was an essential element in any attempt to re-assert colonial 
control. As the town grew beyond the capacity of either the urban formal economy to 
sustain it or the municipal housing supply to provide it with sufficient legal 
accommodation, efforts were made to stabilise the African population. This was 
attempted partly through the adoption in the mid-to-late fifties of a revised policy towards 
urban labour. Equally important though -indeed more so in view of its added role in the
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social control of the urban populace- was the increasing official intolerance displayed 
towards those Africans in the town without formal, full-time employment. Although 
colonial administrators had always disparaged the presence of jobless Africans in the 
urban centres, only rarely was action taken between the wars against individuals on these 
grounds alone. From the early 1940s, however, such action came to be seen as entirely 
justified and occurred with increasing regularity.
Repatriation campaigns in the 1940s
There is a good deal of irony in the timing of Justice McRoberts ruling, in Marchl941, 
that Township Rule 136(2) was an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of the 
colonial subject. Up to this time the machinery for repatriation had been used relatively 
sparsely, generally being restricted to African criminals. In the years 1938, 1939 and 
1940 respectively only 32, 15 and 35 ‘undesirable sojourners with several criminal 
convictions’ were forcibly removed from the town using this legislation.2 Exceptional use 
of it against unemployed Africans appears to have been made in the inter-war period only 
at times of emergency such as the years following WWI, or in the early 1930s, when 
large-scale redundancies led to mass unemployment in the town. It was only after 
McRoberts’ ruling, and the immediate re-introduction of repatriation legislation, that un- 
and under-employed Africans were singled out as a routine target of official action. Such 
measures were necessary in the eyes of urban administrators anxious about the re- 
emergence of an unemployment problem, which unlike the previous decade would this 
time not go away. Writing in response to McRoberts, immediately after his ultra vires 
ruling, Baker argued that it was
vital that unemployment and ill-doing must be checked so far as is possible in urban areas 
and, with this end in view, it is imperative that those who can find no work or are habitual 
criminals must be repatriated for their own good as well as that o f the community.3
Such a view clearly carried weight. Within a month of rule 136(2) being declared ultra 
vires new repatriation legislation had been introduced (see Chapter Seven). These new 
regulations were soon being put into operation. Records survive of the repatriation of
1 Sofers’ report, 21st April 1951, p.41 (TNA/18950/Vol.III); Leslie, Swvey, pp. 123/4.
2 PC Baker to CS, 12th March 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
3 Ibid.
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fourteen youths from Dar es Salaam in early September 1941.4 In reporting the expulsion 
of a further six ‘undesirable natives’ two weeks later, DC Revington remarked upon the 
‘likelihood of many more being repatriated in the next few months as it is considered that 
any native who has neglected to pay tax or is unemployed is an undesirable.’5 
McRoberts’ judgment clearly had no impact on the actions of urban officials. Far from 
witnessing a decline in the forcible removal of unwanted Africans from the town in the 
months following the ruling, the groups against which the legislation was applied was 
extended and ever more frequent use was made of repatriation to control the urban 
population. The trend continued into 1942. That year the Commissioner for Prisons 
reported an ‘abnormal number of Remand Juveniles’ (83) being received at Dar es 
Salaam. This was due
to a ‘Round-up’ o f undesirables for repatriation which occurred during the months o f  
September and October. At that time, petty thefts and small gangs o f thieves were 
definitely increasing, and there was a large number o f Juveniles in the Township without 
proper guardianship, means o f subsistence or homes. It was found that these Juveniles had 
drifted into the Township from outlying districts for the purpose o f obtaining employment. 
They were first warned to return to their homes, but this warning having no effect, the 
Police and Native Authorities arrested 79 Juveniles. Within 24 hours they were handed 
over to the DC who affected repatriation.6
Some indication of the impact of these repatriation campaigns on the African 
consciousness can be gauged by the reaction to the arrest of 15 African ‘vagabonds’ in 
May 1944. In the wake of this action, Baker reported whisperings in the township that 
‘Africans were being taken from their houses at night, loaded into lorries and taken to an 
unknown destination.’7 Another rumour current at the time had it that police had recently 
arrested 400 men in a single night. Such a figure is not entirely implausible. Three years 
later, in the last nine months of 1947, a massive total of 904 removal orders -which 
usually constituted a fraction of those picked up by the police in the first place- had been
Q
made under Cap. 104. It seems likely that the scale of repatriations in 1947 is an 
indication of official determination to reassert control over the town after the strike of 
September that year'.
4 See record dated 11th September 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
5 DC Revington to PC, 24th September 1941, TNA/61/688/5.
6 Cmmr. for Prisons to CS, 4th November 1943, TNA/21122.
7 Baker to DC, Uzaramo, 29th May 1944, TNA/540/3/58.
8 Uzaramo DAR for 1947, p. 16, TNA/540/1/4/B.
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It is unfortunately impossible to gain an accurate impression of the extent to which the 
repatriation legislation was applied in the 1940s. Whilst records of specific campaigns 
have survived, they are, to say the least, patchy. It is clear, though, that repatriations 
increased substantially compared to the inter-war period as unemployment in the town 
grew. In 1939 the number of forced removals for the whole year totalled just 15. In 
September 1941 alone, at least 20 people were repatriated. The high level of action 
appeal's to have been sustained throughout the war years as officials attempted to retain a 
grip on the town, although few records have survived. A correspondent to the Tanganyika 
Standard in 1950 recalled that:
During the war Government decided that owing to the influx o f Africans from up-country 
and the food situation in the town all Africans without work not domiciled in Dar es 
Salaam would be rounded up and sent back to their respective villages.9
By the end of the decade there is evidence of an even greater increase. The 904 Africans 
repatriated between March and December of 1947 has been mentioned. The bulk of this 
large total of repatriatees can admittedly perhaps best be accounted for as the victims of a 
concerted post-strike campaign. However, following this, intermittent action continued to 
be taken. In his reminiscences of colonial service, Timothy Mayhew, whose first posting 
on arrival in Tanganyika in 1947 was as a DO in the Dar es Salaam office, recalled 
weekly raids in which
unarmed Tax clerks and DC’s messengers, sometimes assisted by unarmed police, would 
cordon off a section o f high density housing before day-break... Those with no fixed abode 
in the town were given government railway warrants to the stations nearest their homes and 
put on the train.’10
A year after the 1947 strike, the Superintendent of Police reassured members of the 
Township Authority that ‘the problem of unemployed Africans was borne constantly in 
mind’ by police officers in the town and periodical round-ups of undesirables were being 
carried out as and when it was felt necessary.11 This is borne out by surviving statistics 
from 1949. 385 removal orders under Cap. 104 were made in Eastern Province that year, 
the vast majority of which would have been from Dai' es Salaam.12
9 TS, 9th February 1950.
10 Mayhew, ‘Reminiscences’, p.18.
11 SP, reported at a Dsm TA meeting, 23ld January 1948, TNA/540/27/3.
12 The only other town in Eastern Province where Cap. 104 applied was Morogoro, from where in 1951 just 
one repatriation was made. EP response to Memo from MLG, 12th May 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
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1949 385 (Eastern Province)
1950 425 ( -do- )
1951 234 ( -do- )
1954 1,094
1,230*





^Includes prisoners immediately repatriated on release from Ukonga.
Source: 1938-1940 from PC Baker to CS, 12.3.41, TNA 61/688/5; 1947 from 
Uzaramo DAR for 1947, p. 16, TNA 540/1/4/B; 1949-51 from info in TNA  
21616 Vol.III; 1954, 1955 & 1958 from Qrtly Police Reports in TNA 90/1011 
V ol.l; territorial figures 1954-57 from 1957 PAR.
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Repatriation campaigns in the 1950s
In the closing years of colonial rule, this trend towards the more frequent and 
indiscriminate use of repatriation legislation actually accelerated. By the late-1950s use 
of Cap. 104 had become the principal means of controlling the rapidly expanding urban 
African population, and as many as 2,000 individuals were being removed from the town 
annually. Meanwhile wahuni (or spiv) raids, as they came to be known by the police in 
the course of the decade, also played a major role in restricting illegal informal sector 
activities, apprehending tax defaulters, and more generally in the fight against crime.
The first evidence of a more concerted drive against urban undesirables in the 1950s
is, predictably, connected with the strike in February 1950. The violent outcome of this
dispute resulted in heightened anxiety -on the part of both officials and Indian, European
and even African residents of the town alike- about the presence of large numbers of
jobless Africans in the town. The strike took place in early February. By the end of the
month reprisals had begun to be extracted. A police ‘drive’, the Tanganyika Standard
reported, was on against ‘spivs and drones, known undesirables, and others of dubious 
1value to the town.’ Raids took place in the last week of February and in early March. By 
the third week of March a ‘very mixed bag’ were reported to have been apprehended, 
including some old offenders.14 The drive was announced to be continuing and ‘to avoid 
inconvenience’ employers were asked to supply their employees with a letter to establish 
them as ‘respectable citizens’. In a further raid three weeks later, 60 African ‘loiterers’ 
were reported to have been apprehended along the beach one Sunday afternoon.15 Over 
the year as a whole 425 removal orders were made in Eastern Province.16
Intermittent raids continued to occur in the early-1950s. The following June, a 
morning sweep of Dar es Salaam and its outskirts was reported to have resulted in the 
arrest of 40 Africans ‘who could not give a reasonable explanation of what they were 
doing at the time.’17 ‘Some of the Africans who were picked up’, it was reported, ‘were
13 TS, 18th March 1950, p.21.
14 Ibid., p .19.
15 TS, 8* April 1950, p.23.
16 EP response to Memo from MLG, 12th May 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.IlI.
17 TS, 2 June 1951, p. 17.
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sleeping on the beach and in the cemetery in Upanga Road.’ Nineteen arrests had also 
been made the previous week in operations against gamblers, and most of these had been 
expelled from the town. The total number of removal orders made in Eastern Province in 
1951 was 234, about half the amount made the previous (strike) year.18 In the first six 
months of 1952, 90 Africans were repatriated.19 It was later the same year, however, 
when the scale of repatriation campaigns escalated dramatically. On 7th November that 
year, in the largest operation of the kind conducted up to then, 676 African ‘spivs’ and 
tax-evaders were apprehended in raids on Wireless Village and other areas of the town.20 
Whilst only thirty four of those apprehended were immediately repatriated, this is a 
significant amount to result from a single days’ raids. After this wahuniltax defaulter 
campaigns became a recurring feature of African urban life. A police report for the third 
quarter of 1953 records that ‘a number of ‘spiv’ raids’ were carried out between July and 
September 21 In the next quarter, six raids ‘to round up undesirables’ along with ‘normal 
routine checks of undesirables in the centre of town by beat-duty constables’ were 
reported to have resulted in the removal of 68 persons ‘who were found to have nothing 
better to do than to hang about the centre of Dar es Salaam looking for what they could 
pickup.’22
By 1954 -along with 1955 the only year from which detailed records survive- these 
campaigns were in full swing. According to a police report for the first quarter of the 
year:
Special attention has been given to the ‘spiv’ population o f Dar es Salaam and the 
increased number o f undesirables who, having come to Dar es Salaam in search o f  
employment, and been unsuccessful, turn to crime.23
Nine raids conducted in the first quarter of 1954 netted 298 defaulters from a total 575 
persons checked. Meanwhile, 127 were repatriated to their homes. The Assistant 
Superintendent of Police was encouraged, and assured central government that ‘the ‘clean 
up’ of Dai' es Salaam will continue and, I feel, show practical results.’24 In the following 
quarter action was intensified. 737 persons were checked, of whom 191 were found to be
18 EP response to Memo from MLG, 12th May 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
19 CP to CS, 14th August 1952, TNA/21963/Vol.II.
20 TS, 8th November 1952, p.8.
21 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st July-30,h September 1953, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
22 ibid., 1st October-31st December 1953.
23 Ibid., 1st January-3 Is'March 1954.
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in default of tax and 268 were repatriated. A total of twenty two raids were conducted: 
thirteen in April, eight in May, and just one in June. Towards the end of the quarter raids 
were stopped, in part because the District Office had used up all its repatriation funds.25 
However, further resources were soon pledged for this purpose,26 and whilst in the next 
quarter fewer raids were conducted, more than three times the amount of people were 
screened; 2,307, of whom 539 were defaulters and 400 were served with removal 
orders 27 Action reached a peak in August during which 216 Africans were repatriated. In 
just four days —4th to 7th August- 93 ‘undesirables’ were served with removal orders 28 In 
the final quarter of 1954 almost as many raids were conducted as had been carried out in 
the first nine months of the year -taking place almost every other day- although the 
amount of persons screened actually declined slightly. In the course of 44 raids in 
October-December, 1,859 persons were checked, of whom 546 were in default of taxes 
and 299 were repatriated, bringing the annual total of repatriated ‘undesirables’ to 
1,094.29 The provincial annual report recorded an even higher total of 1,230 removal 
orders from Dar es Salaam in 1954. The discrepancy can perhaps be accounted for by the 
immediate repatriation of Ukonga detainees on their release from prison.30
The momentum was maintained in the first half of 1955. ‘The rounding-up of ‘spivs’ 
throughout the district,’ observed the Assistant Superintendent of Police, ‘continued 
unabated, with gratifying results.’31 As a result of 31 raids conducted in January-March a 
massive 3,104 persons were checked, leading to the detection of 787 defaulters and the 
repatriation of 249 ‘undesirables’. By the second quarter, however, things had quietened 
down somewhat. Whilst the frequency of the raids was not significantly diminished (25), 
and a substantial number of individuals were checked (1,467), just 259 were found to be 
in default of tax and only 89 were served with removal orders.32 Perhaps this is an 
indication that, after a year of vigorous action against the surplus population, 
‘undesirables’ were getting thinner on the ground. If this is the case, however, the respite
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 1st April-30th June 1954.
26 CS to CP, 16th July 1954, TNA/34184
27 PAR for 1954, p. 12.
28 Removal orders in TNA/540/55/10/1
29 PAR for 1954, p. 12.
30 A later report (1st April-30,h June 1955) records the repatriation o f 29 released prisoners separately from 
those apprehended in raids.
31 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st January-31st March 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
32 Ibid., 1st March-30*1' June 1955.
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was brief. In the third quarter, 213 persons were repatriated33 and by the end of the year 
the annual total had risen to 1,024.34 Meanwhile, as many as 7,009 individuals -10 per 
cent of the urban African population- had been screened at some point in the year.35 With 
as many as 3,000 migrants arriving in the town annually, it was unlikely that any scarcity 
of ‘undesirables’ would ever last for long. Nevertheless, in 1956 action under the 
ordinance appears to have eased slightly, with a significantly smaller total of 638 being 
repatriated.
Once again, the respite was a brief. In his report for 1957, the Provincial 
Commissioner observed that ‘ [unemployment and law and order problems demanded an 
increase in the attention paid to repatriation and expulsion of undesirables.’36 The scale 
and frequency of wahuni raids were intensified yet further, becoming, by 1958 at least, a 
daily occurrence.37 In both 1957 and 1958 over 2,000 people were repatriated from Dal­
es Salaam; 842 in one quarter alone.38 Comprehensive records for 1959 have not 
survived, although early in the year the screening of over 1,000 men during a raid at 
Keko Juu is reported by the Tanganyika Standard?9 The previous week the same paper 
had reported that 138 were screened at Kipawa village (38 being detained for tax 
offences), and that another raid at Kinondoni police netted 95 defaulters.40 In fact, the 
largest operation to take place in the colonial period also occurred around this time. After 
rioting had resulted in the death of an African policeman at Buguruni, 2,817 Africans 
were screened in a clampdown designed to catch the killer/s. A side effect was the 
detection of 959 persons in default of tax for the previous year, and, no doubt, a number 
of repatriations also occurred as a result of the raid.41 The violence in Buguruni was 
associated with rumours about the disappearance of Africans in which mumiani 
superstitions were connected to the colonial administration.42 Brennan has rightly 
observed that in the context of the late-1950s ‘the idea that government officials were
33 Ibid., 1st June-30111 September 1955.
34 PAR for 1955 -  or 1957, p.30???
35 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st October-31st December 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
36EPARfor 1957, p.30.
37 See QPRs for 1958 in TNA/90/1011/Vol.l,
38 Ibid., 1st January-31st March 1958 .
39 71?, 5th March 1959, p .l.
40 TS, 27thFebruary 1959, p .l.
41 TS, 19th March 1959, p.5.
42 Brennan, “Mumiani”, p .l.
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responsible for the disappearance of Africans from urban areas is not at all far-fetched.’43 
Indeed, when over 2 per cent of the African population of the town were being forcibly 
removed by the administration annually,44 attributing the disappearance of individual 
Africans to government action probably made powerful sense to those missing friends or 
relatives.
This was especially true when, as the decade progressed, increasingly arbitrary use 
was made of the repatriation legislation. More than ever before, by the mid-1950s to be 
unemployed in Dar es Salaam was in itself enough to be categorised as ‘undesirable’, and 
hence subject to repatriation. Reviewing action taken in the course of 1954, a police 
spokesmen told the Tanganyika Standard that:
[C]hecks carried out during the year after 9 a.m. when presumably all law-abiding Africans 
were at work, tended to indicate that there were too many undesirables and Africans of the 
casual labourer class for whom there was no work... They were the people who were being 
repatriated.45
DC Harris concurred, singling out “ drifters’ unqualified to do anything but labouring 
work’ as legitimate targets for removal, as ‘the completion or near-completion of several 
post-war capital works meant that that there was no employment for them.’46 Looking 
back in his memoirs, the same official describes his role in the intensification of action 
under Cap. 104 (after his domestic staff had been subject to strike-related intimidation):
Little could be done to counter such potentially dangerous behaviour unless actual breaches 
o f the law took place, but it seemed to me that a certain ‘showing o f the flag’ might be 
useful, especially in improving the morale o f the bulk o f African citizens. I therefore 
increased the already regular attempts to keep out o f town those young, unemployed and 
often tax-defaulting elements... There existed on the statute book an Ordinance making 
provision for the expulsion o f undesirables... This Ordinance had been used for some time 
to repatriate persons convicted in the local courts, and, with the cooperation o f the police, I 
saw no reason why its use should not be extended to repatriate those who, whether through 
their own fault or not, ‘toiled not neither did they spin’ and could therefore not even make a 
contribution through their tax to the management of Dar es Salaam.47
As we have seen, unemployed Africans had actually been targeted for some time 
under Cap. 104, however, it was during Harris’ tenure as DC that a substantial
43 Ibid., p. 12.
44 Based on annual totals for the two previous years, 1957/58.
45 TS, 28th December 1954.
46 Ibid. Many o f these ‘drifters’ had presumably been welcome urban residents for as long as their labour 
was required.
47 Harris, Donkey's Gratitude, p.298.
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intensification took place leading to increasingly blameless individuals being defined as 
undesirable. As a result the tiny office of his assistant, John Cairns, was, he recalls, 
constantly filled with cwahuni awaiting repatriation or the helpless and hopeless Tax 
Defaulters.’ Later 011 Harris appears to recognise the injustice of repatriations, but 
concludes that public order imperatives necessitated such action being taken:
Hard and sometimes unsympathetic -unfair even- this culling o f the wahuni might have 
seemed. In reality they were often the young pioneers of the African population, leaving 
home in their dissatisfaction with the futureless subsistence agricultural economy o f the 
rural areas. However, the African residents of Dar es Salaam genuinely felt that law and 
order, as well as internal security, could only be ensured by controlling the numbers o f  
wahuni present in the town to indulge in petty theft and similar offences against property 
and person. It was, after all, the young wahuni from whom was most easily recruited the 
rabble which formed the crowd on the scene of any street incident or traffic accident.48
Harris is unjustified in claiming African support for the repatriation campaigns. A 
large proportion of Africans in Dar es Salaam would have been close to those sections of 
the population vulnerable to repatriation, through kin or social bonds, or simply because 
they were in danger of becoming jobless themselves. The vast majority of African 
townsmen, as Leslie points out, were poor, and they resented those ‘in authority, fixing 
the low wages, opposing the strikes, arresting those who steal, harassing those who do not 
pay their tax, repatriating those who cannot give a good account of themselves.’49 
Meanwhile, whilst there is evidence of elite anxiety about the presence of unoccupied 
Africans in the town, educated Africans were not inclined to view repatriation as a 
solution to the problems of over-urbanisation. This could be for political reasons. African 
nationalist leaders could not afford to alienate the urban population by supporting such 
action, and anyway found Harris’ so-called ‘rabble’ a useful presence at political rallies 
(at least up to independence).50 It could be for practical reasons. Lawi Kardi, in a letter to 
the Tanganyika Standard in 1957, acknowledged the need for something to be done to 
reduce the surplus population (and hence crime). He ruled out repatriation, however, as 
being ineffective. ‘[Y]ou say that Police should round them [wahuni] up and send them to 
their villages, such assumption is without foundation for the reason that they all come 
back within a few days.’ ‘Hundreds of them who were sent home’, he observed, ‘are in 
Dar es Salaam and the outskirts of Dar es Salaam.’51 Kardi’s preferred solution was for
48 Ibid., p.341.
49 Leslie, Survey, p. 106.
50 Although once in power their minds would quickly change on this issue.
51 TS, 18th June 1957, p.4.
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the Department of Agriculture to find them employment in the rural areas, as African 
politicians were in fact to attempt to do after the assumption of responsible government. 
Meanwhile the Convention of Representative Chiefs, held in January the following year, 
counselled for similar action:
The Conference distinguished between children and youths under twenty, who should be 
subject to repatriation to their homes as at present: criminals who should be dealt with as 
criminals: and unemployed loafers. To teach these last the habit o f discipline, it requested 
Government to consider the introduction o f some form o f compulsory labour service, 
which, to avoid criticism from outside Tanganyika, it would be necessary to relate closely 
to the needs o f Native Authorities in respect o f the work to be undertaken.52
In carefully breaking down those groups currently subject to repatriation for 
differentiated treatment, the Conference acknowledged the same dangers of 
indiscriminate application of the removal of undesirables legislation that Justice 
McRoberts had seventeen years earlier. Dangers which, for colonial officials, it was 
convenient to ignore.
The discrepancy between Harris5 belief to be acting 011 behalf of ‘respectable5 urban 
citizens and Africans5 attitudes towards repatriation campaigns -which actually 
represented a massive intrusion into the everyday life of the African community as a 
whole-53 are perhaps best illustrated by the general response to a radio broadcast he made 
in the wake of some raids in the mid-1950s,54 In an ill-judged attempt to inject some 
humour into the subject, Harris reported that:
we had been fishing at Msasani early that morning, and went on to say that perhaps some 
o f my listeners had seen the police lorries full o f fish being taken to the Ukonga prison to 
be dried.55
The audience response was -as far as Harris was concerned- unexpectedly negative. ‘It 
was not long5, he wrote, ‘before I learned that some Africans were deeply hurt at being 
referred to as fish ‘when they were just humans like everyone else5.5 For Harris, this 
illustrated ‘the extent to which nationalist, anti-govermnent propaganda had so charged 
the atmosphere with emotions as to impair the customary quick and reliable sense of
52 Mins, o f  Convention o f Representative Chiefs o f Tanganyika, 6lh-8th January 1958, TNA/225/80070.
53 No African was spared the humiliation o f screening.
34 Harris tells us his ‘predecessor had very cleverly encouraged the Broadcasting Corporation Sauti ya Dar 
es Salaam into inviting him to give a short talk occasionally on affairs in the town, and this had become a 
useful calming and morale-boosting occasion, much appreciated by the householders and more stable, 
respectable and conservative citizens.’ Harris, Donkey’s Gratitude, p.298.
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humour....’56 Whilst anti-colonialism may well have played a part in the articulation of 
such grievances, perhaps a more plausible interpretation of the African response to 
defaulters and ‘undesirables’ being described as fish was simply that it was too close to 
the bone. When a community is treated inhumanely it is not surprising if it bristles when 
members of that community are singled out for flippant dehumanisation by persons in 
authority.
De-spiwing Dar
Substantial resources were devoted to campaigns against undesirables in 1950s Dar es 
Salaam. Occasionally action was taken by the police unilaterally; as occurred early one 
Saturday morning in June 1951 when a sweep by 60 plain clothes policemen and 4 
mobile patrols took place. The plain clothes men, it was reported, had concentrated on the 
town area whilst the mobile patrols ‘swept the outskirts of the town.’57 Their efforts led to 
40 Africans being apprehended. More commonly, however, representatives from several 
different bodies participated in increasingly systematic raids. In the first major raid of this 
type for which details survive, in November 1952, the Standard reported the use of ‘[a] 
force consisting of 40 police, 40 tax-collectors and 6 vehicles’ along with the police 
bicycle squad.58 These ‘District Teams’ included representatives from the native 
administration to check on such details as the employment status and place of residence 
of persons screened. ‘The local Jumbes and Wazee\ it was observed in 1954, ‘rendered 
valuable assistance in assuring that respectable citizens were released from the ‘net’ with 
minimum delay.’59 Someone from the district office was also expected to be present ‘to 
keep an eye on things’ -  one of the DOs or even the DC himself.60 Occasionally, officials 
from Kisarawe and other districts in Eastern Province also participated in the raids. 
Though priorities differed according to district. According to Leslie:
55 Ibid, p.299.
56 Ibid, p.299.
57 TS, 2nd June 1951, p. 17.




The primary function o f the raids was, as far as officials in surrounding districts were 
concerned, to collect tax. To the Dar es Salaam officials it was to reduce the number o f 
people who were floating around.61
Tax collectors would, of course, have been an integral part of any 4wahuni’ team, 
checking up on tax receipts -cheti ya kodi- for recent years. They were usually Africans; 
native administration employees such as messengers from the district office.62 Finally, 
there were the police themselves, who were responsible for the arrest of potential 
undesirables, and their eventual removal to prison to await prosecution and repatriation. 
The police Motorised Company usually played an important role. Being used ‘in force’ in 
10 out of 19 raids carried out between July and September, 1954, for example, and 24 out 
of 31 in the first three months of 1955.63 The four patrol vans with radios installed were 
used to cover the Municipality, which by this time stretched to 36 square miles.64 The 
task of the other cars, meanwhile, was ‘to cordon off an area whilst the District Team 
sorted out the ‘sheep from the goats’.’65 Alongside the Motorised Company there were up 
to 50 or 60 African constables under two or three (European) commanding officers.66 
Special Constables were also sometimes used in the raids. ASP Young mentions the 
assistance of one -appropriately named- Mr. Eager who took part in a morning raid at 
Chang’ombe in August 1954.67 A police report for Coastal District the following year 
notes the use, in ‘a full scale operation carried out against previously selected targets in 
the Urban Division’, of ‘a large number of Special Constables... as telephone operators, 
R/T operators, drivers, control room operators and with executive Police Officers on the 
ground.’ The operation was conducted partly ‘to instruct... Special Constables in 
rounding up and screening undesirables.’68 In 1955 these District Teams were augmented 
by a special police squad composed of ‘the more energetic constables, under an 
intelligent probationary corporal,’ which ‘was given the task of apprehending loiterers, 
unlicensed hawkers and the ‘crafty’ type of ‘spiv’, who is generally too cunning to be 
caught in a normal raid.’69 In their first two weeks operating in central Dar es Salaam 
they apprehended 74 undesirables, of whom 34 were defaulters, and 36 were repatriated.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 See QPRs, Dsm Dist., TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
64 TS, 14th August 1954, p,5.
65 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st June-30,h September 1954, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
66 ASP Young’s Personal Duty Diary, 10th February & 5th August 1954, RH/Mss.Afr.s.2293.
67Ibid.
68 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st October-31st December 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
69 Ibid., 1st January-31st March 1955.
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The location and timing of wahuni raids varied considerably. In June 1951 a sweep of 
the town was conducted in the early hours of the morning.70 Seven years later, in 1958, 
small raids were said to have taken place in the Ring Street area in the evening.71 More 
commonly, though, raids would begin in the early daylight hours and continue throughout 
the morning. ‘When’, according to Harris, ‘employed persons had either gone to work or 
were going to it.’72 ASP Young’s notebook entries for the 10th and 11th February, 1954, 
may be taken as typical in this regard:
10 . 2 .54
1350 hrs around Temeke ‘H ’ setting up tomorrow’s raid with Paul Roberts and Weston o f  
Mot[or] Co[mpan]y
11 . 2.54
0730 hrs to St[atio]n - getting wahuni raid under weigh [sic]
0800 Kilwa Rd Division men on way to muster at Changombe 
...0825 to PTS to pick up Mot Coy with 2 pickups 
...0845 drive to raid
0900 Arrive spot on: cordon round rapidly: only one man made break - nabbed: raiders[?] 
through looking for wahuni, stolen prop etc.
1100 Poor haul - only 18, include 2 bad boys, 3 bags cement and 5 yds KD 
1130 Mot Coy Kilwa Rd Division returned.73
Raids such as the above occurred throughout the town; in Zones I and II as well as the 
main African areas. Records survive of action taken in Oyster Bay, Upanga and Uhindini, 
in addition to the more obvious locations such as Buguruni, Temeke, Msasani, Keko and 
Kigogo. Even communities on the Kigamboni peninsula, separated from the town by the 
ICurasini Channel, did not escape the occasional raid.74
The police would usually choose to be located at a bridge or some other form of 
bottleneck in order to facilitate screening.75 At other times, though, house-to-house 
searches were conducted. Harris recalls that he used to accompany the raids
to provide them with magisterial cover (as a sort o f human, walking search warrant if any 
householder protested at the invasion o f his privacy in our search for undesirable 
lodgers)...76
70 7S, 2nd June 1951, p.17.
71 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st April-SO* June 1958, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
72 Harris, Donkey‘s Gratitude, p.298.
73 ASP Young’s Personal Duty Diary, RH/Mss.Afr.s.2293.
74 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st October-31st December 1955.
75 Leslie interview.
76 Harris, Donkey's Gratitude, p.298; see also TS, 14th August 1954, p.5.
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Anyone apprehended in the course of a raid would have their tax receipts checked. Those 
without proof of having paid tax for the current year or either of the two preceding ones 
were taken to the tax office (in the boma), where they would have the opportunity of 
having their receipts brought from their homes, or be prosecuted for failure to pay. Ex­
offenders and those caught in breach of the law -unlicensed traders, returned repatriatees, 
beggars etc.- were taken to the police station to be charged. Raids were highly effective. 
After one such raid conducted in the early 1940s, inconvenienced Europeans complained 
that ‘only those Africans who were exceptionally meticulous or successfully cunning 
were able to comfort their employers with their customary early morning tea.’77
On arrival at the tax office, defaulters were questioned, in order to sift out 
‘undesirables’. One such scene is described by J.C. Cairns, who served as a District 
Officer in Dar es Salaam in the mid-1950s under DC Harris, in his lightweight -and to 
the post-colonial reader often supercilious- account of colonial service in Tanganyika. It 
is worth quoting from at length. The scene is set with a preliminary invective against the 
urban ‘undesirable’:
In the tax office a defaulter is being questioned by one o f the clerks. The defaulter is about
thirty. He wears a black and white check shirt, green trousers, torn tweed jacket and bare
feet. He is one o f the problems of urban Africa, one of the new parasitic class: the spiv who 
lives by his wits without work. But he does not think o f himself like this. The city has 
given him freedom, which he wants. He lives here without restriction. He can come and go 
as he pleases, vanish, change his name a dozen times, have different women nightly. Best 
o f all, he can live on others, for in the elaborate family and tribal communities there is 
always someone to help him. There is always a cousin or uncle or tribal brother who will 
give a place to sleep or a little food from the family pot. His only responsibility is to pay 
tax, and that is no responsibility unless he is caught. When this happens, o f course it is bad 
luck. Still, sometimes even this can be bluffed out.




‘Where is your home?’
‘Here. I am from Dar es Salaam.’
‘You were born here?’
‘Born? Not born here, bwana.’
‘Ehehh. Where were you born?’
‘Up-country, bwana. Mwanza.’78 
‘Where is your father?’
‘My true father?’
77 TS, 10th October 1941, p.6.
78 Note Cairns gives a coastal name to an individual from Mwanza.
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‘Y e s ,’ the clerk says angrily. ‘Your true father.’
‘H e is not here. H e is up-country. M w anza.’
‘And your m other?’
‘M w anza.’
‘Hehhh! W hen did you com e to Dar es Salaam ?’
‘M e, bw an aV  A  look  o f  surprise.
‘Y es, y o u .’
A  long silence. This is the tim e to lie. Still, what sort o f  lie?
Finally, ‘Last year, bwana. Year 1 9 5 4 1 cam e to Dar es Salaam .’
‘So you  are not from Dar es Salaam?’
‘N o t really, b w a n a '
‘W hat work do you  do?’
A stonishm ent. Then injured innocence. Then an inspired triumphant sm ile.
‘I have good work, b w a n a '
‘What is it?’
‘In the d ock s.’
‘Y esterday you w orked?’
A  pause.
‘N ot yesterday.’
The clerk is sarcastic now. ‘The day before?’
‘N o , b w a n a '
‘Last w eek ?’
A  long silence. Finally, ‘N o. N ot last w eek .’
‘But you  do work as a docker?’
‘Oh yes, bw an a . N dio. N dio . But not n ow .’
‘N ot n ow ?’ the clerk asks.
‘N o , bw an a . I left that work a long tim e ago .’
‘W hen w as that?’
‘Y ou said you  didn’t com e to Dar es Salaam until 1954.’
‘Y es .’ A  silence. The clerk, w ho is becom ing increasingly angry, stares at the man.
‘That was the second tim e. Year 1953 was the first tim e.’
‘I s e e .’ The clerk realizes he is facing what he faces continually; a m ixture o f  lies, deceit, 
exaggeration and bad m em ory.
‘W hat work do you do n ow ?’
‘I have no work now , b w a n a . N o t since year 1953. N obody w ill g ive  m e work. N ob od y  
w ill help m e.’
The clerk groans, for now  it is fa llin g  into a pattern. ‘Y ou have done no w ork for tw o  
years? W here did you  get your food? Your shirt? Your coat?’
N o  answer. The man stands sullenly, scuffing his bare foot on the floor.
‘Have you  paid your taxes?’
‘I a lw ays pay taxes, b w a n a . H ow  could I not pay taxes to the governm ent? Y es, I have 
paid. Year 1947, year 1948, year 1949 .’
‘T hose are old years,’ the clerk shouts. ‘The governm ent does not care about them. N o w  it 
is 1955. H ave you  paid for 1955?’
‘N o t 1 9 5 5 .1 am late, bw ana.'
‘And 1954?’
‘N o t yet. I wanted to pay, but I forgot.’
‘Y ou forgot!’ the clerk says savagely. ‘And 1953?’
‘Oh yes, bw an a . I paid in 1953 ,’
‘W here is your tax ticket?’
T he man looks at the clerk blankly, and then inspiration com es, and he says triumphantly, 
‘I paid the m oney, but he didn’t g ive m e a ticket.’
‘W ho?’
251
‘M y headman, bw an a . Y es, I paid him, but he has eaten the m oney I gave him in 1953. H e 
w as a thief, and that is w hy I did not pay this year, bw an a. W hy should  a man pay i f  he is 
not given  a ticket?5
.. .The clerk says, ‘You w ill have to see the District O fficer.5 
‘But I w ill pay m y tax. I w ill pay at the end o f  next m onth.5
‘The B w an a Shauri [DO ] m ust hear about th is .5 The man is brought to m e w here I am 
w aiting at the next table. A  m essenger stands beside him lest he run away. The man looks 
around sullenly. The B w ana Shauri, he sees, w ill have a heart o f  stone.79
The fate of such an individual was almost inevitably repatriation. In August 1952, a 
reporter from the Tanganyika Standard observed ‘[ojutside the Boma in Dar es Salaam... 
a disconsolate row of Africans, roped together within a few yards of the tax collection 
office... await[ing] removal for failure to pay tax.580 Such individuals were sent on 
remand to Ukonga Prison, pending the application of a removal order. Space in the prison 
was limited, there being accommodation for not many more than 90 detainees on remand. 
This meant that at times wahuni raids were stopped due to lack of space. ‘The Prison’s 
Officers have been most helpful’, commented the Assistant Superintendent of Police at 
the time of one such crisis in 1955, ‘but one cannot ‘get a quart into a pint mug’.’81
Once the removal order had been served -usually within a few days- the victim was 
repatriated to his home district. This was not always the end of the story, however. 
Occasionally, repatriatees were returned to districts which were found after arrival not to 
be their real districts of origin. In 1955, the DC at Kigoma complained that large numbers 
of ‘undesirable destitutes’ were being despatched to him whose true homes lay 
elsewhere.82 It is clear that some of those Africans who were removed from Dar es 
Salaam under Cap. 104 were actually exploiting the eagerness of officials to reduce the 
urban population in order to obtain free transport to areas other than their home districts. 
‘I have seen’, the DC Morogoro informed the Provincial Commissioner in 1950:
H .M . G overnm ent’s help exploited  so often in the case o f  so i-d isa n ts  destitutes w ho w ish  
to v isit their friends up-country, say that they are natives of, say, Bukoba, and expect to be 
sent there straight aw ay.83
In order to counter this phenomenon the Member for Local Government in 1955 required 
receiving DCs to be consulted in advance.84 This was soon found to be impracticable,
Cairns, Bush, pp. 122-125.
80 TS, 23rd August 1952, p.5.
81 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st January-31st March 1955, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
82 MLG to PC, EP, 23rd April 1956, TNA/540/3/1.
83 DC, Morogoro to PC, EP, 6th April 1950, TNA/61/502/50.
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Figure 1 ‘Spivs and self-government philosophers’ 
Source: Cairns, Bush and Boma, p. 133
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however. ‘Bearing in mind the dilatoriness of many Native Authorities5, wrote DO Clark 
in 1956,
and their d ifficu lties in having investigations made by idle H eadm en and Elders, I su ggest  
the delay betw een picking up the repatriatee or destitute and getting him away from  Dar es 
Salaam  is likely  to be very considerable and costly  i f  concurrence by the receiving district 
is to be received in advance.85
With scant financial resources and limited prison accommodation at Ukonga, the district 
administration in Dar es Salaam could simply not afford any delay.
The other, more common, problem associated with repatriatees on arrival in their 
districts of origin was a disinclination to stay there. Without close rural supervision 
-usually beyond the capacity of Native Authorities- many took the first opportunity that 
arose to return to Dar es Salaam. It was a problem that had troubled urban officials for 
some time. In 1947, for instance, the DC had complained that whilst it was ‘not known 
how many [repatriatees] returned to the township... there have been a number of 
convictions for failing to comply with Removal Orders.’86 Mayhew (urban DO in 1947) 
recalled the return of undesirables as a routine fact of life. Those repatriated by train 
simply ‘got off at the first stop and walked back to Dar es Salaam.’87 According to the 
Attorney General, writing in 1952, Cap. 104 was ‘not always the howling success it 
appeal's to be5. ‘The reason is’, he explained,
although it provides com paratively sim p le m achinery for repatriating natives it breaks 
dow n because the natives against w hom  rem oval orders are m ade tend to return shortly  
after the m aking o f  the order using different nam es, with the result that in the absence o f  
any system  o f  regulation it is extrem ely difficult to identify them .88
The Commissioner of Police was of the same opinion. ‘Due to the inadequate number of 
police,’ he informed Hutt, ‘it is comparatively easy for these people to re-enter the 
Municipality and become absorbed into the native population again.’89 In an attempt to 
address this phenomenon, an Assistant Probation Officer was sent to Kisarawe district 
(where the largest number of the repatriatees were sent) in 1954 ‘to help with the problem 
of men and youths repatriated to their homes as a result of a removal order made by the
84 MLG to PC, EP, 23rd April 1956, TNA/540/3/1.
85 Clark to PC, EP, 22nd June 1956, TNA/540/3/3/XIV.
86 Uzaramo DAR for 1947, p. 16, TNA/540/1/4/B.
87 Mayhew, ‘Reminiscences’, p.18.
88 Min., 31st March 1952, TNA/21616/Vol.III.
89 CP to CS, 14th August 1952, TNA/21963/Vol.II.
253
DC, Dar es Salaam.’ c[F]rom present indications’, wrote the head of the Commissioner of 
Prisons at the end of the year, ‘it appears that it will prove extremely useful in helping to 
settle these men in their homes and villages and preventing them from drifting back to 
town.’90 By 1958, however, the service was reported to have become overburdened 
‘owing to the large numbers involved’ .91
Statistics recording the number of returning repatriatees are sparse indeed (and refer 
only to those who were apprehended by the authorities), however, they do give some 
indication of the problem. For example, many of the 307 ‘offenders’ picked up in 1954 
were said to be persons returning to the town after having been repatriated.92 In a single 
raid on Chang’ombe in August that year, 7 out of the 204 people screened were found to 
be in contravention of previous removal orders. Three years later, in the first ten months 
of 1957, 101 returned repatriatees were prosecuted in the Resident Magistrate’s court. 
Meanwhile, in raids carried out in April-June 1958 at Ring Street and Buguruni, 52 of the 
331 persons checked had returned to Dar es Salaam ‘although subject to repatriation 
orders’.94 There were presumably countless others who did the same and escaped 
undetected.95 The attraction of the capital was clearly, in many cases, sufficient to 
overcome the inconvenience of repatriation. Meanwhile, the removal of an ever 
increasing number of urban ‘undesirables’ was leading to a proportionate increase in 
repatriatees returning illegally to their favoured place of residence in the African areas of 
Dar es Salaam.
Some ‘Undesirables’
Little impression has been gained so far of the identity of the subjects of repatriation; 
their district of origin; their age; their length of residence in the town. Colonial 
administrators tended not to prioritise the recording of such information; crude statistics 
usually served their purposes. Whilst scant information about those subjected to 
repatriation has survived for the bulk of the colonial period, however, the contents of a
90 Prisons AR for 1954, p.34.
91 Social Devt. Dept. AR for 1958, p.27.
92 PAR for 1954, p. 12.
93 ASP Young’s Personal Duty Diary, 5th August 1954, RH/Mss.Afr.s.2293.
94 QPR, Dsm Dist., 1st April-30,h June 1958, TNA/90/1011/Vol.l.
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number of files from the mid-1950s does provide us with more substantial background on 
a limited number of ‘undesirables’.96 A random sample from 1954 indicates, as might be 
expected, that the majority of repatriations occurred to districts in Eastern Province. Out 
of a total of 70 removal orders from August 1954, 39 were to Eastern Province, the 
majority (18) being to villages in neighbouring Kisarawe district. Amongst the other 
repatriatees there were a handful from districts scattered throughout the territory, from 
Newala in the south to Musoma in the north. In addition, six of them originated from 
neighbouring territories. The impression that the majority of repatriations were of 
Africans originating in Eastern Province is confirmed by a tribal breakdown of removal 
orders from three months later in November 1954. Over 60 per cent were against 
members of ethnic groups whose main district/s of origin lay within Eastern Province. As 
in August the majority -Zaramo, Nyagatwa and Ndengereko- were from neighbouring 
Kisarawe. The main districts of origin for those outside of Eastern Province were once 
again scattered throughout Tanganyika; the largest groups being the total of 12 
Sukuma/Nyamwezi repatriated, which reflected their combined status as the largest 
ethnic group in Dar es Salaam after those originating in Eastern Province.
The kind of offences which formed the basis for applications for removal were varied. 
Stealing or other property offences were, of course, common. The reasons for removal, 
though, were in many cases petty indeed. One man was repatriated for sleeping under a 
tree at night; another for walking the streets without a light. A removal order was made 
on the basis that one ‘boy’ had ‘got no job and has been harassing school girls on the 
way.’ Unlicensed petty traders were vulnerable to repatriation. As were fare-dodgers on 
the trains. ‘Wilful neglect to pay poll tax’ was, of course, a repatriating offence, as was 
affray. Most common of all, however, was the simple fact that the accused was an 
‘undesirable person’. This could no doubt cover a multitude of sins, but official inability 
to come up with a specific offence indicates that it is perhaps best translated as 
joblessness. Unemployment was, above all else, undesirable.97
Some of the repatriatees actually took advantage of Cap. 104. As we have seen, it was 
not unknown for individuals to exploit official keenness to apply the legislation against
95 Ibid.
96 TNA Acc. Nos. 540/54, 540/55, and 540/56.
97 Information taken from removal orders in TNA Acc. Nos. 540/54, 540/55, and 540/56.
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Table 9.2 Districts receiving repatriatees, August 1954
Bagamoyo (EP) 1 Kilwa 2 Nyasaland 1
Kilosa (EP) 2 Lindi 2 Same 1
Kisarawe (EP) 18 Liwali 1 Singida 2
Morogoro (EP) 12 Mbeya 2 Tabora 6
Utete (EP) 6 Mombasa 1 Tanga 1
Dodoma 1 Musoma 1 Ufipa 2
Kahama 1 Mwanza 1 Uganda 2
ICakanga 1 Newala 3
Source: Information in TNA 540/54/8/1.
Table 9.3 Tribal breakdown o f repatriatees, November 1954
Zaramo (Kisarawe)* 30 Sukuma 7 Mwera 2
Ruflji (Rufiji) 13 Nyamwezi 5 Ngoni 2
Ndengereko (Kisarawe/Rufiji) 10 Matumbi 4 Kinga 1
Luguru (Morogoro) 6 Gogo 3 Pangwa 1
Nyagatwa (Kisarawe) 4 Yao 3 Rangi 1
Kutu (Morogoro) 2 Hehe 2 Tende 1
Pogoro (Ulanga) 1 Luo 2 Tongwe 1
N g i n d o  ( U l a n g a /  + 
Kilwa/Nachingwea, SP)
5 Makonde 2 Zigua 1
71 28 10
* Indicates main district/s o f  origin in Eastern Province (from J.P. Moffett (ed.), Handbook o f Tanganyika, 
Dsm, 1958, pp.294-97)
Source: Information taken from TNA 540/54/11/1.
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urban undesirables in order to obtain free transport to districts other than those from 
which they originated. Commoner still were temporary migrants from the rural areas 
who, having ‘heard of the monthly hundreds who are repatriated, decide to rely on this 
for [their] return.’98 One such was Salum bin Juma, who with no money and no relations 
in Dar es Salaam, made his way from Tabora to see the town.99 He was repatriated in 
February 1956. Another group who commonly took advantage of Cap. 104 were Africans 
who came from the rural areas to seek medical treatment at Dar es Salaam’s hospitals, 
many of whom were repatriated after being treated.100
From the isolated examples which turn up in the official record it is possible to begin 
to sketch a clearer picture of this group. In a letter about the control of unemployed 
persons from 1942, for example, DC Pike wrote to Baker of a trio of demobilised soldiers 
who were prime candidates for removal.101 Musa bin Saidi had lost a leg whilst on army 
service and was discharged at Dai* es Salaam on 23rd April 1942 with a final payment of 
Shs.344/65. Within a month, however, the money had been spent and he found himself 
destitute. ‘He will not go home’, complained Pike, ‘but wants to stay in Dar es Salaam 
permanently.’ Ibrahim bin Chande provided Pike with a second example of urban 
profligacy. He was discharged on 1st June 1942 with a substantial Shs.800/- owing to 
him. The DC was reluctant to pay the full amount, allowing him to take just Shs.300/-. To 
Pike’s consternation, within three days Chande had spent the lot, and was back at the 
district office demanding the outstanding amount. To paternalistic officials, the exposure 
of such individuals as Ibrahim bin Chande to the urban environment was bad not only for 
the person concerned but also for the native administration, to whom they represented a 
potential future burden. The third individual singled out by Pike was Mohamed bin Saidi, 
a young man who was born and grew up in Mohoro, a village located to the south of the 
Rufiji delta. He was discharged in mid-1942 after working a year for the E.A.M.L.S. He 
too was ‘determined to stay in Dai* es Salaam’, expecting Government to supply him with 
‘some work which he himself considers satisfactory.’ ‘Government’ was inclined to view 
the matter differently!
98 Leslie, S w vey, p.244.
99 Removal Order, 18th February 1956, TNA/540/3/1.
100 See TNA/540/3/1 for examples.
101 DC, Dsm to PC, EP, 4th June 1942, TNA/540/27/13.
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Whilst these individuals were likely victims of urban ‘cleansing’ -Pike wrote to 
recommend the introduction of a pass system to control such people- there is no evidence 
that the above-named were actually repatriated. To find some examples of actual 
repatriatees we must go forward a decade. In November 1954, for instance, a removal 
order was served against one Zacharia Viteris. He was a Tende (Kuria) former prison 
warder who on his discharge from work -‘sometime ago’- had been given a government 
warrant to return to his home. The lure of the capital proved too strong, however. 
Returning to Ukonga prison lines he was initially driven away by the authorities there. A 
few nights later he was found once again wandering around the European officers’ 
quarters at Ukonga. The same night a houseboy at Ukonga had reported having a box 
stolen. Whilst there was no evidence to connect Zacharia with the theft of the box, it was 
decided nevertheless that removal was the best option. ‘Zacharia has no work in Dar es 
Salaam,’ a police officer wrote. ‘He has no real place to live in and has not even paid a 
single poll tax. Please get him repatriated.’102 A few months later, in March 1955, Maria 
Salume was found to have made her way to the capital from Bukoba. ‘This woman has 
come again to Dar es Salaam without any reason’, complained the DC, somewhat 
illogically. People had good reasons for travelling to Dar es Salaam (especially from as 
far away as Bukoba), they were simply not acknowledged as such by pressurised 
officials. She was expelled under Cap. 104.103 Judging by the lack of further instances, 
this constitutes an isolated example of what must have been an extremely rare 
phenomenon: the removal of a female ‘undesirable’.104
A number of probation reports on tax defaulters which have survived from early 1956 
shed further chinks of light on the world of the repatriatees. The information preserved 
reflects the priorities (and prejudices) of colonial officials, but for all its weaknesses it at 
least gives us some insight into those being categorised by officials as ‘undesirable’.
Mikidandi Athumani was relatively old to be facing repatriation. He was 45 years old 
and from the village of Ndundu on the Rufiji river close to the district headquarters at 
Utete. According to his probation report, he had been in town for just four months,
102 Chang’ombe Police Station to Central Police Station, 10th November 1954, TNA/540/54/11/11.
103 DC, Dsm to DC, Bukoba, 16th March 1955, TNA/540/3/1.
104 The only other reference to the repatriation o f  women I have come across is in a 1936 letter from Erica 
Fiah in which he refers to: ‘a few cases o f women who were repatriated for a certain crime [prostitution?] to
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staying rent free at the house of a ‘tribal associate’ in Tungi, before being arrested for 
being in default of taxes. He had just one female relation in the town; a niece. At the time 
of his arrest, Athumani was employed making makuti thatch for the roofing of African 
houses. In previous years he had travelled to the islands of Zanzibar to work on the 
plantations during the clove harvest. Enquiries were made into his character by the 
probation service. Hassani Mawazo, in whose home he had been staying at Tungi, 
confirmed official suspicions: Athumani had many debts outstanding in his home village 
and was no longer welcome in his house. ‘A very doubtful character’, the Senior 
Probation Officer, J.E. Silvertand, concluded: ‘To be repatriated.’105
Mbegu Salehe came from Msonga in the south of Kisarawe district. When he was 
apprehended for defaulting in March 1956 he was 22 and unmarried. He moved 
frequently between Dar es Salaam, where he would work for short periods, and Msonga 
where he had a shamba that he cultivated. When in town he stayed with an uncle who 
lived in Pemba Street in Kariakoo. In February 1956, Salehe had been in the town just a 
few days before being picked up for being ‘abroad at night without a light’, for which he 
was sentenced to seven days imprisonment. After his release he was immediately 
prosecuted for failure to pay tax for 1955. He was in default of taxes for just one year, 
having paid for both 1953 and 1954. However, neither this nor the fact that he was simply 
taking advantage of the ‘off-season’ to leave his shamba -as he had done in previous 
years- in order to obtain some waged labour in the capital (as a result of which, perhaps, 
he could have settled his tax arrears) was enough to redeem him in the eyes of the 
probation officer. ‘This man’, Silvertand decided, ‘should be sent back to Kisarawe 
where he can be supervised by the APO for that district.’106
Mrisho Omari was a 19 year old Kwere from Msoga in southwestern Bagamoyo 
district. He gave as his town address one in Temeke, but most of the fifteen months he 
had been in Dar es Salaam had been spent serving time inside Ukonga prison, where he 
had just completed a ten month sentence. He had also been convicted and imprisoned on 
two other occasions, although the nature of the offences is not recorded. It is most 
probable -judging by its length- that the latest ten month term was for some form of
their countries but have privately returned to Dar es Salaam without your knowledge.’ TAWCA to MS, 12lh 
April 1936, TNA/22444.
105 Court Report, 29th February 1956, TNA/540/56/1.
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crime against property. Prior to his spell at Ukonga, Omari had been employed by an 
Indian at the rate of Shs50/- per month. He had also worked in Dar es Salaam as a 
labourer on building sites. Unsurprisingly, Silvertand considered him a bad risk. In the 
Probation Officer’s assessment he was ‘a very doubtful character who would be very 
difficult to supervise’ and repatriation was considered ‘the best thing for him.’107
Amiri Zauma, a 20 year old Makonde from Mikindani, had been living in Magomeni 
for five months prior to his prosecution in March 1956 for defaulting. Having reached 
Standard IV, he had completed a full course of primary education. On arrival in Dar es 
Salaam he first worked as a servant in an Indian household for a couple of months, and 
then went on to gain employment at the New Africa Hotel, where he was earning Shs.50/- 
per month. His only relative in town was an uncle in whose Magomeni house he stayed. 
In February 1956 Zauma was arrested for loitering and was sentenced to seven days 
imprisonment. On his release, after prosecution as a defaulter, he was considered 
unsuitable for probation and repatriated to Mikindani.108
Hamisi Asumani was a 25 year old Ndengereko from Kitomondo village, close to the 
coastal town of Kisiju in southern Kisarawe district. Prior to prosecution, he had been in 
Dar es Salaam for five months. He claimed to have many relatives in the town, one of 
whom, an uncle was providing him with free accommodation at his home in Nyamwezi 
Street, Kariakoo. He also claimed to be working at an Arab restaurant for the monthly 
wage of Shs25/- plus food. In his sixth month in town Asumani was arrested for loitering 
and given a one week sentence. He had one previous conviction from the previous year, 
when he had served two months for an unspecified offence. On his discharge Asumani 
was immediately re-arrested -for tax offences- and his background was looked into by 
the Probation Office. The uncle and the employer denied having provided him with either 
work or accommodation. In fact, the uncle went so far as to give ‘a very bad report on his 
behaviour and character.’ It was, wrote Silvertand, ‘a good opportunity to get rid of a bad 
lot.’109
106 Ibid., 5th March 1956.
107 Ibid., 6th March 1956.
108 Ibid., 5th March 1956.
109 Ibid.,2611' March 1956.
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Ramadhani Saidi, a 26 year old Zaramo from Kitunda in Kisarawe district, had been in 
town for two months when he was apprehended as a tax defaulter. He lived rent free in a 
house occupied by his cousin in Kinondoni, and tapped palm wine to earn a living, for 
which he got on average about Shs50/- per month. He had one previous conviction; an 
assault charge for which he received a six month sentence. On investigating his 
background, it was discovered that whilst he had been living with his cousin in 
Kinondoni, Saidi had no room there, using instead the passage of the house as his 
sleeping place. ‘The general information obtained was not satisfactory’, the Probation 
Officer concluded, ‘and the Cousin is not prepared to take any responsibility. I think this 
man would benefit from being repatriated to his home.’110
As a sample of those people being removed from the town as ‘undesirables’ it is likely 
that the above individuals are representative. They are predominantly young and from 
Eastern Province, although Mikidandi Athumani was over forty, and Amiri Zauma was 
from Southern Province. In some cases there is evidence of previous (or current) criminal 
activity, though none could be described as hardened criminals. Others appeared to have 
fallen foul of colonial by-laws restricting freedom of movement -abroad at night without 
a light- or been arrested on suspicion for loitering (how justified this suspicion was is of 
course something we shall never know). Some of the repatriations seem particularly 
harsh. That of Mbegu Salehe especially so. Colonial officials, though, pressurised as they 
were by the rapid growth of the African urban population, were -to  say the least- not 
inclined to benevolence, and here too the sample is no doubt representative.
The avenues of investigation pursued by the probation department are revealing. The 
first thing to establish apparently, was the length of residence in the capital. Cap. 104 
restricted legitimate urban residence only to those who could prove they had lived in the 
town for 18 months out of the last two years (from 1958 four out of the past five years). 
Whilst most of the people domiciled in town who could not fulfil this requirement were 
left untouched, this section greatly facilitated the removal of those designated as 
‘undesirables’. The next issue was the marital status of the accused. Each of the six 
repatriatees above was declared single in the court reports. It is not clear whether this 
referred only to their position in Dar es Salaam itself. Officials may well have viewed
110 Ibid., 27th March 1956.
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married men -even those with rural wives- as more stable and responsible and hence a 
lesser risk. It is unlikely that individuals with families in the town would have been 
repatriated. A third factor in determining the fate of potential repatriatees was the 
presence of relatives in the capital. To have none at all meant that -without regular 
employment- you would be highly vulnerable to repatriation. In several of the court 
reports even the presence of a single relative was not enough to prevent removal. It did 
not help when relatives were not supportive, as in the case of Hamisi Asumani or 
Ramadhani Saidi. Why relatives might be inclined to disown the accused is unclear. It 
may have been a desire to avoid trouble themselves or reluctance to be seen to be 
associated with a malefactor. Alternatively, it could simply have been eagerness to 
relieve the burden on sparse domestic resources. The inference in some reports is that had 
the accused been found to have several relatives in the town -who it was assumed would 
take some responsibility for his behaviour- then he may be allowed to remain. A fourth 
factor to be investigated was evidence of a permanent address in Dar es Salaam. Failure 
to provide one would likely result in eviction from the town. Living with a relative may 
be enough to avoid this, but not necessarily. In the case of Ramadhani Saidi it appears 
that his having no room of his own, and sleeping in a passage, was one more factor 
pointing to removal. In determining repatriation it was also, of course, important for 
officials to ascertain the employment status of an individual. Lack of a job would almost 
certainly lead to expulsion. What is more, judging by our sample, even evidence of work 
was not necessarily enough to prevent removal. Three of the six repatriatees actually had 
waged employment at the time of prosecution, and another was self-employed. Only two 
appeared to be jobless, one of whom also claimed to have been employed at the time of 
his arrest, whilst the other had only just arrived in town. Finally, the criminal record of 
the accused was taken into account in any judgment over whether or not to repatriate an 
individual. Presumably, those with previous convictions were at a disadvantage in this 
regard.
By the late 1950s thousands of migrants were entering Dar es Salaam annually. 
Admittedly, some did perhaps come to the town unprepared for urban life. In addition, it 
is likely that a small proportion were attracted by the criminal opportunities that the great 
concentration of population offered. However, these groups probably represented a
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minority of the urban immigrants. A great deal more were attracted by the opportunity to 
engage temporarily in waged labour; or by the opportunities the capital provided for 
income generation in the urban informal sector. For those able only to produce a 
subsistence from their rural shamba a periodic move to the town may have represented 
the most convenient way of earning the cash that the colonial administration was so 
assiduous in collecting as tax. Urban officials disregarded such calculations. As Dar es 
Salaam’s African population burgeoned they were increasingly determined to restrict the 
entry of these rural-urban migrants. So, by the end of the colonial period the removal of 
‘undesirable’ Africans was taking place on a massive scale. Wahuni raids were conducted 
daily. Involving mass roadside screening as well as house-to-house searches these raids 
represented an extraordinary degree of government intrusion. Amongst the African 
community they were no doubt deeply resented and provided a strong basis for 
mobilising support for TANU. Whilst colonial officials may have acknowledged that the 
repatriation campaigns were at times unfair, however, they were convinced about the 
correctness of their actions, perceived as being for the good of the town as a whole. In 
1941, Justice McRoberts had warned of the neglect of African civil liberties. His 
judgment was brushed aside. Almost two decades later these same civil liberties were, if 
anything, being even more comprehensively ignored.
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Conclusion
Dar es Salaam prior to independence
By the late 1950s a policy of stabilisation, involving the encouragement of more 
settled African urban communities whose numbers were restricted by the opportunities 
for formal employment, was being pursued in Tanganyika. It was most advanced in the 
territorial capital where rising wages -encouraged by the implementation of a statutory 
minimum wage- and increased provision for housing -both government and self built- 
appeared to be resulting in ‘a move towards family living.’1 In a 1959 re-survey, the 
African community of Magomeni -one of those areas covered by the original social 
survey of 1956- was, with almost equal numbers of men and women, found to have more 
of a balance between the sexes than three years earlier. ‘This change’, according to 
Leslie, ‘which may be an index of ‘urbanisation’, or the adoption of a settled town life 
and an intention to remain there with one’s wife and children, [was] reflected throughout 
the re-survey.’ However, the same factors that were resulting in greater urban rooted­
ness were also contributing to an ever-growing flow of immigrants into the town, who, 
with the ‘pruning of staffs’ which had occurred in the wake of the introduction of a 
minimum wage,3 were perhaps less welcome in Dar es Salaam than ever. And whilst 
increasing numbers of ‘undesirables’ were being repatriated to their ‘homes’ this was 
never enough to ease the position of officials responsible for administering the African 
areas. As immigration continued unabated, unemployment and all its concomitant 
problems grew - partly as a result of the ‘better use being made from labour’ resulting 
from the policy of stabilisation.4 In 1957 (the year in which the minimum wage was 
introduced), according to the Eastern Province annual report, ‘a rise in unemployment 
figures for Dar es Salaam and a resulting increase in the ‘spiv’ population engaged the
1 Leslie, Sw'vey, p.290.
2 Ibid., p.281.
3 Ibid., p. 123.
4 R. H. Gower to Secretary o f  State for the Colonies, 22lld June 1959, in PRO/CO/955/83.
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special attention of the Administration.’5 In spite of repatriating ‘a larger number than 
usual of workless immigrants’ to their ‘homes’,6 however, the Provincial Commissioner 
still reported ‘an increased disrespect for the forces of law and order and decreasing 
assistance from the public in maintaining it.’7 ‘The problem is not new’, he complained,
but it has been intensifying over a considerable period. It arises from  a m ixed  population  
inexperienced  at urban liv in g  under m odern conditions esp ecia lly  am ongst the African  
com m unity w ho find in Dar es Salaam a vacuum  in place o f  the N ative Authority o f  rural 
areas, from  the w eakening o f  religious and com m unity d iscipline in the face o f  individual 
am bitions,8 from the introduction o f  party p olitics and from the clearer organisation o f  
em ployers and em ployees accom panying the spread o f  Trade U nion ism .’9
It was not just recent arrivals to the town who were causing the Administration a 
headache. The Provincial Commissioner and the Officer in Charge of the Dar es Salaam 
police identified a great number of the town’s ‘spiv’ element as being ‘persons who have 
been in the town for a longer period than eighteen months but who have either never been 
employed or who only take up from time to time temporary or part-time employment’.10 
According to the Chief Secretary to the Government
many o f  the sp ivs and hooligans are a useless type who sleep  on shop verandas and other 
places and w ho have been in Dar es Salaam for a very much longer period than three years.
It is m ore than probable that these are the worst type and have been  liv in g  this life o f  
indolence and petty crim e for so long that the only cure is to send them  back to their tribes 
where they w ill com e under a certain amount o f  tribal influence and d iscip line.11
The long urban residency of these undesirables was evidence of the wrong kind of 
stabilisation. Such was the concern with which this phenomenon was held that a 
committee was set up in 1957: ‘[t]o consider and make recommendations in regard to the 
problems caused by the presence in Dar es Salaam of large numbers of persons of no 
fixed abode and no known means of support.’12 In its initial report, the committee’s 
Working Party drew up a list of ‘factors affecting the problem’ which, as a litany of
5 Eastern PAR for 1957, p.22.
6 Eastern PAR for 1957, p.22,
7 Eastern PAR for 1957, p.30.
8 This is presumably the same individual ambition which the EARC were so keen to inculcate amongst 
Africans in both urban and rural areas in order that the market economy could penetrate East African 
societies swifter and deeper.
9 Eastern PAR for 1957, p.30.
10 CS to W.A.C. Mathieson, CO, i f 1' November 1957, in PRO/CO/822/1795. The significance o f  the 18 
months period was that this was the length o f time necessary to have resided in an urban area in order to





colonial concerns, encapsulates perfectly official anxiety about the situation in Dar es 
Salaam. These factors included:
1. L on elin ess and frustration; id leness and boredom , evidenced  by the lessen in g  o f  the 
im portance o f  the tribal ties and the waning influence o f  local heads and leaders.
2. Thriftlessness leading to hunger and indebtedness.
3. U nem ploym ent due to labour surp lus...
4 . A m orality and irreligion, although generally the in fluence o f  Islam  is still the m ost 
powerful unifying influence.
5. Indiscipline in the home.
6. Lack o f  respect for law  and order.
7. D ifficu lty  found by the incom ing rural African in adapting h im se lf  to tow n conditions 
and a strictly m oney eco n o m y ...
8. Traditional and econom ic attraction to Dar es Salaam from  the Southern and Eastern  
P rovinces...
9. Facilities provided by relatives established with housing accom m odation ...
10. Bright lights and the aura o f  independent liv in g .13
The Working Party put forward recommendations to address the situation. On 
receiving a copy of the committee’s deliberations, however, Whitehall officials were 
dismissive. ‘This is not a particularly impressive report’, wrote W.H. Chinn, the advisor 
on Social Welfare, ‘and its recommendations are entirely negative.’ ‘Experience in other 
territories’, he continued,
proves that it is im possible to deal w ith the influx o f  people into the tow ns m erely by using  
com pulsory powers to rem ove them or to prevent them com ing. I agree that there have to 
be regulations to ensure that large numbers o f  people do not enter the tow ns look ing for 
w ork w hich  is not th ere ... but repressive m easures o f  this kind cannot alone deal with  
problem s w hich are deep rooted in the social conditions w hich produce them .14
B.E. Rolfe, another Whitehall official, concurred. ‘This leaves a lot of questions 
unanswered’, he wrote, ‘and indeed quite a number unasked.’ ‘Is it too much to hope’, 
Rolfe added, ‘that we shall hear less about spivs, thugs and hooligans in future and more 
about human beings?’ 5 If these criticisms filtered back to officials in Tanganyika, it was 
too late. In early 1958, the working party reported that many of their proposals had either 
been acted upon or were in the process of being taken up. These included the 
strengthening of powers of repatriation, the extension of the period of residence 
qualifying an individual to be a ‘legitimate’ town-dweller, the introduction of a system 
for voluntary registration, and the expansion of remand facilities to accommodate
Confidential Memo, 1741 February 1958, PRO/CO/822/1795 (numbering differs in orig.).
14 Min., 8th April 1958, PRO/CO/822/1795.
15 Min., 26th March 1958, PRO/CO/822/1795.
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‘undesirables’ awaiting repatriation.16
As predicted by Chinn, however, these initiatives failed to achieve the desired effect. 
By the end of 1960, it was estimated that out of an adult male population of forty one 
thousand, between ten and fifteen thousand were un- or under-employed.17 Now, with a 
newly appointed ‘responsible’ government and an African at the helm, Dar es Salaam’s 
surplus population was beginning to be conceived of as more than simply an 
administrative or social problem. After just two months in office Chief Minister Nyerere 
voiced concern about ‘the political dangers inherent in the number of unemployed in Dal­
es Salaam who were easily susceptible to the suggestion that the new Government was 
doing nothing for them.’18 ‘There was an urgent need’, the Minutes continue, ‘for an 
opportunity for the genuinely unemployed population to be able to get work.’ (My 
emphasis). In the following January the Minister for Health and Labour was extolling the 
necessity of ‘the formation of a public conscience which actively condemns town 
idleness.’19 Like its colonial predecessor the new TANU-dominated Government was 
anxious to effect the civic education of the urban populace.
16 Confidential Memo, 17th February 1958, PRO/CO/822/1795.
17 Memo, on unemployment in Dar es Salaam by the Minister for Health and Labour, Jan. 1961, in 
PRO/CO/ 822/2962.
18 Extract from Minutes o f  a Meeting o f the Council o f Ministers, 4.11.60, in PRO/CO/822/2962. There is 
some irony in Nyerere singling out the town’s surplus population as a political threat. Just three years 
earlier the Chief Secretary was complaining o f  the ‘spivs and hooligans in the towns, particularly in Dar es 
Salaam and Tanga, from whose numbers undoubtedly come the majority o f  the thug element which so 
obviously supports TANU.’ CS to W.A.C. Mathieson, CO, 11th November 1957, in PR 0/C 0822/1795.
19 Memo, on unemployment in Dar es Salaam by the Minister for Health and Labour, Jan. 1961, in 
PRO/CO/822/2962.
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Africans (Total) Asians Europeans Total
1922 20,000 (approx.)
1923 24,000 (approx.)
1927 29,000 5,000 774 34,774
19281 12,791 9,139 22,734
1931 15,299 7,417 22,716
19371 11,550 12,000 23,550 8,800 970 33,320
1940 18,200 16,550 34,750 8,825 1,043 44,618
1946 Nearly 45,000
1947 46,383 18,529 1,467 66,379
1948" 51,2314 16,270 1,726 69,227
1950 Nearer 75,000 than 
50,000
1952 77,330s 22,547 3,603 103,480
1953 Nearer 90,000 than 
70,000
1957 53,847 39,516 93,363 29,986 4,479 127,828
1967 272,515
Source: DARs (except where stated)
1 Dsm DAR reports (p. 10) ‘Census... o f the Township was taken in a single day, and was an 
enumeration o f  all the people who had slept in town the previous night... Believed percentage o f error 
very sm all.’
2 Sources for 1937 and 1940 are Labour Dept. ARs in TNA/61/14/12.
3 Source: 1948 Township census. The Asian total contains 908 Goans and 1,067 Arabs; the African 
total 77 ‘Coloureds’ and 389 ‘Others’.
4 The 1957 African Census Report (Dsm, 1963)) puts the African population at 50,765 in 1948.
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